

Jews in a Changing South Africa

Highlights of the 2005 National Survey,
with comparisons to the 1998
and earlier surveys

Shirley Bruk and Milton Shain



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Into the 'new South Africa'

Although numbering less than one-quarter of a per cent of the total South African population, Jews are acknowledged as an integral and valued component of the 'rainbow nation'. They operate within a broadly comfortable environment in which a pragmatic African National Congress-led government has abandoned the movement's historic commitment to nationalisation and has instead adopted market-friendly policies. The government has displayed fiscal discipline, resisted populist pressures, and won the confidence of the business sector. In spite of affirmative action and 'Black Economic Empowerment', there are ample opportunities for entrepreneurship in an economy with growing connections to Africa and to the world. Generally Jews are well-equipped to succeed in the 'new South Africa'. As a group, they are highly educated, well beyond the average of a society with a burdensome legacy of educational disadvantage.

Internally, an aging Jewish community has adapted well to the new and democratic South Africa. It has survived stringent budget cuts, especially in Johannesburg, as emigration sapped communal resources. Major administrative structures have been rationalised and centralised and an overarching body in Johannesburg known as Beyachad was created in 2000. Rationalisation and centralisation has also taken place at lower levels. Israel continues to be a focal point of Jewish communal consensus, a focus of fundraising activity and a force for cohesion. Jews do not feel targeted as Jews in South Africa and antisemitism is not seen as a major problem.

Alongside their discounting of antisemitism, Jews feel more comfortable now in the 'new South Africa' than they had soon after the advent of democracy. Leadership engages with the government and closely monitors issues of concern to the Jewish community. The community appears less restless. Nonetheless emigration continues – particularly among young adults – albeit on a lesser scale. Years of attrition has reduced the Jewish population to somewhere between 72 000 and 85 000 (a statistical uncertainty resulting from problematic census data), far short of the high-water mark of close to 120 000 thirty years earlier. Two-thirds of Jews are now living in greater Johannesburg and a quarter in Cape Town and its environs. There are still pockets in the larger regional centres: Durban, Pretoria and, to a lesser extent, Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein. Small town communities have all but disappeared, although there are some striking exceptions: Plettenberg Bay on the southern Cape coast has a thriving new Jewish community.

A dozen years into the 'new South Africa', South African Jewry remains cohesive and vibrant, although there are some signs that old-style pluralism is being challenged as the community moves in a more Orthodox direction. But weighing against this, at least in part, is a shared concern about a public discourse increasingly hostile to Israel. This was especially evident at the time of the United Nations conference dealing with Racism, Xenophobia and Related intolerances in Durban in 2001.

Nonetheless, despite widespread anti-Zionism, the community is appreciated. Speaking in 2003 at the commemoration of the centenary of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, State President Thabo Mbeki acknowledged the historic role of the Jewish community and confirmed its respected place in the 'new South Africa'. 'Our Constitution proudly proclaims that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white', explained Mbeki. 'It belongs to the Jewish South Africans as much as it belongs to any other South African'.

A democratic South Africa's celebration of cultural diversity and its deep commitment to multi-culturalism promises the continued well-being of South African Jewry. For all its fissures, and despite the long-term haemorrhaging through emigration, the community continues to thrive and to retain the allegiance of the overwhelming majority.

Key Findings and Recommendations

• Sample Details and Demographic Characteristics

The 2005 sample comprised 1,000 face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of adult Jews living in the major South African cities in which Jews reside. The interviews were distributed as follows: Johannesburg (65%), Pretoria (5%), Cape Town (25%) and Durban (5%); with 46% male and 54% female; 18-24 years (11%), 25-34 years (16%), 35-44 years (17%), 45-54 years (17%), 55-64 years (18%), 65-74 years (13%), 75 years and older (8%). Also, 57% were married, 9% divorced/separated, 9% widowed, 23% single/unmarried and 2% unmarried but living with a partner. As detailed in the full report,¹ the main demographic criteria of the sample were controlled in accordance with the most recent census data. In addition, for reasons of comparability, the sample was controlled in the same way as the sample in the 1998 study i.e. Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban samples were methodically drawn from communal lists. The Johannesburg sample was, once again because of the absence of lists, geared to census data and suburb estimates from the South African Jewish Board of Deputies.

Of Jews residing in South Africa, virtually all are citizens and most were born in the country. South African Jews are well-educated and the employment level is high. The average level of education in 2005 had increased from the already high 1998 level. There is an upward trend towards more and higher qualifications, particularly evident in the rise of university qualifications in the Honours-and-above category. Virtually all are fluent in English as was the case from 1974 through to 1998 and still today. Almost half claimed fluency in Afrikaans as well, with indications of a slight downturn since 1998, but not quite down to the 1974 level. The Yiddish score is half of what it was in 1974 – understandable, but decisions should be made as to whether it is desirable and/or feasible to step up this score to keep this part of the Jewish heritage alive. The Hebrew score, which increased steadily over the years, is still not high and here too it must be decided whether this score should and can be improved. Fluency in African languages is very low, as it was when surveyed in 1998.

Most Jews live in homes owned by themselves or other family/household members. In fact, home ownership is exceptionally high. More live in houses and the rest are divided mainly between flats/apartments and townhouses/cluster houses. Townhouse/cluster house living was decidedly higher in Johannesburg (particularly) and Pretoria than elsewhere, possibly related to greater security-consciousness.

• Jewish Identity

The Jews of South Africa are clearly bound to their Jewish identity. Virtually all would not want to be anything other than Jewish "if they were to be born all over again" and, as in 1998, the bulk feel a strong bond with Judaism. Furthermore, South African Jews consistently and intensely believe that an unbreakable bond unites Jews all over the world and that it is important that Jews survive as a people. Highlighting the extent of Jewish identity is the finding that the bulk of those who are or were ever married are/were married to Jews and the majority of Jews not currently in a marriage relationship would ideally want a Jewish spouse/partner. In addition, Jewish traditions have been firmly established over time and this includes various religious practices and rituals which have become widely practiced traditions over many years, even amongst secular Jews. Also, there is sizeable participation in a range of Jewish-related activities and experiences.

It should be noted that Jews in South Africa feel strongly Jewish but with an undoubtedly strong loyalty to South Africa as well i.e. opinions are divided between feeling more Jewish than South African and feeling equally Jewish and South African. Only a small percentage feel more South African than Jewish. These findings did not change significantly in the seven year period.

• Youth Movements

Attendance of Jewish/Zionist youth movements is sizeable but whether or not the attendance score pattern is satisfactory should be decided by organisers of the movements.

• Education

Data from the 1974 Jewish Population Study illustrates that Jewish dayschool attendance was far lower in the mid-seventies than it is three decades later. There is an overwhelming preference for Jewish as opposed to non-Jewish preschools/nursery schools; and in cities which have Jewish primary/middle/high schools the Jewish option features far more often than does the non-Jewish option. The appeal of children being with other Jewish children, having a Jewish education and learning about Judaism in a Jewish environment/atmosphere, which promotes Jewish values, continuity and identity, cannot be denied. However, it must be noted that with progress up the school scale, factors other than Jewish-related ones can come into play resulting in a tendency for siphoning off towards other school options. Schools such as Crawford, Eden and Reddam House have worked towards catering for Jewish children and although none

¹ Shirley Bruk *The Jews of South Africa 2005 – Report on a Research Study* Kaplan Centre, 2006.

of these emerge anywhere near as prominently as does the Jewish dayschool option, indications are that they could be gaining ground. The potential for erosion of Jewish dayschool proportions should not be underestimated. It is imperative to ensure that Jewish dayschools, built up through the years, maintain and increase rather than decrease their current dominance. The study shows that those who went to Jewish schools themselves are more likely to want the Jewish school concept for their children. Therefore, attracting children to Jewish schools increases the proportion at Jewish schools now and works towards perpetuating Jewish schools in South Africa for some time to come.

- **Jewish Education**

A positive rating was given for the quality of Jewish education in the country at present, but there is room for improvement. Furthermore, in 2005 (as in 1998) there was virtually unanimous agreement that some form of formal Jewish education is necessary for Jewish children and it was perceived as having distinct benefits as regards knowledge about Judaism and Jewish identity. They were however not quite as certain that Jewish education influences commitment to Jewish life. This finding is worth noting even though Jewish education alone cannot be expected to ensure this type of commitment.

- **Jewish Community, Communal Organisations and Support Structure**

It is reassuring from a communal planning point of view that by 2005 the bulk of the Jewish population in South Africa had the protection of a medical aid or hospital plan and there was a definite improvement in this regard since 1998. Furthermore, the 2005 study showed that of those with children 22 years and older, the majority (85%) had at least one of those children living in South Africa, with this splitting almost evenly between all these children in South Africa and some but not all in South Africa. Interesting and reassuring for communal planning purposes is a finding which is contrary to popular belief that more and more children are leaving their parents behind as they move on to other countries i.e. indications are that in the fourteen years since 1991 there was minimum change in the proportions with adult children living elsewhere as opposed to in South Africa.

The Jewish community is perceived as supportive where necessary and providing a range of necessary services and facilities e.g. for the elderly; the intellectually disabled; the mentally ill (but of normal intellectual ability); the physically disabled; and the financially disadvantaged. A wide range of Jewish communal organisations are well-known and well-regarded, with some emerging better than others. Impressions of functions of various organisations are often on target but results should be reviewed to determine whether there are additional aspects to be conveyed and whether any facets require more emphasis. It would be advantageous for organisations to ensure that Jewish people in South Africa are fully aware of their existence and what they offer.

- **Religiosity**

There are varying degrees of religiosity amongst South African Jews, with the largest sector classifying themselves as Traditional Jews (66%); then Strictly Orthodox far below (14%); Reform/Progressives next (7%); the less involved Secular/Just Jewish totalling 12%; and 1% unable to classify themselves. Since 1998 there was a slight move from secularity towards embracing more aspects of being Jewish. However, the overall self-classification proportions for Strictly Orthodox and Reform/Progressive did not change in the seven year period. Within these two religious sectors there are issues to be noted. The Strictly Orthodox sector has a healthy age profile with emphasis on those who are under 35 years. This bodes well for the future of Orthodoxy since the young people of today are the older people of tomorrow. The Reform/Progressive sector needs to attract younger people, rather than being primarily dependent on those who are older. Attention to this is imperative particularly since the heavy older focus in its age profile, already reflected in 1998, had intensified by 2005.

Comparison of synagogue attendance over the years shows that frequency of attendance seemed to increase from 1973/1974 to 1991 and again from 1991 to 1998/2005. There was no change, statistically-speaking, from 1998 to 2005. With regard to synagogue categories, Traditional Orthodox exhibits continued dominance over a number of years but with some decrease attributable to growth of more right wing (in religious terms) synagogues e.g. Lubavitch/Chabad and Ohr Somayach. Under 45 year olds showed above average involvement with and/or interest in Chabad/Lubavitch and Ohr Somayach. Reform/Progressive has been holding its own for a number of years, but perceptions are that it could show a decrease in the future. Some synagogues feature to an above average extent in certain cities i.e. Chabad/Lubavitch (Johannesburg), Ohr Somayach (Johannesburg and Cape Town), Reform/Progressive (Cape Town and Durban).

As stated earlier, some religious practices and rituals have become widely practiced traditions over many years, even amongst secular Jews e.g. Sabbath candlelighting, Passover Seder attendance and fasting on/observing Yom Kippur. Adherence to these high level practices have not changed significantly over the last three decades, as shown by results from studies conducted in 1973, 1974, 1991, 1998 and now 2005. Another religious practice which has become a firmly entrenched tradition amongst South African Jews is not allowing pork/bacon in homes (89%). The proportion of "Kosher meat only" homes has not changed significantly over fourteen years i.e. in 1991, 1998 and 2005 the Kosher meat only score was 39%/40%.

There is no equivalent data for the 1973/74 studies for this issue. What seems to have increased over time is Sabbath observance. It is observed almost exclusively by the Strictly Orthodox and is therefore, overall, a low rather than high level practice.

- **Israel**

Israel has slipped slightly as an emigration destiny. Those who would not consider Israel speak mainly of lack of familiarity/identification with the country, the language and the people or lifestyle. They are also concerned about the current situation and resultant problems e.g. personal safety, the political situation, the economy and potential for jobs/career development. The majority do, however, feel a strong or moderate attachment towards Israel.

- **Attitudes to South Africa**

The Jews of South Africa are strongly bound to the country. In 2005, an overwhelming majority (92%) claimed to want to stay in South Africa and had no intention of leaving. This finding is dramatically enhanced by the fact that in 2005 attitudes towards staying were unquestionably more positive than in 1973, 1974 and 1998. An important age-related finding in 2005 showed a remarkable drop in likelihood of leaving amongst under 45 year olds. Staying close to family was the most powerful reason given for wanting to stay. Also important were emotional attachment to the country and to what it has to offer and having a career/business/financial security in the country. Seven years earlier there was less emotional attachment, attitudes to the country were less positive and there was less satisfaction with the economy/business. The exceptionally small sector (7%) claiming to be very/fairly likely to leave were far less concerned about South Africa's future than potential emigrants had been seven years earlier, particularly regarding personal safety.

However, no matter how attached those likely to stay in South Africa are, they would not stay unconditionally. They could be pushed towards leaving if crime or threats to personal safety, militancy, anarchy, corruption, and unrest escalated to intolerable levels. Also likely to drive them away would be deterioration in quality of life; issues relating to Jews; career/business/economy-related deterioration or severe job availability issues (e.g. because of affirmative action); and issues relating to family.

Although there is undoubtedly a great deal of room for improvement, it cannot be denied that Jewish adults in South Africa were far more positive about the country in 2005 than they were in 1998. They swung from rating the economic situation as poor to rating it as good; personal safety was still unquestionably a problem in 2005 but far less so than 1998; divided opinions in 2005 on the country's political situation were a vast improvement on distinctly negative evaluations of this seven years earlier; health care and education emerged particularly negatively in 1998 but less so in 2005. However, health care and education are still primary concerns. Crime and corruption also need attention.

- **Antisemitism and anti-Zionism**

Jews detect minimal antisemitism in South Africa but recognise it as a major problem in the world generally. Anti-Zionism is perceived as more of a problem than is antisemitism, both in relation to South Africa and (particularly) elsewhere and it is seen as escalating. The heavy emphasis on perceived anti-Zionism in the rest of the world cannot but be interpreted as a problem for Jews generally because of the fine line between antisemitism and anti-Zionism. Muslims are the group regarded as posing the greatest threat to Jews. Jews feel that the government allows them religious freedom, but there could be improvement regarding the government's overall attitude to Jews and to Israel, as well as improvement in media attitudes to Israel.

- **Future of Jews in South Africa**

Will there still be a substantial Jewish community in South Africa in 20 years? In 1998 the tendency was more towards seeing a negative scenario for the future whereas by 2005 the focus had swung more to the positive side. Also, South African Jews were far more positive in 2005 about the future for under 30 year old Jews in South Africa than they were in 1998 and less likely to view the community as ageing. What is interesting and reassuring for the future of South African Jewry is that 18-44 year olds (particularly those under 35 years) were more optimistic about the future scenario than were their older counterparts.

In conclusion, after decades of instability, it is apparent that Jews in 2005 have greater confidence in South Africa and increasingly anticipate a future in the country.


Jews in a Changing South Africa – Highlights of the 2005 National Survey, with comparisons to the 1998 and earlier surveys

For a number of years the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town has provided survey data relating to the Jewish Community of South Africa. The last survey was conducted in 2005. It was geared to be a follow-up on the 1998 JPR² study, but with particular focus on providing data which would be helpful to the community. This objective was achieved by: including comparisons of 2005 and 1998 data (and where possible earlier data) thus allowing for detection of trends and changes over time; incorporating amended as well as additional questions to heighten the usefulness of the survey to the Jewish community; and providing a detailed report on the data with follow-up presentations and related articles. It was recognised that a summary highlighting the main findings would provide relatively quick insight into South African Jewry in 2005 and comparisons with earlier data would be a useful record.

A. Some characteristics of Jewish adults in South Africa

1. Level of Education

Clearly, there is an upward trend to more and higher qualifications as shown by the increase in average level of education in the seven years from 1998 to 2005. Not only was there an increase in an already exceptionally high matriculation rate, but there was also an increase in post-matric qualifications and in university qualifications above a Bachelor's degree. More specifically, in 1998, 44% claimed to have Matric or below and 56% had post-matric qualifications. In 2005 Matric-or-below dropped (36%) and post-matric rose (64%). Also, in 1998, 12% (approximately 1 in every 5 of those with post-matric qualifications) had university degrees at the Honours or above level, whereas by 2005 the Honours-or-above score had risen to 20% (almost 1 in every 3 of those with post-matric qualifications).



² The 1998 study was undertaken by the Institute for Jewish Policy Research in London (JPR) in association with the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town, with Decision Surveys International (DSI) responsible for the fieldwork, sampling and data processing under the direction of Shirley Bruk who also provided input for the questionnaire. The study was reported on in: Barry A. Kosmin, Jacqueline Goldberg, Milton Shain, Shirley Bruk, *Jews of the 'new South Africa': highlights of the 1998 national survey of South African Jews*, Institute of Jewish Policy Research, London 1999.


2. Employment

This remained essentially unchanged over the seven years. Almost 7 in every 10 were in paid employment, more working full-time (of the 7 employed, 5 were full-time and 2 part-time) and the sizeable self-employed proportion was not much below the employee proportion (approximately 3 in 7 self-employed and 4 in 7 employees). Those not in paid employment were mainly housewives/husbands, retirees or students.



3. Languages

Comparison of 1974,³ 1998 and 2005 data consistently reflects fluency in English. In 2005 half were also fluent in Afrikaans. Fluency in Afrikaans rose from 1974 to 1998 with a slight downtrend by 2005, even if not quite down to the 1974 level. Perhaps this is because of English being given prominence in the "new" South Africa and Afrikaans being relegated a back seat. Fluency in Yiddish decreased over the years. In 1974, 1 in 5 claimed to speak it fluently; by 1998 this dropped to 1 in 10; and was still at that level in 2005. Fluency in Hebrew went up from 1974 to 1998 (8% to 13%) and increased to 17% by 2005 (double of what it was in 1974). Other language scores were lower. Despite the "new" South Africa, the African languages score remained unchanged from 1998 to 2005, with only 2% claiming to speak an African language fluently.⁴




³ Table 11, p.13, A.A. Dubb, S. Della Pergola and D. Tal, *South African Jewish Population Study – Advance Report no. 6, Educational attainment and Languages*. Study directed by Prof A.A. Dubb, University of the Witwatersrand 1977. The document, dated 1978 with the data gathered in 1974, will hereinafter be referred to as S. Della Pergola et al. SAJPS 1974. Although the 1974 study included two additional cities (i.e. Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein) and although the exact demographic composition of the sample is not clearly outlined in the report, the language comparisons are interesting.

⁴ Knowledge of African languages (and languages other than the first four discussed above) was not surveyed in 1974.


4. Country of birth and citizenship

In 2005, as in 1998, virtually all Jews 18 years and older living in South Africa were citizens of the country and virtually 9 in every 10 were born in South Africa – a very different scenario to 30 or 40 years earlier when there was still a sizeable proportion born in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. In 1998 a small percentage (3%) had dual citizenship (South African and other), which was allowed then but is no longer permissible.



5. Marital status


In 2005 as in 1998, of all Jewish adults 18 years and older, approximately 6 in every 10 (55%-57%) were married; 1 in every 10 (9%-10%) divorced/separated; 1 in every 10 (9%) widowed; 2 in every 10 (23%-24%) single/unmarried; and far below 1 in every 10 unmarried but living with a partner (2%).




6. Household composition and Children

In 2005, on average, 2.94 people lived in each Jewish household. Johannesburg had the highest and Durban the lowest average number per household: Johannesburg (3.04), Pretoria (2.94), Cape Town (2.76) and Durban (2.54).

In both 1998 and 2005, of those who were or had ever been married, 93% had children i.e. irrespective of whether the children lived with them or not. In 2005,⁵ of all those with children, 1 in every 5 (20%) had a child/children below primary school age; just over one-third (35%) had a child/children at school; over 1 in 10 (13%) had one or more post-school under 22 year olds; over one-third (35%) had one or more 22-35 year olds; and over one-third (34%) had one or more over 35 year olds.



Where are the children 22 years and older and has the proportion moving from South Africa increased over the years? The 2005 study showed that of those with children 22 years and older, the majority (85%) had at least one of those children in South Africa, with this splitting almost evenly between all in the country (42%) and some but not all in the country (43%). Only 15% had all these children living elsewhere. In addition indications are that in the fourteen years since 1991⁶ there was minimum change in the proportions with children living elsewhere as opposed to in South Africa.




⁵ This chart reflects, for each category, the proportion of parents with children in that category, irrespective of whether they have one or more children in that category. It does not reflect the number/proportion of children per category. For example, 20% of parents have a child or children below primary school age but it cannot be said that 20% of children are below primary school age.


⁶ This question was not asked in the 1998 study but a comparison can be made with reworked results from the 1991 study. Table 4.23, p.93, Allie A. Dubb, *The Jewish Population of South Africa – The 1991 Sociodemographic Survey*, Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research, University of Cape Town 1994. That study comprised differences in sample structure and question wording e.g. in 2005 the check was on where the “22 years and older” are living, while in 1991 the check was on where “children no longer living at home” are living. Also, in 2005 there was methodical selection of individuals per household in Jhb, Pta, CT and Dbn, whereas the 1991 sample comprised household heads in the same cities and included an additional city (Port Elizabeth). Since in 1991 no separate city data was shown, we cannot exclude PE data and are therefore obliged to consider the results overall. Notwithstanding differences, comparison of the findings for the two studies is nevertheless interesting.

7. Type of abode and Home ownership

In 2005 more lived in houses (60%), with the rest divided mainly between townhouses/cluster houses (18%) and flats/apartments (20%). A very small percentage lived in hotels/aged homes/retirement complexes (2%). Townhouse/cluster house living was decidedly higher in Johannesburg (particularly) and Pretoria than elsewhere, possibly related to greater security-consciousness.



Ownership of homes is particularly high amongst Jews in South Africa. It increased to 90% in 2005 from the already high 1998 proportion of 83%. Accordingly, renting dropped from 16% (1998) to 10% (2005). More specifically, in 2005, 90% lived in homes owned by themselves or other household/family members, with this splitting: 72% owned by respondents or spouses, 16% by other household members and 2% by other family members not in that household. The 1998 score (83%) splits: owned by respondents/spouses (66%), by other household members (16%) and by other family members not in that household (1%).




B. Schooling, Types Of Schools and Attitudes to Jewish Education

1. Nursery Schools/Preschools: Current and Potential Attendance

In 2005 there was almost unanimous preference for Jewish nursery schools/preschools. Of parents with children at nursery school/preschool, an overwhelming proportion (96%)⁷ had chosen the Jewish option. This strong preference was mirrored amongst those with younger children who were going to attend nursery school/preschool in the near future i.e. 94% were likely to select the Jewish option provided that it would be available in their city of residence when the time comes.


⁷ When evaluating the data in this chart and the next one, it is imperative to bear in mind that we are **not** talking about proportion of children at various types of schools. Instead we are discussing proportion of parents with children at various types of schools.



Choice of the **Jewish** option was based on strong feelings about wanting children, at an early stage of life, to learn about Judaism, the Jewish religion, tradition and values in a Jewish environment/atmosphere amongst Jewish children. Reasons unrelated to Jewish aspects featured far less prominently e.g. quality of teachers/curriculum and convenience of location. The very small proportion favouring the **non-Jewish** option, found the Jewish preschool/nursery school concept unimportant or unappealing because of the perceived insularity and/or the greater importance they attached to convenience of location or where their children's friends will be going.


2. Primary and Middle/High Schools: Current attendance

Jewish schools are also dominant at the primary/middle/high school level. In 2005, 7 or 8 in every 10 Jewish parents whose children attended primary/middle/high school, had a child/children at a Jewish school. However, the Jewish option loses some drawing power as children move up through the schools. The tendency for parents to choose a Jewish school for children was exceptionally high at preschool/nursery school level (96%), dropping down at primary level (77%) and dropping slightly more at or during middle/high school (70%). Overall Jewish schools still account for the major share of the "schoolgoers market", where such schools are available. Other schools, non-Jewish, but catering for Jewish children (Crawford, Eden, Reddam House) also feature in some cities. Grouped together these schools feature noticeably as do non-Jewish government schools.



3. Type of schools Jewish adult South Africans attended: Past attendance

When moving away from schoolchildren to all adult Jewish South Africans, we are talking about a wide age range from 18 to over 75 years. A large sector finished school at a non-Jewish government school (57%) and a far smaller sector at a Jewish school (25%), a very different pattern to that reflected for schools attended by Jewish children today. Clearly "non-Jewish private schools" have not made major inroads into the Jewish sector. These schools (as shown above) feature to a similar extent for schoolchildren now (4% for primary and 4% for high) as they did (see below) for their parents (6%) or the adult sample as a whole (6%). However, as mentioned earlier, the role played by specific types of private schools and colleges (some of which gear themselves to catering for Jewish children), cannot be ignored.



Data from the 1974 Jewish Population Study,⁸ reworked as far as possible, illustrates that Jewish dayschool attendance was far lower in the mid-seventies than it is three decades later.⁹

1974 data (Jewish Population Study)	2005 data (Current study)
<p>a) <u>Of Jews 15 years and older:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">10%</p> <p>attended Jewish schools (i.e. some in the past, some "currently")</p>	<p>a) <u>Of Jews 18 years and older, (99% of whom have finished school):</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">25%</p> <p>finished at a Jewish private school</p>
<p>b) <u>Of all children "currently" (1974) at school:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">29%</p> <p>attend a Jewish dayschool</p>	<p>b) <u>Of all parents with children at school:</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">77%</p> <p>have a child/children at a Jewish school</p>

4. Hypothetical choice of schools and related attitudes


When all, irrespective of whether they have children or not, are faced with the hypothetical situation of having a child starting primary school "tomorrow", an overwhelming majority (86%) would choose a Jewish primary school. Similarly, an overwhelming majority (83%) would choose the Jewish option for a hypothetical child starting high school. Parents who actually have schoolchildren, showed similar results (88% would choose a Jewish primary and 86% a Jewish high school for a hypothetical child). Parents, and adults generally, are strongly oriented towards Jewish schools, but those particularly likely to send their children to Jewish schools are **those who already have a child/children at a Jewish school and also those who went to Jewish schools themselves**. There is obviously satisfaction with the

⁸ Advance Report no. 12, S. Della Pergola et al. SAJPS 1974, p.1

⁹ The data must be interpreted with care since the figures are not directly comparable because of sample and other differences e.g. the 1974 sample includes two additional cities (Port Elizabeth and Bloemfontein), the questions were not quite the same as in 2005 and other sample proportions may have been different. Also,

- In row a) 1974 data relates to Jews 15 years and older, while 2005 data relates to those 18 years and older;
- in row b) 1974 data shows proportion of **all children** at Jewish schools, while 2005 data shows proportion of **parents** with children at Jewish schools i.e. irrespective of the number of children each parent has.


Jewish school concept. Experiencing it themselves and/or via their children, makes them even more emphatic about being likely to choose the Jewish option.



Why would the vast majority choose a Jewish school for a (hypothetical) child? Most importantly, for children to learn about Judaism/Jewish-related issues. The Jewish environment/atmosphere/culture/identity/values/continuity and particularly presence of other Jewish children were also regarded as important. Some added that Jewish schools encourage confidence, character, stability and independence in a happy, comfortable, familiar environment. Emerging less often but sizeably (and not Jewish-related) is the perception of Jewish schools having better teachers/curriculum. In essence, reasons for favouring Jewish primary/high schools are similar to those underlying Jewish nursery school/preschool choice (discussed earlier).




The minority who would not choose a Jewish school for their (hypothetical) child, mainly criticised the insularity of Jewish schools. Some disliked values and attitudes (materialism, competitiveness, "brats") and some the emphasis on religion/Judaism. Emerging to some extent were reasons not Jewish-related (other schools better for: location, teachers/curriculum, sport, discipline, less emphasis on academic achievement which suits some children).




5. Jewish Education in Jewish schools

Ratings of the quality of Jewish education provided by South African Jewish schools yielded a positive picture overall, but there is clearly room for improvement i.e. although 89% rated the quality as very/fairly good this splits "Very Good" 52% and "Fairly Good" 37%.



Ratings cover a broad area and different numbers and types of Jewish schools in different cities e.g. Cape Town ratings for quality of Jewish education in South African Jewish schools were higher ("Very Good" 58%, "Fairly Good" 32%) and likely to be based mainly on Herzlia; while Johannesburg ratings were also high but not quite as high ("Very Good" 50%, "Fairly Good" 39%) and likely to be based on a range of Jewish schools, with some schools being more and some less right wing in religious terms.¹⁰

In 2005, opinions were divided on whether Jewish education insulates children from the reality around them. There was however virtually unanimous agreement that some form of formal Jewish education is necessary for Jewish children and it was perceived as having distinct benefits as regards knowledge about Judaism, Jewish identity and commitment to Jewish life. They were not quite as certain that Jewish education influences commitment to Jewish life. Overall, results for 1998 were similar.



¹⁰ Pta and Dbn scores were based on very small samples. These are detailed in *The Jews of South Africa – Report on a Research Study* prepared for the Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research at the University of Cape Town by Shirley Bruk Research May 2006.

C. Attitudes to South Africa


1. Political Party Affiliation

Jews in South Africa essentially support the Democratic Alliance (DA).¹¹ Approximately two-thirds (67%) claimed to have voted DA in the 2004 elections, with no other party scoring above 3%. In fact, excluding those who did not vote and those who gave no answer as to who they voted for, 9 in every 10 voted for the DA. The sizeable voter apathy should be noted i.e. 14% did not vote though qualified to do so. Voter apathy in the 2004 elections is particularly apparent amongst 18-24 year olds where one in every three claimed not to have voted.

Have voting patterns changed since the last election i.e. 2004 elections compared to 1994?

The 2005 survey gives the impression that there has **not** been much change in Jewish voting patterns since 1994 i.e. the DP (forerunner of the DA) is reflected as the only party which featured sizeably in the 1994 elections. However, there were memory-related inaccuracies related to asking respondents in 2005¹² how they voted in 1994 (eleven years earlier). We were fortunate to have 1998 survey data for more reliable insight into the 1994 elections (with voting data based on a four year gap only).

Comparison between the two sets of data for 1994 shows that the National Party (NP) attracted more Jewish support in 1994 than Jews today (i.e. in the 2005 survey) recall. Perhaps it is not memory alone but also a possibility that some may not want to recall or admit now that they voted NP in 1994. The 1998 data for evaluation of the 1994 voting pattern, shows that although the Democratic Party (DP), clearly received far more votes (44%) from Jews than did the National Party (NP), the NP vote was still sizeable (24%). The African National Congress (ANC) was in third place (8%) and all other parties scored below these. By the time the 2004 elections took place there had been a clear move to the Democratic Alliance (DA) in line with white voting in general. Voter apathy seemed to be less of a problem in 1998 than in 2004.




¹¹ The party which participated in the 2004 elections was the DA but some referred to it as DP (which was the forerunner of the DA).

¹² An extra factor preventing the 2005 survey from giving a true reflection of voting in 1994, is that some of those who were young adults in 2005 were too young to have voted in 1994.

2. Racial Prejudice


A positive shift was perceived as having taken place with regard to perceived racial prejudice in South Africa. Whereas in 1998 there was a greater tendency to perceive racial prejudice in South Africa as having increased in the preceding 5 years than as having decreased, the 2005 situation shows more emphasis on a decrease than on an increase in the last 5 years.



3. Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism


Antisemitism in South Africa was generally regarded as a minor problem in 1998 and again in 2005. The findings should be seen against the backdrop of perceptions relating to antisemitism in the world generally i.e. South Africans perceive antisemitism as being a major problem "in the world generally". In fact, comparison with 1998 data shows that it is perceived now as far more of a problem in the world generally than it was 7 years ago.

Anti-Zionism¹³ in South Africa emerged as far more of a problem than antisemitism. Almost 9 in every 10 considered it a problem with almost 4 of these emphasizing that it is a major problem. The significance intensifies when viewed in a broader context i.e. South African Jews distinctly perceived anti-Zionism within the rest of the world as being a problem, with the emphasis distinctly on it being a major problem.




¹³ Antisemitism was monitored in the 1998 and 2005 surveys but anti-Zionism was only investigated in 2005.

Muslims are far and away the group¹⁴ considered to be posing the greatest threat to Jews in South Africa. In 2005 an exceptionally large proportion (82%) spontaneously referred to Muslims in this context. In fact, other categories of concern (mentioned primarily in Johannesburg) also comprise a sizeable Muslim element (Pagad, Hamas, Arabs). Pagad is interesting in that, in its day, it was primarily Cape Town based but it had not been noticeably active for several years before the 2005 study, yet it had obviously made so strong an impression that by 2005 it was still perceived as a sizeable threat to Jews in South Africa. The 2005 Muslim-focus was essentially similar to 1998 i.e. in 1998 "Muslims" scored marginally lower but scores for Pagad, Hamas and Arabs were higher. The perceived Afrikaner/right wing Afrikaner "threat" declined from 17% (1998) to 4% (2005).¹⁵



Jews in South Africa unequivocally feel that the government allows them religious freedom¹⁶ but they are divided in their opinions as to whether or not the South African government is hostile to Jews, with some thinking that the government is never hostile to Jews and some thinking that it sometimes is. In the main, the government's attitude to Israel was perceived as being "sometimes fair", while the South African media was regarded as being less fair to Israel than is the South African government i.e. the focus was on "sometimes fair" but the "never fair" proportion was sizeable.



¹⁴ Interviewees mentioned one or more groups which they perceived as posing a threat to Jews. Responses were spontaneous not prompted. Groups mentioned by less than 8% are not charted, except for "Afrikaner/right wing" categories because of the significant change from 1998 to 2005.


¹⁵ In 1998 two categories emerged "Afrikaners" (12%) and "Right wing/ far right/AWB" (5%) but the perceived threat from these sectors had decreased by 2005 and resulted in a combined category "Afrikaners/Right wing Afrikaners" (4%).

¹⁶ The "never fair" score for government allowing religious freedom to Jews was less than 0.5% and is therefore not shown on the chart.

4. South Africa: Quality of life, Overall situation, Jewish community


Although there is a great deal of room for improvement, the 'new' South Africa has made positive strides since 1998.

- In 1998 responses veered more towards disagreeing that "the 'new' South Africa had benefited the people of South Africa as a whole", whereas in 2005 the responses veered more towards perceiving such benefits.
- Although in 2005 opinions were divided on whether "the 'new' South Africa has benefited me", again the results were more positive than in 1998 where almost two-thirds claimed that it had **not** benefited them.
- As to whether "the 'new' South Africa has benefited the Jewish community", 2005 yielded divided opinions. Once again, this is an improvement on 1998 where results tended to the negative side.
- Similarly there were more favourable perceptions in 2005 than in 1998 of likely improvement in the next five years of their "quality of life in South Africa" i.e. although in 2005 opinions were divided, optimism was greater than in 1998 when almost two-thirds disagreed that their quality of life would improve in the next five years.




Jewish adults in South Africa were far more positive about South Africa in 2005 than they were in 1998:

- An extraordinarily positive swing from rating the economic situation as "poor" (1998) to mainly "good" (2005).
- Personal safety was unquestionably still perceived as problematic in 2005, but far less so than 1998.
- Divided opinions in 2005 on the country's political situation were a vast improvement on distinctly negative evaluations of the political situation seven years earlier.
- Health Care and the Education system emerged particularly negatively in 1998 but less so in 2005. However, these facilities are still reflected in a controversial light. A cautionary note applies to 1998 and 2005 findings i.e. a major difference is perceived between government and private sector facilities and responses are not all based on the same criteria. Some may have based ratings on the overall situation; some on a combination of private and government facilities; and some on government facilities only.




Additional statements checked on in 2005 showed virtually unanimous agreement that Crime, Corruption and Personal Safety are indeed major problems in South Africa. About half acknowledged that there are always teething problems when a new government takes over so all things considered things will work out in South Africa. However, the rest were not ready to accept this blanket statement. Obviously they would strongly prefer not to have the negative issues to contend with, particularly since some of these are severe problems. On the positive side, there was further confirmation of a perceived improvement in the South African economy and strong focus on being more likely to stay in South Africa with known problems than move to another country which also has its problems. It is interesting that, although Jews in South Africa, in the main, claim not to have suffered because of affirmative action, they more often viewed the idea of affirmative action in a negative than in a positive light.




5. The future of Jews in South Africa

Jews were far more positive about their future in South Africa in 2005 than in 1998. In 1998 the South African Jewish community was mainly regarded as ageing and, tying in with this, were overwhelming claims about under 30 year olds not seeing a future for themselves in the country. By 2005 there was decidedly less pessimism i.e. the extent of such negative claims dropped dramatically. What is interesting and reassuring for the future of South African Jewry is that younger Jews (18-44 years, particularly under 35 years) are less likely than their older counterparts to think that under 30 year olds see no future for themselves in the country and correspondingly less likely to perceive the community as ageing. The 2005 optimism extends to whether or not there will still be a substantial Jewish community in South Africa in 20 years time i.e. in 1998 there was more of a tendency to see a negative scenario for the future; by 2005 the focus had swung more towards the positive side.



6. Migrants who emigrated but returned to South Africa

Of adult Jews resident in South Africa in 2005, only 8% had – in the 24 year period since 1982 – “emigrated but then returned” to live in South Africa again. Israel tops the list of countries to which they had emigrated but returned from. Also featuring sizeably were the USA, Australia and the UK, with Canada scoring far below these and other countries still lower.¹⁷ The comparable score in the 1998 survey for the preceding 24 year period showed that 13% “emigrated and returned”¹⁸.



According to the 2005 survey, those who “left but returned”, on an average, gave more than one reason for having left and more than one reason for having returned.¹⁹


Why did they leave? The main reason given was the situation in South Africa (62%), with concerns here mainly about the overall future of the country, personal safety, children’s quality of life and education. They also claimed to have left to further their careers and/or improve their financial situation (43%), with some citing the South African economy as the problem. A smaller sector left to be with family or friends, but particularly family (25%). Some spoke of being Zionist/wanting to live in Israel (17%) and some (14%) mentioned personal reasons and/or wanting to experience other countries, lifestyles etc.

¹⁷ Since the study only covers the small proportion who emigrated but returned, the findings relating to countries must be interpreted with care. We do not have data as to the proportion who emigrated to but did not return, nor satisfaction rate data for each country i.e. the extent to which each country is able to hold onto those who go to live there.

¹⁸ When comparing 1998 and 2005 data for “emigrating and returning”, we are drawing from two periods which are not mutually exclusive. 1975-1998 and 1982-2005 overlap for 1982-1998.


¹⁹ Percentages are based on the 84 respondents who said that they had “left but returned”. Each respondent could give as many reasons for leaving as they wished to – the total percentage for reasons for leaving was 161% (i.e. average 1.6 reasons per respondent). Thus, for example, 62% for the category “crime/personal safety” is a total of references falling into that category and, assessed as a proportion of 161%, means that 4 in every 10 of the total “reasons for leaving” relate to this top factor and so on. Similarly, reasons for returning totaled 170% (average of 1.7 reasons per respondent), so 51% for family/friends can be seen as 4 in every 10 of the total mentions of 170% and so on.

Why did they come back? Essentially they found that the grass was not greener elsewhere. The career/financial aspect (60%) was the main reason for returning, with focus on disappointment about not succeeding careerwise/financially or in finding suitable jobs/occupations and feeling that by comparison South Africa offers more opportunities and a better standard of living. Another major drawcard for returning was the presence of family (51%) and featuring sizeably were the generally positive attitudes to South Africa (39%) – a country they love, are familiar with, have their roots in and regard as home. A few added that it has a better climate, better education for children and an easier life. Personal/other reasons for returning feature to some extent (17%). A small sector (3%) were unhappy in Israel because of the political situation or other aspects.




7. Likelihood of staying in or moving from South Africa in the next five years.


In 2005 an extraordinarily high proportion (92%) claimed that in the next five years they would be very or fairly likely to stay in South Africa, with this splitting into overwhelmingly heavy emphasis on **very likely to stay** (79%) and only a small sector for **fairly likely** (13%). The desire to stay has increased dramatically since 1998. In 2005 South African Jews were clearly far more oriented towards staying than they were in 1998. In 1998, the very/fairly likely to stay score was 71%, splitting: very likely 44% and fairly likely 27%. This meant a major drop in "likely to leave" scores from 1998 (where 12% claimed to be very likely to leave in the next five years and 15% fairly likely) to 2005 (with only 3% very likely and only 4% fairly likely to leave).



Furthermore the 2005 results were also unquestionably more positive than those obtained in the seventies. Charted below are comparative results for four studies.²⁰ Although the samples and questions were not exactly the same in all the studies, we reworked the data to provide interesting and meaningful comparisons. Generally, attitudes towards staying in the country are unquestionably more positive than in 1973, 1974 and 1998.



An important age-related finding showed a remarkable drop in likelihood of leaving claims amongst under 45 year olds. 18-24 year olds reflected an exceptionally large drop (55%, over half, made such claims in 1998 and only 19% in 2005); as did 25-34 year olds (43% down to 11%); and 35-44 year olds (31% dropping to 5%). Older sectors showed less dramatic drops.



8. Reasons for wanting to continue living in South Africa²¹



In 2005 **staying close to family** was the most powerful reason for wanting to stay, with staying close to friends playing a minimal part but bolstering up the overall "holding power" of people. Also important and sharing the second position were **emotional attachment to South Africa and to what it has to offer** (it is their "home", they love, were born in, have roots in, with a climate and life quality/style they like and are used to and some wanted an active role in the country's future) and the **financial/business/career factor** (having an income/career/business/financial security in the country, whilst feeling apprehensive about starting elsewhere and with less money). Other factors featured far below. Seven years earlier, the holding power of people had been similar but with less emotional attachment and less positive attitudes to South Africa. The financial/career factor then was sizeable but focused more on concern about starting elsewhere than satisfaction with careers/finances in South Africa. This ties in with perceptions of an improved economy in the seven-year period.

²⁰ In 2005 (first two columns) and 1998 (next two columns), the "likelihood of staying/leaving" question was the same and in both studies the sample covered Jhb, Pta, CT and Dbn. The chart for each of these studies shows total sample (incl. Jhb) as well as Jhb separately (facilitating comparison with the 1973 study which sampled only Jhb).

SAJPS 1974 study (5th column) included 2 extra cities (Jhb, Pta, CT, Dbn plus PE and Bfn), with results available only in total and not per city. The question was not exactly the same as for 1998/2005, but responses enabled construction of "likely to leave SA" and "likely to stay" categories. Data was based on table 6, p.7, *Advance Report no. 2, Della Pergola et al. SAJPS 1974*. The "likely to stay" category included some saying "yes, unless I emigrate to Israel". Exclusion of these from the "yes" category, makes the total 73% rather than 78%.



The 1973 study (sixth column) covered Jhb only and is based on table 9.14, p.142, *Dubb et al., Jhb. 1973*. Because of rounding off, this column totals 99% instead of 100%.

²¹ The 2005 reasons-for-wanting to stay chart is based on 924 respondents, since 92% (i.e. 924 respondents) claimed to be very/fairly likely to stay. The 1998 chart is based on 711 respondents, since in that study 71% (i.e. 711 respondents) claimed to be very/fairly likely to stay.



9. Reasons for wanting to leave South Africa²²


In 1998 a decidedly higher proportion than in 2005 claimed to be very/fairly likely to leave. The key driving force then was **concern about the situation and future in South Africa, particularly personal safety**. Featuring far lower was desire to join family living elsewhere and desire to improve career/financial aspects. By 2005, the very small sector claiming to be very/fairly likely to leave was far less concerned about South Africa's future, particularly regarding personal safety. As a reason for considering leaving, this rated slightly below wanting to be with family elsewhere, with the career/financial reason (particularly a career move) next in line.



²² The 2005 reasons-for-wanting-to-leave chart is based on 69 respondents, since only 7% (69 respondents) claimed to be very/fairly likely to leave. The 1998 chart is based on 267 respondents, since 27% (267 respondents) claimed to be very/fairly likely to leave in that study.

10. Danger points or thresholds to be monitored in South Africa²³


No matter how attached those very/fairly likely to stay in South Africa are, they would not stay unconditionally. They would undoubtedly be pushed towards leaving if **crime/threats to personal safety/militancy/anarchy/corruption/unrest escalated to intolerable levels**. Also likely to drive them away would be: **deterioration in quality of life** (e.g. due to legislation, deterioration in health services and education); **issues relating to Jews** (through legislation, heightened antisemitism/persecution of Jews, severe dwindling of the community, Jewish education problems); **career/financial/business/economy-related deterioration or severe job availability issues** (e.g. because of affirmative action) and **issues relating to family** (e.g. they may be pushed to leave if important family members leave).



11. Countries most likely to emigrate to

Irrespective of whether they intended emigrating or not, all mentioned their "first choice" country if they were to emigrate. In 2005, Australia was in the top slot; USA and Israel shared the second position; the UK followed; and all others scored far below. Compared with 1998, this 2005 data hinted at increased popularity for Australia with Israel having slipped slightly i.e. Australia, Israel and USA were in the top three slots in 1998 and still in 2005, with UK next in line. However, while Australia and Israel shared the top position in 1998, by 2005 Australia had risen above Israel to first place and Israel dropped to share the next slot with the USA.

²³ The data must be interpreted with care. Percentages are based on the 924 respondents who said that they would be very/fairly likely to stay in South Africa. Each respondent could make as many comments as they wished to. It is thus possible that they could have made comments in more than one category and more than one comment per category. Thus, for example, 97% for the category "crime/personal safety etc" does not mean that 97% of the respondents mentioned something in this category. Instead it is a total of the references falling into that category and should be assessed as a proportion of the total percentage for comments made i.e. 322%. Doing so allows us to conclude that 3 in every 10 of the total responses relate to this top factor. Similarly, 68% for quality of life can be seen as 1 in 5 of the total mentions of 322% and so on.




In 1998 only the 1st choice country was checked. In 2005 there were also 2nd and 3rd choices. Totals of 1st, 2nd and 3rd still show Australia in the top slot (61%), then USA (55%), Israel (51%), UK (38%), Canada (18%) with others distinctly lower.

D. Israel


1. Reasons for Israel not being country of choice for all

According to the above, in 2005 half did not consider Israel at all as a country to move to if they (hypothetically) were to leave South Africa. This was mainly because of lack of familiarity and/or identification with the language, people, lifestyle and country as such, with focus on the language issue. The situation in Israel (particularly regarding personal safety) and anticipated financial/career/job/standard of living problems were also deterrents. Another reason they gave was wanting to be with family who live elsewhere/not in Israel.



2. Rating of Israel on specific factors


All respondents rated Israel for a range of factors on a scale ranging from "very good" to "very poor". In 1998 and still in 2005, Israel's most positive scores were for **health care provision** and **education**. Despite a slight (not major) score drop in the seven year period, Israel consistently maintained a good score for these two factors. Ratings are even more positive than at first glance since there was a virtually negligible proportion of negatives i.e. those not giving favourable ratings primarily said "don't know". **Personal safety** in Israel was perceived as having deteriorated from 1998 (when perceived as more good than poor) to 2005 (when it veers to the good side without emerging clearly as good). The **economic situation** was also perceived as having deteriorated. The **political situation** was the lowest scoring factor with scores centering more on "poor" in 2005, as was the case in 1998.




Compared with 2005 results discussed earlier for South Africa, Israel fared well and distinctly better on health care and education, in spite of South Africa's improvements since 1998. Also, whilst South Africa improved from 1998 to 2005 on personal safety perceptions, it still scored less positively than did Israel. On the other hand, in 2005 the economic situation was rated far more positively for South Africa than it was for Israel. Also, although neither of the countries was perceived as offering a positive political situation, the situation in Israel was rated more negatively.

3. Bonds with and extent of attachment to Israel


In 1998 and still in 2005 a particularly large sector (approximately 8 in every 10) had close friends and relatives there, a particularly large sector (8 in 10) had ever visited Israel and almost 6 in 10 had done so in the last ten years. Differences between 1998 and 2005 results are, statistically-speaking, not meaningful unless able to be substantiated via additional data from other sources.



The other side of the coin is that in both 1998 and 2005 a total of just over 4 (not quite 5) in every 10 claimed **not** to have visited Israel "in the last 10 years", either they had never been or they had but not in the last 10 years – a statistic which those promoting travel to Israel may wish to note. There was no sizeable change between 1998 and 2005 as to number of visits in the preceding 10 years. Of every 10 Jewish adults: just over 2 (not quite 3) visited once in the preceding 10 years, approximately 1 went twice, approximately 1 went three/four times, and approximately 1 had been five times or more.




There is also consistency in the 1998 and 2005 scores for attachment towards Israel: Just over half (53% or 54%) felt a strong attachment, approximately one-third (33%) a moderate attachment, approximately one-eighth (12% or 13%) had no special feelings towards Israel, and only 1% had negative feelings.



4. Should Israel give up some territory in exchange for peace?


There was a definite change in the seven year period (1998 to 2005) as to whether or not Israel should give up some territory in exchange for peace. In 1998 opinions were essentially divided (even if veering a bit to the "Yes" side), whereas in 2005 the emphasis was decidedly more on "Yes". Of the total respondents, 6 in every 10 opted for some territory to be given up in exchange for credible guarantees of peace.



E. Jewish Identity


1. The nature and extent of Jewish identity and bonds

Jews in South Africa feel strongly Jewish but with an undoubtedly strong loyalty to South Africa as well i.e. Opinions are divided between feeling more Jewish than South African and feeling equally Jewish and South African. Only a small percentage feel more South African than Jewish. These findings did not change sizeably in the seven year period. There is a hint of an increase (even if not a distinct increase) for "equally South African and Jewish", which rose slightly (by 3%) in 2005, while "more Jewish than South African" dropped accordingly (by 3%). This is not surprising considering how positive attitudes to South Africa became in the seven year period.




In the main, Jews in South Africa would not want to be anything other than Jewish as indicated by responses to a 2005 question: "If you were to be born all over again, would you want to be born Jewish?" Virtually all said "Yes" (95%); a minimal proportion said "No" (2%); to a few "it doesn't matter to me/no importance either way" (less than 1%) and a minimal proportion said "don't know/gave no answer" (3%).

A key question asked in 1998 and in 2005 yielded more insight into Jewish identity and the bonds with being Jewish. Responses to this key question, in effect, showed no change in the level of Jewish identity in the seven year period – an unbelievable finding. In both studies, the majority were divided between those who feel a very strong bond with Judaism (49% or 50%) and those who feel quite a strong bond (41% or 42%). Only a small proportion had "mild" Jewish feelings (8% or 9%).




Furthermore, there was minimal change in the seven years regarding three powerfully held beliefs i.e. South African Jews consistently exhibit intensely strong belief in: "an unbreakable bond unites Jews all over the world", "it is important that Jews survive as a people", "the Holocaust should be included in the core of young people's Jewish identity". What was controversial and yielded divided opinions in 1998 and still in 2005, was whether Jews in a crisis situation can depend only on other Jews.



2. Jewish identity as regards: Spouse/Partner, Parents, Conversion

(i) Requirements for future spouses/partners

In 2005, of those who were not married, the majority (8 in every 10) ideally wanted a Jewish rather than non-Jewish partner/spouse, with focus more on it being **very important** rather than just **important**. There were no major changes since 1998 but possibly some increased intensity.



Still talking about unmarrieds, an above average tendency towards wanting Jewish partners was exhibited by 18-34 year olds and by Johannesburg/Pretoria more than Cape Town or Durban. Amongst unmarrieds, the divorced sector is less insistent on Jewish future partners than are the single or widowed. Also, understandably, it is vitally important to the Strictly Orthodox for partners to be Jewish; Traditionals emphasised Jewish partners less intensely but still to an above average extent; Reform/Progressives gave this a below average importance rating; and the Secular/Just Jewish veered towards considering it unimportant.


(ii) Actual spouses

In 2005, 95% of those married (or with a live-in partner),²⁴ had a Jewish spouse/partner. The 1998 score was similar (93%). The widowed had also primarily been married to Jews. There is a tendency²⁵ for divorce/separation to be slightly greater in an intermarriage situation (where only one spouse is Jewish) than when both are i.e. in 2005, 85% of the divorced/separated had been married to a Jewish spouse and 15% to a non-Jewish spouse ("Jewish" here includes Jewish by birth or conversion and those who may not be halachically Jewish but consider themselves Jewish).

Johannesburg and Pretoria "marrieds" reflected higher Jewish spouse proportions (98% and 95% respectively) than did Cape Town (89%) and Durban (85%). Also, Jewish spouse/partner scores are lower for Secular/Just Jewish and Reform/Progressive than for Traditional and Strictly Orthodox.

(iii) Attitudes to marrying a Jewish vs. non-Jewish person

In the main, Jews in South Africa, irrespective of whether they are or have ever been married, feel that "a Jew should marry someone who is also Jewish" (8 in every 10 expressed that opinion). 1998 results were similar (and are not shown below).





(iv) Parents and Self

An overwhelming majority claimed that both their parents were Jewish²⁶ (94% for 2005 and 96% for 1998) and this rises to 96% and 97% respectively when adding those with a Jewish mother but not father; a further 1% spoke of only the father being Jewish; and a very small proportion (3% in 2005 and 2% in 1998) said neither of their parents were Jewish. This ties in with data on whether respondents claimed to have been born Jewish or converted to Judaism i.e. an exceptionally large proportion were born Jewish, with statistically the same proportion for 2005 (96%) as 1998 (97%) and the remainder converted, mainly at 18 years or older. Incidentally, this does not show the proportion of those born Jewish in Orthodox terms and those born Jewish according to Reform. The Orthodox sector would consider only those born of an Orthodox mother as halachically Jewish (Jewish according to Jewish law). We do know that of the total converted, just under half converted Reform and just over half Orthodox.

²⁴ Although the results refer to those "in a marriage relationship (or with a live-in partner)", it should be noted that the category primarily comprises "marrieds" since only a minimal proportion (2%) claimed to have a live-in partner.

²⁵ In 1998 there was no check on whether the spouse which the respondent was divorced/separated from, or the spouse who had died, was Jewish or not.

²⁶ "Jewish" here means Jewish irrespective of whether by birth or by conversion.



Data examined by city, shows that Durban's combined "both parents/mother Jewish" score (96%) is in keeping with the overall sample score, but when split into its components: both-parents-Jewish (88%) scores lower than for other cities (92% - 95%), with "only mother was Jewish" proportion (8%) correspondingly higher than for other cities (1% or 2%).

3. Involvement with Jewish/Zionist youth movements²⁷


In both 1998 and 2005, 71% of Jewish adults claimed to have personally ever attended Jewish/Zionist youth movements, thus maintaining a constant level. This refers to youth movements mentioned by the sample as a whole, which encompasses a wide age range from 18 to over 75 years of age. Therefore, some youth movement attendance dates back many years. Nevertheless, the score pattern is interesting.²⁸ In 1998 Habonim was the top scorer (mentioned by over half), Bnei Akiva and Betar shared the second position (each mentioned by one-fifth), with Netzer Maginim far below. In 2005 most scores remained similar but Betar dropped below Bnei Akiva to third position, with Netzer maintaining its 1998 score.

In 2005, parents with children at primary/middle/high school or out of school (but under 22 years of age) were also asked about their children's attendance of Jewish/Zionist youth movements. Of the total respondents, 3 in 10 were parents of children in this category. Of these parents, 61% said that one or more of these children attend a Jewish/Zionist youth movement and/or did in the past. This 61% splits: currently attend (35%) and attended but no longer do (26%) e.g. attended when younger.


Bnei Akiva's rise over time is interesting. As observed, for personal attendance, Bnei Akiva improved over the seven year period, but still scored sizeably below Habonim. However, for attendance of children (currently at school or under 22 years), the top scorer is Bnei Akiva (62%), then Habonim (45%), followed far below by Betar (12%) and then Netzer/Maginim (hinting at improvement with 9%). Some parents mentioned more than one youth movement, possibly because of having more than one child per age category with not all attending/having attended the same movement and/or a particular child/children may have been very involved with more than one movement. On average parents mentioned 1.3 youth movements for their child/children.

²⁷ Youth movement data could also have been placed in the Israel section (because of the Zionist element) or the religiosity section (different youth movements identify with different religious sectors). We positioned it here (since attendance starts off with Jewish identity).


²⁸ In 1998 they named all movements attended when 10-18 years of age. Since not all spoke only about movements attended at that age, the 2005 question was changed i.e. they named movements they had mainly been involved with and not restricted to a specific age.



There are two indicators that Machaneh (Jewish/Zionist youth camp) attendance has increased over time: **Rise in attendance** from 1998 to 2005 and **increasing popularity amongst the youth**. Of 18-24 year olds, 73% "ever attended"; for 25-34 year olds the score drops (59%); and it drops further (to below 45%) for over 35 year olds.



4. Other Jewish activities, programmes, trips, websites etc.




Data in the chart above as well as additional information shows that:

- In 2005, 1 in 5 (20%) claimed to have **been to Israel during schoolgoing age**. They were more likely to be from Johannesburg and Cape Town than elsewhere. There was a slight increase in overall score from 1998 (15%) to (2005) 20%. In total, 1 in 5 mentioned **other Israel-related experiences** (post-matric programmes; Yeshiva/seminary), with Johannesburg scoring higher than other cities. A small percentage (all from Johannesburg and Cape Town) attended **Yeshiva in South Africa** after having left school.
- The “ever participated” in **SAUJS** score 23% (2005) had moved up from 18% (1998), with above average scores for under 35 year olds. The “ever participated” in **YAD** score (7% in 2005) improved since 1998 (2%), particularly in Cape Town (from 8% to a clearly above average 15% in 2005). 25-34 year olds had the highest “ever participated” score, understandable since YAD is targeted at “young adults”.
- Other activities scoring well for “ever having participated in” were: Jewish adult education courses (no distinct age trend); surfing Jewish websites (more by under than over 45 year olds); listening to Jewish music (sizeable for all ages, but highest amongst over 54 year olds – perhaps not all ages listen to the same type of Jewish music). A small sector had participated in: Kabala study (no clear age trend); Jewish heritage trips (more so 18-24 and 55-64 year olds); Jewish internet dating sites (prime users understandably: single or divorced; 25-44 particularly 25-34 years).

F. Religiosity


1. Torah

Of every 10 Jews: approximately 4 believe that the Torah is the actual word of God; approximately 4 that it is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally word for word; and approximately 2 that it is an ancient book of history and moral precepts recorded by man. In the seven year period this did not change significantly. Understandably, the more Orthodox the Jews are, the more they believe it is the “actual word of God”.



2. Religious Practice Sectors

When Jewish adults classified themselves: Traditional Jews formed the largest sector (66%); then Strictly Orthodox far below (14%); Reform/Progressives next (7%); the less involved Secular/Just Jewish totalled 12%; and 1% could not classify themselves. These results were very similar to those for 1998, but with some movement – a slight increase for Traditionals by drawing from the Secular/Just Jewish (which in turn dropped slightly). Strictly Orthodox and Reform/Progressive retained their scores.




Intercity differences occurred:


Johannesburg and Pretoria: In the seven years Johannesburg exhibited an above average increase in the already large Traditional sector, at the expense of the Secular/Just Jewish sector. Because of the small sample in Pretoria, changes there are not large enough to be statistically significant. Overall, in 2005 the Johannesburg-Pretoria area exhibited higher Strictly Orthodox scores than elsewhere and lower Reform/Progressive scores.

Cape Town: Cape Town shows a different trend. Here too Traditionals form the biggest sector but there was no intensification of Traditional or Strictly Orthodox sectors in the seven years and overall no major change occurred. However, there are hints of a move to the left in religious terms, with greater strength for Reform/Progressive there (and in Durban) than elsewhere and Secular/Just Jewish scored higher in Cape Town than elsewhere. In 2005 Reform/Progressive was stronger than Strictly Orthodox in Cape Town.


Durban: In the seven years there was a major decrease here for Secular/Just Jewish; a slight decrease for Reform/Progressive; and a decided increase for Traditional and Strictly Orthodox. Seven years earlier Reform/Progressive was far stronger than Strictly Orthodox but in 2005 the two scored equally. As for Pretoria, the Durban sample was small and further confirmatory research would provide clarification.



With regard to age, the Traditional sector is unequivocally the major sector in each age group. Strict Orthodox scores far below (and is more prominent amongst 18-34 year olds, particularly 25-34 years). As we move up the age scale the tendency towards Strict Orthodoxy decreases (and a minimal proportion are over 65 years). By contrast Reform/Progressive scores poorly amongst under 35 year olds. Secular/Just Jewish is also over-represented amongst over 65 year olds.




Above we saw the extent of penetration of various religious sectors into each age group. It is also informative to view the age profile within religious sectors. Clearly, of those claiming to be Strictly Orthodox, almost half (46%) were under 34 years, but amongst Jewish adults overall only just over one quarter (27%) are in this age category. Reform/Progressives show an older profile (71% are over 44 years, while in the total sample only 56% are).




3. Upbringing compared with current classification

Traditional is clearly the dominant sector for how they were brought up and how they classified themselves. However, there was some movement from "upbringing" to "current" classification i.e. Strictly Orthodox increased and more at the expense of the Traditional than other sectors. In fact, Strictly Orthodox, which scored the same as Reform/Progressive at the "upbringing" level, doubled its score to the "current" level, while Reform/Progressive essentially held its own and maintained its original score level.



4. Some beliefs

In 1998, and more so in 2005, South African Jews were inclined to believe that Jewish people have a special relationship with God. Also, in 1998 and still in 2005, they were more likely to believe that the universe did not come about by chance than that it did; and largely perceived praying to God can help with personal problems.



The Strictly Orthodox are emphatic about Jewish people having a special relationship with God and adamant that the universe did not come about by chance. Traditionals are next in line (i.e. not as quite as intense about these issues), Reform/Progressives follow and then Secular/Just Jewish. The Strictly Orthodox are far above average (and essentially at maximum score level) as regards believing that praying to God can help to overcome personal problems. Other sectors follow as expected. It is however surprising that even the Secular/Just Jewish tend (though slightly) towards the positive side of the scale. Clearly, belief in the power of prayer is not linked only to religiosity. A role may be played by additional factors e.g. perceived psychological effects of prayer; or prayer not only related to the traditional concept of a God but to variations thereof.

5. Observance of various practices and rituals

(i) Bar Mitzvahs and Bat Mitzvahs

97% of males claim to have had a Bar Mitzvah, with comparable scores for earlier years being: 1998 (93%) and 1991 (95%). A Bar Mitzvah is a religious requirement for males whereas a Bat Mitzvah for females is not. There were thus much lower scores for females having had a Bat Mitzvah. However, Bat Mitzvahs have made progressively greater inroads with time: 1991 (17%), 1998 (31%), 2005 (37%). These proportions are for the total sample (ranging from 18 to 75 years and older) therefore, understandably, scores for the younger ages are higher.


(ii) Different levels of observance for different practices and rituals

Amongst Jews in South Africa, there was minimal change between 1998 and 2005 as regards observance of most religious practices and rituals investigated. Throughout, there are clearly high, medium and low level practices.

The very high level of observance for some practices and rituals has made them part of Jewish tradition rather than only an indication of level of religiosity e.g. Bar Mitzvahs (mentioned above); Friday night/Sabbath dinner with family/friends;²⁹ yearly Passover Seder attendance; fasting on Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement); not working on Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year); and Sabbath candlelighting have all become strongly traditional, featuring in all religious practice sectors. These are *not* exclusively the domain of the Strictly Orthodox but the Strictly Orthodox do reflect higher observance scores for these than do Traditionals, with Reform/Progressives third in line. Even the Secular/Just Jewish observe these sizeably (although least intensely).

A “medium level” practice: For whether they had ever refrained (or would if the situation arose) from writing exams on Jewish holidays, opinions were divided. Some said that it would depend on which Jewish holiday it was.


It is the “low level” practices which define the Strictly Orthodox as distinct from other sectors (e.g. eating out only in Kosher restaurants; refraining from Sabbath driving/travelling). Scores here were, remarkably, the same for 1998 and 2005. Not driving/travelling on the Sabbath is almost exclusively the domain of the Strictly Orthodox. In 2005, only 18% of Jewish adults claimed not to drive/travel on the Sabbath but amongst the Strictly Orthodox 96% made these claims. For other religious sectors adherence to this is very low. Eating out only in Kosher restaurants is also a domain of the Strictly Orthodox but they are not quite as committed to this as to the driving/travelling issue i.e. in 2005, 87% of the Strictly Orthodox claimed to eat out only in Kosher restaurants. For both these practices observance is greater amongst under 45 year olds and particularly 25-34 year olds.



²⁹ The “Friday night dinner” question in 2005 was not comparable to what was asked in 1998. Only 2005 results are charted here for this.


(iii) Observance over three decades

Remarkably, proportions for “always lighting” Sabbath candles have not changed significantly over the last three decades – as shown by comparisons between five studies dating back to 1973.³⁰ There has also been a consistently (extremely) high level of Passover Seder attendance and fasting on/observing Yom Kippur. What seems to have increased over time is Sabbath observance. Questions/criteria underlying this conclusion may differ but give some indication: 9% (1974) for “full Sabbath observance (abstaining from work, travel, smoking etc.)” and 18% (1998 and 2005) for “refrain from driving/travelling on Sabbath”.




(iv) Kosher meat

Irrespective of whether or not only Kosher meat is bought for the home, there is a firmly entrenched tradition amongst South African Jews of not eating pork/bacon. In 2005, 89% had “no pork/bacon” homes (splitting: 39% only Kosher meat; 50% no pork/bacon but meat not necessarily Kosher). A small percentage (7%) do have pork/bacon in the home, 3% are vegetarians (no meat in the home) and 1% do not buy meat (live in a hotel/aged home). There were no statistically significant changes from 1998 to 2005 as to “Kosher meat only” claims and extent of a “no pork/bacon” policy. In fact, there was no significant change over 14 years for “only Kosher meat in-home” i.e. in the 1991 study 38% spoke of “only Kosher meat” in their homes.



³⁰ Despite some sample and question differences, we were able to rework the data from the 5 studies to allow for comparisons. Data was drawn from: Table 8.5, p.120, Dubb et al., Jhb. 1973; Table 8, p.11, Advance Report no. 11, Della Pergola et al. SAJPS 1974; Table 5.5, p.116, Dubb et al. 1991 Sociodemographic Study; Kosmin et al., 1998 National Survey of SA Jews; 2005 Study reported on in this document. **Sample differences:** 1998/2005 covered Jhb, Pta, CT, Dbn – results shown are for total sample; 1991 covered the 4 cities and PE – results are for total sample; 1974 covered the 4 core cities plus PE and Bfn – results shown are for total sample; 1973 study covered Jhb only – results shown are for Jhb only. **Because of question differences:** candlelighting results for 1973 are for “usually/regularly” lit in the home on Friday night; 1974 results are for “candles are lit in home on Sabbath” without reference to always/usually – explaining why the 1974 score for candlelighting is higher than the others; 1991 results relate to “always/usually lit in home on Friday night”; 1998/2005 results relate to candles always lit in home on Friday night. Still relating to question differences: 1973 Passover, Yom Kippur and Sabbath observance questions were not comparable to other studies thus no results are shown; in 1974 they were asked if they “participate in Passover Seders”, “observe Yom Kippur”, “fully observe the Sabbath (abstaining from work, travel, smoking etc)”; in 1991 they were asked if they “always attend a Passover Seder”, if they “fast on Yom Kippur” and there was no comparable Sabbath observance question; in 1998/2005 they were asked if they “attend a Passover Seder every year”, if they fast on Yom Kippur, and if they refrain from driving/travelling on Sabbath.


Understandably the Strictly Orthodox almost exclusively claim that only Kosher meat is bought for their homes.³¹ Traditionals, because of being in the majority, reflect scores close to those of the total sample (with almost 4 in 10 specifying Kosher meat only). Amongst Reform/Progressives only 1% live in "Kosher meat only" homes but they have a relatively high "no pork/bacon" policy. Amongst the Secular/Just Jewish, a sizeable sector spoke of a "no pork/bacon" policy but only a very small percentage claimed to have only Kosher meat in their homes.³² The latter have a higher proportion of vegetarians than do other sectors.



Under 45 year olds (particularly under 35) were far more likely than those older to claim that only Kosher meat is bought for their homes. Johannesburg and Pretoria showed an above average tendency towards using only Kosher meat. Durban and Cape Town scores were far below average. However, even in Cape Town and Durban an overwhelming majority do not eat pork/bacon.

(v) Synagogue Attendance

In the 2005 study, claimed synagogue attendance scores "for the past year" – excluding weddings, bar mitzvahs or bat mitzvahs – showed that out of every 10 adult Jews in cities covered by the survey: 4 attended "most Sabbaths or more often", 2 attended once or twice a month, 3 attended once to five times a year and 1 said "not at all".³³




³¹ The small percentage of those claiming to be Strictly Orthodox who are not in homes which exclusively buy Kosher meat, could possibly be more religious than others in the household in which they live.

³² Some who classify themselves as Secular/Just Jewish could be living in homes which are more Traditional. A percentage (though very small) of the Secular/Just Jewish claimed that Kosher meat is bought for their homes.

³³ Claimed attendance level is high. Future studies need to check on alternative ways of asking the question to determine whether these scores are inflated or not e.g. pilot-testing of various question alternatives and examining the responses.

Those with a greater disposition towards frequent attendance (most Sabbaths or more often) were: males (understandable considering the role of males in synagogues operating in the Orthodox tradition), under 35 years (but more so 25-34 years), from Johannesburg/Pretoria (where most South African Jews reside) and – understandably – Strictly Orthodox. As expected, Secular/Just Jewish showed a minimal tendency. Of the cities, Cape Town had the least intense attendance pattern.

In past surveys, 1973 to 1998, questions and frequency categories for synagogue attendance were not quite the same as in 2005 but comparisons can be made between the two ends of the scale i.e. “not attending at all” and the other extreme “attending frequently – at least once a week”. This shows that in 1973/1974 “frequent attendance” did not (statistically) differ from “no attendance” i.e. both scores were around 2 in every 10 (in 1973) and both just under 2 in 10 (in 1974). However, in 1991 frequent attendance (3 in every 10) rose above no attendance (1 or 2 in 10). In 1998 and 2005, frequent attendance was distinctly higher than in earlier years (4 in 10) and distinctly higher than “not-at-all” (1 in every 10). There was not much change, statistically-speaking from 1998 to 2005.³⁴



(vi) Types of Synagogue³⁵

Traditional Orthodox is dominant in South Africa, with a very high level of familiarity from childhood days and/or because of current involvement. However, despite the very high score pattern, there has been a tendency for some movement away i.e. “belong to” and “attend now” scores are very high, but not quite as high as the “parents belonged to” score. The direction of the siphoning off is clarified by the growth of more right wing (in religious terms) synagogue types e.g. Lubavitch/Chabad and Ohr Somayach. Although these score far below Traditional Orthodox, they feature noticeably when considered together and/or separately.


Lubavitch/Chabad shows a positive growth pattern: Only 2% had parents who belonged to it, yet 7% claimed to be members, while 10% claimed to actually attend. In other results (not shown here) another 20% might like to try attending it in the future and 31% (almost one-third) thought that this synagogue type is likely to show the greatest increase in future membership. Only 5% thought that it was the one likely to show the greatest decrease in future. **Ohr Somayach** also shows a positive growth pattern: Only 1% had parents who belonged to it, 5% were current members and 8% claimed to attend. A further 17% claimed (elsewhere) that they would like to try attending and 31% said that Ohr Somayach is the one which would show the greatest increase in future membership, while only 1% mentioned it as likely to show the greatest decrease in future membership.

Reform/Progressive scores far below but holds its own: 8% had parents who belonged to it; 8% personally “belong now”; and 9% “attend now”. However, besides those belonging to it, only 4% aspired to attending it in the future and only 9% think that its future membership will increase, while a sizeable proportion (almost one-third) think it will decrease. **Sephardi** scored below 3% for each of: parents having belonged, own “attendance” or own “belonging”. Statistically-speaking, there appear not to have been changes in attendance over time. However, the numbers are too small for this to be conclusively stated without further information.

³⁴ The 1998 frequent attendance score (39%) was statistically speaking the same as the 2005 score (41%).


³⁵ Not charted below are a small number of other synagogues each scoring 1% or less. Of these, some (e.g. Mizrahi) may have received higher mentions had they been listed separately on the list respondents chose from. However, a broader category classification was used within the context of this study design and sample. For more input on smaller synagogue sectors, specific research geared for this can be undertaken. Note that charted categories can total over 100% (e.g. 2005 “attend now” totals 109%), since some attend more than one synagogue type.

2005
Types of Synagogue -
(i) Parents belonged to
(ii) They themselves belong to now (iii) They themselves attend now



The above chart relates to the 2005 study. Comparison (below) of "belong to now" and "attend now" for 1998 and 2005 confirms: Traditional Orthodox's unquestionable and continued dominance but with some decrease attributable to growth of Lubavitch/Chabad and Ohr Somayach. Reform/Progressive held its own with similar score patterns over the seven years.

2005 compared to 1998
Types of Synagogue -
They themselves belong to now
They themselves attend now



Some synagogues feature to an above average extent in various cities e.g. Chabad/Lubavitch (Johannesburg), Ohr Somayach (Johannesburg and Cape Town), Reform/Progressive (Cape Town and Durban). Under 45 year olds showed above average involvement with and/or interest in Chabad/Lubavitch and Ohr Somayach.

G. Jewish Community, Organisations and Support Structure


1. The Jewish community's support/facilities

(i) Support/assistance for those "currently" not married

Of those not in a marriage situation in 2005, almost 7 in 10 felt that the community **attempts to help Jewish single/unattached people meet each other**, but they felt more that "some attempt" is made than that a "major attempt" is made. Generally, they leaned more towards feeling supported than not supported by the Jewish community.

(ii) Extent to which it is felt that the Jewish community provides support/facilities for specific groups.

The Jewish community is perceived as providing excellent or at least adequate services for various groups. The focus was more on "excellent" than "adequate" regarding support/facilities for: the elderly; intellectually disabled; and pre-primary children. Also positively viewed but with opinions divided between "excellent" and "adequate", were support/facilities for: the mentally ill (but of normal intellectual ability); physically disabled; and financially disadvantaged.




(iii) A note on medical aid

It is reassuring from a communal planning point of view that by 2005 the bulk (95%) of the Jewish population in South Africa had the protection of a medical aid or hospital plan and there was a definite improvement since 1998 (87%).

2. Membership and participation in Jewish communal or religious organisations

Approximately two-thirds (67%) are members of such organisations and more often than not they are active, participating members. The 67% splits: 40% type A (members and participate) and 27% Type B (members but do not participate much). The remaining one-third (33%) are not members, but approximately half of these (Type C) participate in activities arranged by such organisations even though they are not members and the other half (Type D) are not members and do not participate at all.



Non-members (Types C and D) primarily claimed **lack of interest** in Jewish organisations or in what they have to offer and being **restricted by their current situation/lifestyle/stage of life** (with comments here primarily related to not having enough time for membership of such organisations). Also featuring but less often were mentions of **problems with the people or organisations as such** e.g. that the people are not appealing to them, not of their type or age group, "cliquey", not welcoming and some non-members added that they feel uncomfortable or shy to join or that the organisations have never reached out to them and not offered them the opportunity to join nor necessary information.

3. The Organisations as such

(i) Awareness check on 31 organisations

The success of any organisation is measured according to the objectives which have been set for that particular organisation but extent of awareness is often a preliminary indicator of how successful the organisation is (or is likely to be in the future) as regards attracting potential users/members/contributors/beneficiaries. A list comprising 31 organisations was shown and respondents indicated which they had ever heard of. Organisations were listed in full, but in the tabulation below the names have been abbreviated to facilitate easy reading.

Awareness i.e. percentage have heard of the organisation	No. of organisations in category	Names of organisations
Over 90%	7	Beth Din, Chevra Kadisha, Maccabi SA, SAJBD, SABJE, SAZF/WPZC/KZNZC, UJW
80%-89%	12	HOD, JNF, B'nai Brith, WIZO, IUA-UCF, Holocaust Centre, SAUJS, CSO, Jewish Women's Benevolent Soc., UOS, MDA, ORT
61%-76%	4	SA Jewish Museum, Staff Wise, Nechama, Kaplan Centre
Below 55%	8	United Sisterhood, SAICC, Broth Zion, SAUPJ, Israel Centre, Beyachad Library, MaAfrika Tikkun, Gittin Library

(ii) Focus on 14 organisations³⁶

Awareness of the organisation is the first step, with the next step being awareness of its function and also how well it performs that function. For fourteen of the organisations two further questions were asked.³⁷ The following is a brief summary of the findings with more detail available in the full 2005 report.

Beth Din: As observed, it is in the highest awareness category. In fact virtually all had heard of it. Perceptions regarding what the Beth Din is all about are on track but there are aspects of its function which could be conveyed to a greater extent.

Chevra Kadisha: It had also been heard of by virtually all. Furthermore, its two main functions clearly emerged as being well-known i.e. welfare and burial. However, the organisation should evaluate the detailed results in the main report to establish whether the impression held of the Chevra Kadisha embodies sufficient emphasis on all facets of its function in different cities.

CSO: Awareness of the CSO has penetrated a very large sector of the Jewish community, even if not quite as large a sector as is the case for the Beth Din and Chevra Kadisha. Jewish South Africans are undoubtedly aware that security is the main function of the CSO. More detail relating to the range and extensiveness of CSO's activities would further enhance their very positive image.

³⁶ Timing did not allow for all of the 31 organisations to be checked in detail.

³⁷ **First Question:** "Please think aboutMENTION ORGANISATION..... What do you think its function is i.e. What does it set out to do? PROBE FULLY: Please explain? What do you mean by that? Anything else?"

Second Question: "Considering everything you know about NAME OF ORGANISATION.....to what extent would you say that it seems to fulfill its functions as stated on this card. Would you say it seems to fulfill the stated functions: very well, fairly well, not really well or not well at all? HAND VERSION OF CARD X WHICH DESCRIBES THAT ORGANISATION"

IUA-UCF (now the United Jewish campaign – UJC):³⁸ It emerged as well-known as did the fact that it does fundraising for Israel and Israeli causes. However, the community should be made more aware of how the money is used in Israel and more aware of the variety of Israeli causes into which the money is channelled. Heightened and better-informed perceptions will be advantageous to the organisation. Furthermore, there is definitely work to be done as regards heightening awareness of the functions of the UCF arm of the organisation. There was insufficient playback of the charitable functions relating to South Africa and to relevant South African institutions which are beneficiaries. The low average number of comments per respondent describing the IUA-UCF indicates insufficient perception of and knowledge about what this organisation does. Those currently involved with the United Jewish Campaign (UJC), formerly the IUA-UCF, should bear these conclusions in mind.

MaAfrika Tikkun: Awareness of the organisation as such was definitely low and even amongst those aware of it a large sector (one-quarter) did not know what it does. Those able to describe what it does tended to do so correctly but fleshing out of their perceptions could be an advantage. There is work to be done regarding awareness of and knowledge about the organisation,

ORT: Although awareness was high, a large sector of those aware of it (almost 4 in every 10) could not describe its function. The remainder primarily understood its main function. It would be advantageous for ORT-SA if a higher proportion knew more than just the name i.e. if there were to be greater clarity regarding the organisation and how it works.

SABJE: As shown, awareness of the South African Board of Jewish Education is exceptionally high. Furthermore, in essence, Jews in South Africa correctly perceived that the SABJE is involved with both Jewish education as such and Jewish dayschools. Whether or not the SABJE would like to convey more detail about the type of involvement, is an issue to be decided by them.

SAJBD: An extremely high proportion are aware of the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and most of these are able to describe it in some way. Broadly-speaking, their perceptions of its functions are correct. The SAJBD should however examine the findings to determine whether various aspects are being conveyed to a satisfactory extent. Furthermore, they should decide whether there are any misperceptions (even if minor) which they wish to correct.

SAUPJ: Awareness of the South African Union for Progressive Judaism is not high. Also, amongst those who claim to have heard of it, only half were actually able to describe what the organisation is/does. Those able to describe its function, did – in broad terms – understand what it is about. The SAUPJ should review the results to determine whether there are any impressions which they wish to change, enhance and/or convey more intensely.

SAUJS: In accordance with the South African Union of Jewish students' mission statement, this organisation is correctly perceived as representing students and looking after their interests. However, Jews in South Africa also perceive SAUJS as having an important social function i.e. bringing Jewish students together, often by means of organising activities for them. Although SAUJS may be aware of this as one of the functions it is linked with, it should acknowledge this more and include it in the SAUJS mission statement because this benefit is of great importance to students. South African Jews are reasonably aware that SAUJS aims to promote Jewish identity and Zionism but they did not comment on SAUJS being involved in South African issues.

SAZF/WPZC/KZNZC: An extremely high proportion are aware of this organisation and are able to describe it in some way. Their perceptions are on target in that they focus on Israel and Zionism. However, there are details which the Jewish community tends not to be aware of e.g. the organisation's involvement with various activities; the organisations and youth movements falling under their umbrella etc.

UJW: This is a well-known organisation and – in the main – its functions appear to be reflected appropriately. However, it is for the organisation to decide whether or not it requires more emphasis on any particular aspect.

UOS: Awareness of the UOS is very high and awareness of its functions seems very good overall. It is primarily linked with synagogues/shuls. If requirements are that it should be seen in a broader context (e.g. incorporating the Beth Din and related aspects), this should be attended to by relevant information being conveyed to the community.

WIZO: Awareness of WIZO was very high and the Israel-focus of its charitable activities is well-known. Full evaluation of whether perceptions are suitably on target or require adjustment/change of emphasis can only be made by WIZO.

³⁸ At the time the survey commenced the UJC had been launched but was regarded as not sufficiently well-known to be investigated. The results discussed thus refer to IUA-UCF.

After conveying their own perceptions of the functions of each organisation, respondents were shown a card detailing the functions of that organisation and asked how well they think the organisation fulfills its stated functions. They could obviously only comment on organisations which they had heard of. All fourteen organisations emerged well with some veering more distinctly to the *very well* side:

- Those strongly perceived as performing their functions *very well* were Chevra Kadisha and CSO.
- Those regarded as performing their function *very/fairly well with more emphasis on very well* were IUA-UCF, SABJE, SAJBD, UJW, UOS, MaAfrika Tikkun. The MaAfrika Tikkun rating should be interpreted with care since it could obviously only be obtained from those aware of the organisation and awareness was relatively low. On the positive side it can however be said that those who do know the organisation, perceive it as fulfilling its function *very/fairly well with emphasis on very well*.
- Scoring *very/fairly well* as regards how well they perform their stated functions were Beth Din, ORT, SAZF/WPZC/KZNZC and WIZO. The ORT result should be treated with caution since a large sector of those who claimed to have heard of ORT did not know anything about it and essentially knew only the name. When exposed to the card stating the function they were prompted to recall what they subconsciously knew about the organisation and were thus able to rate it. Greater awareness of what ORT does is necessary.
- SAUPJ and SAUJS were regarded as performing their stated functions *very/fairly well but with equal focus on "very" and "fairly"*. It should be borne in mind that awareness of SAUPJ is not high and the ratings are based only on those aware of the organisation.