

Jews of the 'new South Africa': highlights of the 1998 national survey of South African Jews

'South African Jews, with their high level of general education and exposure to Western culture, combined with a relatively high level of religious observance and education, are an interesting community in which to test out how Jewish beliefs and values are operationalized in the social world. We can now see how this cultural inheritance plays out in the particularly intriguing realm of contemporary South African society.'

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in association with the



The **Institute for Jewish Policy Research (JPR)** is an independent think-tank which informs and influences policy, opinion and decision-making on social, political and cultural issues affecting Jewish life.

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Summary of key points

• Demographic characteristics

A nationally representative sample of 1,000 adult respondents was interviewed for the survey, of whom there were 464 men and 536 women with a median age of 45. Eighty-seven per cent were born in South Africa; 94 per cent were South African citizens. Geographically, 650 lived in Johannesburg, 250 lived in Cape Town, 50 in Pretoria and the remaining 50 in Durban.

The general profile shows a population group that is well educated, with 35 per cent having achieved a minimum of a university degree. Half the economically active population are in professional and managerial occupations. On the basis of its occupational and educational patterns the South African Jewish population is shown to be an important and valuable human capital asset for the development of a new democratic society and a healthy economy.

• Identity

The majority of the respondents in the survey feel strongly about their Jewishness, with 49 per cent feeling 'extremely conscious of being Jewish', and 41 per cent feeling 'quite strongly Jewish'. Overall, personal and psychological ties to Jewish life were rated more important markers of Jewish identity than externalities such as religion and culture. Moreover, there is a general trend towards a strengthening of Jewish identity that is taking place side by side with the political changes in South Africa.

• Jewish education

Ninety-four per cent of the adult male respondents and 77 per cent of the female respondents have received some form of Jewish education. A majority of Jewish children currently attend Jewish day schools at both the primary and secondary levels.

• Religious belief and observance

South African Jewry is by and large more Orthodox in its religious outlook and behaviour than comparative samples in Britain and the United States, with 36 per cent subscribing to the belief that the Torah is the actual word of God (compared to 15 per cent in the UK and 13 per cent in the US). In terms of religious outlook, 61 per cent describe themselves as 'traditional', 14 per cent are strictly Orthodox, 7 per cent are Reform/Progressive and 12 per cent 'Just Jewish'. Religiosity is high: 39 per cent of the respondents attend synagogue each week and 91 per cent fast on Yom Kippur. As adults, a majority also tend to keep the same (Orthodox) affiliation with which they were raised.

• Israel and Zionism

In keeping with a century-old trend in South Africa, Israel continues to be a point of Jewish communal consensus, a focus of fundraising activity and a force for cohesion. Overall, South African Jews are Zionist, with 54 per cent feeling a strong attachment and 33 per cent a moderate attachment to Israel. A considerable 79 per cent have visited Israel at least once (as compared to 37 per cent of American Jews).

• Exposure to the media

The majority of respondents have daily access to television, with 95 per cent watching at least some programming every day; 88 per cent listen to some radio daily.

Perceptions of current media bias—important in a country with a recent history of media censorship under the apartheid regime—varies from subject to subject. There is considerable concern that news about the Arab-Israeli conflict and about Israel tends to be negatively biased. In addition respondents felt there was a media bias against police behaviour, South African government policy and the personal lives of South African MPs. Significantly, they regarded as comparatively insignificant any media bias against Jews in general and Jewish businessmen in particular. This points to a certain fair-mindedness—and lack of 'paranoia'—on the part of South Africa's Jewish population.

• Moral issues

Respondents were asked to rate the degree to which certain practices were or were not justified. In the 'justified' column came 'using a firearm in self-defence', and 'the death penalty', whereas a vast majority deemed 'never justified' 'buying something you knew was stolen'.

• Perceptions of antisemitism

South African Jews tend to believe that antisemitism is more of a problem elsewhere than it is in their home country. Yet 34 per cent believe there has been an increase in antisemitism in South Africa over the last five years. This perception is based on personal experience, with 60 per cent reporting hearing derogatory remarks about Jews generally, or specifically (29 per cent). The pattern suggests that antisemitism largely falls within the realm of unpleasant discourse in South Africa and is of minor importance in political terms.

• Affirmative action

Despite the policy of affirmative action in the new South Africa, only a minority of the sample—18 per cent—was in favour of giving preferential treatment in housing and jobs, as compared to a

considerable 77 per cent who are against such laws. By comparison, 62 per cent support laws against incitement or inter-group ill will.

• Neighbours

Despite the legacy of residential segregation by race, 84 per cent of the respondents stated that having neighbours from other races was acceptable. The groups now considered least desirable were right- and left-wing extremists, members of minority cults and people with a criminal record.

• Attitudes towards the New South Africa

While about a third of the sample were positive about the benefits that have been gained for the people of South Africa as a whole, only 1 in 6 feel that they have benefited personally. In the main, personal safety ranks high on the list of concerns, with an overwhelming 90 per cent rating South Africa 'poor' or 'very poor' on this issue.

• Cultural identity

Despite emerging from a country that for more than 50 years stressed cultural difference and institutionalised racial segregation, a majority of the population (54 per cent) positively identify themselves as South Africans. Seven per cent of the sample say that they feel 'more South African than Jewish', while 47 per cent now consider themselves 'equally South African and Jewish'. Forty five per cent said they feel 'more Jewish than South African'.

• Quality of life

Only one in eight respondents (13 per cent) agreed with the optimistic statement, 'The quality of my life in South Africa will improve over the next five years', whereas a resounding 65 per cent disagreed, implying that they believe the quality of life in South Africa in fact will deteriorate over the next five years. At the same time, 59 per cent of the respondents believe that people are less willing to help each other than they were five years ago.

• Special responsibilities

Against the backdrop of the recent abolition of the apartheid system of legalised discrimination, 42 per cent of the sample believe that Jews have a special responsibility, as Jews, to help those who suffer discrimination. Similarly, given the clear biblical injunction on Jews to give charity, 41 per cent agree that Jews have a special responsibility to give charity and 58 per cent believe they have the same responsibility as others.

• Government spending

A clear consensus emerges regarding increased government spending on domestic priorities. Ninety six per cent of the respondents want more spending on police and law enforcement, 88 per cent on education, 88 per cent on health, 81 per cent on old age pensions, 50 per cent on the environment, and 33 per cent on culture and the arts. By comparison, only 13 per cent want more spending on the military and defence. A majority of 86 per cent regards HIV/AIDS as 'the most serious social/health issue in South Africa'.

• Migration and emigration

When asked about their own personal emigration plans, the vast majority of Jews do not seriously contemplate leaving the country. Only 12 per cent of the total sample say they are very likely to leave over the next five years. Half of these likely emigrants cite fears of crime and 'personal safety' as the prime reason for this decision.

• The future

The responses to the issues addressed in the report point to a cohesive community existing within what is perceived to be a turbulent social and political climate.

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, South African Jewry remains religiously and communally vibrant, highly skilled and well qualified to assist in the development of a democratic South Africa.

I Introduction

Early Jewish contacts with Africa

Jews have been associated with Africa since their enslavement by the Pharaohs of ancient Egypt. Indeed their very origins have been attributed to this period in captivity and to the biblical Exodus from Egypt. After the destruction of the First Temple in Jerusalem (586 BCE), a number of Jewish survivors took refuge in the military outpost at Elaphantine. Following the conquests of Alexander the Great in the fourth century BCE, the city of Alexandria became a centre of Jewish learning. Under the Romans, Philo (first century CE) was one of the most influential Jewish philosophers associated with the city. Jewish settlement spread westward under the Romans, despite periodic oppression. After the Arab conquest of North Africa in the seventh century, Jewish life and culture flourished. Jews were prominent in newly founded Arab cities such as Fostat (Egypt) and Kairouan (Tunisia). Isaac Israeli (d.950) in Kairouan, and Moses Maimonides (1135-1204) in Fostat, were eminent Jewish scholars in North Africa.

Other than Ethiopia, where the Beta Israel (Falashas) lived, the history of sub-Saharan Jewry is linked to the history of European colonization. Jewish navigators were involved in the early Portuguese voyages of exploration and Jewish merchants in Holland were connected to the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) which pioneered settlement to the Cape of Good Hope. However, non-Protestants, including Jews, were denied the right to settle during the rule of the DEIC (1652 to 1795). This practice was abrogated under the relatively enlightened Batavian administration (1803-06) and maintained thereafter by their administrative heirs, the British, in 1806.

Jews in South Africa

A handful of Jews, mainly of English, Dutch and German origin, availed themselves of the new circumstances. In 1841 they founded 'The Society of the Jewish Community of Cape Town', forerunner of the Cape Town Hebrew Congregation. Their numbers were consolidated by the influx of Eastern European Jews, mainly from Lithuania, following the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold two decades later. Some of the newcomers made their way to Rhodesia (present day Zimbabwe and Zambia). Mass immigration of Jews to South Africa was virtually curtailed with the introduction of a Quota Act in 1930.¹

The Eastern European newcomers readily adopted the Anglo-Jewish style, rapidly discarding their distinctive garb and mores. They did not, however, dilute their Jewish identity and indeed helped to establish a wide range of communal institutions and organizations designed specifically to safeguard that identity. Most importantly, the Eastern European Jews brought with them a Zionist fervour which continues to mark the South African Jewish community to this day. In 1898 the South African Zionist Federation (SAZF) was founded, co-ordinating all Zionist work in the country, and in 1912, the Jewish Board of Deputies for Transvaal and Natal (founded in 1903) and the Jewish Board of Deputies for Cape Colony (founded in 1904) were merged into the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, hereafter referred to as the Board. As the official voice of the community, the Board understood its mandate as representing the Jewish community to the authorities solely on matters Jewish.

Both Anglo-German and Eastern European Jews had great respect for Britain, its liberal institutions and its reputation for fair play. This showed in the Jewish community's support for British-orientated political parties, first the Unionists and later the United Party. The latter's attractiveness was enhanced by Jan Smuts' association with the Zionist movement and, most importantly, by the serious manifestations of antisemitism from right-wing Afrikaners in the 1930s and 1940s.² Antisemitism prompted the governing United Party to introduce the 1937 Aliens Act, curtailing German Jewish immigration. Jews were left with a profound sense of vulnerability and fear of Afrikaner hegemony in South Africa. Their fears were exacerbated when right-wing pro-Nazi Afrikaners, including the Greyshirts and other fascist-like organizations, opposed South Africa's entry into the Second World War. Jewish identification with the English-speaking population was thus reinforced. Concern reached its zenith when the National Party, with its blatantly anti-Jewish record, came to power in 1948.³

The 'Jewish problem' disappeared rapidly from the public agenda as the National Party government concentrated its energies on institutionalizing apartheid. The new government's recognition of Israel and Prime Minister D. F. Malan's visit to the Jewish state in 1953 further alleviated Jewish anxiety. Jews showed consistent upward mobility with the proportion of

¹ G. Saron and L. Hotz (eds.), *The Jews in South Africa: A History* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press 1955).

² G. Shimoni, *Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience 1910-1967* (Cape Town, Oxford University Press 1980).

³ M. Shain, *The Roots of Antisemitism in South Africa* (Charlottesville and London, The University Press of Virginia 1994, and Johannesburg, Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).

administrative and professional workers in the labour force increasing from 12 per cent in 1936 to 40 per cent in 1960.⁴ By 1961, virtually the entire Jewish population was urbanised, with the overwhelming majority in the metropolitan areas of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban and Pretoria. At its zenith in 1970, the community numbered 118,200, or 0.6 per cent of the country's total population of 21.4 million, and 3.1 per cent of the 3.7 million white population.⁵ Fifty-six per cent of all Jews had matriculated in comparison with 23 per cent of the total white population and 10 per cent of all Jews held university degrees compared with 4 per cent of the total white population. Jews were disproportionately represented in the commercial and financial sectors (94 per cent of Jewish males were concentrated in the four sectors of manufacturing, commerce, finance, and services) and employed almost exclusively in the private sector, with 28 per cent of economically active Jews being employers.

Numbed by the Holocaust, buoyed by the emergence of the Jewish state and reassured by the National Party's new attitude, Jews for the most part ignored the unfolding of apartheid in the 1950s. There were, however, a number of radical left-wing Jews who were prepared to confront the state directly. Other bodies, most notably the Union of Jewish Women, helped alleviate some of the misery caused by apartheid through charitable projects and self-help schemes. In the wake of the Sharpeville massacre of 1960 some Jews emigrated; others supported liberal initiatives. But the majority of Jews were satisfied simply to voice their opposition to the evils of apartheid through the ballot box. Accusations of dual loyalty after Israel's support for the African bloc at the United Nations in 1962, as well as public accusations associating Jews with liberalism and communism, both terms of opprobrium at the time, may well have contributed to Jewish communal quiescence during this period. Unprecedented co-operation between Pretoria and Jerusalem from the 1970s intensified the dilemmas.

In the wake of the Soweto uprising in 1976, many Jews moved into the white *laager*; in the 1977 elections more than one in four Jews supported the ruling party. The move to the right continued through the 1980s as the National Party shifted to the centre of the political spectrum. It was against this background that two new organizations, Jews

for Justice and Jews for Social Justice, were founded in 1985, in Cape Town and Johannesburg respectively. Both organizations sought to enlighten Jews about South African realities, to build bridges to black community organizations, and to participate actively in changing South African society. Their members, largely of a younger generation, rejected a bystander role and argued forcefully for a direct and explicitly Jewish involvement in the unfolding political process.

With the National Party regime losing ideological coherence, amidst massive repression and resistance, the South African Jewish Board of Deputies increasingly condemned apartheid. South African Jews by and large welcomed the momentous changes inaugurated by President De Klerk on 2 February 1990, which in effect ended the apartheid era. The Jewish people stood fully behind the negotiation process, culminating in South Africa's first democratic election in 1994. Applauding President De Klerk did not, of course, mean unequivocal Jewish confidence in the future. In addition to apprehensions they shared with many other white South Africans, they had particular concerns: the freedom to practice a full Jewish life as individuals and as a collectivity, the right to pursue Zionist activities, and the continuation of relations between South Africa and Israel.

Jews and the 'new South Africa'

According to the 1991 Census there were 59,000 Jews in South Africa, that is approximately half the number enumerated a decade earlier. However, the figure was misleading because, for the first time, the census described the question on religion as optional. As a result one-fifth of all whites did not answer the question. The size of the Jewish population could therefore only be estimated. According to Allie A Dubb, an estimate based on a range of variables, was between 92,000 and 106,000—less than 2 per cent of the total white population and 0.5 per cent of the total population. The size of the community had thus remained fairly constant, despite the emigration of an estimated 40,000 Jews since 1970. There had been some immigration from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the 1960s and 1970s, some re-immigration, and an estimated influx of 6,000 Israelis.

The composition and structure of the community had changed significantly because emigration occurred largely among middle-aged couples and their children, with immigrants and returning émigrés having a different profile. Examination of the age distribution suggests that, compared with 1980, the proportion of school-age children and their parents had decreased; the proportion of

4 A. Arkin, 'The contribution of South African Jewry to contemporary South African economic life', *Jewish Affairs*, 1995, 40, 1.

5 A. A. Dubb, *The Jewish Population of South Africa: 1991 Sociodemographic Survey* (Cape Town, Kaplan Centre, UCT 1994).

those aged 60-70 decreased; and those over 70 increased. Migration within South Africa continued. It was estimated that Johannesburg had 60,000 Jews and Cape Town 21,000. Eighty per cent of South African Jews were affiliated with a religious body. About four-fifths belonged to Orthodox congregations and one fifth to Progressive organizations.

Confronting the Challenges

Although funds, skilled professional personnel and committed lay leadership have become scarce—related to the emigration of young people and the ageing of the community—South African Jewry continues to manifest a vibrant communal life. This is exemplified in the two major organizations: The Board and the SAZF. The Board deals essentially with domestic matters and the SAZF with Israel-related activities. In 1987 the two premier fundraising bodies—the United Communal Fund (UCF) and the Israel United Appeal (IUA)—had merged. This single entity known as the IUA-UCF has unified the community and ensured that the two funds do not compete with each other for contributions. The IUA-UCF also enlists the help of the rabbinate and lay leaders of synagogues. The major beneficiary of the IUA is Israel. Other recipients include the Board, the Jewish day school movement, the Union of Orthodox Synagogues, the Union of Progressive Judaism and the Union of Jewish Women. Congregations and other bodies raise their own funds among members and with fundraising drives. In 1992 it was decided to establish a Joint Communal Co-ordinating Committee from the Board and SAZF to ensure communal unity, loyalty and discipline. The initiative was stillborn. However, in October 1998 the Board, the SAZF and the IUA-UCF established a joint commission to create a single administration for the three groups. Under the new plan, each organization would continue to follow its own agenda and maintain its own identity.

Financial rationalization, security, and the need to establish sound relations with the wider population has dominated the Jewish communal agenda. Among the priorities of the Board are monitoring acts of antisemitism and safeguarding the rights of Jews as South African citizens. In pursuit of these objectives the Board has maintained contact with government and public officials and informed opinion makers, the press, and politicians on issues relevant to the Jewish community. The Jewish community is enormously concerned with rising crime levels. Safety and security has become a major focus of communal endeavour. Caring for the elderly has

also become a major problem, especially as emigration broke up extended families and many of the elderly were left to survive on their own resources.

South Africa's relationship with Israel under the ANC-led government has come under close scrutiny by the SAZF. It appears that the government does not wish to turn the Middle East into an arena of contention and conflict among South Africans. Certainly it is aware of the centrality of Israel for South African Jewry and the positive feelings of many others towards Israel. At the same time, in the 'new South Africa', Middle Eastern foreign policy is clearly going to be even-handed, based on the substantial sympathy that existed for the Palestinians among the black majority.

The Union of Orthodox Synagogues (UOS) is the umbrella body for Orthodox synagogues throughout South Africa. The UOS appoints and maintains the office of the Chief Rabbi, the Johannesburg Beth Din, and the Cape Beth Din. Recently there has been a tremendous growth in the Ba'al Teshuva (religious revival) movement and a number of *shtieblach* have been established mainly in and around Johannesburg. The Lubavitch Hassidic movement has also made inroads into the community, especially in Johannesburg. The South African Union for Progressive Judaism is the co-ordinating body for Reform congregations which comprises approximately 12 per cent of the population.

The South African Board of Jewish Education (SABJE) controls a large Jewish day school system. Despite the number of Jewish pupils in day schools declining in recent years, these schools still enrol 7,443 children, or approximately 75 per cent of all Jewish children. The schools are concentrated in Johannesburg and Cape Town. The sole exception in Port Elizabeth survives only because the majority of its pupils are not Jewish. The schools range from tiny splinter institutions like the Yeshiva Maharsha to large day schools like King David High School in Johannesburg. In ideology they range from the strictly Orthodox (e.g. Yeshivas Toras Emes) to modern/centrist orthodox (Yeshivah College) to national-traditional (King David Schools and the United Herzlia Schools). The SABJE also involves itself with Jewish children in state schools. The Progressive movement maintains a network of supplementary and religious classes at temples affiliated with it. A perennial cloud over the Jewish day school horizon is funding. In April 1998 a government White Paper effectively cut off state funding for private schools beginning in April 1999. At the

tertiary level university students are able to take undergraduate and postgraduate courses in Jewish studies at the University of South Africa and the University of Cape Town.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

A Truth Reconciliation Commission (TRC), charged with investigating crimes committed under apartheid, was established in 1995.⁶ Under its provisions, individuals who applied for amnesty would not be brought to trial if they made a full disclosure of their actions since 1960. Geshet, a social action group based in Johannesburg, was the first Jewish organization to make a submission to the TRC, in January 1997.

A major oral submission was made to the TRC in November 1997 by Chief Rabbi Cyril Harris. He identified substantial anti-apartheid activism on the part of Jews but confessed on behalf of the community a 'collective failure to protest against apartheid'.

The TRC's first published report contained a full section on the role of the 'faith communities' under apartheid. Among the findings it was noted that 'Religious communities in general,

as a rule, failed adequately to support dissident ministers, priests, imams, rabbis and lay persons who found themselves in confrontation with the state.'⁷ 'While members of the Jewish community made their greatest contributions to South African human rights as individuals, some organizations also played a role. During the last years of apartheid, Jews for Justice and Jews for Social Justice were important voices of protest.'⁸

Jews are largely part of the white minority and are fully protected under the constitution by a Bill of Rights which enshrines religious and cultural freedom. Antisemitic incidents in the 'new South Africa' have been largely confined to far right and Islamist groups. Given the ANC's opposition to racism, the climate for opposing antisemitism in South Africa publicly is more favourable than in the past.

According to the usable sector of the preliminary 1996 census data, there were 55,734 Jews in South Africa. Employing the same methodology used by Allie A Dubb to adjust the figures in his 1991 survey, it is thought the Jewish population is between 80,000 and 90,000.

6 *Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report*, Volume 4, 1998.

7 *Ibid.* 91.

8 *Ibid.* 64.

2 Social Profile of the Respondents

Demographic characteristics

A total of 1,000 adult (18 years and over) respondents were interviewed for this survey of whom there were 464 men and 536 women. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the sample according to age. The median age of respondents was 45 years. The nationally representative nature of the sample is discussed in Appendix A.

Table 1: Age distribution of survey respondents

Age group	Percentage
18-24	12.8
25-44	35.7
45-64	33.1
65+	18.4
Total	100

In terms of their current marital status, 55 per cent of the respondents were married, while 9 per cent were divorced and 1 per cent were separated at the time of the survey. A further 9 per cent were widowed and 2 per cent were unmarried but living with a partner. Nearly one in four respondents or 24 per cent were single, i.e. had never married and were not living with a partner.

Educational achievements

The sample was very well educated by South African standards. Only 7 per cent of respondents had failed to matriculate indicating a very high level of education. Table 2 tabulates the highest educational attainments of respondents who had matriculated showing that overall 35 per cent had attained a minimum of a university degree, including 41 per cent of men. The table also shows the percentage of men and women at each level of educational achievement. A clear male advantage is shown at the highest levels of tertiary education with twice as many men as women holding Honours degrees and above.

Table 2: Highest educational attainments of matriculators

Highest level of education achieved	Overall valid percentage	Men (percentage)	Women (percentage)
Matric	39	36	41
Diploma/certificate but not at Technikon or University	16	10	21
Technikon diploma/degree	10	13	9
Bachelor's degree at university	22	24	20
Honours degree at university	8	11	6
Masters degree at university	4	5	3
Doctorate	1	1	—
Total	100	100	100


Employment and occupation

In total 68 per cent of the sample were in paid employment at the time of the survey. Of these, 75 per cent were working full-time and 25 per cent part-time. Furthermore, of those who were in paid employment, 42 per cent were self-employed.

The breakdown of those who were not in paid employment revealed that 36 per cent were full-time housewives/househusbands or mothers/fathers. About one in four were students and one-third were retired with only 5 per cent being unemployed and seeking work.

The occupations themselves were distributed across 7 job-type categories as shown in Figure 1. The pattern of occupations reflects the high levels of educational achievement of the Jewish population with half in professional and managerial occupations and only 2 per cent in manual and unskilled jobs.

Figure 1: Occupation categories of respondents



Languages spoken

Not surprisingly this was a multi-lingual sample with a variety of languages being spoken fluently. The vast majority of 98 per cent spoke English fluently, while just over half of the respondents (53 per cent) also spoke Afrikaans fluently. In addition, 13 per cent spoke Hebrew, 9 per cent spoke Yiddish, 3 per cent spoke French, 4 per cent spoke another European language and 2 per cent spoke an African language such as Zulu or Xhosa.

Birthplace

This pattern of language proficiency is largely explained in terms of the birthplaces of the respondents. While 87 per cent of the sample were born in South Africa, the remaining

respondents were born in other Sub-Saharan African countries (3 per cent), the UK (3 per cent), Germany (1 per cent), Eastern Europe (2 per cent) and Israel (2 per cent).

When respondents were asked about the birthplace of their parents the trend was clearly different with about 50 per cent of their mothers and fathers being born in South Africa and around 25 per cent coming from Eastern European countries.

Citizenship

In terms of citizenship, 94 per cent of respondents were South African citizens. The remainder were citizens of the UK, other European countries, Canada, the US and Israel. Given the common perception of the large numbers of Israelis living in South Africa it was perhaps surprising to find that only 1.4 per cent of respondents were Israeli citizens.

Geographical residence

The respondents were sampled according to the strategy laid out in Appendix A in order to ensure a nationally representative sample. Of the 1,000 respondents, 650 lived in Johannesburg, 250 lived in Cape Town, 50 in Pretoria and the remaining 50 in Durban.

Housing tenure

This is a population with a high degree of home ownership. Only 17 per cent of respondents were living in rented accommodation at the time of the survey. The majority, 67 per cent, were living in a residence that was owned by the respondent or their spouse with the remaining 16 per cent living in a residence owned by another household member.

Household composition

In addition to details about the individual respondents, some basic demographic information was also collected about the

Table 3: Size of respondents' households

Household size	Frequency
1	199
2	288
3	145
4	204
5	114
6	34
7	5
8	3
9	3
10	3
11	1
12	1
Total	1000

households. Table 3 shows a breakdown of the sizes of the households including the individuals being interviewed. Nearly 20 per cent of respondents live alone while nearly 17 per cent live in households of five or more persons. The most common sizes of households consist of two and four individuals with a mean average household size of 2.94 persons.

The population was overwhelmingly composed of nuclear families. In terms of the relationship of other household members to the respondent, the majority fell into the following categories: husband/wife of respondent, child, father/mother and brother/sister.

The survey reveals South African Jews as a high status, property owning, urban community. Their social class profile is very much that of an elite even within the white population. They are very much a unique population in the African context and this is epitomised by the fact that 29 per cent of Jewish women are university graduates. The occupational and educational patterns reveal the South African Jewish population to be an important and valuable human capital asset for the development of a new democratic society and healthy economy.

3 Jewish Identity and Religiosity

Jewishness

Origin/parents

All 1,000 survey respondents were Jewish and the vast majority of 970 were born Jewish. The remaining 30 respondents were converts to Judaism—including 10 patrilineal Jews.

Personal sense of Jewishness

Respondents were questioned about their personal sense of Jewishness, and how important being Jewish was to them. This question was not concerned with their levels of religious observance. The majority of respondents felt strongly about their Jewishness with 49 per cent feeling 'extremely conscious of being Jewish and it is very important to me' and 41 per cent feeling 'quite strongly Jewish, but I am equally conscious of other aspects of my life'. Only 9 per cent indicated that they were aware of being Jewish, but do not think about it very often. Out of 1,000 respondents, only 1 respondent, or 0.1 per cent, answered 'although I was born Jewish, I do not think of myself as being Jewish in any way' while 0.5 per cent were not able to choose one of the above categories.

The concept of Jewishness is a complex one, not easily encapsulated by answers to one question. The questionnaire highlighted several different aspects of Jewish life and asked how important they were to the respondents. Table 4 represents the percentages of responses for each item starting with the aspect of Jewish life rated as the most important one by the majority of the sample, namely feeling Jewish 'inside'. Overall, externalities such as religion and culture were not regarded as important as intangible personal and psychological ties.


Table 4: Percentages of opinions as to the importance of aspects of Jewish life

	Very important	Quite important	Not at all important	Total
Feeling Jewish 'inside'	72	24	4	100
Loyalty to my Jewish heritage	70	27	3	100
A feeling of closeness to other Jews	57	37	6	100
Involvement in Jewish home life (e.g. food, customs etc.)	51	37	12	100
A sense of attachment to Israel	37	45	18	100
Participation in Jewish religious life (synagogue, observances etc.)	37	44	19	100
Interest in Jewish culture (art, music, literature etc.)	21	52	27	100

Identity

Jewishness and Jewish identity are not static concepts. They are open to change over time and under differing circumstances. Respondents were asked whether their Jewish identity had changed or remained the same in recent years, and this finding is represented in Figure 2. The general trend was for an overall increase in Jewish identity. It is interesting to note that this strengthening of Jewish identity has occurred simultaneously with the political change in South Africa.

Figure 2: Changes in Jewish identity



Jewish friendship networks

In the 'Jewish attitudes, practice and belief' section of the survey the respondents were asked what proportion of their close friends was Jewish. Table 5 shows that over half of the sample responded that 'all or nearly all' of their close friends were Jewish while only 8 per cent in total responded that 'less than half' or 'none or very few' of their friends were Jewish.

Table 5: Comparison of SA and UK Jewish friendship patterns (percentage)

Friendship groups	SA	UK
All or nearly all Jewish	56	41
More than half Jewish	23	17
About half Jewish	13	13
Less than half Jewish	6	12
None or very few Jewish	2	17
Total	100	100

The intensity of South African Jewish friendship networks and the concomitant high level of social segregation is evident in the comparison with British Jews who have wider friendship networks.⁹

⁹ Stephen Miller, Marlena Schmol and Antony Lerman, 'Social and political attitudes of British Jews: some key findings of the JPR survey', *JPR Reports*, no. 1, February 1996.

Intermarriage

Intermarriage with persons of other faiths is always an issue that is of interest to small religious minorities. Table 6 compares the percentage of current married persons who were intermarried (or living as married) in the South African survey with those in equivalent surveys in the UK and the US.¹⁰ It is clear that the rates of intermarriage in South Africa are much lower than either of these two countries. Obviously this pattern is linked to the above finding that most South African Jews mix in mainly Jewish social networks.

Table 6: Comparison of in-married and out-married percentages in South Africa, the UK and the US (percentage)

Couples (married and partners)	SA	UK	US
In-married	93	77	72
Out-married	7	23	28

Jewish education

Experience of formal Jewish education

The issue of Jewish education was addressed in a range of questions. Judaism encourages lifelong religious education and just over one in three (38 per cent) respondents had been involved in furthering their Jewish education as an adult in the form of informal Jewish education. In fact at the time of the survey 9 per cent of the sample were or had been a Jewish education lecturer or teacher. Looking back then to the respondents' youth, overall 83 per cent indicated that they had received some kind of Jewish education.

However, there are gender differences with almost universal male uptake of Jewish education in comparison with only three-quarters of women. The form that this education took was then examined in more detail in terms of the type of education and the number of years attended. The form of Jewish education attended by the greatest proportion of the sample was part-time classes in synagogue (Cheder); 56 per cent of respondents had attended Cheder, some for 3 months and others for 10 years or more.

Table 7 shows the percentage of male and female respondents who experienced a range of different types of Jewish education for a minimum of 3 months. Multiple answers were accepted. Men and women emerge as fairly evenly matched for experiences of Jewish education, however men

Table 7: Male and female experience of Jewish education (percentage)

Form of Jewish education	Men	Women
Received any kind of Jewish education	94	77
Part-time classes in synagogue (Cheder)	66	47
Jewish primary school	28	21
Jewish secondary school	30	21
Formal Jewish lessons from parent/relative	11	14
Yeshivah/ seminary	8	4
University course(s) in Jewish studies	3	4
Degree in Jewish studies	2	2

were more likely to have attended Cheder or have received formal lessons from a family member.

The impact of their Jewish education can be measured by respondents' attitudes towards Jewish education and perceptions of the role it might play. Table 8 shows the strength of agreement or disagreement about a number of Jewish education related statements.

Table 8: Attitudes towards Jewish education (percentage)

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
It is important that all Jewish children attend some form of formal Jewish education	94	3	3	100
The greater the number of years attending Jewish education classes, the greater the knowledge about Judaism	82	7	11	100
The greater the number of years spent attending Jewish education classes, the stronger the Jewish identity	69	14	17	100
The greater the number of years spent attending Jewish education classes, the greater commitment there is to a Jewish life in adulthood	58	20	22	100
Jewish education insulates children from the reality of the world around them	41	15	44	100

Table 8 shows that respondents are in agreement that it is important that all Jewish children attend some form of formal Jewish education, but they are divided on the idea that Jewish education may insulate children from the realities of the wider world. It is interesting to note that 42 per cent of the sample were either in disagreement or unsure as to whether the years spent in Jewish education have a cumulative effect with regard to strengthening the commitment to a Jewish life in adulthood. This statement on the utility of maximum possible exposure reflects a key argument behind communal funding of Jewish education for children and young people.

¹⁰ Barry A. Kosmin, Sidney Goldstein, Joseph Waksberg, Nava Lerer, Ariella Keysar and Jeffrey Scheckner, *Highlights of the CJF 1990 National Jewish Population Survey* (New York, Council of Jewish Federations 1991).

Schooling of respondents' children

With these attitudes in mind we can now assess information about the contemporary pattern of schooling in the Jewish population. This was collected by asking about the respondent's oldest child from Grade 1/ Sub A (up to and including age 20). Table 9 tabulates all the types of schools attended by these children so far.

Table 9: Types of schooling attended by current students

Type of school	Frequency	Percentage
Primary school		
Government school	81	27
Non-Jewish private school	40	13
Jewish private school	176	60
<i>Sub-total</i>	297	100
High school		
Government high school	42	22
Non-Jewish private high school	44	24
Jewish private high school	101	54
<i>Sub-total</i>	187	100

The majority of South African Jewish youngsters attend Jewish day schools. The choice of school is a religious, educational and financial decision for parents. However, the overall pattern of schooling is of importance for inter-group relations because the various types of schooling have differing proportions of students from the non-white populations. The identification benefits of Jewish day school for students have to be offset against the lack of personal contact with non-Jews. Hence the division among parents on the issue of the insulation of Jewish children in day schools which was found in the final item of the previous table.

Experience of Jewish youth groups

Having addressed the younger generations' formal education, we now return to consider the adult respondents' own earlier experiences of informal Jewish education. The majority of respondents (71 per cent) had been members of a Jewish club or youth movement when they were in their teens. Table 10 shows the membership pattern which reflects the Zionist orientation of the Jewish community and the historic strength of socialist Zionism.

Table 10: Frequencies and percentages of attendance at Jewish/Zionist youth clubs or movements

Youth club/movement	Frequency	Percentage
Habonim Dror (Labour Zionist)	388	39
Bnei Akiva (Religious Zionist)	143	14
Betar (Nationalist Zionist)	151	15
Netzer/ Maginim (Reform Synagogue)	27	3
Bnei Zion (Merged with Habonim)	24	2
Other	113	11

Eighteen per cent of respondents had been members of the South African Union of Jewish students (SAUJS) and 15 per cent had participated in an Israel group trip during their school going years.

Religious outlook and behaviour

Origin of the Bible/Torah

Table 11 compares the beliefs of the South African sample regarding the nature of the Torah to those of UK and US samples. The South African population emerges as being much more Orthodox and traditional in its theological outlook on this issue.

Table 11: Comparison of feelings towards the Torah (percentage)

	SA	UK	US
The Torah is the actual word of God (Orthodox theology)	36	15	13
The Torah is the inspired word of God but not everything should be taken literally word for word (Conservative/traditional theology)	41	30	38
The Torah is an ancient book of history and moral precepts recorded by man (Reform theology)	23	52	45
Don't know	—	3	4
Total	100	100	100

Religious outlook

Table 12 tabulates the replies to the question 'In terms of Jewish religious practice, which of the following best describes your position?' from both the South African and the JPR 1995 UK surveys.

Table 12: Religious outlook groups (percentage)

Religious outlook	SA	UK
Non-practising (i.e. secular) Jew	6	23
Just Jewish	12	20
Reform/Progressive Jew	7	15
'Traditional' (not strictly Orthodox)	61	32
Strictly Orthodox (e.g. would not turn on a light on Sabbath)	14	10
Total	100	100

It can be seen that the distribution of the samples across the religious outlook categories are quite different, with the South African sample being much more to the 'right' than British Jews. Mirroring the pattern of theological belief, South Africa has twice as many 'Traditional' Jews but about half as many Just Jewish and Progressive Jews than the UK. The South African sample emerged as having only a quarter of the proportion of secular Jews compared with the UK.

Kashrut

The keeping of kashrut (Jewish food taboos) is an indicator of adherence to normative Judaism. Table 13 shows the kinds of meat bought by respondents for their homes.

Table 13: Kinds of meat bought for the home

Kind of meat	Percentage
None (vegetarian)	2
Only meat from a kosher butcher	40
From an ordinary (non-kosher) butcher, but not pork or bacon Sometimes from a kosher butcher and sometimes from a non-kosher butcher but not pork or bacon	33
Sometimes from a kosher butcher and sometimes from a non-kosher butcher including pork and bacon	18
From an ordinary (non-kosher) butcher including pork and bacon	1
Total	6
	100

Table 13 shows that 40 per cent of the sample will only buy meat for the house that comes from a kosher butcher. Further questioning revealed that 95 per cent of these individuals then separate meat from milk products as regards cooking and serving and so on, i.e. 38 per cent of the overall sample. This proportion equates with UK figures of 36 per cent, with the US at 15 per cent emerging as being half as likely to observe the same practice. A further subset of 15 per cent of the whole South African sample will eat out only in kosher restaurants.

Religious observance

The many facets of religious observance including synagogue attendance and participation in the various practices and rituals were addressed during the interview. We already know from Table 12 earlier that 6 per cent of the sample regard themselves as 'non-practising' (i.e. 'secular'), 12 per cent as 'Just Jewish', 7 per cent as 'Reform/Progressive', 61 per cent as 'Traditional (not strictly Orthodox)' and 14 per cent as 'Strictly Orthodox'.

Table 14 shows the percentage of respondents observing a range of personal religious practices. These levels of religious practice exceed those of the Jewish populations of all other countries including Israel.

Ninety-three per cent of respondents said that they attend a Seder meal at Passover either at home or elsewhere. Of those remaining, 4 per cent attended most years, 2 per cent some years and only 1 per cent never attend a Seder meal. Another key ritual is the lighting of Sabbath

Table 14: Percentage of respondents observing different personal religious practices

Religious practices	Percentage
Refrain from work on the Jewish New Year	92
Fast on Yom Kippur	91
Prefer to stay home on Friday night	71
Have or would refrain from writing exams during Jewish holidays	64
Refrain from travelling on Sabbath	18

candles in the home on a Friday night. Exactly three-quarters of the sample responded that candles are lit in their homes every Friday night, with 16 per cent saying 'sometimes' and 9 per cent replying 'never'.

Synagogue affiliation and attendance

Patterns of synagogue affiliation and attendance and how they change are of importance to life within the South African Jewish community. The interview focused on both present and past synagogue belonging and attendance. In the year prior to participating in this research only 9 per cent of the sample had not attended a synagogue service, with a further 11 per cent going once or twice. Thirty-one per cent indicated that they had been on a few occasions such as for festivals or *Yahrzeit*,¹¹ 10 per cent went once a month, and 39 per cent went to synagogue most Sabbaths or more. In comparison with the UK Jewish community, the South African community is much more likely to attend synagogue regularly. The UK survey found that more than a quarter (28 per cent) of all respondents had not attended synagogue in the year prior to the survey.

Moving on to compare parental and current respondent affiliation, the intergenerational shift appears to be very slight. Table 15 shows the past and current affiliation patterns of the sample in addition to their current synagogue attendance. It shows that the biggest shift in percentage terms is towards non-affiliation rather than between synagogue types.

Table 15: Past and present synagogue affiliation (percentage)

Synagogue type	Parents affiliation in respondents' childhood	Respondents' current affiliation	Synagogue respondent currently attends
Orthodox	84	72	79
Lubavitch	1	3	4
Sephardi	1	1	1
Conservative	1	1	1
Reform	7	8	8
None/not applicable	6	15	7
Total	100	100	100

¹¹ Annual remembrance service for close family member.


Israel/Zionism

Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, and its creation the state of Israel, are widely regarded by Diaspora communal leaders and many ordinary Jews as being of crucial importance to Jewish life. For most of this century it has been seen as a focus of consensus in the Jewish community, the central aim of fundraising activity, as well as a force for cohesion. The survey included a number of items concerning Israel and the answers give an indication of the current relationship between respondents and Israel.

Attachment to Israel

A general overview of South African Jews' present attachment to Israel is supplied by respondents' answers to the question 'Can you say whether you have any special feelings of attachment (or otherwise) towards Israel?' Four choices were given: strong attachment, moderate attachment, no special attachment and negative feelings. Figure 3 shows that overall, 54 per cent felt a strong attachment and 33 per cent a moderate attachment to Israel. Thus while 87 per cent expressed special feelings of attachment to Israel, just under 1 per cent expressed negative feelings. Figures from the 1995 UK survey found that 80 per cent of respondents felt a strong or moderate attachment to Israel, while US figures on a similar survey question in 1990 revealed that 69 per cent had a moderate or strong attachment.

Figure 3: Attachment to Israel



Another interesting indicator of a general feeling of solidarity with Israel was the finding that a majority of the sample felt that there was a consistent pattern of unfairness or bias in the media representation of news about Israel: 12 per cent felt that the media was 'always' biased, 34 per cent though it was 'often' biased and an additional 37 per cent thought it was 'sometimes'


biased. In contrast, only 13 per cent felt that the South African media was 'rarely or never' biased. This pattern of responses is strikingly similar to that among Jews in the UK.

Visits

The majority of respondents, 79 per cent, have visited Israel at least once. For comparison, in the UK 78 per cent of Jews have visited Israel and in the United States, 37 per cent of Jews have visited Israel at least once. Surprisingly perhaps, South African Jews are as likely to have visited Israel as UK Jews despite the disparities in the distance between these countries and Israel, and twice as likely as American Jews.

Respondents were also asked how many visits they had made to Israel in the past ten years. Figure 4 shows that while 21 per cent had never visited Israel, a further 20 per cent of the sample had not been to Israel since 1998. Thus 59 per cent of the sample had visited Israel at least once in the ten years prior to participating in the survey.

Figure 4: Number of visits to Israel in the past 10 years



The significance of these figures is open to interpretation. Should this level of visiting be placed in the context of international tourism, seen in terms of solidarity or viewed in some other way such as emigration planning? Obviously variables such as discretionary income and the leisure patterns of this population need to be factored into the equation before a judgement can be made.

Friends and relatives in Israel

Given recent increases in emigration from South Africa and, as we have already seen, high levels of tourism, we should expect increasing social connections with Israel. In fact over 8 out of 10 (83 per cent) South African Jews said they have close friends or family in Israel.

Taken in aggregate the survey evidence on Jewish identity and religiosity shows that overall levels of Jewish identity are high and even increasing. There is a particularly strong sense of Jewish solidarity and active community involvement within this population. In terms of international comparisons, South African Jews are more Orthodox in belief and observance than British Jews, and more Zionist than American Jews. South African Jews, with their high level of

general education and exposure to Western culture, combined with a relatively high level of religious observance and education, are an interesting community in which to test out how Jewish beliefs and values are operationalized in the social world. We can now see how this cultural inheritance plays out in the particularly intriguing realm of contemporary South African society.

4 Social and Political Attitudes

Exposure to the media

It is appropriate to consider the media preferences of the respondents as this is a major form of communication for both information and opinion. The survey examined the respondents' television viewing patterns and their preferences for secular and Jewish newspapers to determine which types of media and communications reach and influence this population.

The majority of respondents have daily access to television, with 95 per cent of the sample watching at least some programming every day. Likewise, 88 per cent of respondents also listen daily to some radio. Table 16 shows this sample's access to different forms of media.

Table 16: Respondents' use of the media

	Percentage
Television daily	95
Radio daily	88
Weekly newspaper (3+ times/week)	80
Sunday paper (2+ times/month)	77
Jewish publications (ever)	77

In addition to the terrestrial television channels, 73 per cent subscribe to M-Net, 19 per cent to DStv, 1 per cent to Astrasat, with 4 per cent having access to Shalom TV.

The choice of daily newspaper, which is specific to city of residence, also reflects and influences political outlook in South Africa. The choice was well distributed across the spectrum of broadsheets. The most popular daily newspaper was the *Star* (47 per cent). Others that were regularly read were *Business Day* (12 per cent), the *Cape Argus* (15 per cent), the *Cape Times* (14 per cent) and the *Citizen* (12 per cent). The *Sunday Times* was the most popular of the Sunday papers with a regular readership of 67 per cent of this sample. The *Sunday Independent* was read regularly (at least twice a month) by 11 per cent of the sample.

Table 17: Percentage believing there is media bias

	Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely or never	Don't know or no answer	Total
News about the Arab-Israeli conflict	17	35	31	11	6	100
News about Israel	11	34	37	13	5	100
The behaviour of the police	9	37	37	11	6	100
South African government policy	8	26	40	18	8	100
Personal lives of South African MPs	6	24	45	15	10	100
Jews in general	4	18	43	29	6	100
News about other African states	4	18	43	22	13	100
Jewish businessmen	3	12	37	38	10	100

The statistics on the reading of the Jewish press are particularly relevant for communication within the community. The majority of respondents (77 per cent) have read at least one Jewish newspaper or publication regularly, the most popular of which were the *Jewish Times* (25 per cent read regularly or occasionally), the *South African Jewish Report* (24 per cent) and the *Jewish Tradition* (15 per cent).

Media bias

The previous section has shown that the majority of the sample have regular access to the radio and both visual and printed media. Perceptions of media bias have particular relevance in South Africa, a country with a recent history of government media censorship under the apartheid regime. Respondents were asked in reference to the South African media as a whole (i.e. press, TV and radio) whether they believed the media is ever negatively biased in the way they present a range of events. Table 17 shows how often respondents sense bias in the handling of different topics. It is clear that the representation of issues concerning Israel are particularly likely to be perceived as biased. The fact that this sample considered the least sinned against group was Jewish businessmen is a very important finding both for what it says about contemporary South African society and the fair-mindedness and lack of 'paranoia' of this population.

General social attitudes

Importance of religion in South Africa

Bearing in mind the current social climate within South Africa, it was interesting to address perceptions of the future importance of religion among a population whose own average level of religiosity was increasing. When asked to think of the country as a whole, 42 per cent believed that religion will become more important to people while a further 38 per cent believed that religion will remain of equal importance as present. Only 18 per cent believed that it will become less important with 2 per cent of respondents professing not to know or not to be able to answer.

Moral issues

Attitudes towards moral issues are subjective and though they usually correlate closely with religious beliefs they can also be influenced by individuals' personal experiences or circumstances at the time. Respondents were questioned on a range of personal and social practices and complex issues of conscience, where personal judgement and religious principle tend to overshadow the legal dimension. They were asked to rate these practices on a scale of 1 to 10, whereby the closer they were to 1 the more they thought the practice was never justified and the closer they were to 10 the more they thought it was always justified. Table 18 tabulates the mean average of scores on these questions in descending order, i.e. the practices at the top of the table were believed to be more acceptable than those at the bottom of the table.

Table 18: Personal and social practices

Practices	Mean average
Using a firearm in self-defence	8.3
The death penalty	8.0
Euthanasia (ending the life of the incurably ill)	6.1
Abortion	6.0
Keeping money you have found	4.1
Buying something you knew was stolen	1.6

The scores on these questions provide an interesting insight into the day-to-day lives of individuals living in a sometimes volatile environment where it is more acceptable to use a firearm in self-defence or uphold the death penalty than to keep money that has been found or to buy goods that are known to be stolen.

Family roles

With changing economic, social and political climates come changes in gender roles both within and beyond the family. Traditional male and female roles have changed dramatically in recent years across the western world and attitudes as we approach the twenty-first century are more liberal than ever before. Table 19 shows the patterns of agreement and disagreement to a range of statements on traditional and more

Table 19: Percentage agreeing and disagreeing with different family roles

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
It is difficult to manage a home and family and have a job but these days women often have to work to supplement the family income*	95	3	2	100
Women can achieve a greater sense of fulfilment if they have a job and are not restricted to being housewives only	80	10	10	100
All in all, family life suffers when a woman has a full-time job	47	16	37	100
A job is all right but what most women really want is a home and children	42	18	40	100
A man's job is to earn the money, a woman's job is to look after the home and family*	22	17	61	100

N.B. * denotes a statistical difference between the responses of men and women

liberal family roles. In the contemporary South African context, responses to these questions reveal the economic pressures to go out to work on both spouses within a family unit as well as the general agreement that work plays an important role for women.

When these items were analysed further by gender it was interesting to note that responses to the two items concerned with family finances were significant (as denoted in Table 19). Women tended to agree more strongly with the statement 'It is difficult to manage a home and family and have a job but these days women often have to work to supplement the family income' than men, but disagree more strongly with the statement that 'A man's job is to earn the money, a woman's job is to look after the home and family'.

Sexual mores

Along similar lines to the section addressing particular social and moral practices, the survey also looked at attitudes towards particular types of sexual relationships as shown in Table 20. Thus, this sample of South African Jews believe

Table 20: Attitudes towards sexual relationships in different circumstances—percentage ('Don't know' responses excluded from table)

	Always wrong	Mostly wrong	Sometimes wrong	Rarely wrong	Not wrong at all
Sexual relations between a married person and someone other than his or her partner	65	26	8	—	1
Sexual relations between two adults of the same sex	41	12	11	9	27
Sexual relations between two adults of different races	16	11	16	10	47
Sexual relations between a man and a woman before marriage	14	10	25	13	38

that adultery is more wrong than homosexuality, and the general liberal outlook of this population in South African terms is shown by the fact that 47 per cent believe that inter-racial relationships are not wrong at all.

Prejudice

Racial prejudice


Attitudes of the general population towards the prevalence of racism are pertinent in South Africa in general, and particularly so within the Jewish community where one might believe there would be a heightened awareness of such issues. When asked 'Do you think there is more racial prejudice in South Africa now than there was 5 years ago, less or about the same amount?' the sample was split. A plurality of 42 per cent believed that there was more racial prejudice now than the period prior to the change of government in 1994, with 29 and 28 per cent respectively believing that there was less and no change in the level of prejudice.

Antisemitism

Some of these attitudes may be placed in context when we find that in their opinion, 44 per cent of respondents believe that antisemitism is different from other types of racism. In fact very few Jews believe that antisemitism has decreased in the past 5 years (8 per cent), while 34 per cent believe there has been an increase and 55 per cent believe that it has remained about the same (3 per cent did not answer).

Yet when antisemitism in South Africa is then examined in the context of antisemitism across the world, respondents tend to believe that it is more of a problem elsewhere than it is in their home country as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: Antisemitism in South Africa and the world



Personal experience of antisemitism

Table 21 tabulates the experiences of the respondents of different forms of antisemitism during the past 5 years. These range from hearing someone else making derogatory remarks about Jews in general to personally being refused employment on these grounds. The pattern suggests that antisemitism largely falls within the realms of discourse in South Africa but that it is not important in practical terms, i.e. it is at the level of unpleasantness rather than being threatening. Over a third of the sample have had no personal experience of antisemitism in five years.


Table 21: Experiences of antisemitism (respondents may have experienced more than one form of antisemitism)

	Percentage
Heard someone making derogatory remarks about Jews generally	60
Been called a Jew in a derogatory way	29
Picked on (victimised) at work	5
Refused employment	2
Business contracts or orders refused	2
Refused membership of a club	1
You (or your child) not allowed a place at a school or college because of a Jewish quota	0.5
None	35

Anti-Zionism

South African Jews' strong emotional ties to Israel mean that they are particularly sensitive to the issue of anti-Zionism. We have already seen that they regard the media as heavily biased against Israel. They also believe that in terms of anti-Zionism, there has been a distinct shift towards a perceived increase in negative attitudes over recent years as illustrated in Figure 6. The ANC's ties in exile to Libya and the PLO are obviously a factor in this perception, as is the fact that the previous government tended to take a pro-Israel stance on the Middle East question.

Figure 6: Anti-Zionist feelings over the past 5 years



Affirmative action, gender equality and hate incitement laws

Affirmative action—giving preference to the disadvantaged races in jobs and housing for example—is increasingly prevalent in the 'new South Africa'. When asked about their views regarding the laws which encourage affirmative action only 18 per cent were in favour or supported them. In fact the majority, 77 per cent, were against such laws with the remaining 5 per cent being unsure or declining to answer. However, when considering laws which prevent gender inequity (i.e. laws preventing sexual discrimination) this sample was split down the middle with 51 per cent supporting such laws and 49 per cent opposing them. When this question was examined in more depth according to gender there was the surprising finding that marginally more men than women supported such a law (54 and 48 per cent respectively); however this difference was not statistically significant.

As regards laws against people who incite or promote ill-feeling between groups, by displaying posters or writing racist signs in public places for example, there was more of a general consensus with 62 per cent supporting such laws. However, a significant proportion of 35 per cent were still in opposition to laws preventing the incitement of racial hatred, presumably mostly on civil liberties grounds.

Neighbours

A classic social science method of assessing how comfortable individuals are with certain groups of people is to ask how they would feel about having this type of person or persons as next-door neighbours. This question is particularly fascinating in the South African context because under

Table 22: Attitudes towards different types of neighbours (percentage)

Neighbour	Happy	Neither happy nor unhappy	Unhappy
Strictly Orthodox Jews	69	27	4
Reform/Progressive Jews	65	30	5
Unmarried mothers	53	43	4
Christians	51	47	2
Students	44	42	14
People of a different race	42	46	12
Indians	39	47	14
Coloured people	38	48	14
Black people	38	46	16
People with large families	37	44	19
Muslims	34	36	30
Left wing extremists	13	27	60
Members of minority cults	10	30	60
Emotionally unstable people	6	22	72
People with a criminal record	6	20	74
Right-wing extremists	5	15	80

apartheid's Group Areas Act there was legal enforcement of racial segregation. Table 22 shows how happy or unhappy respondents felt about having a range of different groups of people as neighbours today, with those they felt happiest about at the top of the table.

The table demonstrates the largely liberal and tolerant outlook of this population. Their feelings are placed in perspective when it is realised that more people are unhappy even with fellow Jews as neighbours as compared with Christians. Other races are now acceptable as neighbours by the vast majority of the Jewish population. Given the Jewish historical experience, it is not surprising that 80 per cent of the population would not want to live next door to right-wing extremists.

Attitudes towards South Africa

Benefits from the 'new South Africa'

There have been substantial changes in South Africa since the new government came to power in 1994, some of which may be perceived positively and others negatively. This sample overwhelmingly judged the change as negative in its impact as shown in Table 23. So while about a third of the sample were positive about the benefits that have been gained for the people of South Africa as a whole, only 1 in 6 feel that they have benefited personally. There is an even clearer belief that the new political situation has not been of benefit to the Jewish community as a whole.

Table 23: Benefits from the 'new South Africa' (percentage)

The 'new South Africa' has benefited...	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
...the people of South Africa as a whole	35	13	52	100
...me	16	21	63	100
...the Jewish community	13	26	61	100

Crime and personal security

With social, political and economic changes have also come increases in crime and concerns about personal security. It has already been noted that on average, respondents believe that it is often justified to use a firearm in self-defence, a reflection of the growing concerns about personal safety.

This was confirmed when respondents were asked to rate South Africa in terms of personal safety. An overwhelming majority, 90 per cent of the sample, rated South Africa as either 'poor' or 'very poor' on this issue. Further concerns were highlighted when questioning those who were

fairly or very likely to leave South Africa to live in a different country during the next five years. Of these 267 individuals, 121 cited 'personal safety concerns' as their most important reason for leaving. A further 90 cited such concerns as their second or third most important reason.

Law and order

Given the growing concern about crime, perceptions of the purpose of criminal sanctions and appropriate punishments are important. The survey briefly addressed sentencing and law and order, eliciting views on what the main aim of imprisonment should be when someone is sentenced by a court. This is clearly a divisive issue. The sample was split across all four categories as follows: 25 per cent believe the main aim of imprisonment is to re-educate the prisoner; 28 per cent believe it is to make those who have done wrong pay for it; 27 per cent believe it is to protect other citizens; and the remaining 14 per cent think it is to act as a deterrent to others (1 per cent was unsure).


A more consensual topic was the application of the death penalty for different situations, between which there appeared to be very little to choose. Eighty per cent were in favour of the death penalty for murder in the course of a terrorist act, 81 per cent supported it for murder of a police officer and 79 per cent were in favour of the death penalty for other murders.

Cultural identity

Group identification is a particularly pertinent issue given the political and social changes in South Africa's recent history. It is interesting to see how this population perceives itself in the context of the country and the alignment of different groups of people living within it. They were asked 'Would you describe yourself more as an English speaking South African, a white South African, or both equally?' The smallest proportion, 9 per cent, identified themselves as 'more white South African', 57 per cent as 'equally English speaking and white', and 32 per cent as 'more English speaking South African'. Two per cent were unsure.

Respondents were then asked directly 'Would you say you feel more South African than Jewish, more Jewish than South African, or both equally?' in order to discover the range of identifications within this population. Figure 7 shows that only 7 per cent replied that they felt 'more South African than Jewish', 47 per cent that they felt 'equally South African and Jewish' and 45 per cent that they felt 'more Jewish than South African'. Only 1 per cent was unsure.

Figure 7: South African vs. Jewish group identity



There is obviously a sizeable segment of this population that does not regard itself as primarily South African (if it ever did) when offered this choice alongside language, race and ethnicity. This lack of national identity is probably unexceptional amongst a population subject for over 50 years to a political climate that stressed cultural difference and institutionalized racial and linguistic segregation.

Quality of life

One way of measuring the levels of optimism in this population in South Africa was to ask how much respondents agreed or disagreed with this statement: 'The quality of my life in South Africa will improve over the next five years'. Given the results reported so far it was not unexpected to find that just one in eight respondents (13 per cent) agreed with this optimistic statement while a further 19 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed. However, a resounding 65 per cent disagreed with the statement, the implication being that they believe that the quality of life in South Africa will in fact deteriorate over the next five years.

The accompanying finding that 59 per cent of respondents believe that people are less willing to help each other than they used to be 5 years ago may be implicated in these views on the current and future trends in the quality of life.

Social Responsibility

Attitudes towards charitable giving

The Hebrew term *tzedakah* is often translated into English merely as charity. However, this is an inadequate definition for it also means righteousness and social justice. There is a clear religious obligation on Jews to pursue these goals in the world. The Jewish population of South Africa, with its high degree of religiosity, should be well aware of this fact.

Given the clear biblical injunction on Jews to give to charity, the survey asked respondents whether they thought Jews had a special responsibility to give to charity because they were Jews or whether they had the same responsibilities as others. The sample was roughly divided into two halves on this question. Forty-one per cent agreed that Jews had a special responsibility to give and 58 per cent believed that they had the same responsibility as others (1 per cent didn't know). Presumably most of the latter group believed that Christians were also obligated to be charitable because of their acceptance of the Hebrew Bible.

Given these perceptions of charitable giving, respondents were also asked: 'Irrespective of what you did in the past year, do you feel you have a greater responsibility to support some types of charity than others?' Respondents were asked to choose between general South African charities, aid for the poor in other countries (i.e. outside SA), Jewish causes in South Africa and Israeli causes and to nominate both their first and second charitable priorities as shown in Table 24. Clearly this population believes in the old adage 'charity begins at home' since their first choice is their own community followed by other South Africans.

Table 24: First and second charitable priorities (percentage)

	First/highest priority	Second highest priority
Jewish causes in SA	70	18
General SA charities	18	36
Israeli causes	6	34
Aid for the poor outside SA	1	3
No priority charity type	5	9
Total	100	100

Patterns of charitable giving

Why some people in society are more charitable than others and how one motivates larger numbers of donors are questions of interest to social scientists as well as to charities. We would expect both the propensity to give and the size of gifts to be higher among South African Jews than among the general population because of a combination of factors including wide exposure to religious education and comparatively higher levels of socio-economic status, educational qualifications and income.

This survey addressed financial contributions to charitable causes. Respondents were questioned about both household and personal financial contributions to Jewish and non-Jewish causes or charities in the year prior to participating in the

survey. In terms of donations to Jewish causes, 75 per cent of respondents had personally made a financial contribution to these while an additional 12 per cent were part of a household within which donations had been made. A lower proportion of respondents, 61 per cent, had personally made a contribution to non-Jewish causes with an additional 10 per cent being within a household making such a contribution. Thus the actual pattern of charitable giving correlates well with the pattern of priorities discussed above.

Special responsibility on discrimination

Given the views of this population regarding prejudice and the recent abolition of the apartheid system of legalised discrimination, it is interesting to note that 42 per cent of the sample believe that Jews have a special responsibility, because they are Jews, to help people who suffer discrimination. The remaining 57 per cent believe that Jews have the same responsibility as others (1 per cent was unsure). Jews were often regarded as the most liberal element among the dominant white population. Their level of liberalism however needs to be seen in an international perspective. The above finding is even more pertinent when compared with UK figures whereby a higher proportion of British Jews (54 per cent) believed that Jews have a special responsibility to help others suffering discrimination.

HIV/AIDS

The HIV and AIDS pandemic is a health issue for communities and countries across the world but it is particularly serious in Africa. The fears associated with the disease results in some sufferers being exposed to discrimination. Attitudes towards HIV and AIDS are often formed in the context of communities and their values, and the survey addressed a range of such issues. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with a number of statements which reflected the views some people have about HIV and AIDS as shown in Table 25. These attitudes reveal a mix of educated liberalism together with more traditional Jewish views. Even among this well-educated population there is an element of placing the moral blame on sufferers.

Wealth tax

Nation building and social equity in South Africa may well require going beyond the redistribution of income. The introduction of a wealth tax would be one measure that would predominantly affect the wealthier inhabitants of South Africa, such as members of the Jewish community. The sample was divided on the issue of a wealth tax on assets and property owned. Twenty per cent agreed with the introduction of such a wealth tax,

Table 25: Attitudes towards HIV and AIDS (percentage)

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree
HIV/AIDS is the most serious social/health issue in South Africa	86	5	9
I would be totally comfortable having someone with HIV/AIDS as a guest in my house	63	18	19
I would be totally comfortable working with someone who has HIV/AIDS	60	20	20
People with AIDS should be able to work in any job they wish to	60	14	26
Official warnings about AIDS should say that some sexual practices are morally wrong	53	9	38
People with HIV/AIDS should have a right to privacy and should not have to tell people that they have AIDS	40	15	45
AIDS is a way of punishing the world for its decline in moral standards	25	17	58
Most people with AIDS have only themselves to blame	18	12	70
People with HIV/AIDS should be physically isolated from other people by law	4	4	92

14 per cent neither agreed nor disagreed and 63 per cent disagreed, while 3 per cent were unsure or didn't answer.

Government spending

One way of gauging the importance of certain services to individuals is to ask whether there should be more or less government spending in those areas, on the understanding that if increased spending is proposed there might have to be tax increases to pay for it. Table 26 shows the attitudes of respondents towards government spending on a range of services. There is a clear consensus regarding increased spending priorities on policing and law enforcement, education, health and old age pensions, which reflect the contemporary concerns of the Jewish population.

Table 26: Government spending on service (percentage)

More spending on...	Spend more	Spend the same	Spend less
Police and law enforcement	96	3	1
Education	88	10	2
Health	88	9	3
Old age pensions	81	18	1
Environment	50	43	7
Culture and the arts	33	44	23
Military and defence	13	35	52

Interestingly these concerns largely align with the spending priorities of the current government.

This table reflects a theoretical willingness to increase rates of taxation for spending on key services. This is particularly interesting given that 70 per cent of respondents think the amount of tax their household has to pay is too high at present.

Political outlook

Political party support in 1994 and 1998

This survey took place in 1998, four years after the 1994 general election but before the recent 1999 elections. Respondents were questioned on their voting patterns in the 1994 elections and their current political party preference as shown in Table 27.

Table 27: Support for political parties by eligible voters

	1994 General Election percentage	1998 Preference percentage
African National Congress	11.1	3.1
(New) National Party	30.8	4.4
Inkatha Freedom Party	1.2	0
Democratic Party	56.4	44.5
Freedom Front	0.2	0.3
United Democratic Movement	—	0.8
Others / Undecided*	0.3	46.9*
Total	100	100

The Jewish vote in 1994 was unique amongst the white population. Over half the Jews voted for the Democratic party, which gained less than 2 per cent of the vote nationally. Roughly one in nine voted for the African National Congress and one in three for the former governing National Party.

The party preference figures for 1998 reveal the political realignment and uncertainty that occurred during the period of South Africa's first multiracial parliament. There was a general decline in support for the National Party and of white support for the ANC. Our survey seemed to presage the emergence of the Democratic Party as the official opposition which took place at the second free General Election in 1999. Assuming the undecided spread their votes in the same way as those with a preference, we can assume that the Democratic Party led by Tony Leon received over 80 per cent of the Jewish vote.

The overwhelming Jewish support for the Democratic Party reflects the good fit between its political policies and approach and the opinions and attitudes presented in these findings. The clearest manifestation of this is the negative

attitude towards affirmative action which is regarded by the DP as merely an inversion of the apartheid mentality and a re-racialization of South African society.

Migration

Internal migration plans

Respondents' migration plans are clearly important for a community that is planning for the future; migration being concerned with not only emigration but also movements within South Africa. A high rate of residential migration has always been a feature of South African Jewry. There has been a drift away from the small centres of the *Platteland* and more recently the provincial centres towards the two major cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town.

However, a plateau has now been reached and less than 3 per cent of the sample intend to move within South Africa in the foreseeable future. Any further movement is likely to be towards Cape Town and away from Durban.

The Jewish future in Israel

An essential feature of classic Zionist ideology is the belief that only in a sovereign Jewish state is there a secure long-term future for Jews. Therefore in a Jewish community where emigration is a serious concern there is a real opportunity to measure Zionist commitment in action. Important conclusions can be drawn about the state of more ideologically-based attachment to Israel from the responses to the following statement: the only long-term future for Jews is in Israel. Respondents could tick one of five boxes: strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree. Of the total sample, only 8 per cent strongly agreed but 46 per cent rejected the classic Zionist view.

Attitudes towards aliyah

Whatever people's ultimate opinion about the long-term viability of the Jewish Diaspora, on the personal level Israel has entered into the equation as a place to live for a majority. In this 1998 South African survey, 8 per cent of the sample have lived there while 40 per cent have thought about going to live in Israel in the past.

Table 28: Attitudes towards aliyah (emigration to Israel)

	Frequency	Percentage
Made preparations	22	2
Maybe in the future	119	12
Thought about it	401	40
Have been but returned	67	7
Am an Israeli living in South Africa	10	1
Never thought about it	418	42

Return migrants

Information was sought about respondents' migratory patterns between January 1975 and the time of completing the survey. A total of 130 respondents, or 13 per cent of the sample, replied that they had left South Africa with the intention of settling in another country between 1975 and 1998 when the respondents were once again residing in South Africa. Emigration was particularly high during the years of 1979, 1985 and 1987, with half of the leavers going before 1985.

Of the 130 individuals who left South Africa during this period, 39 per cent went alone, 22 per cent went only with their spouse, a further 22 per cent went with their children and their spouse, 8 per cent with their parents and 8 per cent with other family members. The most popular countries for the returnees were Israel (35 per cent), the US (22 per cent), the UK (17 per cent) and Australia (13 per cent). However, one in four respondents who left to live in one country were not living in that same country before returning to South Africa.

As respondents to this survey, all individuals who left during this period returned to South Africa at some point prior to mid-1998. Thirty per cent of the leavers had returned after the political changes following the 1994 elections, with 9 per cent returning in 1996.

Emigration plans

Emigration and talk of emigration is a feature of contemporary white South African society. Yet when asked directly about their own personal emigration plans, it appears that the vast majority of Jews do not seriously contemplate leaving the country. Only around 12 per cent of the total sample are very likely to leave over the next five years. This figure too has to be offset against the 13 per cent of returnees who were emigrants in the past. Nevertheless, it appears there will be a constant stream of farewell parties for the foreseeable future which will inevitably lower communal morale. However the impact of overseas migration will vary across cities since proportionately more people appear to be planning to emigrate from the smaller centres of Durban (24 per cent) and Pretoria (16 per cent)

Table 29: Respondents' emigration plans

	Percentage	Cumulative percentage
Very likely will continue living in SA	44	44
Fairly likely will continue living in SA	28	72
Fairly likely will leave SA to live elsewhere	15	87
Very likely will leave SA to live elsewhere	12	99
Don't know	1	100

than from Johannesburg (12 per cent) and Cape Town (10 per cent).

Respondents were questioned on the likelihood of them staying or leaving South Africa in the next 5 years and the responses are shown in Table 29.

Destinations of potential emigrants

Responses to questions by respondents who were either 'fairly' or 'very likely' to leave South Africa in the next five years were examined further in terms of the countries they would most like to move to. Four countries emerged as being the most popular. Thirty-three per cent favoured Australia, 27 per cent favoured Israel, 20 per cent were most likely to move to the US and 13 per cent to the UK. We have noted that only one in four potential emigrants was seriously considering a future in Israel.

Reasons for leaving South Africa

The 27 per cent of respondents who said that they were either fairly or very likely to leave South Africa to live elsewhere in the next five years were questioned further on their reasons for leaving. One reason emerged as the primary concern for 52 per cent—personal safety. Other respondents' impetuses were to be with family (15 per cent), worries about the future of South Africa (15 per cent) and the education of their children (9 per cent).

The future of South African Jewry

The response patterns to the issues addressed in the report so far point to a cohesive community existing within what is perceived to be a turbulent social and political climate. Nation building, as already discussed, goes beyond the internal redistribution of power and wealth. It requires the availability of human capital as a foundation. The same may be said for the Jewish community and its infrastructure, and as such respondents'

Table 30: Attitudes towards the future of South African Jewry (percentage)

	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Total
It is likely that most Jews under the age of 30 years do not see a future for themselves in SA	87	8	5	100
The SA Jewish community is an ageing community	66	12	22	100
There will still be a substantial Jewish community in SA in 20 years	22	17	61	100

opinions were solicited on the future of Jewish life in South Africa as shown in Table 30.

Obviously the findings on the previous emigration questions colour people's expectations of the future. Table 30 suggests that respondents believe themselves to be part of an ageing community, one within which most younger Jews do not feel themselves to have a future. Interestingly, attitudes towards the perceptions of Jews under the age of 30 years were consistent across each age group including the target group itself.

There is a need to see the present rather pessimistic view of the future of South African Jewry in historical perspective. A question mark has hung over the future of the community ever since the National Party won the 1948 General Election and introduced apartheid. This led over the past 30 to 40 years to a slow erosion of the population base because of the emigration of young Jews and was particularly noticeable among the liberally minded and well qualified professionals whose qualifications meant that they were welcome in other countries.

5 Concluding remarks

South African Jewry remains vibrant, highly skilled and well qualified to assist in the development of a democratic South Africa. The vast majority of Jews do not wish to emigrate; they are deeply rooted in the country of their birth. However, crime and fears for personal safety remain a source of concern. The new government under President Thabo Mbeki has committed itself to tackling the unacceptable crime rate. Success in this regard will do much to ensure confidence among all South Africans, including Jews.

In the event of instability and a major demographic shift, all aspects of Jewish life will be affected: institutional memberships, synagogue life, welfare needs and services, schooling, funding—to say nothing of general morale. The emigration of philanthropists and benefactors is already being felt in a community heavily dependent on self-funding. Of course, emigration also affects the quality of leadership, and at this time of social transformation, the need for wise and sensitive guidance is acute. To date this has been manifest and there is good cause for optimism, both insofar as the Jews of South Africa are concerned and the country as a whole.

6 Further Analysis—Postscript

This report contains the highlights of the survey findings but it provides only a glimpse of the fascinating and wide range of topics and issues that the national survey covered. As such it is only the start of the process of analysing this large and rich data set. Appendix B shows there were actually over 100 questions posed to 1,000 persons. In fact hundreds of variables can be created from the answers which means there are hundreds of thousands of pieces of information potentially available. Many topics which were dealt with only perfunctorily in this report can be considered in much greater depth by drawing on additional answers to associated questions. For instance, there is much more that could be said about gender issues, demographics, migration, the media, health,

Jewish education, religious practice and Jewish identity than we had room for here.

The data presented here were mainly in the form of aggregate data—the overall national scores. There is the possibility of producing comparative breakdowns of groupings within the overall population. Mining of the data alongside segmenting the population will tell interesting and important stories. How and in what ways do Johannesburg and Cape Town Jews differ? Where do men and women, Reform and Orthodox, or young and old agree and disagree? What were the social profiles of Jewish ANC or NP voters in 1994? This data also provides important material for the crucial practical task of planning the future of South African Jewry in terms of education, welfare and religious services. The Kaplan Centre is committed to producing a series of further reports along these lines.

7 Appendices

Appendix A. Methodology of the 1998 National Survey of South African Jews

The objective of the survey was to complete 1,000 face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of adult South African Jews. The questionnaire content was designed to replicate as far as possible the postal JPR 1995 *Survey of the Social and Political Attitudes of British Jews*. The questionnaire also drew on other contemporary national surveys of Jewish populations as well as items from the *British Social Attitudes Survey* in order to enhance the comparative international context. The full range of topics covered can be seen in Appendix B. The questionnaire consisted of 100 questions and the average length of an interview was between 40-60 minutes.

1 Fieldwork

The fieldwork was carried out between June and October 1998. For a survey of this nature, evening or night-time interviewing is essential. A sizeable sector of interviewers in Johannesburg were reluctant to work at night because of fears relating to the levels of crime and violence. As a result the data collection took longer to complete than originally anticipated. In addition the questionnaire was quite long and often necessitated making appointments to interview.

2 Research approach and methodology

a. Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban

Communal lists were available for these cities. The lists were given to Decision Surveys International (DSI) in alphabetical order and comprised names, addresses and, in most cases, telephone numbers.¹²

To ensure that all suburbs were proportionately represented within each of the three cities, the suburbs were colour-coded on the full list and the number per suburb grouping were counted.¹³

12 The names were either those of individuals e.g. Mr R Levy, Mrs Z Jacobs) or couples (e.g. Mr and Mrs R Stein). The count covered the listings and was not a population count i.e. Mr and Mrs R Stein was counted as one name. The Pretoria lists excluded phone numbers and our interviewers were required to look up the numbers in the directory.

13 To yield numbers that could be worked with, the suburbs were grouped together if they were close to one another or in the same area. At times the grouping spanned a relatively large geographical area because of the suburbs being rather isolated and comprising a small number of Jewish people e.g. the 'Sarnia Queensborough, Cowies Hill, Westville, Berea North, Pinetown, Kloof, Hillcrest' grouping in the Durban sample.

Using Pretoria as an example, it was checked whether the list of 50 'originals' drawn comprised the correct proportion per suburb grouping and the list was corrected where necessary. Thus if the list of 50 'originals' drawn by the nth number method yielded 6 interviews in an area which the total suburb grouping count reflected as requiring 8 interviews, the sample was adjusted accordingly. However, such adjustments were only necessary in a few instances. Overall, the approach ensured that the sample would yield a representative spread area-wise within the three cities (Cape Town, Durban and Pretoria).

Since it was not always possible to obtain interviews with the original household drawn, the interviewers were also provided with 3 substitute names for each original name. So for example, if in Pretoria the first name on the list of 50 originals drawn was 'Mr and Mrs G Cohen from Sunnyside', the interviewers were provided with the first 3 names from the correct suburb grouping following G Cohen on the Pretoria communal list i.e. from the grouping 'Sunnyside, Brooklyn, Muckleneuk, Menlo Park'.

Substitution only occurred after at least 3 attempts were made to obtain the required respondent from the 'original' household. More specifically the interviewers telephoned a household from the 'original' list and then applied the 'last birthday' method to determine which person in the household should be interviewed. Following this the interviewer attempted to set up an appointment to conduct a personal interview with the *selected respondent*. If this interview could not be conducted, interviewers did not substitute it for someone else in the household as this could have skewed the sample. Instead they tried the first substitute household and applied the 'last birthday' approach and so on.

b. Johannesburg

The lack of communal lists in Johannesburg necessitated a review of information on proportionate distribution of Jewish people in various suburbs. DSI were obliged to use the 1991 census data as a starting point. The data was submitted to the South African Jewish Board of Deputies and they adjusted it in accordance with their current suburb proportion estimates. These new proportions were used to structure the Johannesburg sample i.e. based on these proportions the number of interviews to be done per suburb and per suburb grouping was calculated.

Grids were used to draw the sample. If, for example, a suburb required 15 interviews the map of that suburb was divided into 15 grid-blocks and

a starting point was found within each block. Using starting point no. 1 as an example: The household at the starting point was approached. A 'contact questionnaire' was used to establish if anyone in the household considers himself/herself to be Jewish and, if so, the 'last birthday' method was applied to identify the selected respondent. If there were no Jewish household members, interviewers tried to get a lead as to where the nearest Jewish person lived and/or the interviewer moved on to find a household comprising a Jewish person(s). The first household in which they found a Jewish person would become the 'original' household for starting point no. 1. The 'last birthday' method was then used to select the respondent. If for some reason the selected respondent could not be interviewed, interviewers would move on to find a substitute household comprising Jewish person(s) and would reapply the birthday method to select a respondent. Once again—as was the case for other cities—substitution only occurred after at least three attempts to obtain an interview with the selected respondent from the original household had been made.

c. Substitution during the survey

It should be noted that interviewers were instructed to put maximum effort into obtaining the respondents from 'original' households. They only moved to substitute households if it was essential to do so as follows:

- When there were 'refusals'.
- When there was no reply from the selected 'original' household after at least 3 calls made at suitable times.
- When the respondent selected via the last birthday method from the original household was unavailable during the interviewing period (e.g. on leave, holiday, seriously ill, in hospital); permanently mentally or physically disabled to the extent that they could not be interviewed; theoretically in the relevant city at the time and fit to be interviewed but could not be contacted or interviewed despite at least 3 attempts to contact or interview the individual at appointed times.

In the survey as a whole, a high percentage of 'originals' was obtained, that is:

- 77.5 per cent of the interviews were with the selected respondents from the original households.
- 22.5 per cent of the interviews were with respondents from substitute households.

The reasons for the substitutions were:

- 6.3 per cent: refusals
- 2.5 per cent: selected household could not be contacted after at least three attempts

- 5.5 per cent: selected respondent unavailable during interviewing period
- 0.6 per cent: selected respondent permanently mentally or physically disabled to the extent that they could not be interviewed
- 1.8 per cent: selected respondent could not be contacted/interviewed despite at least three attempts at appointed times
- 5.8 per cent: instructed by office to substitute¹⁴

3 Sample size and composition

Decisions relating to sample size and composition were based on the study objectives, the estimated number and distribution of Jewish people in various cities/areas throughout South Africa and budgetary issues. Unfortunately, there was no up-to-date information on the number and distribution of Jewish people. It was therefore necessary to work with adjusted 1991 census data to decide on which cities to include in the survey and the proportion of interviews per city and the distribution of interviews in Johannesburg since no communal lists were available there.¹⁵

In total, 1,000 individual face-to-face interviews were conducted with Jewish males and females

Table 31: Proportion of respondents per city (percentage)

City	Proportion per city
Johannesburg	65
Cape Town	25
Pretoria	5
Durban	5

Table 32: Sex distribution of respondents

Sex	Percentage of sample
Male	46.4
Female	53.6

Table 33: Age distribution of respondents

Age group	Percentage of sample
18-24	12.8
25-34	16.5
35-44	19.2
45-54	20.8
55-64	12.3
65-7	49.9
75 yrs and older	8.5

¹⁴ Throughout the survey the proportions of males and females and those within different age groups were monitored. Towards the end of the survey it was necessary to boost the proportion of males and younger age groups in order to ensure that there would be adequate numbers in each cell for the purpose of data analysis. Adjustment totalled 5.8 per cent.

¹⁵ Details of the 1991 adjusted data showing proportions of Jewish people per city were given to JPR together with initial sample recommendations per city. JPR made final decisions as to the sample composition.

aged 18 years and older in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban. In the absence of precise up-to-date information, the extent to which the age and sex ratios in the sample being obtained reflected the current total Jewish population is unknown.

Although JPR had opted for using the 'last birthday' method without controlling the male:female ratio, DSI was concerned that an imbalance could occur. The gender ratio was monitored throughout the survey and it was found necessary

to boost the male proportion towards the end of the survey. Similarly it was also necessary to boost the younger age groups towards the end of the survey (as mentioned previously).

Suburbs for Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban

There were lists to work from in these three cities. Table 34 shows the area proportions per suburb grouping based on analysis of the lists and alongside that the proportions actually obtained in this survey.

Table 34: Sample proportions in Cape Town, Pretoria and Durban

City and area	Proportions based on list analysis percentage	Proportions obtained in survey percentage
Cape Town		
Sea Point/ Anchor Bay/ Fresnaye/ Green Point/ Mouille Point/ Granger Bay	42	39
Camps Bay/ Bantry Bay/ Clifton/ Bakoven/ Hout Bay/ Llandudno	10	12
Vredenhoeck/ Highlands/ Highlands Estate/ Oranjezicht/ Gardens/ Kloofnek/ Higgovale/ Tamboerskloof/ Devil's Peak/ Woodstock/ University Estate/ Zonnebloem/ Central	10	11
Rondebosch/ Rosebank/ Rondebosch East/ Crawford/ Observatory/ Mowbray/ Pinelands	4	4
Newlands/ Bishops court/ Claremont/ Kenilworth/ Wynberg	13	14
Constantia	5	5
Plumstead/ Diep River/ Bergvliet/ Meadowridge/ Heathfield/ Zeekoevlei/ Retreat/ Southfield	3	2
Muizenberg/ Marina Da Gama/ Tokai/ Kirestenhof/ Lakeside/ St. James/ Noordhoek/ Scarborough/ Kommetjie/ Fishhoek/ Simonstown/ Kalkbay	3	3
Tableview/ Milnerton/ Brooklyn/ Rugby/ Monte Vista/ Bothasig/ Richwood/ Edgemoed/ Melkbosstrand/ Bloubergstrand/ Strand/ Maitland/ Goodwood	9	8
Bellville/ Panorama/ Durbanville/ Brackenfell/ Tygerhof	1	2
	100	100
Pretoria		
Waterkloof/ Monument Park/ Groenkloof/ Waterkloof Ridge/ Waterkloof Heights/ Maroelana/ Hazelwood/ Ashlea Gardens	38	42
Sunnyside/ Brooklyn/ Muckleneuk/ New Muckleneuk/ Muckleneuk Hill/ Garsfontein/ Lynnwood/ Lynnwood Glen/ Arcadia/ Hatfield/ Central Pretoria/ Bosman St./ Lukasrand/ Elardus Park/ Faerie Glen/ Newlands/ Menlo Park	58	52
Colbyn/ Rietfontein/ Silverton/ Queenswood/ Totiusdal	3	2
Centurion/ Lyttleton/ Innesdale/ Clubview	1	4
	100	100
Durban		
Durban North/ Glen Ashley/ Sunningdale/ Umgeni Park/ Glen Hills/ Umhlanga/ Umhlanga Rocks/ Virginia/ Glen Anil/ Umgeni Heights/ La Lucia	16	16
Lambert Rd./ Marriot Rd/ Greyville/ Mont Pelier/ Overport/ Nonoti Ave/ Morningside/ Wallace Rd/ Dronfield Rd/ Ridge Rd/ Newlyn Rd/ Currie Rd/ Chelmsford Rd/ Vause Rd/ Musgrave Rd/ 10 th Avenue/ Springfield/ Essenwood/ Berea/ Bellevue Rd/ Norfolk Rd	36	40
Pinsent Rd/ Aliwal St/ Field St/ West St/ Somtseu Rd/ Old Fort Rd/ Marine Parade/ Seaview St/ Sol Harris Crescent/ Snell Parade/ Playfair Rd	18	12
Glenmore/ Congella/ Glenwood/ Moore Rd/ Manning Rd/ Carrington Heights/ Howardene/ Mayville/ Lamont Rd/ Davenport Rd	22	26
Sarnia/ Queensborough/ Cowies Hill/ Westville/ Berea North/ Pinetown/ Kloof/ Hillcrest	8	6
	100	100

The 1996 National Census data

The most recent national census data, which included a voluntary question on religion, became available at the end of 1998 once the survey had already been completed. Although it was received in time for weighting the survey data if necessary, this did not seem to be necessary or wise. The new census data is still controversial because of problems of coverage and coding. However, some comparative census information on the Jewish population is used for the relative proportions for the cities included in the survey and the sex and age ratios as shown in Table 35. The census results appeared largely to validate the geographical distribution and sex ratios of the sample. However, they suggested that the survey may have oversampled the middle aged at the expense of the elderly population. Yet, given the concern of the sponsors about the future of Jews in the 'new South Africa', this may not be regarded as a serious deficiency.

Table 35: Comparisons between the census and the survey data

Variable	New 1996 Census Data ¹⁶ percentage	Survey Respondents percentage
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	46.6	46.4
Female	53.4	53.6
<i>Age</i>		
18-24	12.1	12.8
25-34	16.2	16.5
35-44	15.5	19.2
45-54	17.0	20.8
55-64	13.2	12.3
65-74	13.4	9.9
75+	12.6	8.5
<i>City</i>		
Johannesburg	67.8	65.0
Pretoria	4.2	5.0
Cape Town	20.6	25.0
Durban	7.3	5.0

¹⁶ The census results show a sizeable sector of the Jewish population as being black. Interestingly they are geographically dispersed and they do not reside in Vendaland, the Lemba tribal area, so they cannot belong to this tribe which considers itself Jewish. Given this discrepancy, the comparative data shown above uses the census data only for white Jews.

Appendix B. Question Guide

Topic	Question	Topic	Question
Household demographics (including respondent)	House size Sex Relationships within household Age Jewish/non-Jewish Country of birth/ parents' country of birth	Media	Radio listening Cable TV including Shalom Jewish Voice TV programme Newspaper readership Jewish newspaper readership Bias in media representations
Individual demographics	Income: personal/household Marital status Employment status Partner's employment status Highest educational qualification Languages spoken Housing tenure	Prejudice and antisemitism	Racial prejudice over 5 years SA antisemitism over 5 years SA anti-Zionism over 5 years Problem of antisemitism in SA Anti-Jewish feelings scenarios Antisemitism vs. racism Groups posing threat to Jews in SA Groups act in ways that cause hostility Personal experience of antisemitism Jewish responsibility to sufferers
Individual migration	Year moved to address City/town/country lived 5 years ago City/town/country lived 10 years ago Year left SA prior to 1975 Who left SA with, pre-1975 Country left to go to prior 1975 Year of return to SA Year parents came to SA Citizenship Likelihood will move in 3 years If move—suburb, city, country Likelihood leave SA in 5 years Reasons for staying and leaving Community tax if left Country ratings: SA, US, UK, Australia, Israel, Canada	Israel	Friends/relatives in Israel Ever visited Number of visits in 10 years Attachment to Israel Aliyah considerations Land for peace
Family migration	Family migration patterns post 1975	Charitable giving	Personal/HH donations to Jewish causes Personal/HH donations to non-Jewish causes Total personal donation Jewish/non-Jewish breakdowns Charitable priorities Jewish responsibility to give
Medical insurance	Medical aid cover	Identity	South African vs. Jewish English speaking vs. white Jewish social network
Children	Have children or not Sex and age of children School attendance of oldest child	Attitudes to Judaism	Jewish consciousness Personal sense of Jewishness Strength of Jewish identity recently Beliefs and experience Feelings about Torah
Taxation attitudes	Government spending on different areas Income tax level Wealth tax attitude Communal tax if left SA	Practice and observance	Jewish religious practice profile Observance: Shabbat, Seder, Christmas Kashrut Expense of kashrut Various religious practices Synagogue attendance, belonging
Moral attitudes	Helpfulness of people Importance of religion in future Personal and social practices	Conversion	Age of conversion
Marriage, divorce and sexual relationships	Civil divorce ease Get and support of community Institution of marriage Sexual relationship types Gender roles	Single attitudes	Welcoming nature of community Search for partner; Jewish or not
HIV and AIDS	HIV/AIDS attitudes	Community attitudes	Community, singles, intermarriage Jewish organizations—cliquey Support of community for people Future of community in SA
Social distance	Groups of people as neighbours Type of Jews at ease with	Jewish education	Experience of Jewish education Jewish/Zionist youth club Other Jewish youth experiences Role of Jewish education Jewish upbringing—practice
Political support	Party closest to Voting/support pre- and post-1994	Jewish adult education	Taken courses Been Jewish education teacher
Life in 'new South Africa'	Benefits/quality of life	Parental Jewish identity	Parents Jewish or not Parental beliefs and practices
Law and order	Attitudes towards types of laws Aim of imprisonment Attitudes towards death penalty		

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