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Liberalism as a manifestation of the ideals and values of Zambia's Southern Province: The United Party for National Development and the promotion of self-reliance through social welfare

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Abstract

Despite the impressive rise of the United Party for National Development (UPND) on the Zambian political scene since its formation in 1998, little academic research has been conducted on the party. This paper examines how self-identified liberal politicians in the UPND adapt liberalism to Zambia's ideological, political and socio-economic context in order to tackle the challenges of poverty and unemployment through social welfare policy. It draws from semi-structured interviews conducted with Members of Parliament (MPs) and party officials, in addition to content analysis of official party documents. It demonstrates that liberalism and ideas about the role of the state in tackling poverty and unemployment are largely rooted in the unique culture of small-scale farmers in Southern Province and the normative value placed on self-reliance and individual economic achievement. This means that interventions that are perceived to contribute to self-reliance – such as education, health care and agricultural input subsidies – are prioritized over Social Cash Transfers (SCTs), which are targeted towards households without able-bodied individuals. The approach to liberalism articulated by members of the UPND is further shaped by the dominance of the hegemonic ideology of non-interventionist developmentalism; the existence of a social welfare system that is designed around the objectives of empowerment and self-reliance; and the UPND's rural support base.

1. Introduction

Since the formation of the United Party for National Development (UNPD) in 1998, it has become a formidable opposition party, securing 48 per cent of the popular vote in the 2016 general election. Despite the UPND's notable rise and growing strength, little scholarly research has been done on the party and its ideological outlook and approach to social welfare policy. Much of the existing research on Zambia's opposition has focused on the rise and success of the Patriotic Front (PF) (which became the governing party in 2011) and what has been described as its 'ethnopopulist' and pro-poor campaign strategy (Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015; Sishuwa, 2016).

This paper adds to the literature on opposition parties in Zambia by examining how members of the UPND adapted liberalism to the Zambian context in order to tackle the challenges of poverty and unemployment through social welfare. It relies on semi-structured interviews with Members of Parliament (MPs) and party officials in the UPND (see Appendix) as well as content analysis of official party documents.[1] It applies the morphological theory of ideology which argues that all political ideologies are made up of an internal structure of core concepts that are defined and shaped by the geographic, temporal and cultural context in which they operate. The analysis of the adaptation of liberalism is guided by Freeden's (1996) seven core concepts of liberalism – liberty, individualism, role of the state, general interest, sociability, progress, and rationality. It examines how liberal politicians adapt liberalism, and each of these concepts, by focusing on four ideological dilemmas: the general role of the state in ensuring individuals' well-being; whether social assistance creates a 'culture of dependency'; how to assist the unemployed; and if non-contributory transfers should be paid in cash or in kind and if cash transfers should be conditional.

Interviewees in the UPND viewed the primary role of the state as ensuring the right conditions for individuals to become self-reliant. This included the provision of basic social services and targeted social assistance. There was a greater emphasis on the provision of health care, education, and agricultural inputs than Social Cash Transfers (SCTs). This seemed to be a result of the importance placed on empowerment and self-reliance and the perceived utility of health care, education and agricultural subsidies in achieving these goals. Ideas about dependency were similarly dominated by ideas about self-reliance. The large majority of interviewees expressed that social assistance programmes, and especially SCTs, lead to

[1] Interviewees are identified with a code (e.g. UPND #) in a footnote when referenced in the text. Interviewees' names and codes are listed in the appendix.

dependency because they do not provide individuals with the ability to become self-reliant. Only one interviewee argued that social assistance makes people lazy. Ideas about dependency and self-reliance carried through to ideas about how to assist the unemployed. There was widespread belief that SCTs should not be provided to individuals who are working-age and able-bodied. Instead, it was argued, the unemployed should be assisted through programmes that provide individuals with the ability to become self-reliant, such as the Farmer Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). Ideas about non-contributory transfers made in kind and whether or not transfers should be conditional, were mixed. Some interviewees argued that the monetary value of the SCT is not enough to expect beneficiaries to fulfill any rigid conditions such as sending their children to school or going for health check-ups. Others argued that the value of the SCT should be increased so that conditions can be implemented. Conditions, it was argued, would ensure that SCTs make beneficiaries self-sufficient. The majority of interviewees preferred the provision of cash transfers for incapacitated beneficiaries. Transfers made in kind (such as agricultural inputs) were preferred for able-bodied, unemployed individuals as they would promote self-reliance.

The paper demonstrates that the conceptualisation of liberalism by self-identified liberal politicians in the UPND is shaped by the interpretation of liberty as the ability to be self-reliant. Self-reliance, UPND politicians believe, should be realised through small-scale farming or other forms of economic activity. The state is needed to create the right conditions for individuals to become self-reliant. This includes the provision of education and health care and targeted social assistance. Individualism means that the individual is seen as the primary unit of focus. General interest is interpreted as a shared sense of belonging and desire to contribute to the nation. This is closely related to sociability, which is interpreted to mean that the promotion of self-reliance contributes to the development of the nation. Progress is thought of as national development, which is achieved through the promotion of self-reliance. Rationality, to liberal politicians in the UPND, means that individuals strive to obtain self-reliance.

This adaptation of liberalism is rooted in the unique ideological, political and socio-economic context of Zambia, pointing to the importance of the spatial, temporal and cultural context in shaping the conceptualisation of liberalism (see Table 1). The UPND is guided by an individualist, agrarian economic outlook that draws from the distinctive culture of Southern Province, which values small-scale farming and individual economic achievement (Beardsworth, 2017; Macola, 2010). This unique and pervasive culture is rooted in the prosperity of cash-crop farmers across much of Southern Province dating back to the colonial era (Momba, 1985). The UPND draws

from the legacy of the African National Congress (ANC) – a nationalist party from the 1960s that was popular in Southern Province – by catering to these values (Macola, 2010). In defining itself alongside the distinct culture of Southern Province, the UPND draws the majority of its support from Southern Province and other parts of rural Zambia where agricultural inputs are particularly important. This sets it apart from the governing PF, which has used a pro-poor, populist approach to gain support in the urban areas where issues pertaining to job creation are of higher importance to voters.

Table 1: Summary of Zambia's ideological, political and socio-economic context

Ideological	
Hegemonic ideology	Developmentalism; embrace of the market as a response to excessive intervention under United National Independence Party (UNIP) (Post-1991)
Political	
Authoritarianism	Persistent (growing under Edgar Lungu, 2015-present)
Major support base	Rural, small-scale farmers (especially in Southern Province)
Socio-economic	
Institutionalisation of social welfare	Very low (no legislation and not in popular discourse)
Coverage of social welfare	Low
Driver of social assistance	Donor-driven, resisted by government
Unemployment	Medium-low
Informal employment	High, majority of the employed (mostly in subsistence farming)
Formal employment	Low
Mode of production	Agriculture, wage-labour
Poverty	High
Inequality	High

Zambia's existing social welfare system, largely established under the liberal Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) after the end of one-party rule in 1991 and the PF after 2011, complements the UPND's political ideology in that it is based on the promotion of empowerment and self-reliance, reflecting the dominance of non-interventionist developmentalism. Cash transfers are targeted towards 'incapacitated households' (households with no able-bodied, working-age individuals) while agricultural inputs are targeted towards 'low-capacity households' (households with able-bodied individuals who do not have a reliable source of income). Since 1991, the government has also been committed, at least rhetorically, to the universal provision of health care and basic education. The existing social welfare system is thus largely in line with the UPND members' normative ideas about what the role of the state *should* look like.

2. Conceptual framework

This paper presents the findings of one of three case studies carried out for a larger study on how liberalism adapts to contexts outside of the global North, in order to address issues pertaining to 'the social'. In the global North, questions about the social aspects of liberalism have largely been disputed around the need for state intervention in social welfare and the recognition of socio-economic rights (Gordon et al., 2014). It was these questions that led to the push for social liberalism in the late 19th- and early 20th-centuries and the emergence of the liberal welfare state, and it is the same kinds of questions that are again initiating reforms and shaping what we might refer to as contemporary liberalism. The need to think about these questions in other regions of the world is motivated by the theoretical standpoint that varying conceptualisations of liberalism (and any political ideology) are dependent on the temporal, spatial and cultural context in which they are operating (Festenstein & Kenny, 2005; Freeden, 2013; Strath, 2012).

The existing literature on the diffusion of liberalism as a political ideology in the global South, and in Africa in particular, is limited, if not completely absent. Individuals contend that Anglo-centric values such as individual rights are incompatible with the communal nature of African cultures (Mutua, 2002). Rejoice Ngwenya, a Friedrich Naumann Foundation consultant for Zimbabwe, argues that liberal thinkers in Africa (and scholars who write on liberalism in Africa) are commonly criticised as being 'neoliberal', 'agents of western imperialism', and 'apologists of white monopoly capital' (Ngwenya, 2018). This has undoubtedly played a role in limiting academic inquiry into liberalism in Africa. The literature that does exist focuses on the spread of neoliberalism and its socio-economic outcomes (see Ashman & Fine, 2013; Lim & Jang, 2006; Moore, 1999; Robinson,

2006) and the spread of ideas associated with liberalism such as constitutional democracy and individual rights (see Alford, 2000; Carothers, 1999; Levitt & Merry, 2009; Mutua, 2002; Seekings, 2018). It does not consider how liberalism has adapted to answer questions surrounding the social (Gordon et al., 2014).

The study sought to answer questions surrounding 'the social' in relation to the interpretation and application of liberalism in three Southern African countries: South Africa, Botswana and Zambia. It addressed how liberal politicians in these three countries adapt liberalism to the Southern African context through an examination of ideas about the role of the state in social welfare. It relied on semi-structured interviews with MPs and party officials in the Democratic Alliance (DA) in South Africa, the Botswana Movement for Democracy (BMD) and the Alliance for Progressives (AP) in Botswana, and the United Party for National Development (UPND) in Zambia, all of which are opposition parties. [2] The study was thus not concerned with the politics of policy-making in Southern Africa but with the normative ideas surrounding the role of the state in the provision of social welfare. The study also incorporated content analysis of official party documents.

The study's analysis of liberalism was guided by the work of Freeden (1996) and his comprehensive account on the emergence of liberalism in 19th-century Britain (and Europe more broadly) and its transformation thereafter, in addition to the writings of critical liberal thinkers from John Stuart Mill (1885, 1989) to Amartya Sen (1999). From the literature, it is clear that liberalism has gone through two distinct phases and is arguably undergoing a third phase. The first and second phases included the emergence and formalisation of classical liberalism in the 18th- and 19th-century and then the rise of social liberalism in the late 19th- and early 20th-century. The literature on what might constitute the third phase, perhaps best referred to broadly as contemporary liberalism, is less complete (probably due to the fact that it is still emerging as a coherent political ideology). This study used egalitarian liberalism, as manifested by Sen's (1999) *Development as Freedom*, to represent one dominant variant of contemporary liberalism.

The study approached the analysis of liberalism from the perspective of the morphological theory of ideology, which views a political ideology as being made up of a core group of concepts that are shaped by the spatial, temporal and cultural context in which the ideology is being defined (Freeden, 1996, 2013). It is the semantical interpretations of each concept that give rise to multiple variants of the

[22] The DA is the governing party of the Western Cape Province and several municipalities; however, social welfare is primarily the responsibility of the central government.

same political ideology. Freeden (1996) argues that any variant of liberalism must contain seven core values: liberty, individualism, role of the state, general interest, sociability, progress, and rationality. While all three variants of liberalism maintain the seven core values identified by Freeden (1996), it is the unique conceptualisations of liberty and the role of the state that differentiates them from one another (see Table 2).

Classical liberal thinkers placed an emphasis on liberty as the freedom from constraint to develop the self. This meant that state intervention was only justified to prevent harm to individuals. However, by the second half of the 19th-century, with the negative effects of industrialisation, it became clear that the 'invisible hand' of the market was not always able to maximise individuals' well-being and a number of liberal thinkers pushed for a greater role for the state. Liberty was reconceptualised as not only entailing the freedom *from* but also as the freedom *to*, especially the freedom to an adequate standard of living, commonly thought of as positive freedom (Green, 1881; Hobhouse, 1923; Hobson, 1909). With the rise of egalitarian liberalism, Sen (1999) offered another re-interpretation of liberty, arguing that freedom is made up of five types, all of which, together, contribute to development: political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security (See Table 2). According to Sen, the state is responsible to help individuals realise all five of these
freedoms.

The three main variants of liberalism and the corresponding interpretations of the seven core values were not used as a fixed template to try to fit Southern African liberalisms into, but rather as a blueprint for understanding how liberalism in Southern Africa varies from the 'global', Anglo-rooted liberalisms. The study demonstrated that it is the unique ideological, political, and socio-economic context of each country that shapes the interpretation of liberalism articulated by liberal politicians, demonstrating the prominence of the temporal, spatial and cultural context in determining the semantical interpretations of liberalism.

Table 2: Interpretation of the seven core liberal values in each of the three main variants of liberalism

	Classical Liberalism	**Social Liberalism**	**Egalitarian Liberalism**
Liberty	Freedom from constraint to develop the self	Freedom from (constraint) and freedom to a decent standard of living, which necessitates socio-economic rights	Political freedom (civil rights); economic facilities (economic participation); social opportunities (health care and education, shelter, food); transparency guarantees (individuals can engage in contracts with transparency and honesty); and protective security (social safety net)
Individualism	'…the notion of the person as a separate entity possessing unique attributes and capable of choice' (Freeden, 1996: 145)	The individual is the central unit of focus in a broader society	
Role of the state	State intervention is only justified in order to 'prevent harm to others' (Mill, 1989: 17)	The promotion of positive freedom, including the right to a life worth living	To ensure the realisation of the five instrumental freedoms and the corresponding rights; expansion of capabilities
General interest	Concern for the 'general good' (Freeden, 1996: 151)	'Self-interest, if enlightened and unfettered, will, in short, lead him to conduct coincident with public interest' (Hobhouse, 1923: 59)	'…people themselves must have responsibility for the development and change of the world in which they live' (Sen, 1999: 282)
Sociability	'There is a greater fulness of life about his own existence, and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them' (Mill, 1989: 118)	A shared morality for the common good (Freeden, 1996)	'Individual freedom is quintessentially a social product' (Sen, 1999: 31)
Progress	'The spirit of improvement' (Mill, 1989: 132)	Self-development, which contributes to the development of the whole	Development as freedom; the expansion of capabilities and freedoms
Rationality	Individuals pursue wealth, happiness, and power (Freeden, 1996)		

In order to identify how liberal politicians in South Africa, Botswana and Zambia have adapted liberalism to the Southern African context to tackle the challenges of poverty and unemployment through social welfare policy, the study considered four ideological dilemmas that are pertinent not only to liberal politicians in Southern Africa but also across the global South more broadly and, to varying extents, the global North: the general role of the state in realising individuals' minimum well-being; whether non-contributory social assistance creates a 'culture of dependency'; how to assist the unemployed; and whether non-contributory transfers should be paid in cash or in kind and if they should be conditional. The stance of the governing parties and prominent opposition parties, civil society organisations, the public, and other relevant actors towards each of the four dilemmas were considered in order to better contextualize the ideas of liberal politicians in each of the three countries.

In the global North, it was not until the rise of social liberalism that the state had a clearly defined role in the provision of social welfare. Classical liberal thinkers were of the thinking that individuals' welfare was best maximised through the market without the intervention of the state. State interventions were limited to workhouses set up by the Poor Laws where individuals would receive food and accommodation in exchange for work. The state had also begun to play a role in the provision of education. Individuals in need of assistance were largely reliant on private philanthropy (Fraser, 2009). Yet charitable assistance had a negative stigma and people feared that it would make people lazy and dependent. With the emergence of social liberalism, liberal thinkers acknowledged that the state was needed where and when the market had failed to ensure individuals' positive freedom. This meant that the state was thought to be responsible for the provision of education, health insurance, contributory insurance plans for the elderly and the unemployed, workfare, and means-tested social assistance (Beveridge, 1942, 1944; Hobhouse, 1923; Hobson, 1909).

This also led to the embrace of socio-economic rights. Proponents of social liberalism asserted that social welfare based on legal right would not create dependence. With egalitarian liberalism, positive freedom has come to include the right to what Sen (1999) refers to as 'basic capabilities', which includes a minimum income or a 'social safety net'. Due to the prevalence of poverty and low levels of formal employment in the global South, contributory insurance plans only help a small proportion of the population. This has meant that non-contributory social assistance programmes, such as Social Cash Transfers, have become increasingly important. Yet these often do not reach poor, able-bodied adults who are unemployed. Instead, the unemployed are often assisted through workfare

programmes, or not at all. How each of the three variants has approached (or might approach) each of the four ideological dilemmas is summarised in Table 3.

Table 3: Responses to the four ideological dilemmas by each of the three main variants of liberalism

	Classical Liberal	**Social Liberal**	**Egalitarian Liberal**
Role of the state	Individual welfare should be maximised through the market; no coherent social welfare system; preliminary provision of education; poor houses for the elderly, the infirm, and the disabled and workhouses for the able-bodied; individuals largely reliant on charitable assistance	The state should intervene where and when the market has failed; contributory insurance; targeted, means-tested social assistance; education and health insurance; introduction of socio-economic rights	The state should intervene where and when the market has failed; right to basic capabilities (health, education, food, shelter, minimum income guarantees; greater use of non-contributory social assistance in the global South
Dependency	Individuals are best able to maximise their freedom without the intervention of the state; charity makes people lazy	Rights-based, means-tested assistance/insurance does not create dependence	Rights-based, means-tested assistance does not create dependence
How to assist the unemployed	Workhouses (workfare)	Workfare; contributory unemployment benefits	Non-contributory unemployment benefits; contributory unemployment benefits; workfare
Conditions and transfers made in kind	Assistance for unemployed 'conditional' on work; beneficiaries either received food and accommodation, or cash	Social assistance paid in cash; workfare 'conditional' on work; employment benefits sometimes conditional on training or looking for work	Social assistance paid in cash; assistance provided in workfare programmes 'conditional' on work

3. Background of Zambia's political landscape

Anderson Mazoka, a Tonga-speaker from Southern Province and former CEO of Anglo-American, formed the UPND after leaving the liberal (and sometimes neoliberal) MMD (Siachiwena, 2016b), which he said had become 'undemocratic' (Jere, 1998). In the UPND's first general election, Mazoka lost to the MMD's Levy Mwanawasa by only 1.9 per cent of the vote (Beardsworth, 2017). After Mazoka died in 2006, Hakainde Hichilema (commonly referred to as HH), a businessman also from Southern Province, became the new leader of the party. The election of a fellow Tonga-speaker led to charges of 'tribalism' and negatively impacted the party's success in the 2006 general election (Beardsworth, 2017).

The MMD held onto power until 2011 when it was replaced by Michael Sata's PF. The PF capitalised on growing discontent among the public with the (neo)liberal policies of the MMD, and campaigned on a more interventionist platform that targeted the urban poor (Siachiwena, 2016b). Some scholars have referred to the PF's (and its leader Michael Sata's) approach to campaigning as 'ethnopopulist' (Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015; Sishuwa, 2016). Despite claims that political parties in Zambia (and their leaders) are motivated primarily by ethnic loyalties, these scholars point to the fact that no ethnic group in Zambia is large enough for a purely ethnic political strategy (*ibid.*). Political parties thus have to use a multi-faceted approach that entails both ethnic and populist claims. In contrast to the UPND, the PF draws most of its support from urban areas and Bemba-speakers in Northern Province (Beardsworth, 2017; Cheeseman & Larmer, 2015). The UPND's major support base is in the rural areas and among Tonga-speakers in Southern Province (Beardsworth, 2017; Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2016). Health care, education and agricultural input subsidies are thought to be particularly important to voters in rural areas while job creation as well as service delivery are the main concerns in the urban areas (Resnick, 2014; Siachiwena, 2016b).[3]

It was not until the 2015 presidential by-election after the death of Michael Sata when the UPND regained the support it had lost in the 2006 general election. HH lost narrowly to the PF's Edgar Lungu, with some claiming that the results had been fixed. The 2016 general election saw similar results, with HH losing again to Lungu by a small margin amidst concerns about the legitimacy of the results. Fears about the legitimacy of the elections came at a time of increasing authoritarianism under the Lungu government (Cheeseman, 2018). In 2017, HH spent over 100 days in prison on treason charges after allegedly blocking president Lungu's motorcade.

[3] UPND 2

Upon his release from prison, HH stressed the importance of upholding basic negative liberties (Bagnetto, 2017).

4. The political ideology of the UPND

Since the party's formation in 1998, the UPND has articulated what Macola (2010: 155) defines as a 'liberal-democratic, ruralist' ideology. The UPND has built onto the tradition of the ANC – Zambia's first nationalist party which was particularly popular in the South until it joined with UNIP in 1973 (Beardsworth, 2017; Macola, 2010). The ANC, led by Harry Nkumbula, advocated for limited state intervention and embraced individual economic achievement, which resonated with the small-scale farmers of the South (*ibid.*). Momba (1985) demonstrates that the history of wealthy cash crop farmers in Southern Province, and parts of Central Province, helps to explain the support for the ANC's (and now the UPND's) agrarian, individualist economic outlook in these provinces.

When discussing the impact of the ANC's legacy on the UPND's political ideology, Jack Mwiimbu, the Leader of the Opposition in Parliament and the UPND's longest serving MP, explained that:

> Nkumbula's roots are individualistic in nature. There are no villages in Southern Province. The next house is 5km away. Each person looks after himself. The government doesn't give everyone everything. The government must provide an enabling environment to sell produce… Nkumbula was capitalist in nature because of his upbringing in Southern Province. The ANC had to be revived through a new form.[4]

As it will be seen below, the UPND's message since 2001 (when the first accessible document was published) has entailed three core principles: economic development as a means of individual self-reliance and emancipation through good economic policies, health and education, and the promotion of agriculture; good governance and the protection of civil liberties and other negative freedoms; and national unity. The following analysis relies on the UPND's 2001 constitution, a draft 2006 manifesto, a 2011 policy document, and the 2016 manifesto. The 1998 manifesto cannot be accessed and the party did not develop a manifesto for the 2001 or 2011 elections. Interview text is also drawn from in order to provide insight into how UPND members conceptualise the UPND's approach to liberalism.

[4] UPND 10.

The UPND's 2001 constitution briefly outlined its vision and overall party objectives before going into the more intricate details of party operations (UPND, 2001). It highlighted the importance of economic development, good governance and the protection of civil liberties and socio-economic rights, and national unity. In the 2006 manifesto, these values were reiterated again (UPND, 2006). This was first seen in the party's vision and mission statements. The vision statement stated that the UPND's vision was 'to create a united and prosperous Zambia with equal opportunities across ethnic, tribal, religious, and gender considerations, living in harmony in a free society' (UPND, 2006: 3). The mission statement, on the other hand, read 'The UPND seeks to foster accelerated national development through the mobilisation and sustainable use of the available and potential human and natural resources for the empowerment of every Zambian citizen' (*ibid.*). The document then included an exhaustive list of 32 issue areas, with economic development, agriculture, health, education and good governance featuring as some of the key priorities. The section on the economy emphasised the need to promote economic development in order to ensure all Zambian citizens can meet their basic needs. The document then acknowledged the potential of agriculture for economic growth and discussed the importance of empowering small-scale farmers. Health and education were also spoken about as essential components of economic development. Finally, the document spoke to the importance of good governance and the party's commitment to ensuring basic civil liberties, a free press, separation of powers, and tackling corruption.

The 2011 policy document built onto the 2006 manifesto but presented a more concise summary of seven key priority areas, including: job creation, agriculture, education, health care, infrastructure development, cost of living, and the constitution and governance (UPND, 2011). The 2016 manifesto began by reiterating its commitment to the same objectives outlined in the 2001 constitution and 2006 manifesto (UPND, 2016). It then took the same concise approach of the 2011 policy document, presenting 10 key priority areas in what it referred to as a '10-point plan' (*ibid.*). The first point was the creation of jobs and business opportunities. Other high-ranking priority areas included in the 10-point-plan were agriculture, education, health, and good governance (*ibid.*).

It was evident that interviewees' conceptualisation of liberalism embraces the three principles eminent in the party's official stance. When asked to define liberalism, one interviewee spoke about the liberal, capitalist nature of the UPND's ideology while also pointing to what they referred to as 'social democratic' policies, such as free education and health care, and intervention in the agricultural sector:

> You need to build a strong liberal, capitalist economy but an economy that is based on services, welfare, and strengthening the people's situation …You have to look after the interests of your people. So, that's why if you look at our manifestos and look at the sections on education and health, and agriculture, there is a strong social democratic trend, such as our commitment to free education for those who cannot afford it… free health care. We believe that to have a strong economy you have to offer those kinds of services. If you look at our agriculture policy, it is to provide infrastructure and service delivery to help poor farmers grow and turn them into successful farmers.

This interviewee spoke to the importance the party (and individuals within it) places on education, health care, and agriculture as means to create economic growth.

UPND 3 spoke about liberalism with regard to both positive and negative liberty, speaking about the importance of socio-economic rights and allowing citizens to 'flourish' while also emphasising the importance of democracy:

> Liberalism, in terms of our economic management policies and positions on those issues, we are liberal… more for private investment, more liberal in terms of property ownership, more liberal in terms of people's social and economic rights. We are more open to people's rights and freedoms and participation, we are more open to more modern trends in terms of just allowing citizens to flourish, in terms of limiting the restrictions of them, and, of course, we are a democratic political party, so it's a blend of being democratic at the same time as being liberal: in terms of economic management, and in terms of social and economic policies as well…

One interviewee spoke specifically about negative liberty and the freedom of expression in relation to the PF government:

> We are mid-fielders, we are not extreme. We are not too much on the left and not too much on the right… I would describe myself as a liberal democrat. I think liberalism includes allowing ideas to flow, from within, from without. It's important for any democracy to take that approach in accommodating different ideas. You can be united in your diversity, in your own views. I have always believed that is the best form of governance… All of those who have dissenting views from within

> the [governing] party have been expelled. Anyone who stands up and says the government is wrong is expelled. They just write you a three-lined expulsion letter. [5]

After his release from prison, HH expressed similar concerns, emphasising that, 'After 2011 when the Patriotic Front came into office we began to see the breakdown in the rule of law. We began to see the erosion of basic and fundamental human rights and freedoms, such as freedom of assembly, association, [conscience], [and] freedom of the press…' (Bagnetto, 2017).

Interviewees' conceptualisation of individualism and the importance of individual economic achievement is evident in their reasoning for supporting Mazoka and Hichilema. Interviewees related their support for their presidents to the business successes of both these presidents. Beyond being impressed by their leaders' economic success, interviewees emphasised the fact that, because these individuals had made their money privately and not through involvement in the public sector, they could trust their intentions for wanting to be presidential candidates. This highlights the importance of individual economic achievement and self-reliance to individuals in the UPND and their conceptualisation of liberalism.

The UPND's overall approach to liberalism can be understood in relation to the three principles identified above, including economic development as a means of individual self-reliance and emancipation through good economic policies, health and education, and the promotion of agriculture; good governance and the protection of civil liberties; and national unity. The first principle is related to ideas about positive liberty. It demonstrates the idea that national development should be achieved through the promotion of individual self-reliance. Individualism is thus largely conceptualised as the ability to be self-reliant. The key role of the state is thought of as helping individuals in becoming self-reliant.

[5] UPND 1

5. Background of Zambia's social protection system

Zambia's social protection system is characterised by four main arms: social assistance, social security, livelihood and empowerment, and protection (Republic of Zambia, 2014). This was outlined in the 2014 National Social Protection Policy (NSPP). Although the document was published by the PF government, it had begun to be drafted under the MMD government with the help of international organisations and civil society organisations. The document highlighted the lack of a 'coherent and harmonised' social protection policy framework which undermined poverty reduction efforts (Republic of Zambia, 2014: 4). The NSPP's goal was to create a 'comprehensive and integrated approach to Social Protection' (*ibid.*: 1). According to the NSPP, the Zambian government defines 'social protection' as 'the policies and practices that protect and promote the livelihoods and welfare of people suffering from critical levels of poverty and deprivation and/or are vulnerable to risks and shocks' (Republic of Zambia, 2014: vii). The ways in which this framework addresses each of the four ideological dilemmas programmatically is summarised in Table 4.

Table 4: Zambia's historical programmatic approach to the four ideological dilemmas

	Programmatic response to the four ideological dilemmas
Role of the state	Means-tested cash transfers for 'incapacitated households'; agricultural inputs for low-capacity households; free primary education; goal of universal health care
Dependency	Widespread concerns about dependency; ideas about laziness
Unemployment assistance	Agricultural inputs (FISP)
Conditions and transfers in kind	Cash transfers for children, the disabled, and the elderly; transfers in kind for the able-bodied; cash transfers unconditional; agricultural inputs 'conditional' on farming

Social assistance entails non-contributory benefits made either in kind or in cash which are targeted towards individuals who are inherently 'incapacitated', meaning they do not have the physical or mental capacity to acquire an adequate income to live (Republic of Zambia, 2014: 5). This includes vulnerable children (including orphans), the elderly, and the 'differently abled'. Zambia's various social assistance

programmes include Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS), which provides non-contributory in kind transfers to vulnerable households and reached 150 000 beneficiaries in 2008, decreased to 75 000 beneficiaries in 2011, and was not reported on in the 7th National Development Plan (NDP) (International Labour Organisation [ILO], 2008; Republic of Zambia, 2011, 2017); and the SCT programme, which reached a total of 632 000 individuals in 2018, and was forecast in the 2019 budget speech to account for 0.8 per cent of the total budget in 2019 (Republic of Zambia, 2018).

The SCT programme is the second largest social assistance programme in Zambia in terms of its beneficiaries and budgetary requirements, after FISP. The formation of Zambia's SCT system was largely steered by international organisations. It first began to be rolled out in the early 2000s with a donor-funded pilot project launched in 2003/2004 (Siachiwena, 2016b). The SCT programme remained almost completely funded by donors for a decade (*ibid.*). With the transition to the PF government in 2011, the SCT programme became primarily tax-funded (*ibid.*). Yet the system remained fragmented and lacked coherence, with different targeting practices used in different areas. The 2014 NSPP adopted a 'harmonised targeting' strategy which meant SCTs would be targeted towards poor households who were 'labour-constrained', meaning that no working-age and able-bodied adults are present. It would also target households who have 'dependency ratios' equal to or more than three. Dependent members were defined as the elderly (older than 64), children (younger than 19), and the disabled or chronically ill (between the ages of 19 and 64) (Republic of Zambia, 2014).[6]

Despite the PF's efforts to 'pioneer a paradigm shift' in social protection, and social assistance more specifically, there seems to be a growing mistrust of the PF government's approach to SCTs (Republic of Zambia, 2014: 1), with top UPND members criticising the PF for 'politicising' the programme. UPND members have accused the PF of telling voters that if they do not vote for the PF they will no longer receive the cash transfer.[7] Criticism of the PF government and the SCT programme grew even more in September 2018 when it was discovered that K41 million for the SCT programme had been unaccounted for (Lusaka Times, 2018). According to an official press statement, this was the equivalent of about 29 per cent of the value of all grants paid out (*ibid.*).

[6] FISP is not included under social assistance in the NSPP but is considered a social assistance programme in this paper.
[7] Personal interviews. See Appendix A.

Social security, the second arm of the social protection system, entails contributory benefits such as pensions schemes and unemployment benefits. This is accessed through both private and public schemes (Republic of Zambia, 2014). The provision of universal health insurance is also included under the social security arm in the NSPP (*ibid.*). Shortly after the election of the MMD in 1991, the Ministry of Health adopted the National Health Policy and pledged to implement universal primary health care. Yet, in 1993, user fees were introduced for all citizens except children under five and individuals with chronic illnesses introduced in 1995 (Aantjes *et al*., 2016). User fees for primary health care were then abolished for rural facilitates in 2006, peri-urban facilitates in 2007, and urban facilities in 2011 (after the PF had come to power) (*ibid.*).

The livelihood and empowerment arm of Zambia's social protection policy provides support to those who 'lack sufficient capacity to generate adequate reliable income' (Republic of Zambia, 2014: 6). This entails those who are able-bodied but have not been able to achieve an adequate level of welfare on their own. It seeks to empower individuals to become self-reliant. The largest programme under this arm of the social protection policy is FISP, which provides vulnerable farmers with agricultural inputs. FISP is the also the largest social assistance programme in Zambia, supporting over 716 000 beneficiaries as of 2018 (Republic of Zambia, 2018). In 2015/2016, the government began to roll out the FISP e-voucher system, which provides beneficiaries with a voucher to purchase inputs. The budget for 2019 outlined that 1.6 per cent of the budget would be spent on FISP, compared to 0.8 per cent for SCTs (Republic of Zambia, 2018). In theory, FISP is targeted towards poor farmers. Yet, as Harland (2014) has suggested, it has been politically abused, reaching few vulnerable farmers and likely going to individuals who hold influential positions at the local level. Other programmes under the livelihood and empowerment arm include the Women Empowerment Fund, Community Self Help Initiatives, Functional Literacy and Skills Training, and the Micro Bankers Trust.

The final arm of Zambia's social protection policy is 'protection'. The overarching objective of this arm is to enhance the legal protection of Zambian citizens' social and economic rights, especially for the vulnerable. This entails 'reviewing' and 'harmonising' relevant legislation.

It is unclear where education fits into the four arms of social protection. The document states that one of its guiding principles is that 'All Zambians should have access to food, water and sanitation, decent shelter, clothing, health care, decent work and other income generating activities, education and training and live in a safe environment' (Republic of Zambia, 2014). The social assistance section also

indicates that one of its priorities is to work to strengthen linkages between the provision of social assistance and basic social services, presumably education. While it does not seem to have a defined place in the framework, education appears to be seen as a part of the social protection system in Zambia. In 2002, the government adopted a policy of free primary education (grades 1-7) (Republic of Zambia, 2003). However, school fees remain for secondary school.

This paper focuses specifically on the first three of the social protection arms, all to varying degrees. In Zambia, it is evident that the FISP is particularly important to the social protection system. While it is not categorised as 'social assistance' in the NSPP, the FISP is a non-contributory transfer made in kind and can thus be analysed in unison with other social assistance programmes like the SCT and PWAS. As it will be seen, PWAS does not seem to play a significant role in the UPND interviewees' approach to social protection nor in the party's official stance.

6. The official stance of the UPND towards social welfare and the four ideological dilemmas

The UPND sees the primary role of the state as establishing the right environment for economic growth, self-reliance, and national development. The UPND affords the state a role in the provision of social protection, both in terms of social assistance and basic social services. It is clear that education, health and agricultural inputs are prioritised over SCTs in light of their perceived utility in promoting self-reliance. In terms of assisting the unemployed, the party appears to value assistance programmes, such as FISP which are believed to enable unemployed individuals to become productive, rather than cash assistance. Little insight is provided by way of the official documents into the remaining two ideological dilemmas.

The 2001 constitution did not speak specifically about social protection but emphasised the importance of economic and social development and the promotion of socio-economic rights (UPND, 2001). The 2006 manifesto, on the other hand, included an entire section on social protection, promising that it would implement a 'comprehensive social security system for all citizens in both urban and rural areas' (UPND, 2006: 17). Yet it did not go into extensive detail about how the UPND would achieve this. The UPND's approach to social protection was heavily focused on empowerment and providing individuals with the tools to maximise their well-being through the market rather than through reliance on the state. Efforts to do this would include the provision of 'life sustaining skills', promoting rural development, and giving 'incentives to organisations that create employment' (*ibid.*). The manifesto

also promised that the party would guarantee free education for all poor individuals until grade 12, stating that 'the best economic policy is education' (UPND, 2006: 11). The party also pledged to introduce a bursary programme for higher education. The party made a similar promise with regard to health care, stating that the UPND would provide free health care to all Zambians in need. It argued that both of these interventions would be key to economic growth. It also reiterated the importance of agricultural inputs.

The section on social protection seen in the 2006 manifesto was absent in the 2011 policy document. Instead, the 2011 document spoke about creating jobs, empowering farmers, and providing access to health care and education (UPND, 2011). In the UPND's 2016 manifesto, the prominence of empowerment seen in previous documents was furthered. Like the 2011 policy document, the manifesto did not have a section on social protection. The Deputy Chair of Research and Policy explained that rather than including a distinct section on social protection in the 2016 manifesto, elements of social protection were included throughout the 10-point plan.[8] The plan spoke about reducing inequality and poverty through economic growth, empowering individuals through the provision of education, developing agricultural partially through the provision of input subsidies, and 'building a healthy nation' by improving the quality of health care (UPND, 2016: 17). The manifesto also stated that the UPND would 'put in place measures to protect the vulnerable in our society, which includes women and youth, ensuring they can fully participate in our economy and contribute to their own betterment as well as our national development' (UPND, 2016: 10). Yet it did not outline specific programmes that would be implemented.

None of the UPND's official documents have had an explicit mention of dependency. Nevertheless, all of the documents have emphasised the importance of empowerment and self-reliance, the opposite of dependence. Hichilema was reported saying in a speech made in Cape Town, South Africa 'I hate that stuff…' when talking about SCTs and explained that job creation, education, and agricultural subsidies were more effective forms of social protection (Pruce & Hickey, 2017: 19). While Hichilema's statement is not explicitly about dependency, it points to a preference for policy options that are perceived to be more conducive to individuals becoming economically active and self-reliant. Similar to the issue of dependency, the official documents do not discuss whether social transfers should be made in kind or in cash or whether SCTs should be conditional. The exclusion of SCTs from the party's official stance and the continuing prominence of farming inputs suggest that transfers made in kind, particularly for able-bodied adults, are preferred. Finally, given the importance of empowerment and self-reliance, it is presumable that the party might

[8] UPND 10.

support the use of behavioural conditions due to their perceived effectiveness in human capital development in countries like Brazil and Mexico.

7. Ideas about social welfare among liberal politicians in the UPND

7.1 Role of the state in realising individuals' well-being

Between 1991 and 2011, the MMD favoured pro-market policies and made little mention of social protection outside of education and health care until the 5th NDP in 2006. The MMD resisted the SCT programme advocated for and financed by donors and international organisations in the early 2000s. In terms of social assistance, the MMD prioritised FISP, which the party implemented in 2002, and PWAS (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016).

When campaigning for the 2011 election, the PF capitalised on the public's discontent with the MMD's neoliberal policies and adopted what Siachiwena (2016b) refers to as a 'populist electoral strategy' that portrayed a pro-poor image. The PF promised free, universal education up to grade 12, regardless of a family's income (PF, 2011). It also pledged to abolish all primary health care fees, which it did as soon as it was elected into government. The manifesto recognised the existence of the donor-funded SCT programme but did not mention any intention of expanding the programme or taking over the funding. The manifesto criticised the MMD for politicising FISP but stated that it would continue the programme. Despite the lack of a promise to scale up the SCT programme in the 2011 manifesto, the number of SCT beneficiaries was doubled under the Sata government (2011-2014) (Siachiwena, 2016b). Siachiwena (2016b) argues that this was made possible because of a 'social democratic' faction within the PF that matched the party's strategic interests. The budget for FISP, on the other hand, was left unchanged from 2011 until 2014 when the PF increased expenditure on the programme significantly (*ibid.*). The 2016 manifesto promised to increase again the budget for SCTs (PF, 2016). The PF also promised to continue FISP under the new e-voucher system and pledged to promote the diversification of crops (*ibid.*). In both 2011 and 2016, there was a strong focus on job creation, catering to the demands of the urban voters.

The SCT programme was largely rolled out by foreign donors and international organisations, including the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GTZ and the UK's Department for International Development (DfiD). It also has maintained support from the World Bank (Siachiwena, 2016a, 2016b). Charlotte

Harland-Scott, Chief of Social Policy and Economic Analysis at UNICEF until 2012, was instrumental in the establishment of Zambia's SCT programme and is thought to have played a role in the expansion of SCTs under the PF government (*ibid.*). Civil society organisations have also lobbied for the increase in the SCT programme, demonstrating support for the provision of non-contributory cash transfers. They have also lobbied for the inclusion of social and economic rights in the constitution (Siachiwena, 2016b). It is less clear what the general attitudes of the public are towards the role of the government in social protection. However, health care, education, and agricultural inputs are thought to be particularly important to the rural areas while social cash transfers are more important to the urban areas.[9]

7.1.1 The UPND and ideas about the role of the state in realising individuals' well-being

Interviewees viewed the primary role of the state as creating the right conditions for individuals to become self-reliant. Interviewees supported the provision of basic social services such as education and health care and targeted social assistance. Education, it was believed, should be free for all individuals who cannot afford it. Ideas about health care were more mixed, with some individuals arguing that health care should be free for all Zambians and others arguing that it should only be free to those who cannot afford it. Interviewees supported the provision of social assistance in the form of SCTs (although somewhat reluctantly and not without criticisms) for incapacitated households and of agricultural inputs for low-capacity households.

A number of interviewees spoke about the need for the state to create the right environment for people to become self-reliant. As one interviewee stated: 'Everyone must be able to reach their full potential. It's about building an enabling environment'.[10]

One interviewee recognised the importance of safety nets and other social protection measures but emphasised that economic growth should be the first priority and that social protection should not be a solution to state failure to create the right economic conditions:

> There will be those people out there who are vulnerable but the first priority of the government must be to provide opportunities… given the

[9] UPND 2
[10] UPND 10

> right environment or the correct market … You can't just be creating social protection programmes on account of government failure.[11]

Interviewees also spoke about the importance of ensuring economic growth as a first step in the adoption of social protection programmes.
As UPND 12 expressed:

> We want to have growth in the economy, and when we generate income in the economy, that income that we generate will be used to support social programmes, such as social cash transfers, free education, access to health for all, and other public services. So, our idea is to run an economy that generates income to support social programmes.

All interviewees expressed that education should be free for all who cannot afford it, with many individuals reflecting on the emphasis placed on education by party president Hakainde Hichilema as a tool for promoting self-reliance. One interviewee expressed that:

> If you don't have education you are lost, if you don't have education you are doomed, because that is what causes a society or a family or an individual to become enlightened… You get educated, even the issues of contracting disease you will be able to know how to take care of yourself. At the end of the day it is an investment for a country.[12]

Attitudes towards health care were more mixed. Some individuals argued that, like education, free health care should be means-tested while others argued it should be free for all Zambians, reflecting the UPND's official position.

A number of interviewees also spoke about health and education as socio-economic rights. However, very few interviewees spoke about rights without being probed. Interviewees also clearly viewed education and health care as more important rights than social assistance.

The majority of interviewees demonstrated support for both SCTs and FISP. Despite their support, interviewees still identified a number of problems with both programmes. As one interviewee expressed when speaking about SCTs, 'It is an important programme but it has been politicised… People are being told "go and

[11] UPND 3
[12] UPND 4

vote, hey. If you don't vote properly you won't get [the SCT]".'[13] Interviewees also stressed that part of the politicisation problem is that the transfers are not getting to the 'right' people, which was defined as poor individuals who are unable to work. Interviewees spoke about recent corruption scandals and the fact that programme is 'too reliant' on foreign donors, arguing that the state should increase the budget for the programme.

On FISP, interviewees stressed the fact that inputs are not always delivered on time. As one interviewee said:

> If you go out, some farmers haven't yet received their inputs. And the rains this year, they are expecting the rains to break earlier than normal. So, if a farmer hasn't yet received their inputs when are they supposed to be applying it. Wouldn't it be nice if they had gone into the shop in October and bought their fertilizer and put it on when the rain comes?[14]

It was clear that interviewees perceived the provision of basic social services and FISP as greater priorities than the provision of SCTs:

> If you have a system that delivers goods and services to your people that focuses on improving the lives of people in poverty, especially the majority of which are rural farmers, if you have a programme that organises agriculture and supports it, the social cash transfer system becomes insignificant in my view.[15]

This interviewee highlights the importance of agriculture to the UPND and to Zambia in general. The emphasis on agriculture is not only a result of its importance to the Zambian economy and individuals' livelihoods, but also the fact that the UPND draws a great deal of its support from rural areas (Beardsworth, 2017), especially in Southern Province (Electoral Commission of Zambia, 2016). As it will be seen in the following two sections, the emphasis on basic social services and state support in agriculture, especially through FISP, also seems to be a result of interviewees' perceptions of the inability of SCTs to make people self-reliant.

Interviewees did not discuss any other social assistance programmes, such as PWAS,

[13] UPND 6
[14] UPND 2
[15] UPND 5

with one interviewee stating, '[FISP and the SCT programme] are the only two [programmes] that one can actually look up and say 'this is a deliberate government programme that is trying to help people in the lower social strata'…'[16]

7.2 A 'Culture of dependency'?

Kabandula & Seekings (2016) examine the resistance of the MMD towards the expansion of the SCT programme in the early 2000s, demonstrating that ideology (as exemplified through the Minister of Finance, Ng'andu Magande) was a contributing factor. Magande stressed that SCTs would make beneficiaries lazy and create dependency. The PF, on the other hand, does not seem to have been as vocal on the topic of dependency. While the PF expanded the SCT programme significantly once in government, claims of a populist strategy by various scholars complicate any analysis of the PF's ideological outlook on issues of SCTs. Nevertheless, the PF's Finance Minister from 2011-2016, Alexander Chikwanda, stated in 2013 that poverty reduction would be achieved through 'inclusive growth, education, agricultural productivity and employment but also including social transfers as long as they [do] not turn into handouts or create dependency' (Siachiwena, 2016b). The role of international organisations, such as GTZ and DfiD, in establishing Zambia's SCT programme suggests that they were not concerned about creating a 'dependency culture' in Zambia. The same can be said for supportive civil society organisations. Public sentiments surrounding the issue of dependency are unclear.

7.2.1 The UPND and ideas about dependency

The majority of interviewees were concerned about the idea of a 'dependency syndrome'. Unlike former MMD Finance Minister Magande, the large majority of interviewees in the UPND were not concerned about SCTs making people lazy. Rather, interviewees were concerned about the inability of SCTs to make people self-reliant. Some interviewees argued that it is a lack of opportunities that forces people into 'relying' on the state. These arguments miss the fact that SCTs are targeted towards the 'incapacitated'. Only one interviewee was concerned about the ability of SCTs to make people lazy. A small minority of interviewees were not concerned about dependency, emphasising the fact that SCTs are targeted towards the incapacitated. Some interviewees also spoke about dependency in relation to FISP, emphasising that inputs should be provided for a finite period of time in order to incentivise people to become self-reliant.

[16] UPND 1

For most interviewees, concerns about dependency were related to the inability of SCTs to foster self-reliance. One interviewee said that in order to prevent dependency, the value of the transfer would need to be greater and for a finite period of time:

> In Zambia, they are 90 Kwacha, which is like 9 dollars, 7-9 dollars. If you were me, what could it do for a person? It just makes the people extremely dependent on the government… because that 9 or 18 dollars... can you transform lives completely? But, let's say we use SCT and we identify the people who are really in need, then you give them 300 dollars for the next 12 months or 24 months, because there must be a deadline, because you are trying to empower this person. Yes, the SCT is important, but it is how we administer is that really matters.[17]

When asked what it meant to empower someone, this interviewee explained that it was about making people self-reliant:

> It means you are giving them the ability to look after themselves in the basic human endeavours: food, shelter, and water. They can even send their children to primary school. To me, that is empowerment, because you are giving them back their human dignity.[18]

Another interviewee spoke about their experience living in New York and likened receiving cash transfers to begging on the street, arguing that neither can help individuals become self-reliant:

> Poverty creates a symptom of dependency and that is where you have people going around begging, thinking that if people can get more money out of their pockets and help poor people that life would be better. Life wouldn't be better. I mean, I was in New York for 15 years and people were always on the street begging… So, when you give poor people money to support their homes, to buy food, but you are not linking that to changing their actual economic livelihood, you are not really helping them in the long term…[19]

This interviewee implied that if people are just given cash they will not become

[17] UPND 2
[18] UPND 2
[19] UPND 5

economically active.

For some interviewees, concerns about dependency were related to the lack of economic opportunities available to people relying on SCTs. For example, UPND 3 argued:

> In an economy where corruption is rampant [and the] economy is not managed properly, people always stick onto whatever is coming from government and that can become a vicious cycle with that being the only opportunity they have. But in a normal situation, when there are more opportunities and people are able to free themselves from that kind of dependency... Because it is not even a lot of money. Everyone wants to make a decent living and ultimately have a surplus and safety and ultimately look after yourself…

Only one interviewee expressed the belief that SCTs make people lazy. This was based on the belief that beneficiaries receive the transfer even if they do not do anything. Nevertheless, this interviewee also spoke about how some people are able to use the SCT to empower themselves:

> If I sit here and I do not do anything, I know my meal will come because I am a member of those who receive cash transfers. But… there are people who do very well with that money, who are able to buy some goats and they have improved. They have moved from that level that they were at that time to be elevated… If I am getting money for food every month, I will not put in any effort to look for money elsewhere.

A small minority of interviewees were not concerned about dependency. These interviewees emphasised the fact that SCTs are targeted towards those who cannot work. As UPND 1 stated:

> … people must depend on the government. There is no harm in people depending on government. But, unless you tell me that they become overly dependent… Because, don't forget, the level of the social cash transfer, the absolute figure per month, is only 9 dollars… So, it's really a survival grant. I don't want to call it dependency because at 9 dollars you can only find enough to buy a bag of maize a month. It doesn't spoil you.

This interviewee also emphasised the amount of the SCT not being enough to create

a culture of dependency.

A minority of interviewees also spoke about dependency in relation to FISP, arguing that agricultural inputs should only be provided to farmers for a finite number of years in order to incentivise individuals to become self-reliant. As one UPND interviewee shared:

> People don't seem to graduate from being supported. So, we want to implement a system that will support people for a period of three years. After three years they should be able to support themselves. They should be weaned off. It must not be a way of life, government dependency.

7.3 How to assist working-age, able-bodied individuals

Zambia's 'unemployment' assistance is largely centred around agricultural inputs. Neither the MMD nor the PF have pushed the idea of providing SCTs to able-bodied individuals. As previously mentioned, the SCT programme was largely driven by international organisations, including GTZ and DfiD. In 2003, DfiD and the World Bank recommended to the Ministry of Finance that a Sector Advisory Group (SAG) be established on social protection, which would be chaired by someone in the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services (MCDSS) (Kabandula & Seekings, 2016: 11). The SAG was tasked with drafting what would become the social protection section for the 5th NDP and was funded by DfiD. It included staff in the MCDSS, other ministers, and donors (*ibid.*: 12). Civil society was represented through various NGOs. The document that was eventually produced differentiated low-capacity households from incapacitated households. Individuals living in incapacitated households would have access to SCTs while individuals in low-capacity households would be assisted through FISP and other 'empowerment' programmes. It is unclear the extent to which international organisations and civil society organisations were involved in making this differentiation in the two deserving groups but it is clear that they were involved in the process. Subsequent NDPs, and the NSPP adopted under the PF government, have maintained that only incapacitated households should receive SCTs (See Republic of Zambia, 2006, 2011, 2014, 2017).

7.3.1 The UPND and ideas about how to assist working-age, able-bodied individuals

The large majority of interviewees agreed with the current structure of the social assistance system, arguing that SCTs should only be provided to incapacitated households and FISP should be targeted towards able-bodied individuals. This is not surprising given ideas about the inability of SCTs to make people self-reliant. Interviewees stressed that SCTs would not help poor and unemployed people transition to self-reliance but would keep them dependent on the state. Some interviewees stressed that the poor but able-bodied are not truly 'vulnerable' and that if they have the ability to work, they should not receive cash transfers. Alternatively, some interviewees argued that Zambia should not provide SCTs to the unemployed now but they could see the benefit of it down the road, relating their support to the Job Seekers Allowance in the United Kingdom. Only one interviewee was of the view that unemployed people should receive the SCT.

When asked if Zambia's SCT programme should be extended to the unemployed population, some interviewees referred to the idea of empowerment and self-reliance, arguing that SCTs for unemployed people would keep them dependent on the state. As UPND 2 stated:

> A youth of 20 years, even 25, would you want to give them a social cash transfer? No. Why? I would want to empower them. Let me find a skill, or a reasonable amount of money to empower this youth who is 25 so that they find room for sustainability…

This interviewee went on to say:

> What would I want to do with a lady like you? I am not going to be giving you 10 dollars every month. I am not helping you, you have your whole life time ahead of you. Am I going to sustain you for the next 50 years of your life? Absolutely not. But, if I found a way of helping you doing what you are supposed to do… That is why you find things like village banking, women empowerment, youth empowerment, those must be encouraged.[20]

[20] UPND 2

This interviewee was opposed to SCTs and spoke about interventions that would help individuals become economically active. This interviewee also argued that agricultural subsidies would be a much better approach to helping the unemployed.

Some interviewees were opposed to SCTs for unemployed people due to the belief that working-age, able-bodied unemployed people are not 'vulnerable'. It was clear that 'vulnerable' meant having no ability to engage in work. One of these interviewees was also fearful that SCTs would make unemployed people lazy:

> That money should just focus on the vulnerable. I will not do anything because I know money is coming. So, we should just focus on those that are vulnerable and we should prove that those people are really vulnerable because if they have the strength to do something they can do something anyway. If they know money is coming they will just sit and drink.[21]

Some interviewees expressed opposition to extending the SCT to unemployed individuals in Zambia today, but explained that it might be useful in the future. These individuals spoke about the attractiveness of unemployment assistance in the UK. UPND 12 stated:

> If you are able to work, you are not part of the SCT. We believe that if you are able to find work then you must find work. Because, if we did that, we would have a problem. Even the youth are unemployed. However, in the long term, these cash transfers must become or be transformed into welfare support, like what is happening in the Western world. There is a job seekers allowance. If you are looking for a job, they will give you an allowance, an unemployment allowance….

Only one interviewee supported the extension of the cash transfer programme to the unemployed. In speaking about how Zambia's SCT programme could be improved, this interviewee argued:

> There is so much that needs to be done. If we take an example of the first world, we are so far behind in terms of social protection. For now, it is limited to the elderly, orphans, double orphans, and it has not included people who have just failed to access education…

[21] UPND 8

Then when asked if this meant that it should be extended to unemployed individuals, this interviewee answered:

> Yes. That's what I think, because, you know, in a society where one of the biggest challenges is employment. You will have somebody who is qualified but they will not get a job. What do they do? They need to make a living. It happens in the UK, the unemployed people get a sort of social protection to make sure they have the basics: food, etc.

Interviewees stressed that FISP would be more effective in assisting poor individuals who are able-bodied. As one interviewee stressed:

> Subsidising agriculture is more efficient than cash transfers, because on one side you are empowering the people, you are making them self-sustaining, because there are chances that what they produce they can also sell, and make that 9 dollars for themselves… If you give them enough agriculture inputs or they are able to buy them at an affordable price, they are likely to produce more and even beat that social cash transfers.[22]

This interviewee's response demonstrates the perception that agricultural inputs are more effective in fostering self-reliance among beneficiaries.

7.4 Conditions and transfers made in kind

The SCT programme in Zambia remains unconditional and transfers are paid in cash rather than in kind. Schüring's (2010) study provides insight into attitudes towards conditions among the public, civil society, elites, and international development partners in Zambia. Through the use of semi-structured elite interviews, Schüring (2010) found that the majority of elites supported the use of conditions on SCTs. This included members of NGOs; politicians; ministry members, including in the MCDSS; international cooperating partners; and local level leaders. Schüring (2010) found that 67 per cent of the politicians interviewed supported the use of conditions. However, Schüring (2010) only conducted interviews with three politicians and it is thus hard to generalise her findings. 50 percent of individuals in the MCDSS at the national, provincial, and district level supported the use of conditions.[23] Interviews were conducted with 13 individuals in the MCDSS at national, provincial and district

[22] UPND 2

[23] This included individuals at the national (5), provincial (1), and district (7) levels of MCDSS.

level.[24] This was the second lowest support group, after cooperating partners. Only 40 per cent of the cooperating partners – CARE international, DfiD, Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), ILO, Irish Aid, and United Nations NICEF – supported the use of conditions. Of the NGO representatives, 100 per cent supported the use of conditionality.[25] However, only four individuals were interviewed from NGOs. Schüring's (2010) general public attitude survey found that 42 per cent of respondents supported conditional cash transfers, while 18 per cent supported unconditional cash transfers, and 39 per cent supported no cash transfers at all.

As discussed in the background of Zambia's social welfare system, the country has a number of social protection programmes that provide benefits in kind, including FISP and PWAS. The MMD also resisted the expansion of the SCT programme. This might suggest that the MMD, the party who implemented FISP in 2002 and revised PWAS, supports transfers made in kind. Under the PF, the SCT programme was expanded more dramatically than FISP. Yet it is difficult to decipher the preferences of political elites in the PF without further research. One can point out, however, that the SCT programme is targeted towards incapacitated households whereas FISP is targeted towards individuals with the capacity to farm. This might suggest that governing elites in the PF, like the UPND, prefer transfers made in kind for individuals who are able-bodied but cash transfers for individuals who are not able-bodied.

Using an attitude survey, Schüring (2010: 47) found that the majority of participants among the urban population (73 percent), regardless of income status, supported the use of transfers made in kind. Among the rural population, Schüring (*ibid.*) found that the majority of participants (52 per cent) preferred the use of cash as opposed to transfers made in kind. She did not specify the type of in-kind assistance. Schüring did not conduct the survey with members of the 'elite' group in her study.

[24] MCDSS interviewees included five individuals at the national level; one interview with the Provincial Social Welfare Office in Southern Province; and seven individuals in the MCDSS at the district level.

[25] NGOs included Churches Health Association of Zambia (CHAZ); Children in Need Network (CHIN); Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR); and Programme Against Malnutrition (PAM).

7.4.1 The UPND and ideas about conditions and transfers made in kind

Similar to Schüring's (2010) findings, ideas about conditions were mixed. Some interviewees argued against conditions in light of the fact that the value of the cash transfer in Zambia is not enough to enable beneficiaries to fulfill behavioural conditions such as ensuring that the child is enrolled in school and has regular health check-ups. Others believed that they should be conditional but the transfer value would need to be higher in order to implement such conditions. These interviewees believed that making the transfers conditional would ensure that the SCTs empower individuals to become self-reliant.

Ideas about transfers made in kind as opposed to cash were also mixed. The majority preferred cash transfers but some interviewees did not have a preference and others supported transfers made in kind. For those who supported the use of transfers made in kind it was evident that they believed transfers made in kind would be better at promoting self-reliance. In light of the fact that all but one of the interviewees were opposed to SCTs for unemployed people but supported FISP, it is clear that transfers paid in kind are preferred for individuals who are able-bodied.

One interviewee said that there should be formal conditions but explained that there is an implicit contract between the government and beneficiaries of SCTs. This interviewee argued that when someone receives an SCT it is implied that they should spend it in a way that will improve their life.

Some interviewees argued that they would support the use of conditions if the transfer was a higher value. As UPND 2 stated:

> If it is a grandmother who has been left with orphan children, yes, they should see to it that the child is still going for the under-five clinic, if they are age-going, then they must go to school. But, I am telling you, the amount is too small to do these things… The amount has to be increased to have a reasonable impact.

Others were more dismissive of conditions entirely because of the fact that the value is too low to fulfill such conditions. It was unclear if they would support conditions if the value was increased.

Ideas about transfers paid in cash versus in kind were also mixed. Some interviewees supported the use of cash as opposed to transfers because it provides people with more choice:

> [Cash] is the easier way. Why is it the easier way? Because people have different priorities. There is no point of buying someone a bag of mealie meal if what they desire is sugar. They should be able to decide themselves. I mean, if you give me a cash transfer of 9 dollars, I could buy two chickens, a hen and a cock, and they could start laying eggs and over time there would be more and more. So, why prescribe exactly what to give? They should be allowed cash.[26]

Other interviewees supported the use of cash over transfers made in kind because of the belief that transfers made in kind are more difficult to administer and are more susceptible to corruption.

A number of interviewees preferred the use of transfers paid in kind than in cash. Some interviewees were concerned about beneficiaries' ability to handle money responsibly. As UPND 5 said, for example:

> Social cash transfers may not be good enough because they may not even know how to manage funds. So, you need to deal with that separately and organise it differently because they have never had cash in their lives, if you give them money, in two weeks it will be gone and then what?

One interviewee spoke about the use of transfers made in kind in relation to the importance of health care, highlighting the importance placed on basic social services as compared to social assistance among the UPND:

> It can also be given in kind, like general social welfare. Look, medication, health services … For example, you can improve the life of the people if that resource is put to health rather than the actual cash … It can be reduced to improve other sectors and other areas of human life of the vulnerable, but it is important…

For this interviewee it was less about the responsibility of beneficiaries that motivated their support for transfers made in kind and more about ensuring that

[26] UPND 1

government resources are being used as efficiently as possible to provide people with basic necessities, such as health care. This interviewee thus viewed medicine and other health 'inputs' as a greater priority than cash itself.

One interviewee initially did not have a preference between the SCT and transfers such as food and clothing. They argued that non-contributory transfers of any kind make people dependent. However, as they thought about it more, they said that making people rely on the state for their food made them particularly vulnerable. This interviewee explained that FISP was better because it was able to empower people:

> You know, either way. You are still making them dependent on you. Why should someone be waiting for their food from you? It is a very delicate position. You know, every morning we wake up. Imagine 16 million Zambians, every morning the 16 million of us wake up and we have to eat. Three times a day. Now, imagine I am depending on you for my food and then you don't show up. What will my lifestyle be like? You put me in an extremely vulnerable position. I would rather you to subsidise agriculture because then I determine my fate.

8. Conclusion

This paper showed that UPND interviewees recognised the state's responsibility in the provision of basic social services such as education and health care and targeted social assistance, such as SCTs and agricultural inputs. Interviewees believed that education should be free for individuals who cannot afford it. Ideas about health care were more mixed, with some individuals arguing that health care should be universally free and others arguing that it should only be free for the poor. Interviewees placed a greater emphasis on the provision of health care, education and agricultural inputs than on SCTs. This appeared to be a result of the importance placed on self-reliance and the perceived inability of SCTs to foster self-sufficiency. The large majority of interviewees believed that SCTs cause dependency because they do not enable beneficiaries to become self-reliant. Ideas about dependency and self-reliance impacted interviewees' ideas about how to assist the unemployed. Interviewees argued that SCTs should not be targeted towards poor, working-age adults. Rather, working-age adults should be assisted through programmes such as FISP which provide individuals with the means to become self-reliant through engagement in agricultural production. Ideas about transfers paid in kind and the use of behavioural conditions were varied. Some interviewees argued that the value of the cash transfers in Zambia is not enough to implement behavioural conditions.

Other interviewees suggested that the SCT amount should be raised so that behavioural conditions can be used. Interviewees believed that conditions would ensure that SCTs make beneficiaries self-sufficient. The majority of interviewees preferred the use of cash when providing assistance to incapacitated households. Transfers made in kind, like FISP, were preferred for poor, able-bodied individuals.

The UPND's approach towards the four ideological dilemmas is similar to the country's historical approach, with development and empowerment identified as the primary goals of social welfare interventions. However, the UPND appears to emphasise the importance of education to a greater degree than the PF and the MMD before it. The UPND also supports the addition of socio-economic rights (although weakly). The UPND's approach is similar to the social liberal approach in that members support the provision of means-tested social assistance and the provision of education and health care and recognise, although tentatively, socio-economic rights. It reflects similarities with the egalitarian liberal approach in that non-contributory assistance is the primary form of welfare support due to low formal employment. Fears about dependency and self-reliance stand out from the government's historical concern with laziness. This also contrasts with the three main variants of liberalism. Ideas about how to assist the unemployed are in line with the country's historical approach of agricultural inputs. This, again, varies from the approach of all three variants of liberalism. Finally, the UPND's support for transfers paid in kind, such as agricultural inputs, contrasts with all three variants of liberalism but complements the country's historical approach. UPND individuals who support behavioural conditions stand out from the country's approach in that SCTs have historically been unconditional.

Liberalism in the UPND is largely characterised by the conceptualisation of liberty as the ability to be self-reliant, either through subsistence farming or other economic activity. Individuals argue that the state is needed in order to create the right conditions for individuals to become self-reliant. Furthermore, regardless of party president HH's first-hand experience with the rising authoritarianism of the PF under Edgar Lungu, there is a greater emphasis on the positive conceptualisation of liberty, and its connection to the party's immediate goal of promoting national development through self-reliance, than negative liberty. This points to the strength of the culture of Southern Province in guiding the UPND's overall political ideology. Individualism is interpreted to mean that the individual is the unit of focus in promoting national development. General interest is thought to mean that all individuals have a shared sense of belonging and the desire to contribute to the development of the nation. Sociability means that national development will be

achieved through the promotion of self-reliance. Finally, rationality means that individuals have a strong, natural desire to be self-reliant (see Table 5).

Table 5: The UPND's interpretation of the seven core values of liberalism

	UPND
Liberty	The ability to be self-reliant
Individualism	The individual as the primary unit of focus
Role of the state	Ensure negative freedoms; enable individuals to become self-reliant
General interest	A shared sense of belonging and contribution to the state
Sociability	The promotion of self-reliance will contribute to national development
Progress	National development
Rationality	Individuals want to be self-reliant

Liberalism, as articulated by liberal politicians in the UPND, stands out in comparison to the hegemonic ideology in Zambia in that it embraces the centrality of the individual and values self-reliance and individual economic achievement. Like the hegemonic ideology, the UPND embraces developmentalism, but it is a developmentalism defined by the promotion of self-reliance, which is often achieved through small-scale farming. Liberalism in Zambia contrasts with the three main variants in the crucial importance of agriculture, as opposed to other forms of wage-labour, in the realisation of positive freedom.

The interpretation of liberalism and the ideas about social welfare are rooted in the distinct culture of Southern Province which prioritises small-scale farming and individual economic activity. The strength of the UPND's ideology is given further life by the hegemonic ideology of non-interventionist, developmentalism in addition to the existence of a social welfare system that is designed around the objectives of empowerment and self-reliance. The UPND's ideology, and its approach to the four ideological dilemmas, is thus complemented by the existing social welfare system, and the fact that Zambia is largely an agrarian economy and the party's major support base resides in the rural areas.

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Appendix: UPND interviewees

Table 6: UPND interviewees

Code	Name	Position	About
UPND 1	Gary Nkombo	MP Mazabuka Central, Southern Province (since 2006); Chief Whip (2011-2018); Chairman of Elections (2018-present)	Nkombo joined the UPND in 2001 after leaving the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). He is the MP for Mazabuka Central, which he ran under the MMD in 2001 and lost to the UPND. After joining the UPND, he won the parliamentary seat for Mazabuka Central in 2006 and still holds it as of 2019. Nkombo holds a BA and is a teacher by profession.
UPND 2	Patricia Mwaching-wele	MP Katuba, Central Province (since 2016); Deputy Spokesperson (since 2018)	Mwachingwele began her political career in 2001 in the Heritage Party. She ran in Katuba constituency but lost to the UPND candidate. She then joined the MMD in 2009 after teaching in Botswana for six years. She ran in the 2011 elections and lost again to the UPND candidate. In 2014, UPND president Hakainde Hichilema asked Mwachingwele to join the UPND and she agreed. She then ran in the 2016 election for the Katuba seat and won. Patricia holds a Master's in Education and is a teacher by profession.

Code	Name	Position	About
UPND 3	Ephraim Belemu	MP Mbalala, Southern Province (since 2011); Chairperson of the Specialised Committee for Tourism	Belemu joined the UPND in 1999. He has never been a member of any other political party. Ephraim holds an MBA.
UPND 4	Levy Ngoma	Chairperson of the Specialised Committee for Agriculture (since 2018)	Ngoma joined the UPND in 2015. He was in the MMD from 2001 until 2011. In 2011, he joined the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD). He was the MP for Sinda in Eastern Province between 2001 until 2016. He ran under the UPND ticket for the Sinda seat in 2016 and lost to an independent candidate.
UPND 5	Dr Choolwe Beyani	Head of Policy and Research	Beyani joined the UPND in 1998. He oversees the policy-making process in the party. The specialised committees submit policy documents to the policy unit which edits and approves the documents. Once policy documents have been approved by the policy unit, they are then presented to the National Management Committee (NMC). Beyani holds a PhD in History from Columbia University.
UPND 6	Mutale Nalumango	National Chairperson (since 2013)	Nalumango joined the UPND in 2013. She has been the National Chairman since. She previously served as the Minister of Labour and Social Security under the MMD government. She is from Kaputa, Northern Province.

Code	Name	Position	About
UPND 7	Bradford Machila	Chairperson of Legal Affairs	Hichilema is a lawyer by profession. He obtained his LLB from the University of London. He is a member of the Law Association of Zambia and the International Bar Association.
UPND 8	Mrs. Munene	Member of the Specialised Committee for Community Development and Social Welfare	Mrs. Munene joined the UPND in 2004. She then joined the Committee for Community Development and Social Welfare in 2011.
UPND 9	Fraser Moonde	Member of the Specialised Committee for Community Development and Social Welfare	Moonde joined the UPND in 1999. He was an ordinary member from 1999 until 2007 when he joined the specialised committee on Community Development and Social Protection. He is the secretary of the committee.
UPND 10	Jack Mwiimbu	MP Monze, Southern Province (since 2001); Leader of the Opposition in Parliament	Mwiimbu was one of the UPND's founding members. He is also one of the UPND's longest serving MPs, having served as an MP since 2001.
UPND 11	Elizabeth Lungu	Chairperson of the Specialised Committee for Community Development and Social Protection	Lungu joined the UPND in 2003. Before joining the UPND, she had been a founding member for the MMD.
UPND 12	Joseph Lungu	Deputy Chair of Policy and Research (since 2006)	Lungu has been a member of the UPND since it was founded in 1998. He became active in 2006 and has been the Deputy Chair for Research and Policy since. Lungu holds a Master's in Finance from Oxford.