UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AFRICA

Changes of government and the expansion of social cash transfer programmes in East and Southern Africa

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IDCPPA Working Paper No. 26

June 2021

institute for democracy, citizenship and public policy in Africa

Published by the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa
University of Cape Town
2021

http://www.idcppa.uct.ac.za

ISBN: 978-1-77011-452-4

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between changes of government and the expansion of Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programmes in 10 East and Southern African countries. It examines 53 cases of changes of government for the period 1990 to 2015, including partial changes of government (i.e., changes of president within the same ruling coalition) and complete changes of government (i.e., electoral alternation between political parties and presidential candidates). The paper examines the extent to which changes of government and other variables, such as democratization, donor influence, and the interests of political elites, predict the expansion of social cash transfers. The bivariate analysis for this study shows that higher levels of democracy were associated with the expansion of SCTs in the region. The multivariate analysis shows that the interests of political elites and donor influence (controlling for other independent variables) were significant predictors of reforms to expand SCTs in the region. While the evidence shows that changes of government were not predictors of SCT expansion, the evidence shows that in electorally competitive low-income and lower-middle income countries in the region, the pace of SCT expansion increased over time with the introduction of donor programmes, and as the incidence of changes of government increased. This contrasted with upper-middle income countries in the region that generally expanded the provision of SCTs over time regardless of whether changes of government happened or not. It also contrasted with low-income and lower-middle-income countries that were weak democracies (and did not experience electoral alternation), as these countries expanded SCTs at a slower pace even after the introduction of donor programmes.

1. Introduction

In the early 2000s, social protection programmes proliferated across much of Anglophone East and Southern Africa (Hickey et al., 2019). This includes Social Cash Transfer (SCT) programmes that were promoted by transnational organizations including bilateral donors (such as the United Kingdom's Department for International Development), multilateral agencies (e.g., the European Union and United Nations agencies), international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank) and international nongovernmental organizations such as Concern Worldwide (Devereux & Kapingidza, 2020:273). By 2017, cash transfers were the most widespread form of social protection in Africa, accounting for 41% of total spending on social safety nets (Beegle, Coudouel & Monslave, 2018: 7).

The pace at which national governments adopted and expanded SCT programmes differed across the region with some countries implementing more comprehensive social protection programmes than others (see, for example, Davis et al., 2016). Even within countries, some national governments provided more social protection than government administrations that were in power at different time periods (see, for example, Chinyoka & Seekings (2016) on Zimbabwe, Granvik (2019) on Lesotho, and Siachiwena (2020) on Malawi and Zambia). One factor explaining variation in the expansion of SCTs in the region is the advent of multiparty democracy since the 1990s (Carbone, 2012; Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Democratic reforms in the early 1990s were associated with expectations of improved social welfare for citizens because democratic elections provided incentives for voters to hold their governments accountable to provide more public goods and social benefits (Carbone, 2012: 158). The expansion of social protection has also been fueled by political parties and their leaders, who expect that the promotion of programmes such as SCTs will translate into electoral support (Seekings, 2019). Nonetheless, there is no scholarly consensus over whether the expansion of social protection (or social assistance) programmes provide electoral benefits for incumbents (Seekings, 2019: 2). While evidence from some Latin American countries shows that receiving cash transfers (or other social grants) increases the probability that recipients will turn out to vote and then vote for an incumbent, there is also some evidence that non-recipients of grants may react negatively to incumbents (*ibid.*: 3).

Elsewhere, in Latin America for example, electoral competition between left-wing and right-wing political parties provided incentives for the expansion of cash transfers, although in countries such as Chile and Mexico, right-wing governments were often the advocates of reform (Fairfield & Garay, 2017). In sub-Saharan Africa, statistical evidence from the 2010s suggests that changes of government – rather than electoral competition per se – were an important factor explaining variation in the provision of social welfare – measured by changes in: health expenditure, primary school enrolment rate, life expectancy at birth, and under five mortality rate (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017). Poor economic performance increased the likelihood of electoral alternation and provided incentives for newly elected governments to make policy adjustments that included the provision of better education and health services (Pellegata & Quaranta, 2019).

While there is some evidence that changes of government result in the expansion of social welfare more broadly, the evidence is less clear regarding the implications for SCTs specifically. Process-tracing evidence from Malawi and Zambia showed that in cases where SCTs had not already been embraced as a policy option to address poverty, changes of government created conditions that allowed new government administrations to expand donor-initiated pilots into national programmes (Siachiwena, 2020). The administrations of Michael Sata in Zambia (that came to power through elections in 2011 after defeating an incumbent) and Joyce Banda in Malawi (that came to power through succession after the death of an incumbent president)[1] were motivated to adopt and expand SCTs because of a convergence between the interests of transnational actors and political elites in the new government administrations.

For their part, political elites were motivated by three factors. First, electoral competition provided incentives for Sata and Banda to brand themselves around new modes of redistribution to incorporate voting constituencies that were hitherto not covered by existing mechanisms for redistribution. As is the case in other African countries, such as Malawi (where ideology is less likely to inform voting behaviour), it is important for Zambian presidential candidates to adopt brands that allow them to build multi-ethnic or cross-regional support, to broaden support beyond their ethnic or regional bases (van Donge, 1995). Second, there was a divergence in the ideas and beliefs between leaders in new government administrations and their predecessors regarding the role of social protection in poverty reduction. Finally, intra-party contestation created conditions where factions within ruling coalitions supported different policies and modes of redistribution, with some factions providing more support for social protection than others (Siachiwena, 2020).

The case studies from Malawi and Zambia were not sufficient to make broader claims regarding the impact of changes of government for SCT expansion beyond the two countries. This paper extends the qualitative process-tracing analysis from Malawi and Zambia to the broader region that the two countries belong to. Therefore, this paper provides a quantitative analysis of 10 East and Southern

[1] Joyce Banda was elected vice president of Malawi in 2009 as Bingu wa Mutharika's running mate. In 2010, Mutharika anointed his younger brother, Peter Mutharika, to succeed him as Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader at the end of his second term which was ending in 2014. Banda opposed this move because it frustrated her own political ambitions. She was expelled from the DPP in 2010 for opposing Mutharika's succession plan, but she remained republican vice president in accordance with the constitution. She formed the People's Party (PP) in 2011 and assumed the presidency in 2012, upon the death of Mutharika, as the leader of the PP. The DPP was effectively relegated to the opposition.

African countries to examine the relationship between changes of government and the expansion of SCTs from 1990 to 2015. The countries included in the analysis fall into three country clusters. The first cluster includes three upper-middle income and democratic countries (Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa) that have SCT programmes that were initiated by national governments and mostly predate donor-initiated programmes that emerged elsewhere in the region in the early 2000s. The second cluster includes four low-income and lower-middle-income countries (Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia) that are electorally competitive and have SCT programmes mostly initiated or supported by donors. The third cluster includes three low-income and lower-middle-income countries (Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) that are weakly democratic (i.e., their politics have been dominated by one governing political party with no record of electoral alternation). These countries also have SCT programmes that were initiated by transnational actors.

This study examines the relative importance of changes of government and related factors (including democratization, donor influence, and the interests of political elites) for the expansion of SCTs. The evidence presented in this paper shows that the interests of political elites and donor influence (controlling for levels of democracy and country income status, among other independent variables) were significant predictors for the expansion of SCTs in the region. The multivariate analysis shows that changes of government did not predict the expansion of SCTs in the region. Nonetheless, in low-income and lower-middle-income countries that were also electorally competitive, the expansion of SCTs coincided with the introduction of donor supported programmes and partial and complete changes of government. The case was different for upper middle-income countries that experienced high expansion scores in the 1990s that gradually declined after 2000. The case was further different for low-income and lower-middle-income countries that were weakly democratic (and did not experience complete changes of government) that expanded SCTs at a much slower pace than countries in the other two clusters.

2. Changes of government and the expansion of SCTs

This study considers two forms that a change of government may take. The first is a partial change of government which is characterized by a change in leadership within a governing ruling coalition, for example when a new president is elected from the same party as an outgoing president. A partial change also includes cases where constitutional provisions allow for presidential succession without the need for fresh elections. The second is a complete change of government which occurs when executive office is assumed by a newly elected political party that comes into power through national elections after defeating the former governing political party.

Literature on public policy in the United States provides insights that help to explain the importance of electoral alternation to policy reform. Kingdon (1995: 168) postulated that a change of government (and the turnover of political leaders) provided a policy window for a new set of political leaders, government technocrats, agencies (including transnational actors) to push for positions and policies that did not gain traction with the previous administration. In sub-Saharan Africa, cross-national data on social welfare (but not social protection) have shown that changes of government (between political parties) provided newly elected governments with a greater incentive to provide better social assistance than their predecessors because they recognized that the ousted governments did not 'satisfy voters' demands and expectations' (Carbone & Pellegata, 2017: 1973).

The global literature on welfare state building shows that factors such as democracy, partisanship (i.e., the relative influence of either left-wing or right-wing governments), and economic development were important predictors of SCT expansion, especially in Latin America (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Huber & Stephens, 2012; Van Kersbergen & Vis, 2014). Therefore, while focusing on the contribution of changes of government for SCT expansion in East and Southern Africa, this study also considers the contribution of other predictor variables.

3. Theoretical and empirical evidence

The relative importance of changes of government for the expansion of SCT programmes in East and Southern Africa is not fully understood. The available evidence shows that in Kenya, higher levels of democracy were associated with more spending on social protection, but it is unclear if electoral alternation had any effect on the expansion of SCTs (Opalo, 2019). In South Africa, the ruling African National Congress has consistently expanded the provision of social grants since coming to power in 1994, despite minimal threats to its dominance. Moreover, multivariate analysis shows that, controlling for overall government performance, receiving social grants did not inform voting intentions among South Africans (Seekings, 2019).

Evidence from other regions provides a broader analysis of the implications of democracy (and related variables) on the expansion of social protection programmes. Much of the global literature examining welfare state development and reforms to social protection has focused on the contribution of democratization, partisanship, economic development, and regional diffusion on social welfare outcomes. Studies show a generally strong and positive effect for democracy on at least some measures of welfare provision. Evidence from 114 developing countries in the Global South,[2] from 1990 to 2011, shows that higher levels of democracy were associated with an increased likelihood of adopting any form of cash transfers (both conditional and unconditional) (Brooks, 2015).

The evidence was similar for Latin American and Caribbean countries. Brown and Hunter (1999) found that for a set of 17 Latin American countries, from 1980 to 1992, governments in democratic countries were relatively more sensitive to political pressure from groups that benefitted from social security (meaning, primarily, social insurance) than governments of authoritarian countries. Cruz-Martinez (2017) did not find evidence to suggest that democratization was the main driver of welfare state development in Latin America and the Caribbean, in eight out of 17 countries that he examined, but he found that low levels of democratization appear to have been the main reason behind low welfare state development. More recently, a study of 35 sub-Saharan African countries also found evidence showing that the level of democracy had a positive and statistically significant correlation with total spending on social protection (Opalo, 2019).

The foregoing studies focused on different dependent variables and had different measures of welfare state provision. It is likely that democracy might have more of an effect on some measures than others. Seekings (2013) found that expenditure on social insurance was weakly correlated with democracy (using Polity measures) but expenditure on social assistance was not (using data from c.2000 prior to the recent expansion of new and much better data). This provides some evidence that measuring welfare along one dimension (expenditure) is insufficient to understand variation.

Moreover, the studies controlled for other demographic and development variables that show different effects for democracy on social welfare. Brooks (2015) found that democratic countries with a small youth population size relative to the working age population had a higher likelihood of adopting cash transfer programmes. She also found that democracies with higher levels of per capita income were more likely to enact Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) compared to unconditional cash transfers, while the reverse was true for countries with low levels of per capita income. Similar effects were evident in Latin America. Brown and Hunter (1999) found that the poorest democracies increased social insurance spending by a substantial margin over authoritarian regimes, controlling for other independent variables in their model.

[2] East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America, Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

There is also evidence supporting the contribution of partisan effects on social welfare. Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) found that in 14 Latin American countries, from 1973 to 1997, popular based governments (parties with strong historical links to labour unions or 'the popular sector') were more likely to protect and expand spending on pensions and other forms of welfare transfers. Similarly, Huber and Stephens (2012) found that amongst 18 Latin American countries, democracy enabled left wing governments to provide more social spending because of the effect of left political strength which relied on support of poorer classes. However, recent evidence from developing countries shows that the effect of partisanship on social spending differs depending on the type of programmes. Brooks (2015) demonstrated that across the Global South, the expansion of conditional cash transfers was in neither the left nor the right of the political spectrum (as discussed further by Fairfield and Garay, 2017). Rather, the adoption of CCTs was more likely when governing power between the executive and the legislature was more deeply divided between ideological rivals. This was because conditionalities provided a potential compromise between ideological polarities on welfare state provision. Furthermore, partisanship appeared to have no systematic effect in the adoption of unconditional cash transfers (Brooks, 2015).

Although the study by Brooks (2015) also included cases from the sub-Saharan Africa region, studies that examine the effect of partisanship for African countries only remain very limited. Carbone and Pellegata (2017) did not address partisanship explicitly, but they considered the effects of changes of government between political parties on measures of social welfare – measured by changes in: health expenditure, primary school enrolment, life expectancy at birth, and under five mortality rates. Their study found that multiparty democracies in which electoral turnovers took place over time were more likely to provide more social welfare for their citizens than countries in which such instances occurred less frequently or never took place at all.

Regarding economic development, there appears to be a consensus that high levels of growth contributed to more social spending across regions. Schmitt et al. (2015) found that for 177 territories and independent states, economic growth was a catalyst for welfare state development, with rich countries spending more on social security than poor countries. Cruz-Martinez (2017) could not provide evidence that high levels of industrialization were the common path that conditioned welfare state development in Latin America and the Caribbean, but he found that low levels of industrialization appeared to be one of two main reasons behind the low welfare state development for eight countries in the region.

Finally, studies have also examined the contribution of regional diffusion on the adoption of some social welfare programmes. For example, Schmitt et al. (2015)

showed that there was strong evidence for the existence of regional diffusion of social security programmes and that membership of the International Labour Organization (ILO) had a clear impact on the adoption of work, injury, sickness, and old age programmes. Furthermore, Brooks (2015) found that as more countries of the same geographic region implemented CCTs, the likelihood of subsequent adoptions among regional peers increased, but the effect was sharpest in Latin America compared to other regions she considered. The diffusion of social assistance programmes has also been influenced by colonial legacies. Schmitt (2020) and Seekings (2014; 2020) found that the colonial policies and welfare state principles, that the British and French colonial Empires adopted to address social risks in their colonies, have influenced contemporary approaches to social protection in low and lower-middle income countries.

The foregoing discussion shows that democratization, partisanship (including changes of government), economic development and regional diffusion were among the most significant explanatory variables for social spending for the adoption of social programmes. Therefore, this study considered variables that provided measures of similar outcome and explanatory variables adopted by other global and regional studies. In the sections that follow, I discuss how these variables were measured before providing a discussion on the data and methods used for this study.

4. Literature review of data and variables

While this study focuses primarily on SCTs, most of the quantitative analyses on welfare state development have focused on other forms of social welfare provision. This includes dependent variables that measure social spending on social welfare or on social security. The rest of this section examines the data that other studies used for cross national statistical analysis and considers how the main dependent and independent variables were measured.

Most studies have focused on social spending on various aspects of social welfare ('effort') for their dependent variables. For example, in a study to analyse the determinants of social spending, poverty and inequality for a cross national study of 18 Latin American countries, Huber and Stephens (2012) computed outcome variables for education, health and social security spending as percentages of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The data were obtained from the United Nations University Worldwide Institute for Development Economics Research's Income Inequality Database and the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean. These datasets provided survey data that were comparable across country-years.

Some studies focus on the introduction of welfare programmes. Schmitt et al. (2015) sought to determine the international and domestic factors that explain when and why national governments take on the responsibility of providing social protection. Their study covered 177 territories and independent states from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and the Americas, for the period 1820 to 2013. Using data obtained from the United States Social Security Administration, the study computed outcome variables for the introduction date of five dimensions of social security legislation (compensation in case of work injury, sickness, old age, unemployment, and family support). This provided the researchers with notionally comparable data for all territories and independent states for the period under consideration.

Other studies also used comparable data on social spending for a range of countries over time. Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) used International Monetary Fund data on social spending (including per capita spending, spending as percentage of GDP, and share of central government spending) on social security, education, and healthcare for their time series cross section analysis of fourteen Latin American countries from 1973 to 1991. Brown and Hunter (1999) used social spending and social spending per capita on programmes in education, health, sanitation, housing, and social security as outcome variables. Carbone and Pellegata's (2017) study on the effect of changes of government on social welfare focused on four social welfare outcome variables: health expenditure, primary school enrolment rate, life expectancy at birth, and under five mortality-rate.

Most of the studies highlighted above did not focus on SCTs for their dependent variables. A few exceptions include Seekings (2013; 2014) which focused on social assistance and social insurance and Brooks (2015) in her study which examined factors explaining variation in the adoption of cash transfers. Brooks did not focus on social spending on programmes, but focused instead on whether countries had adopted a conditional or unconditional cash transfer. Her emphasis was on the year programmes were introduced, which she coded 1 for a year a programme was introduced and 0 otherwise. By using a binary dependent variable, she was able to use a dynamic logit model to estimate the likelihood that in any given year between 1990 and 2011, a country had adopted a cash transfer programme.

In terms of independent variables, various measures of democracy, partisanship, economic development, and regional diffusion have been used in different studies. For Huber and Stephens (2012), the main political (independent) variables included democracy (regime type), long-term democracy, left-political strength (proportion of left and centre-left legislative seats over time), and repressive authoritarianism. 'Polity 2 Score' was a commonly used measure of democracy and was also useful for classifying autocracies and democracies (Brooks, 2015; Schmitt et al., 2015). Measures of partisanship included binary measures of left-wing government and right-wing government (e.g., Brooks, 2015). Meanwhile, GDP per capita, GDP growth and inflation rate were the most common measures of economic development. The economic measures were at times used as control variables together with measures such as population size, age dependency, and exchange rates. For the regional diffusion measure, studies considered the probability of a country adopting programmes if similar decisions were made elsewhere in the geographic region and the impact of membership to organizations such as ILO (Brooks, 2015; Schmitt et al., 2015).

5. Data

This study would have benefited greatly from using a dataset that provided quantitative data on various aspects of social protection (including expenditure on programmes and coverage) for a large-N sample of African countries over a long-time horizon. The World Bank's Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE) database provides a comprehensive and comparable set of social protection indicators. However, the database is recent and does not include much data collected before 2010. This limits the use of the data for this study which looks at reform covering a longer period. In addition, to the extent that ASPIRE provides data since 2010, data are not available for every year for all indicators. In the absence of a reliable dataset, I had to create my own. The dataset for this study was primarily obtained from the Legislating and Implementing Welfare Policy Reforms (LIWPR) research project.[3] The data collected focused on reforms to social cash transfer programmes for 53 cases of government administrations in 10 countries. The period considered for this study was from 1990 (the start of the third wave of democracy) to 2015 (when the last change of government considered in the analysis happened).

To create the dataset, I employed the use of 'quasi-statistics.' Prominent qualitative researchers such as Howard Becker and Martyn Hammersley have used quasi-statistics which refers to the use of simple counts of things to support terms such as 'some', 'usually' and 'most' (Maxwell, 2010). There are both advantages and disadvantages of using such statistics. Quasi-statistics can be used for the generalization of qualitative research claims to a broader set of cases. However, a major drawback of using simple counts is that while they may count things precisely, they may be inaccurate measurements which lack validity (*ibid.*). Using simple counts, I coded various aspects of SCT expansion and of changes of government.

For SCT expansion, I used existing data to code whether a reform happened under a government administration for five dimensions of expansion that this study focuses on. A more robust measurement would be to determine the extent of

[3] This paper forms part of doctoral research that I conducted as a researcher on the LIWPR research project in the Institute for Development, Citizenship and Public Policy at the University of Cape Town.

expansion. For example, I use simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ categories in response to the question, ‘Were there reforms to increase state funding for social cash transfer programmes?’ A more robust measure would consider actual expenditure on cash transfers and would consider changes in spending between different governments. However, data on spending, coverage, and other aspects of expansion for most African countries going back to the early 1990s are either unavailable or difficult to obtain. This makes it impossible to collect accurate time series data on expansion.

The quantitative analysis was conducted in an exploratory manner with a view to determine whether the relationship between SCT expansion and changes of government could be found beyond the Malawi and Zambia case studies. Nevertheless, the analysis had significant limitations. On the one hand, the study was limited to only 53 cases in 10 countries. The Africa Leadership Change Project, which forms the basis of Carbone and Pellegata’s 2017 study, is built on a dataset covering all 54 countries in Africa from 1960 to 2015. Such a dataset is more suitable for regression analysis and for making broad inferences. On the other hand, this study used simple counts to measure variables. Despite these obvious limitations, this study provides a foundation upon which further and more robust research can be conducted to examine the statistical relationship between changes of government and SCT expansion in Africa.

6. Variables and methods

This study was primarily concerned with reforms to expand the provision of social cash transfers. It would have been appropriate to measure the dependent variable by considering expenditure on SCTs since 1990 for all 10 countries, like studies from other regions have done with measures of social security. However, while expenditure data has been used in some studies, it also has flaws. Esping-Andersen (1990) argued that using a single expenditure variable reduced multi-dimensional variation to just one dimension, and therefore adopted a multi-dimensional analysis. Further, studies by Seekings (2013; 2014) showed that, in the African case, data on expenditure are especially challenging because it is difficult to separate national expenditure from domestic revenues, expenditure funded indirectly by donors, and expenditure funded directly by donors.

The study would also have benefited from adopting a measure of changes in the absolute number of SCT beneficiaries over time. However, the required time series data on SCT spending and coverage were unavailable for the region. The unavailability of data points to a broader challenge in accessing country level measures of social protection across sub-Saharan Africa from both national governments and international agencies. These factors explain why the study resorted to using simple counts (or quasi-statistics) to measure the dependent variable and the main independent variables.

The data used for this study were drawn from LIWPR case studies and supplemented by additional country studies from other sources, including the University of Manchester's Effective States and Inclusive Development research project. A detailed list of data sources is provided in Appendix 1. The LIWPR studies did not provide time series data to measure reforms, but they provided historical qualitative accounts (which sometimes also included quantitative data) of reforms that have been implemented in respective country cases. Through a careful review of the country studies, this study was able to determine whether respective national governments had implemented SCT expansion reforms considered in this study.

The dependent variable for this study – 'SCT expansion'– is an index that measures whether a government administration implemented five dimensions of reform aimed at expanding the provision of social cash transfers. The index score ranges from 0 to 5, corresponding to the number of dimensions of reform that were implemented. Granted, reforms are in many instances path dependent. This means that administrations that succeeded high-scoring reformers may have lower scores (although few of the counties have the coverage or expenditure recommended by international organisations).

The key independent variable measures whether there was or was not a change of government. This variable is more like the measure used by Carbone and Pellegata (2017) rather than a measure of partisanship that classified national governments on a left- to right-wing spectrum. The change of government variable was measured on a scale that considered whether there was no change, a partial change, or a complete change of government for each national election held since 1990, when the democratic wave began, until 2015, when the last election under consideration for this study was conducted. This corresponds to 53 data points for the change of government variable for the 10 countries.

Among the other independent variables was 'donor influence,' a dummy variable which measures whether reforms to promote SCTs were influenced by transnational actors, either through advocacy, initiating SCT pilots or direct budget support for programmes. Another independent variable was 'elite interests', an index of three variables measuring ideological interests, electoral interests, and factional interests. Ideological interests measured whether reforms to expand SCTs were motivated by ideas, beliefs, and attitudes about the role of SCTs in poverty reduction, among political leaders in new ruling coalitions. Electoral interests measured whether there was evidence that programmes had been expanded for electoral purposes. Meanwhile, factional interests considered the extent to which factionalism had provided incentives both for and against

SCTs within a ruling coalition. This variable was informed by process-tracing evidence from Malawi and Zambia, where factional differences within the ruling DPP in Malawi and the Patriotic Front (PF) in Zambia resulted in variation in the provision of social protection after partial changes of government.[4] The quantitative studies discussed in the previous sections did not consider the influence of elite interests. This was a major focus for this study. Some studies considered the effect of donor influence, in so far as the effect of a country's membership of organizations like ILO on programme adoption and, to a limited extent, on regional diffusion of programmes.

Existing studies have used measures of democracy and economic growth as either independent or control variables. These measures were used as control variables in this study. Polity 2 Score, which places countries on a scale from strongly autocratic to strongly democratic, was adopted as a measure of democracy. The Polity 2 Score data, provided by the Sustainable Competitiveness Observatory website, were available for all countries for the period considered. The rate of GDP growth (in the last year of a government's term of office) was used as a measure of economic growth. The World Bank's online data bank provided data on GDP growth for all 10 countries for the period under consideration.

The analysis also included a control variable for 'SCTs from 2005.' This is a dummy variable which uses the year 2005 as a cut-off period to distinguish between SCTs that were introduced by national governments (primarily from 1990 to about 2004) and those introduced primarily by donors (from 2005 onwards). The analysis also included a control variable for low-income and lower-middle-income countries (or LLMICs). The variable LLMICs is a dummy that measures whether countries in the analysis were LLMICs or not (i.e., or Upper-Middle-Income countries).

Table 1 provides a summary of the variables used in this study and provides a description of how the dependent and independent variables were measured.

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[4] In Malawi, Joyce Banda's PP emerged first as a faction within the DPP before breaking away as a party. The two factions had different attitudes towards the role of social protection in poverty reduction; these were reflected in divergent attitudes towards SCTs between the Mutharika and Banda administrations. Similarly, the PF in Zambia comprised two dominant factions that differed in their support for SCTs, with the Sata administration (2011 to 2014) providing more support for SCTs than that of his successor Edgar Lungu (2015 to present), who emerged as leader of a rival faction that succeeded Sata upon his death.

Table 1: Summary of variables in the quantitative analysis

Variable	Category	Description
SCT Expansion	Index	Did the government administration implement reforms to: (1) increase state expenditure on SCTs, (2) increase coverage of SCTs, (3) introduce a national policy on social protection or a national document with a section on social protection, (4) increase the value of benefits paid to SCT beneficiaries, and (5) introduce new SCT or related social protection programmes
Change of government	Ordinal scale	Was there a change of government? 0=no change, 1=partial change, 2=complete change
Donor influence	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with the influence of donors? 0=no, 1=yes
Factional interests	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with the interests of a faction within the ruling coalition? 0=no, 1=yes
Ideological interests	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with ideological interests of the ruling party? 0=no, 1=yes
Electoral interests	Dummy	Were reforms to promote social protection associated with the electoral interests of the party in government? 0=no, 1=yes
Elite interests	Index	A scale from 1-3 measuring the number of interests for which each government administration scored ‘yes’
Polity 2 Score	Composite scale	Measure of democracy. Scale ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic)
GDP growth	Continuous	Rate of GDP growth in the last year of each term of office for the government administration
SCTs from 2005	Dummy	Coded 0 for SCTs introduced from 1990 to 2004 and 1 for those introduced from 2005 to 2015.[5]
LLMICs	Dummy	Is the country a lower income or lower middle-income country or not? 0 = No, 1 = Yes

[5] Donor initiated SCT programmes were introduced in the early 2000s. The 2004/2005 period was used as a cut-off point to account for the period before and after donor influence.

7. Descriptive results

The statistical analysis begins by providing descriptive statistics for the five items that were used to compute the dependent variable (SCT expansion) and the three items used to compute the variable for elite interests. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. Descriptive results for the dependent variable, three independent variables, and four control variables are reported in Table 3.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variable items

	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
Expansion of programmes	0.38	0.489	0	1
Increase in Expenditure	0.60	0.494	0	1
Increase in Coverage	0.75	0.434	0	1
Introduction of Policy	0.43	0.500	0	1
Increase in Benefits	0.34	0.478	0	1
Ideology	0.13	0.342	0	1
Factionalism	0.25	0.434	0	1
Electoral Competition	0.19	0.395	0	1

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables

	Mean	**Std. Dev.**	**Min**	**Max**
SCT Expansion	2.51	1.56	0	5
Change of Government	0.72	0.794	0	2
Elite Interests	0.57	0.844	0	3
Donor Influence	0.21	0.409	0	1
GDP Growth	4.76	4.58	-17.67	16.67
Polity 2 Score	5.02	3.86	-4	9
SCTs from 2005	0.496	0.505	0	1
LLMICs	0.698	0.463	0	1

Figure 1 shows the average score – on a scale of 0 to 5 – of SCT expansion for the 10 countries. Namibia (3.8), Botswana (3.6), South Africa (3.6) and Lesotho (3) had the highest scores and were above the average for the ten countries. Zambia (2) scored below the average but was ahead of the lowest scoring countries, with Zimbabwe (1.3) recording the lowest average. The data show that upper-middle income countries with programmes initiated by national governments achieved higher expansion scores than low-income and lower-middle income countries with donor-initiated programmes.

Figure 1: Average Expansion



To provide a fuller picture of how the 10 country cases performed over time, I show the distribution of 'social protection reform' from 1990 to 2017. I show how distinct clusters of countries have performed over the years under different government administrations.

Figure 2 shows the first cluster which comprises three upper middle-income countries, namely Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa. These countries had already adopted SCT programmes by the early 1990s and had also developed domestic comprehensive social protection systems by the early 2000s. One implication of this is that the extent of reforms gradually declined in the 2000s under successive national governments.

Figure 2: Reform over time in upper middle-income countries



Figure 3 shows the second cluster which includes the four low and lower-middle income democratic countries in the analysis: Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia. These four countries had similar trajectories.

Figure 3: Reform over time in low and lower middle-income democratic countries



Except for Lesotho, the countries in this cluster did not implement national SCT programmes in the 1990s and the extent of social protection reform was very low during this period. With the introduction of donor pilot cash transfer programmes in the early and mid-2000s, the extent of reform gradually increased, and most countries achieved high SCT expansion scores after changes of government in the late 2000s and 2010s. The countries in this cluster also had a distinct trajectory from the countries shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Reform over time in low income weakly democratic countries



The third cluster includes low and lower middle-income countries that were weakly democratic or that did not experience complete changes of government, i.e., Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Figure 4 shows that these three countries had low scores throughout the 1990s. Even with the proliferation of cash transfer programmes in the region in the 2000s, these countries achieved modest levels of expansion over time, which were on average lower than those achieved by countries in the first and second clusters.

The countries with the highest score of expansion were the upper-middle income countries, regardless of whether they had experienced complete changes of government or not. This suggests that changes of government may not have influenced social protection reforms in the 10 countries. Rather, upper-middle income countries with SCTs driven by domestic politics appeared more likely to have higher expansion scores than low-income and lower-middle income countries that had donor-initiated programmes. This finding provides some evidence confirming arguments made by Devereux (2010), Niño-Zarazúa et. al. (2012) and Hickey et al. (2019), who argue that variation in social protection reforms in Africa can be explained by differences in national wealth, with wealthier countries providing more comprehensive social protection to their citizens than poorer countries. However, descriptive statistics were inadequate to draw major conclusions. In the sections that follow, I present bivariate and multivariate analyses to test the relationships between the study variables further.

Furthermore, a cross tabulation was conducted to display the relationship between social protection reform and the three categories of changes of government. There were 26 cases of no change, 16 of partial change, and 11 of complete change. Table 4 categorises governments according to the extent of reform and the degree to which there was a change of government (showing the date of government formation in brackets). Sixteen out of 53 government administrations had a high score of SCT expansion (i.e., scored 4 or 5). These include 4 administrations in Namibia, three each in South Africa, Botswana, and Lesotho, and one each in Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia.

Table 4: Cross tabulation of social protection reform following formation of government

Pace of reform	No Change	Partial Change	Complete Change
0	Kenya-Moi (1992)		Zambia-Chiluba (1991)
	Kenya-Moi (1997)		Lesotho-Mokhehle (1993)
	Malawi-Muluzi (1999)		Malawi-Muluzi (1994)
	Zimbabwe-Mugabe (1996)		
	Zimbabwe-Mugabe (2002)		
1	Uganda-Museveni (1996)	Tanzania-Mkapa (1995)	Kenya-Kibaki (2002)
	Zambia-Chiluba (1996)	Malawi-Bingu (2004)	
	Tanzania-Mkapa (2000)		
	Uganda-Museveni (2001)		
	Zambia-Mwanawasa (2006)		
2	Uganda-Museveni (2011)	Zambia-Mwanawasa (2002)	Malawi-Mutharika (2014)
	Zimbabwe-Mugabe (2013)	Tanzania-Kikwete (2005)	

Pace of reform	**No Change**	**Partial Change**	**Complete Change**
	Botswana-Khama (2014)	Botswana-Khama (2008)	
3	Lesotho-Mosisili (2002)	Zambia-Banda (2008)	Namibia-Nujoma (1990)
	Uganda-Museveni (2006)	Zimbabwe-Mugabe-Tsvangirai (2009)	Lesotho-Mosisili (2015)
	Malawi-Bingu (2009)	South Africa-Zuma (2009)	
	South Africa-Zuma (2014)	Kenya-Kenyatta (2013)	
	Tanzania-Kikwete (2010)	Tanzania-Magufuli (2015)	
		Zambia-Lungu (2015)	
		Namibia-Geingob (2015)	
4	Botswana-Masire (1994)	South Africa-Mbeki (1999)	Lesotho-Mosisili (1998)
	Namibia-Nujoma (2000)	Kenya-Kibaki-Government of National Unity (2007)	Zambia-Sata (2011)
	Botswana-Mogae (2004)		Lesotho-Thabane (2012)
	South Africa-Mbeki (2004)		
	Lesotho-Mosisili (2007)		
5	Namibia-Nujoma (1995)	Botswana-Mogae (1998)	South Africa-Mandela (1994)
	Namibia-Pohamba (2010)	Namibia-Pohamba (2005)	
		Malawi-Banda (2012)	

8. Bivariate correlations

Table 5 shows the results of an inter-item bivariate correlation among the variables considered in the quantitative analysis. It demonstrates how the items were associated with each other.

Table 5: Bivariate Correlation Matrix

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) SCT expansion								
(2) Change of government	0.057							
(3) Donor influence	**0.282***	0.054						
(4) Elite interests	**0.564***	0.258	0.210					
(5) GDP growth	-0.036	0.019	-0.149	-0.135				
(6) Polity2 score	**0.574****	**0.279***	0.022	**0.409****	0.024			
(7) SCTs from 2005	**0.359****	0.042	0.335	0.103	0.209	0.182		
(8) LLMICs	**-0.553****	0.093	**0.337***	**-0.292***	0.048	**-0.437****	0.070	

*p <0.05, **p < 0.01

Correlations were computed for SCT expansion, change of government, donor influence, elite interests, GDP growth, Polity 2 score, SCTs from 2005, and for LLMICs for 53 cases of change of government in 10 countries. The results demonstrate that 10 out of 28 correlations were statistically significant and were greater or equal to $r(51) = +0.27$, $p < 0.05$. *SCT Expansion* was statistically associated with *Donor Influence* [$r(51) = +0.28$, $p < 0.05$], *Elite Interests* [$r(51) = +0.56$, $p < 0.05$], *Polity 2 Score* [$r(51) = +0.57$, $p < 0.01$], *SCTs from 2005* [$r(51) = +0.36$, $p < 0.01$] and *LLMICs* [$r(51) = +0.55$, $p < 0.01$]. Other significant results were correlations between *Change of Government* and *Polity 2 Score* [$r(51) = +0.28$, p < 0.05], and between *Donor Influence* and *LLMICs* [$r(51) = +0.34$, $p < 0.05$]. *Elite Interests* was correlated with *Polity 2 Score* [$r(51) = +0.41$, p < 0.01] and *LLMICs* [$r(51) = -0.29$, $p < 0.05$]. Finally, *Polity2 Score* was correlated with *LLMICs* [$r(51) = -0.44$, $p < 0.01$].

In general, the results suggest that the extent of SCT expansion across the 10 countries was most closely associated with the level of democratization, followed closely by the interests of political elites and the economic status of the country. Importantly, the results show that changes of government were not statistically associated with social protection reforms even though they were associated with democratization. Furthermore, the results show that over time, donor influence was associated with both a country being a LLMICs and SCT expansion. This is consistent with literature showing that donors were influential in promoting social protection in poor countries from the early 2000s onwards (e.g., Hickey et al., 2019).

9. Multivariate regression

A multivariate regression was calculated to predict SCT expansion based on the main predictor variables i.e., change of government, donor influence, and elite interests. A second regression model included controls for GDP growth, Polity 2 Score, SCTs from 2005, and LLMICs. The results are reported in Table 6.

Table 6: Multiple Linear Regression Analysis of Predictors of SCT Expansion

	Model 1	Model 2
Change of govt.	-0.070 (0.559)	-0.020 (0.826)
Donor influence	0.171 (0.152)	**0.331**** (0.002)
Elite interests	**0.546**** (0.000)	**0.244*** (0.014)
GDP Growth		0.021 (0.811)
Polity2 Score		**0.206*** (0.048)
SCTs from 2005		**0.218*** (0.020)
LLMICs		**-0.518**** (0.000)
Adjusted R^2	0.311	0.667

*p <0.05, **p < 0.01

A significant regression equation was found in the first model $F(3,49) = 8.827$, $p < 0.001$, with an Adjusted R^2 of 0.311. This shows that 31% of the variation in SCT expansion can be explained by the three main predictor variables. The results show that when *SCT Expansion* was predicted, *Elite Interests* (β =0.546, p < 0.01) was the only significant predictor. High scores on *Elite Interests* were associated with higher SCT expansion scores. *Change of Government* (β = -0.070, p = 0.559) and *Donor Influence* (β = 0.171, $p = 0.152$) were not significant predictors of SCT expansion.

A significant regression equation was also found in the second model $F(7,49) = 15.879$, $p < 0.001$, with an Adjusted R^2 of 0.667. The model explained 67% of the variation in social protection reforms (more than double the variance explained by the first model). The results also show that controlling for economic development, democracy, SCTs from 2005, and income level of the country, *Elite Interests* had a statistically significant but much smaller effect on SCT expansion (β =0.331, $p < 0.01$) than in the first model. Three of the four control variables, *Polity 2 Score* (β =0.206, $p < 0.05$), *SCTs from 2005* (β =0.218, $p < 0.05$) and *LLMICs* (β =-0.518, $p < 0.01$) were also significant predictors of reform. It is instructive to note that when controlling for a country's economic growth rate, level of democracy, the year when SCTs were introduced and a country being a LLMIC, *Donor Influence* was a significant predictor of expansion (β =0.331, $p < 0.01$). The results further show that democratization had a stronger unique effect on social cash transfer expansion than elite interests. The remaining independent and control variables were not statistically significant in the second model.

The evidence that emerged from process-tracing evidence in Malawi and Zambia showed that changes of government were consequential for the expansion of SCTs (Siachiwena, 2020). Yet the results of the regression analysis show that changes of government did not predict expansion. However, the statistical analysis shows that controlling for other independent variables, both elite interests and donor influence were predictors of reform. This confirms that the causal mechanisms linking changes of government to social protection reforms in Malawi and Zambia, were also present elsewhere in the East and Southern African region, regardless of whether changes of government happened or not.

10. Broader implications for East and Southern Africa

Based on the evidence emerging from the descriptive statistics (including Table 4), at least four distinctive categories emerge to categorise national governments in terms of the relationship between changes of government and the expansion of social cash transfers.

10.1 No changes of government and no reforms

The first category includes cases with no changes of government and no social protection reforms. The cases in this category (including the 1992 and 1997 Daniel Arap-Moi administrations in Kenya, the 1999 Bakili Muluzi administration in Malawi, and the 1996 and 2002 Robert Mugabe administrations in Zimbabwe) are predominantly national governments in the 1990s, before the introduction of donor-initiated cash transfer programmes. In the Kenya and Zimbabwe cases, they also included long serving autocratic presidents. These results provide some evidence that SCTs did not gain traction in the region before democratization and the introduction of donor-initiated programmes.

10.2 Changes of government and no reform

The second category includes cases with complete changes of government but no reforms. These include cases such as the 1991 Frederick Chiluba administration in Zambia and the 1994 Muluzi administration in Malawi. Complete changes of government were not sufficient for reforms in these cases, partly because national governments were ideologically and fiscally committed to scaling back the state as they implemented structural adjustment reforms. Moreover, the first and second categories comprise cases where social protection had not yet emerged on the agenda of transnational organizations.

These two categories are inconsistent with the focus of this study, which is on the implications for SCT expansion after partial and complete changes in government after the emergence of the social protection agenda in the 2000s.

10.3 No changes of government and reforms

The third distinctive category includes 'deviant' cases in which significant expansions to SCTs happened without changes of government. These cases, mostly from the mid and late 2000s, include the 2004 Festus Mogae administration in Botswana, the 2007 Pakalitha Mosisili administration in Lesotho, and the 2010 Hifikepunye Pohamba administration in Namibia. Evidence from process-tracing research provides insights that explain why changes of government were neither necessary nor sufficient for significant SCT expansion under these government administrations.

In Botswana, public works programmes and welfare provision for orphaned and vulnerable children were expanded during Mogae's second and final term of office (Chinyoka, 2019a). Although political competition in the 2009 elections contributed to the decision to expand social provision, the main drivers of reforms were a response to the 2008 global economic crisis which resulted in an increase in people living in poverty due to job losses in the mining sector, and the effects of AIDS which had contributed to an increase in households with Orphaned and Vulnerable Children (*ibid.*). The Botswana case shows that changes in government did not matter for reforms because structural factors (the economy and AIDS) were the primary drivers of reforms.

In Lesotho, Prime Minister Mosisili won a second term in 2007 the same year that the European Union and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) initiated a means-tested Child Grant Programme (Granvik, 2019). Although

Mosisili is credited for the introduction of an old age pension in 2004, the Child Grant was primarily implemented and funded by international donors (although the next government assumed ownership of the programme) as a response to the HIV and AIDS pandemic, and was not driven by domestic political factors such as a change of government (*ibid.*).

In Namibia, Pohamba was elected to a second and final term in 2010 and his administration presided over substantial social protection reforms which included the introduction of a poverty targeted Vulnerable Grant in 2014 (Chinyoka, 2019b). In the Pohamba case, a change in government was neither necessary nor sufficient for reforms. Chinyoka (2019b: 19) described Pohamba as a 'reformist' who supported programmatic reforms. Even then, the ruling South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) had come under pressure from international donors such as UNICEF and the ILO, as well as domestic civil society, to implement a basic income grant, but the SWAPO leadership adopted the Vulnerable Grant instead. This grant also served as a political tool to win the support of the rural and urban poor, and of unemployed parents who were not recipients of existing grants. Another factor that explains the significant reforms in Namibia after 2010, was the appointment of Hage Geingob as Prime Minister in 2012; he was much more supportive (and less ambivalent) about cash transfers than his predecessor (*ibid.*: 21-22). This paved the way for faster reforms (even though reforms stalled after Geingob was elected in 2014). In the 'deviant' cases the expansion of SCTs happened because of the importance of structural factors, the role of international donors and domestic politics. Reforms happened in the absence of electoral alternation.

10.4 Changes of government and reforms

The fourth distinctive category included cases where partial or complete changes of government were consequential for reforms. This includes the 2007 partial change of government in Kenya (which involved a coalition between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga), the 2011 Michael Sata complete change of government in Zambia, the 2012 Joyce Banda partial change of government in Malawi, and the 2012 Thomas Thabane complete change of government in Lesotho.

The 2007 partial change of government in Kenya, when President Mwai Kibaki formed a coalition government with his main rival, Raila Odinga, resulted in significant reforms to promote social protection which led to an expansion of coverage and increased budgetary allocations for all cash transfer programmes from 2010 onwards. Moreover, the ruling coalition made the provision of social protection for the deserving poor a constitutional right that same year (Wanyama & McCord, 2017). Kenya's social protection agenda initially began ahead of elections in 2002, when UNICEF and domestic civil society convinced politicians from the then opposition National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), led by Kibaki, to sign a memorandum on social protection (Wanyama & McCord, 2017: 14). Consequently, NARC adopted social protection in its manifesto and implemented modest reforms during Kibaki's first term. But disputed elections in 2007 led to the formation of a government of national unity. According to Wanyama and McCord (2017), the large multi-ethnic government coalition formed by the two rivals (Kibaki and Odinga), led to a political settlement that promoted programmatic redistribution that benefited politicians in the coalition.

In Zambia, Michael Sata of the PF won elections in 2011 defeating the incumbent Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) that had governed for twenty years. Donors had initiated SCTs in 2003 but the MMD had resisted donor efforts to expand SCTs, citing fiscal concerns and fears of creating a culture where the poor would depend on the state for handouts (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016). The PF won elections based on promises to implement pro-poor reforms in response to MMD policies that, although achieving strong economic growth, had not made a significant impact on poverty reduction, especially in rural areas (Siachiwena, 2020). Although the PF won primarily on an urban mandate and the support of Sata's rural co-ethnics in the north of the country, the party expanded SCTs as part of its pro-poor mandate and to incorporate rural voters that were previously not covered by social programmes. The MMD had focused its support on rural small holder farmers through subsidised farming inputs. These farmers also provided the basis of the MMD's predominantly rural support. For the PF, expanding SCTs served to incorporate rural voters (especially outside the rural north) who were hitherto MMD supporters. This was also aimed at ensuring expanded support for the PF in future elections.

International donors introduced pilot SCTs in Malawi in 2006. The president at the time, Bingu wa Mutharika, was opposed to the expansion of SCTs partly because of his scepticism of policies promoted by transnational actors (which was informed by his Pan-Africanist views) and because of the popularity of farm input subsidy programmes that he implemented in 2005 that contributed to his resounding re-election in 2009 (Dionne & Horowitz, 2016; Siachiwena, 2020). When Mutharika died suddenly in 2012, his successor and republican vice president – Joyce Banda – assumed the presidency as leader of the PP (and not Mutharika's party, the DPP) but only until 2014 when the next elections were scheduled. The unusual circumstances that brought Banda to power and the desire to seek re-election only two years later, provided incentives for her to expand SCTs, both to broaden her electoral support (by incorporating voters not covered by farm input subsidy programmes) and to distinguish herself from the DPP's focus on food security (Hamer & Seekings, 2019).

In the Thabane case, the ruling coalition, led by the All-Basotho Congress, took over funding of Child Grant benefits in 2013 and published a National Social Protection Strategy in 2014 (Granvik, 2019). While domestic politics was crucial for the adoption of cash transfers, international donors such as the European Union and UNICEF played prominent roles in persuading the government to reform (*ibid.*). The available process-tracing evidence on reforms in Lesotho does not fully explore the extent to which the 2012 change of government (and domestic politics) was consequential for SCT expansion, but it appears that significant reforms to promote pensions and modest Child Grant reforms under the former Prime Minister, Mosisili, led to faster reforms under Thabane (*ibid.*). This suggests that reforms were in part path-dependent, although electoral competition in a fragmented political system (where coalition building is the norm) may also have contributed to reforms.

11. Conclusion

Changes of government were consequential for the expansion of SCTs in Malawi and Zambia in the 2010s. These two countries were like other democratic low-income and lower middle-income countries in the East and Southern Africa region (including Kenya and Lesotho in the 2000s), which also expanded SCTs as they experienced increased electoral competition and partial or complete changes of government. These countries were distinct from cases where structural factors appear to have been the primary driver of reforms. They were also distinct from the upper-middle income cases that achieved significant reforms in the 1990s, before the introduction of donor-initiated cash transfers elsewhere in the region. Nonetheless, the analysis presented in this paper does not provide statistical evidence for the effect of changes of government on SCT expansion in the region.

The evidence showed, however, that advancements in democracy were most closely associated with the expansion of SCTs, while the interests of political elites and donor influence (controlling for other independent variables) were significant predictors of reform. This suggests that countries in the region which democratized in the 1990s were more likely to expand SCTs over time regardless of whether changes of government had occurred or not. This is consistent with theoretical arguments that democratization and electoral competition have provided incentives for political leaders in developing countries to be more responsive to poverty reduction and to the influence of transnational actors on social protection (e.g., Carbone & Pellegata, 2017; Hickey et al., 2019).

Even then, the trajectory of reforms among low-income and lower middle-income democratic countries in the analysis was distinct from the upper middle-income countries and the weakly democratic low and lower middle-income countries (where electoral alternation had not occurred). While the evidence shows that changes of government may not be a strong predictor of reforms across the region, the quantitative analysis presented in this paper was limited by several factors which had implications on the results. A more robust analysis would have relied on spending and coverage data, focused on a larger set of country cases across sub-Saharan Africa, and collected comparable time series data for all countries.

The quantitative analysis presented in this paper also has implications for the theoretical and empirical evidence observed in other regions. Five implications are notable. First, the study relied on simple counts to compute the main variables and did not use time series cross national data. The data used were also not necessarily comparable across time because they were dependent on various (mostly qualitative) sources. Second, the global studies measured reforms for a much larger set of cases (up to 177 in the case of Schmitt et al., 2015). By focusing on 10 country cases only, the modest medium-n analysis was limited in its ability to generate the kind of robust analyses observed in other studies. Third, this study included a measure of elite interests which was a significant predictor of SCT expansion. Other studies reviewed did not consider a similar measure. Fourth, the study did not have a measure for regional diffusion, even though this was found to be a significant predictor of social welfare reforms elsewhere. Instead, this study focused on the influence of donors on domestic political actors. Lastly, statistical analyses measuring reforms to SCTs remain limited. This contrasts with studies that have focused on other forms of social welfare, especially measures of social security. It is possible that a study focusing exclusively on cases where changes of government had happened would reveal better insights into the relative importance for changes of government for SCTs in the region.

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Appendix 1: Data Sources for Quantitative Analysis

Country	Data Sources
Botswana	Seekings, J. 2016. Building a conservative welfare state. *CSSR Working Paper No.388*. Cape Town: CSSR, University of Cape Town
	Chinyoka, I. 2019. Familial child welfare regimes: The case of Botswana, 1966-2017. *CSSR Working Paper No.430*. Cape Town: CSSR, Univeristy of Cape Town
Kenya	Bosworth, J., Alviar, C., Corral, L., Davis, B., Musembi, D., Mwasiaji, W., Ochieng, S., Pearson, R., Pozarny, P., Ward, P. & Wiseman, W. 2016. The Cash Transfer Programme for Orphans and Vulnerable Children: the catalyst for cash transfers in Kenya. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
	Granvik, M. 2019. The initiation and evolution of Kenya's OVC cash transfer programme. Unpublished CSSR Working Paper.
	Wanyama, F.O. & McCord, A. 2017. The politics of scaling up social protection in Kenya. *ESID Working Paper 87.* Manchester: Global Development Institute, The University of Manchester.
Lesotho	Granvik, M. 2019. Policy diffusion, domestic politics and social protection in Lesotho, 1998-2012. *CSSR Working Paper No. 357*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Pellerano, L., Daidone, S., Davis, B., Farooq, M.H., Kardan, A., Masasa, M., Niang., O., Ramirez, B. & Safi, N. 2016. Does evidence matter? Role of evaluation of the Child Grants Programme in the consolidation of the social protection sector in Lesotho. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Country	Data Sources
Malawi	Fieldwork research
	Hamer, S. 2016. Championing the poor: Branding around poverty reduction as a response to electoral competition in Malawi, 2005-2014. *CSSR Working Paper No. 371*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
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Namibia	Chinyoka, I. 2019. Namibia's child welfare regime, 1990-2017. *CSSR Working Paper No. 431*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
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	Subbaro, K. n.d. Namibia's social safety net: issues and options for reform. World Bank
	Pelham, L. 2007. The politics behind the non-contributory old age social pensions in Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa. *CPRC Working Paper 83*. Chronic Poverty Research Centre
South Africa	Seekings, J. 2015. The 'Developmental' and 'Welfare' State in South Africa: Lessons for the Southern African Region. *CSSR Working Paper No. 358*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Samson, M., Heinrich, C., Hoddinott, J., Laryea-Adeji, G., Buthelezi, T., Cluver, L., Jehoma, S., Mogotsi, M., Stevens, T., van Nierkerk, I. & Nyokangi, E. The impact of a promise realized: South Africa's Child Support Grant. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Country	Data Sources
Tanzania	Ulriksen, M. 2019. The development of social protection in Tanzania, 2000-2015. *CSSR Working Paper No. 377*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Jacob, T. and Hundsbæk Pedersen, R. 2018. Social protection in an electorally competitive environment (1): The politics of Productive Social Safety Nets (PSSN) in Tanzania
Uganda	Grebe, E. 2014. Donor agenda-setting, bureaucratic advocacy and cash transfers in Uganda (2002-2013). *CSSR Working Paper No. 352*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Grebe, E. & Mubiru, J.B. 2014. Development and social policy reform in Uganda: The slow emergence of a social protection agenda (1986-2014). *CSSR Working Paper No. 353*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
Zambia	Fieldwork research
	Kabandula, A. & Seekings, J., 2016. Donor Influence, the Minister of Finance and Welfare Policy Reform in Zambia, 2003–11. *CSSR Working Paper*, *395*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
Zimbabwe	Chinyoka, I. & Seekings, J. 2016. Social policy reform under the Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe, 2009-13. *CSSR Working Paper No. 373*. Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town.
	Seidenfeld, D., Dumba, L., Handa, S., Muwoni, L., Reeves, H. & Sammon, E. 2016. Zimbabwe: Using evidence to overcome political and econoic challenges to starting a national unconditional cash transfer programme. In Davis, B., Handa, S., Hypher, N., Rossi, N.W., Winters, P. & Yablonski, J., Eds. 2016. *From evidence to action: the story of social cash transfers and impact evaluation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.