UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN

CENTRE FOR
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

PARTISAN REALIGNMENT IN CAPE TOWN, 1994-2004

Jeremy Seekings

CSSR Working Paper No. 111

Centre for Social Science Research
D·A·R·U

Published by the Centre for Social Science Research
University of Cape Town
2005

Copies of this publication may be obtained from:

The Administrative Officer
Centre for Social Science Research
University of Cape Town
Private Bag
Rondebosch, 7701
Tel: (021) 650 4656
Fax: (021) 650 4657
Email: kforbes@cssr.uct.ac.za

Price in Southern Africa (incl. VAT and postage): R 5.00

or it can be downloaded from our website
http://www.cssr.uct.ac.za/index.html

ISBN 1-77011-046-1

CENTRE FOR
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

Democracy in Africa Research Unit

PARTISAN REALIGNMENT IN CAPE TOWN, 1994-2004

Jeremy Seekings

CSSR Working Paper No. 111

December 2005

Jeremy Seekings is Professor of Political Studies and Sociology at the University of Cape Town (UCT), and Director of the Social Surveys Unit within the Centre for Social Science Research (CSSR).

Partisan Realignment in Cape Town, 1994-2004

Abstract

The Western Cape is the one part of South Africa that has experienced strong competition in democratic elections and a dramatic shift in power between political parties. Between 1994 and 2004 the initially dominant National Party lost almost all of its support, whilst support rose steadily for the African National Congress. Neither voting patterns nor shifts in the Western Cape fit neatly with a simple racial explanation of voting behaviour, because of both the heterogeneity and supposed fluidity of the 'coloured vote'. First, coloured voters have voted for opposing parties. Secondly, it has been asserted widely that there was a swing among coloured voters from the National Party to the African National Congress. This paper explores ward-level election results and survey data on Cape Town to show that coloured voters continue to be heterogeneous in their voting behaviour but that there is little evidence that former National Party supporters have become ANC supporters. The major cause of shifting partisan power in Cape Town is not voter realignment, but rather demographic change, with differential turnout playing a role in specific elections. It is the overall electorate, rather than the individual voter, that has changed.

Introduction

In South Africa as a whole, successive elections since 1994 have returned almost identical results. The share of the vote won by the African National Congress (ANC) has risen very slightly whilst the opposition parties have failed collectively to make any inroads on its support. South Africa seems to have a dominant party system, with little real competition for the popular vote (Lodge 1999, 2002; Reynolds, 1999; Southall, 2001; Piombo and Nijzink, 2005).

In one province, however, not only has there been fierce electoral competition but there has also been a striking shift in political power. The Western Cape is not a historic area of ANC strength, and in the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC won just one-third of the vote in the province – approximately the same share that it won in KwaZulu-Natal and less than its share in each of the other seven provinces in South Africa. The largest share (53 percent) of the 1994 vote in the Western Cape was won by the National Party (NP), so the province had from 1994 a National Party provincial government and premier. Just ten years later, however, the picture was very different. In 2004, in the third democratic elections, the ANC won 46 percent of the provincial vote, against just 9 percent for the by now "New" National Party (NNP). ANC leaders served as provincial premier (Ebrahim Rasool) and Mayor of Cape Town (Noma-India Mfeketo).

The shift in power from the NP to the ANC was fast but steady. Table 1 summarises the votes won in the Western Cape by the major parties in each provincial and local election between 1994 and 2004. The ANC's share of the vote rose from 33 percent in the 1994 provincial election, to 37 percent in the local elections of 1995-96 and 42 percent in the 1999 provincial election. The ANC's share of the vote dropped slightly in the local elections of 2000, before resuming its upward trend again, reaching 45 percent in the 2004 provincial election. The NP's decline was even sharper than the ANC's rise. From 53 percent of the vote in 1994, its share fell to 48 percent in 1995-96 and 38 percent in 1999. It contested the 2000 local elections as part of the newly-formed Democratic Alliance (DA), together with the Democratic Party (DP). In 2004, after splitting away from the DA and forming a new alliance with the ANC instead, the NNP won a mere 11 percent of the vote.

Table 1: Votes for major parties in elections in Western Cape province, 1994-2004

Party	*1994 provincial*		*1996 local**		*1999 provincial*		*2000 local***		*2004 provincial*	
	votes (000)	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*
DA							564	50	425	27
DP	142	7	60	5	189	12				
NP/NNP	1138	53	564	48	610	38			170	11
ANC	706	33	432	37	668	42	440	39	709	45
ID									123	8
Other	151	7	108	9	134	8	117	10	140	9
Total	2137	100	1164	100	1601	100	1120	100	1567	100

Notes: * PR votes ** PR + ward votes.

The shift in institutional power from the NP to the ANC was not achieved through these general provincial and local elections alone. In the Western Cape, ANC power has repeatedly benefited from institutional rules that delivered it power ahead of its rising share of the popular vote. Thus, after the first post-apartheid local elections in 1995-96, the ANC won control of a number of municipalities – including two major parts of Cape Town – on the basis of the legislative provision that former ‘black’ areas received half the wards in the new ‘interim’ councils, even if they were home to a much smaller proportion of the electorate (see Seekings, 1995, 1997a). More recently, changes in power have run ahead of changes in the popular vote due to defections, floor-crossing and shifting partisan coalitions in the provincial and local assemblies. As the NP has fallen apart, so many of its provincial and municipal legislators have found their way into the ANC. At the local government level, for example, the ANC won control of the Cape Town City Council when former NP councillors, elected in 2000 under the flag of the DA, crossed the floor in September 2004.

Both the initial patterns of and post-1994 trends in electoral support have attracted widespread commentary in the press as well as a range of scholarly analyses. Voting patterns in the 1994 election received the most detailed analysis, as scholars grappled with the incongruence between voting in the Western Cape and simple race-based explanations of voting behaviour. In the country as a whole, the support base of the ANC comprised African voters, and the support base of the NNP comprised coloured, Indian and white voters. This simple correlation gave rise to descriptions of the 1994 election as a racial census, to use a phrase coined by Horowitz (1985) to describe elections in other multi-ethnic societies. In the Western Cape, as Reynolds (1994: 203-4) and many others have noted, there was a strong correlation between race and voting, with African citizens voting for the ANC and most white and coloured citizens voting for the NNP. But the ANC did win the votes of an estimated one in four coloured voters (*ibid*: 201; Mattes *et al.*, 1996: 145). Indeed, as Mattes, Giliomee and James pointed out, none of the NP, ANC or DP had a mono-racial support base: the NP’s support base was (they estimate) two-thirds coloured and one-third white, the ANC’s almost equally African and coloured, and the DP’s almost equally white and coloured (Mattes *et al.*, 1996: 146).

Any explanation of voting patterns in the Western Cape has to confront the fact that there is no monolithic ‘coloured vote’. For the ANC and NP, campaigning in ‘African’ and ‘white’ residential areas respectively was a matter of promoting turnout among their core supporters. It was in ‘coloured’ areas that there was a battle for hearts and minds. This presented each of these political parties with a strategic dilemma: might promoting themselves in coloured areas perhaps undermine their turnout in their areas of core support? A series of studies focused on how the ANC and NP addressed this dilemma and how coloured voters responded to the parties’ campaigns (Calland, 1994; Eldridge, 1996; Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Seekings, 1996a; Mattes *et al.*, 1996). The overall result is clear: working-class coloured voters opted en masse for the NP whilst middle-class coloured voters were divided, with many supporting the ANC.

In a poll in mid-1993, one half of all coloured voters in the Western Cape said that they did not know for which party they would vote. In an earlier paper, I argued that the story of the 1994 elections in the Western Cape was essentially the story of the NP's success in persuading most of these initially undecided coloured voters to vote for the NP (Seekings, 1996a). Most other scholars writing about the election have also argued or implied that the 1994 result was not pre-ordained, but instead was contingent upon the campaigns run by the major competitors. The NP emphasised its national leader, F.W. de Klerk, who enjoyed strong personal support among these voters. The ANC's campaign was characterised by mishaps that alienated coloured voters (Mattes *et al*., 1996: 129-31). Almost all voters (and parties) concurred that the key issues in the election were jobs and crime, and both parties ran issue-oriented campaigns, but the NP's take on these issues was more appealing to undecided voters. As I wrote then:

> Coloured voters might have been convinced that the ANC had an impressive 'Plan' [the Reconstruction and Development Programme] to build houses and provide jobs, but they seem to have remained skeptical that they themselves would benefit. … The NP campaign, on the other hand, was effective in linking voters' fears to the spectre of a destructive ANC. When African squatters occupied houses built for coloured families, the NP warned (coloured) voters that their houses were 'not safe under the ANC'. … The NP succeeded in defining the way in which the issues were understood. (Seekings, 1996a: 35; see also Eldridge and Seekings, 1996)

Calland (1994) argues that the ANC would have done better had it adopted a more aggressive, and negative, campaign, focusing primarily on the long history of apartheid. Mattes *et al*. (1996) note that it would have been difficult for the ANC to run a negative campaign in this province whilst running a positive campaign nationally. But there are different kinds of negative campaigns: Eldridge and I (1996) argue that a more effective negative campaign in the Western Cape would have focused on the immediate issues, i.e. jobs and crime, but emphasising the NP's failure to address these issues whilst holding power in the very recent past.

Electoral trends after 1994 supported the general interpretation of contingent voting, i.e. that voting was contingent on circumstance and campaign and was not fixed or pre-determined. The dominant media interpretation of the apparently rising support for the ANC was that there was a 'swing' from the NP to the ANC, with individual voters defecting from the former to the latter party. The ANC, unsurprisingly, backed this interpretation in its public statements. I contested this interpretation in a series of articles following the first post-apartheid local government elections (Seekings, 1995, 1996b, 1997a). My argument revolved primarily around data on turnout in the elections. Between 1994 and 1995-96, the ANC's share of the provincial vote might have risen, but the absolute number of votes won in the Western Cape by the ANC actually declined, from 706,000 to 432,000. The ANC's share of the vote only rose because there was an even more spectacular collapse in the votes won by the NP, from over 1.1 million to just 564,000. I suggested that the shift in the vote was the consequence of differential turnout: the ANC had a much larger core of strong supporters, who turned out to vote in 1995-96, whilst the NP had a small core of strong supporters and a large number of weak supporters, so that it was especially hard hit by low turnout in 1995-96. The 'swing' was the result of voters who were undecided in mid-1993 but opted for the NP in 1994, who then became disproportionately apathetic in 1995-96, such that the primary 'swing' was from the NP to non-voting. The evidence for a swing from the NP to the ANC was weak. 'Without the results of consecutive elections at the same level, or comparable and sound opinion poll data, we should beware strong claims about shifts and swings' (Seekings, 1997a: 135).

The results of the 1999 provincial elections were not so clear as to resolve the issue of voter realignment (see Table 1). The ANC won more votes in 1999 than it had in 1995-96, but fewer than it had in 1994. The ANC's share of the vote continued to rise not because it was winning more votes, but because the other parties continued to lose votes. The DP and NP combined had won almost 1.3 million votes in 1994. In 1999 they won just 799,000. Unfortunately, most studies of these results ignored the existing literature and tended simply to replicate rather than build on the findings of earlier studies. Jacobs (2001)[1] found that the 1999 election showed that support for the NP was not strongly entrenched. Like me, he suggested that there had been a clear swing to the ANC in small towns and among farm-workers. Like me, he pointed to the importance of turnout. Like Mattes *et al.*, Eldridge and myself, and Lodge (1999), Jacobs also argued that the parties' strategic and tactical

[1] In his article, Jacobs claimed that the extant literature on voting among coloured South Africans tell us nothing about the 'political behaviour of coloured voters' or 'the tactics of political parties that were contesting the vote' (26). His grasp of the literature was poor. He fails to cite any of the work of Calland (1994), Eldridge (1996; Eldridge and Seekings, 1996) or myself (Seekings, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997a). Although he did refer to data in one article of mine (Seekings, 1996a), he failed to attribute the article to me and ignored the substantive argument contained therein. Jacobs perhaps ignores all this previous work because he is distrustful of pre-1999 opinion polls, but his criticisms of those polls (p.25) are not specified.

choices were consequential. The new NP leader, Martinus van Schalkwyk, was no vote-puller in the De Klerk mould. The ANC, on the other hand, waged a more effective campaign than in 1994, addressing directly many of the concerns of poorer coloured voters and attacking more strongly the NP (see Lodge, 1999: 142-6, 176-7). The ANC also reaped the electoral benefits of having delivered improved living conditions in some areas. Habib and Naidu (1999) also reached the very unoriginal conclusion that class as well as race played a part in voting behaviour, with the NNP and DP performing better in poorer coloured areas in the Western Cape (and, similarly, Indian areas in KwaZulu-Natal) whilst the ANC performed better in richer coloured (and Indian) areas.

The results of the 2000 local elections further complicated analysis of voter realignment in the Western Cape. The ANC's number of votes dropped to almost the same number as in the previous local elections in 1995-96. Its share (39 percent) was slightly higher than in 1995-96, but was lower than in the 1999 provincial elections (see Table 1). The ANC's opponent in the 2000 local elections was, for the first and only time, the Democratic Alliance comprising the NNP and DP (and very minor allies). The new DA won many fewer voters than the NNP and DP combined in 1995-96, and its share was the same as in 1999 (but was up slightly in Cape Town). There are, to my knowledge, no independent studies of the 2000 elections in the Western Cape or Cape Town specifically[2], but Lodge's study of the local elections countrywide includes some discussion of Cape Town (see especially Lodge, 2002: 104-10). Both parties again pitched their campaigns at coloured voters, with the ANC selecting as their candidate for mayor Lynn Brown (having failed to persuade Cheryl Carolus, the ambassador to London, to stand) and the DA selecting Pieter Marais (from the NNP). Both parties made concerted efforts to appeal to coloured voters. But in the end the overall result reflected more the success of the DA in mobilising its supporters in white areas relative to the ANC in African townships, i.e. the election result hinged on turnout – as both parties acknowledged (Lodge, 2002: 119). Lodge does not attempt to assess trends in coloured areas or among coloured voters.

The 2004 election results seem to provide much stronger evidence for a swing to the ANC. The ANC won 709,000 votes in the province, more even than it had in the 1994 election (see Table 1). The ANC's share of the vote was a full 12 percentage points higher in 2004 than in 1994. Its share rose dramatically because the total number of votes cast in the province in 2004 was much the same as in 1999, and way below the 1994 figure. The opposition parties were more fragmented in 2004 than in 2000. A large section of the NNP had split away from the DA (leaving a significant rump of former NNP members behind

[2] ANC official Max Ozinsky wrote an insightful commentary in the ANC magazine, *Umrabulo* (Ozinsky, 2001).

in the DA) and entered a remarkable alliance with the ANC. Meanwhile, Patricia de Lille – a coloured and high-profile member of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) – left the fractious and moribund PAC to form a new party, the Independent Democrats (ID). The results showed that the NNP was spectacularly unable to maintain its former support, winning just 11 percent of the vote, way behind the DA. But the DA and ID were unable to attract the share of the vote that the NNP had once commanded. The DA won just 27 percent of the vote and the ID an impressive 8 percent.

Overall, comparing the 1994 and 2004 results, it might *appear* that there have been at least two ‘swings’ in the Western Cape: from the NP to non-voting (or to other opposition parties), and from the opposition parties collectively to the ANC. In this paper, I argue that there is still inadequate evidence to support the second part of this conclusion. I suggest instead that the ANC’s vote has risen primarily because of the changing demographics of the electorate, with the ANC’s support base growing rapidly. The ANC’s share of the vote has risen because of the combination of, firstly, demographic change which swelled its support base and, secondly, the collapse of the National Party, many of whose voters never swung behind any other party. This is the case, at least, for metropolitan Cape Town. In this paper, I consider only evidence for the metropolitan area – which does include two-thirds of the provincial electorate. It is likely that processes in voting behaviour in the smaller towns of the Western Cape, and in farming districts, are different to the city of Cape Town (see Seekings, 1995, 1997a; Jacobs, 2001).

I use two kinds of evidence that have been ignored or unavailable hitherto: ward-level results combined with ward-level data from the Population Census; and a sample survey of adults across Cape Town. First, I use ward-level data to analyse in what kinds of areas the ANC performed strongly and in what kinds of area it did not. Secondly, I use data from the 2005 Cape Area Study – a survey of a representative sample of 1,200 adults across Cape Town – to examine which voters supported which parties. Thirdly, I use data from this sample survey to shed some light on changes in the voting behaviour of individual voters, probing both the extent of conversion from one party to another and the characteristics of such converts.

Trends in election results in metropolitan Cape Town have been broadly similar to those for the province as a whole. Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 show how voting has changed in successive elections in the metropolitan area only, i.e. omitting votes cast elsewhere in the province. As Figure 1 shows, the ANC’s share of the vote rose steadily across the decade, excepting the dip in the 2000 local elections. But the overall rise is less dramatic than in the province as a whole (as shown in Table 1), and in Cape Town the ANC failed to win as many votes in 2004 as it had in 1994 (see Figure 2). The NP's share of the vote in Cape Town plummeted, albeit not as dramatically as in the province as a whole.

Table 2: Votes for major parties in elections in Cape Town, 1994-2004

Party	*1994 provincial**		*1996 local***		*1999 provincial*		*2000 local****		*2004 provincial*	
	votes (000)	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*	*votes (000)*	*%*
DA							375	53	280	27
DP	107	8	51	7	142	14				
NP/NNP	655	49	358	48	386	37			112	11
ANC	481	36	278	37	424	41	270	38	454	44
ID									83	8
Other	67	5	51	7	88	8	57	8	110	11
Total	1337	100	738	100	1040	100	702	100	1039	100

Notes: * estimated ** PR votes *** PR + ward votes.

Figure 1: Number of votes in Cape Town



Figure 2: Share of vote in Cape Town



Which areas support which parties?

Since 2000, Cape Town has been divided into precisely one hundred local government wards. Not only are data available on election results by ward, but data from the 2001 Population Census are also available at the ward level. This allows for an analysis of the kinds of area that rally behind each of the parties and their candidates in ward elections.[3]

A simple inspection of the 2000 local election results in the different wards across Cape Town indicates a clear pattern. Of the sixty-six wards in which fewer than 35 percent of the voters were African, the ANC won just one ward. (This was ward 48, Rylands, a middle-class Indian and coloured area). Of the seven wards in which between 35 and 70 percent of the voters were African, the ANC won five. And the ANC won every single one of the 27 wards where more than 70 percent of the voters were African. Overall, there is a very strong relationship between the racial composition of the electorate and the ANC's share of the vote.

[3] Both election results and population census data are available at a higher level of disaggregation than wards, but it would be immensely difficult to match up sub-ward voting data with sub-ward census data.

Table 3: Regression models for ANC's share of the vote

Variable	*Model A*		*Model B*		*Model C*	
	Coefficient	*Std.error*	*coefficient*	*Std error*	*Coefficient*	*Std error*
African voters as % of electorate	0.77***	0.03			1.14***	0.09
Coloured voters as % of electorate					0.43***	0.08
Percentage of adults with post-matric qualifications			2.26***	0.5	0.35	0.28
Employment rate			-1.03***	0.36	0.37	0.18
Mean household income			-0.0006***	0.0001	-0.00002	0.00006
Turnout			0.16	0.12	0.12	0.59
Constant	14***	1.5	108***	16	-38***	14
r2	0.88		0.66		0.93	
Adjusted r2	0.88		0.65		0.93	
N	97		95		93	

Note: these models are for 97, 95 and 93 wards respectively. One ward (#76) is omitted entirely because the ANC did not contest it, instead supporting a pro-ANC independent candidate.

Table 3 reports the results of a series of models regressing the ANC's share of the vote (as a percentage) against other variables. Model A regresses the ANC's share against just one other variable: the share of the ward's adult population that is African. In this simple bivariate regression model, each additional percentage point in the African share of the electorate correlates with an additional 0.77 percentage points in the ANC's share of the vote. The correlation is significant at the 1 percent level. The r^2 is a massive 0.88. This reminds us that there is a very strong correlation between race and voting. But in a situation where race and class are also closely correlated, perhaps the causation runs from class to voting? In Model B, the ANC's share of the vote is regressed against four non-racial variables: the percentage of adults with post-matric education, the employment rate (i.e. the percentage of adults in employment or self-employment), the mean household income, and turnout in the ward in the local election. The coefficients for the employment rate and mean household income are negative (and highly significant), indicating that higher employment and income correlates with a lower ANC vote. But the coefficient on the proportion of adults in the ward having post-matric education is positive: controlling for employment and income, post-matric education increases the ANC's share of the vote. Turnout is not significant. In this second model, the adjusted r^2 is 0.66 – which would normally be considered very high, but is much lower than in the bivariate Model A. Model C uses all of the variables, together with a variable for the percentage of coloured voters in each ward. The coefficients for African and coloured voter share are both positive (but weakly so in the latter case) and highly significant. The other variables cease to be significant. The adjusted r^2 rises to 0.93. Comparing models A and B suggests that the racial share is the crucial variable: both race and class correlate with voting, but race correlates more closely. Comparing models A and C suggests that the addition of other variables besides race does little to improve the model (whilst comparing models B and C shows that adding race to model B improves the model considerably).

Taking only the predominantly coloured wards underscores the power of the analysis. For wards in which more than 90 percent of the adults are coloured, and excluding one ward where the ANC stood aside to support an 'independent' candidate, the relationship between mean household income in the ward and the ANC's share of the vote in 2000 is statistically significant (at the 1 percent level): the higher the mean household income, the larger the ANC's share of the vote. And the relationship is reasonably strong. But a bivariate regression gives an r^2 of just 0.22. Class explains a part, but only a small part, of the variance in voting in predominantly coloured areas.

These results might seem to provide strong support for the racial census model. But the weakness of the racial census model was not that there is no correlation between racial demographics and voting shares. Clearly there is a widespread and strong correlation. The problem is rather different: does correlation indicate causation? Or, to be rather more precise, what is it about a voter's racial classification that explains his or her voting behaviour? Answering this question requires the examination of survey data.

Which voters support which parties? Evidence from the Cape Area Study

Surveys have been widely used in examining voting behaviour at the national level (see Johnson and Schlemmer, 1996; Mattes, 1995; Mattes, Taylor and Africa, 1999). But publicly-available, national sample surveys rarely have samples that are large or representative enough to probe in any detail voting behaviour at the provincial or metropolitan level. The 1993 survey conducted by Research Surveys that I used in earlier articles (Seekings, 1996; Eldridge and Seekings, 1996) was unusual, in that its sample in the Western Cape was both representative and large (n=1282). Mattes *et al.* (1996) used a survey conducted in February 1994 with a large provincial sample (n=2500). Ten years later, in early 2005, we conducted a survey in Cape Town that allows us to examine again voting behaviour at this level.

The 2005 Cape Area Study examined a range of topics broadly concerning inequality and diversity in post-apartheid Cape Town (see Seekings *et al*., 2005). The survey used a two-stage probabilistic sample design. The first stage – the selection of 'enumeration areas' (i.e. the neighbourhoods demarcated as discrete areas by Statistics South Africa for the Population Census) – was stratified, meaning that the sample in practice comprises four separate samples, one in predominantly coloured areas, a second in predominantly white areas, a third in predominantly informal, African areas and the last in predominantly formal, African areas. The second stage entailed the selection of households within each enumeration area, and of individuals within these households. As a result of differential response rates, the final sample requires weighting for the analysis of many issues. The overall sample comprised 1205 adults.

Respondents were asked:

> Did you vote in the national elections held last year, in 2004?

If the respondent answered affirmatively, he or she was then asked:

> I know that voting is a private matter, but I hope you will be able to tell me whether, last year, you voted for the African National Congress (ANC), for the Democratic Alliance (DA), for the New National Party (NNP), for the Independent Democrats (Patricia de Lille), for a different party, or did not vote.

Table 4 show the declared votes of our sample in the 2004 elections and the actual results across the city as a whole in 2004.[4] Whereas the second column presents the distribution of the votes that were actually cast, the third column includes also the many adults of voting age who did not vote, either because they were not registered to vote or because, even though they were registered, they did not bother to vote. The first and third columns are not strictly comparable, because we had a response rate of less than 100 percent and it is not unlikely that the kinds of people who do not vote are the kinds of people who we failed to interview (either because they were not available or they refused). But comparing the first and last columns suggests that our sample

[4] Our sample was in fact drawn from just 55 of the city's 100 wards. In six of these wards we had only one or two respondents, leaving 49 with nine or more respondents. These wards were not entirely representative of the city. A comparison of the 2000 local government election results in these 49 wards with the results in all 100 wards shows that our sample of wards includes a very slightly higher percentage of opposition voters and a smaller percentage of ANC voters than in the city as a whole. But the differences are not large.

includes too many self-reported ANC voters and too few self-reported opposition party voters. The most likely explanation for this is that ANC supporters were disproportionately likely to say they voted for their party even if they did not actually cast a vote in 2004, whilst opposition party voters are disproportionately likely to refuse to answer our questions about voting. This is unlikely to make any significant difference to the analysis below of the decision about which party to vote for, although it would affect analysis of the decision of whether to vote or not.

Table 4: Comparison of declared voting by CAS sample with actual voting results

Party	*Declared votes in 2004, entire CAS sample (unweighted) (%)*	*Actual votes cast in 2004 (%)*	*Votes cast and estimated non-voters in 2004 (%)*
Democratic Alliance	10	27	13
New National Party	5	11	5
African National Congress	39	44	21
Independent Democrats	3	8	4
Other	3	11	5
refused	11		
Did not vote	28		51
Cannot remember	2		
Total	100	100	100

Note: The final column is based on an eligible voting population in 2004 of 2.13 million voters. This figure was extrapolated from the 2001 Population Census data for Cape Town, assuming that the annual growth in the adult population between 2001 and 2004 was the same as between 1996 and 2001 (i.e. 3 percent per year).

The Cape Town survey data can be used to explore the relevance of competing theories of voting behaviour. The three predominant approaches focus on partisan identification, issues and sociological factors. Partisan identification refers to the enduring psychological identification of citizens with parties, formed over long periods of time (often in adolescence). Issue-voting refers to voters' making decisions on the basis of a retrospective or prospective assessment of the competing parties' performance on key issues. Sociological explanations focus on variables such as race or class, which can affect voting behaviour through a variety of mechanisms (including partisan identification or issue-voting).

In South Africa, the 'racial census' view of elections was a rather poorly developed version of a sociological explanation. A more thorough-going sociological explanation would entail analysis of class as well as race, and of the interaction between these in the formation of identities and interests. Table 5 shows that a variety of sociological factors correlate with voting decisions in Cape Town. Unsurprisingly, African voters massively favour the ANC. But there is a clear and strong correlation also between household and neighbourhood income and voting, as well as a weaker correlation between education and voting.

Table 5: Declared voting by race, income, education and gender (%)

		ANC	*DA*	*NNP*	*ID*	*Other party*	*Not vote*	*Refused to say*	*Don't know*	*Total*
Race	white	4	29	6	2	3	24	29	3	100
	Coloured	20	10	8	5	4	40	10	3	100
	African	83	0	0	0	1	15	1	0	100
Household income	Rich	18	19	4	4	5	33	15	2	100
	Middle-income	39	11	8	2	2	31	6	2	100
	Poor	62	6	4	1	2	21	3	1	100
Neighbour-hood	Rich	17	19	6	3	2	29	21	2	100
	Middle-income	35	7	6	3	4	37	6	2	100
	poor	76	2	2	1	1	15	2	1	100
Education	Post-matric	22	17	2	3	2	28	22	2	100
	Matric	38	11	4	2	3	30	9	2	100
	Less than matric	45	8	6	2	2	26	8	2	100
Gender	Male	37	9	4	3	4	29	13	1	100
	Female	40	11	6	2	2	27	10	2	100

Note: The survey asked a series of questions about racial classification; the analyses reported in this and subsequent tables use the variable f5, how were you classified under apartheid?

In the 1990s, there was a relationship between class and voting among coloured voters (as among Indian voters in KwaZulu-Natal), with richer coloured voters disproportionately likely to vote for the ANC and poorer coloured voters disproportionately unlikely to do so (Eldridge and Seekings, 1996; Habib and Naidu, 1999). We found a rather more complex pattern in 2005 (see Table 6). Coloured respondents in rich *and poor* households were more likely to say they voted for the ANC than respondents in middle-income households. This might reflect the difficult choices facing poor coloured voters in the aftermath of the collapse of the NNP. The DA does not provide a comparable home to poor voters. Coloured men were also more likely to vote for the ANC than coloured women.

Table 6: Declared voting by income, education and gender, coloured voters only (%)

		ANC	*DA*	*NNP*	*ID*	*Other party*	*Not vote*	*Refused to say*	*Don't know*	*Total*
Coloured total		20	10	8	5	4	40	10	3	100
Household income	Rich	27	9	5	6	5	38	6	4	100
	Middle-income	13	14	13	4	3	46	6	2	100
	Poor	26	15	9	3	4	36	5	3	100
Neighbour-hood	Rich	21	10	8	4	4	41	8	4	100
	Middle-income or poor	19	12	9	7	2	36	15	1	100
Gender	Male	25	9	8	5	6	36	10	2	100
	Female	17	11	9	4	2	42	11	4	100

The complexities of voting in Cape Town provide an obvious complication to a crude racial census interpretation (see Eldridge and Seekings, 1996). But a more fundamental challenge to sociological interpretations in general arose from an examination of partisan identification in South Africa (Mattes, 1995; Seekings, 1996b; see also Seekings, 1997b). Many South African voters, like voters in other polities with well-established party systems, had deep-rooted attachments to the ANC or, far less commonly, one of the other parties. But explaining voting behaviour in terms of pre-existing identification begs the question, 'what determines identification?' Mattes *et al*. (1999) developed a simple model that explained identification and voting behaviour at the national level without recourse to race or other 'structural' (i.e. sociological) variables. They found that a battery of purely attitudinal variables explained why most voters either identified with the ANC or identified with a competing party or, if they identified with no party, for which party they said they would vote. The attitudinal variables used included views on the competing parties and assessments of their past and prospective performance.

CAS 2005 was not designed as a study of voting behaviour. We did not ask our respondents directly why they voted the ways they did, nor did we ask a large number of attitudinal questions allowing us to replicate the modeling of Mattes *et al*. (1999). But we did ask a number of questions about our respondents' grievances and assessments of different levels of government, allowing for some analysis of voters' reasoning.

We found the expected level and pattern of partisan identification in Cape Town, with high levels of identification among African respondents but much lower levels among coloured and white respondents. Three out of four African respondents identified with a political party, almost all with the ANC. Only one in five coloured respondents identified with a political party, and fewer than one in six white respondents. Strikingly, *most* of the coloured party identifiers identified with the ANC. Even one in five white party identifiers identified with the ANC (with three in five identifying with the DA). Overall, 80 percent of our partisan identifiers identified with the ANC, and less than 10 percent identified with the DA. If identifiers are more likely to vote than non-identifiers, then it would follow that low turnout in all areas would favour the ANC.

Responses to our questions about issues were also much as we expected. Half of our respondents identified job creation and unemployment as the most important problem that the government should address. One-fifth identified crime as the most important problem. Few respondents singled out any other issue. Differences by race were muted: white respondents were somewhat more likely to mention crime, but there were some African and coloured respondents who did likewise and even among white respondents, jobs were mentioned more often than crime.

Table 7 reports the results of a series of probit regressions on voting for the ANC in 2004 as opposed to voting for any other party. The dependent variable is a dummy variable, with a value of 1 if the respondent voted for the ANC and a value of 0 if he or she said that he or she voted for any other party. No account is taken of respondents who refused to say for which party they voted, or who said that they did not vote.

In Model A, voting for the ANC is regressed simply against the racial classification of the voter. Being African increases the probability of voting for the ANC by 83 percent, and being coloured increases it by 29 percent. Just knowing the racial classification of the respondent explains half of the variance in the dependent variable. Model B regresses voting for the ANC against a set of other structural or sociological variables, omitting race. The average income in the neighbourhood and the income of the household are both highly significant. Living in a rich neighbourhood or household reduces considerably the probability of voting for the ANC. But this model explains much less of the

Table 7: Probit regression models for voting for the ANC compared to voting for any other party

	Model A		*Model B*		*Model C*		*Model D*		*Model E*		*Model F*	
	Dprobit coefficient	*Std error*	*Dprobit coefficient*	*Std error*	*Dprobit coefficient*	*Std error*	*Dprobit coefficient*	*Std error*	*Dprobit coefficient*	*Std error*	*Dprobit coefficient*	*Std error*
African	0.83***	0.03									0.5***	0.09
Coloured	0.29***	0.05									0.15***	0.05
Male			-0.01	0.04								
Post-matric education			0.01	0.06								
Matric			0.06	0.05								
Rich neighbourhood			-0.53***	0.05					-0.4***	0.06	-0.08	0.06
Middle-income neighbourhood			-0.32***	0.06					-0.19***	0.06	-0.05	0.05
Rich household			-0.26***	0.06								
Middle-income household			-0.15***	0.06								
Identify with the ANC					0.64***	0.03			0.52***	0.03	0.38***	0.05
Assess Mbeki's performance as good							0.26***	0.04	0.16***	0.04	0.12***	0.04
Assess Rasool's performance as good							-0.04	0.05				
Trust Mbeki to do what is right							0.14***	0.05				
Trust Rasool to do what is right							-0.18***	0.05	0.1***	0.03	0.07**	0.03
Understands politics							-0.16***	0.05				
Most important problem is crime							-0.18***	0.06				
Most important problem is jobs							0.00	0.04				
Pseudo r^2	0.51		0.24		0.43		0.17		0.57		0.66	
N	676		603		711		687		708		673	

Note: *** indicates significance at the 1 percent (0.01) level; ** indicates significance at the 5 percent (0.05) level.

variance in the dependent variable than did Model A. Model C regresses the voting decision against identification with the ANC. Unsurprisingly, the correlation is strong and highly significant. Model D regresses voting for the ANC against a set of attitudinal variables, with some of the correlations being highly significant but others not being significant even at the 10 percent level. But, as with Model B, this model explains only a small part of the variance in the dependent variable. Model E combines a variety of structural and attitudinal variables, but omits race. The neighbourhood, partisan identification, assessment of President Mbeki's performance and trust in Premier Rasool are all highly significant, and explain more of the variance in the dependent variable than did race alone in Model A. This shows that, as Mattes *et al*. (1999) argued, much of the voting decision can be explained without recourse to race, even if there is a strong correlation between race and voting. Finally, Model F adds race, which results in neighbourhood ceasing to be significant and the other coefficients shrinking. This model explains more of the variance in the dependent variable than any of the other models.

In summary, race is clearly a more powerful factor in explaining voting behaviour than other structural or sociological factors or attitudinal variables on their own. But it is no more powerful than partisan identification or a combination of other sociological and attitudinal variables. And the most complete explanation of voting behaviour needs to include some of these other variables alongside race.

Changing voters or different voters?

The 2005 Cape Area Study is, to my knowledge, the first survey to ask people how they voted in several elections. Before being asked about the 2004 elections, respondents were asked:

> South Africa's first democratic elections were held in 1994. I know that voting is a private matter, but I hope you will be able to tell me whether, in 1994, you voted for Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress, for FW De Klerk and the National Party, for the Democratic Party, for a different party, or you did not vote.

The survey thus provides data on respondents' reported voting behaviour in two elections, in 1994 and 2004, i.e. ten years apart. Whilst recall over a long time period is problematic, we hoped that the founding elections were sufficiently pivotal that respondents would remember how they had voted.

The CAS data allows us to examine who voted – or at least who says they voted – for each party in 1994 and 2004. We can then see how many voters changed their vote, and identify who were these voters. We should note that the wording of the question above was not strictly party-based because it refers explicitly to Mandela and De Klerk. It is possible that this wording might lead some respondents to answer "ANC" because of post-hoc identification with Mandela.

Tables 8 and 9 compare respondents' recorded vote in 1994 with their votes in 2004. Note that, given that mistakes might be made either by the respondent or the interviewer, the margin of error must be at least a few percentage points, meaning that small percentages should be treated with caution. The patterns of results are, however, very striking. The first column of Table 8 shows that the ANC retained in 2004 almost all (82 percent) of the votes of those respondents who said that they voted for it in the 1994 elections. Some (11 percent) of its 1994 voters said that they did not vote in 2004. Although the first figure is almost certainly an overestimate and the second an underestimate, because the proportion of our African respondents who *said* that they voted was much larger than the proportion of people in African areas who actually did vote in 2004, the pattern is clear. Very few (only 7 percent) of the ANC's 1994 voters said that they defected to a different party in 2004. The third column of Table 8 shows that the DA also retained almost all the votes of 1994 DP voters. In complete contrast, as shown in the second column of Table 8, the NNP retained the support in 2004 of a mere quarter (26 percent) of its declared 1994 voters. About the same proportion of its 1994 voters (28 percent) voted for the DA in 2004, and a similar proportion said that they did not vote at all in 2004. Small proportions defected to the ANC (7 percent), ID (6 percent) or other parties. Overall, whilst there is clear evidence of voters shifting from the NP to the DA and from the NP to not voting, there is little evidence of voters shifting from other parties to the ANC.

Some of the respondents in our 2005 survey were not living in Cape Town in 1994. About 8 percent of our respondents moved to Cape Town since 2000, and another 14 percent moved to Cape Town during the 1990s (but we cannot tell whether this was before or after the April 1994 elections). Three-quarters of these new arrivals are African, almost all from the Eastern Cape. As many as 27 percent of our respondents who said they had actually voted in 2004 had arrived in Cape Town after 1990, and 86 percent of these say they voted for the ANC in 2004. In short, immigration into Cape Town of ANC-supporting voters from ANC-supporting areas massively boosted the ANC's vote. The ANC also benefited from the new age cohorts reaching voting age. Some of the recent immigrants into Cape Town were too young to have voted in 1994. But the ageing of the younger age cohort that was already in Cape Town also benefited the ANC. Of those of our respondents who were too young to have voted in

1994 but were living in Cape Town before 1990, just over half said that they did not vote in 2004; of the just under half who did vote in 2004, a majority voted for the ANC. If we combine all of the younger voters, i.e. those who were already in Cape Town and those who immigrated after 1990, then the ANC won four out of five of the votes actually cast in 2004.

Table 8: How voters voted in 2004, according to their vote in 1994 (unweighted)

		Vote in 1994					
		Mandela/ ANC %	*De Klerk/ NP %*	*DP %*	*Other %*	*Not vote (too young) %*	*Not vote (age-eligible) %*
Vote in 2004	ANC	82	7	2	9	40	24
	NNP	1	26	2	3	2	1
	DA	3	28	79	23	6	3
	ID	2	6	4	6	1	4
	Other	1	3	2	40	1	1
	Not vote	11	30	12	20	50	68
	total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: The 2004 votes exclude 'refused' and 'don't know'. Possible mistaken responses or recording of responses means that small numbers should be treated with caution.

Table 9: How voters voted in 1994, according to their vote in 2004

		Vote in 2004				
		ANC %	NNP %	DA %	ID %	Not vote %
Vote in 1994	Mandela/ANC	68	5	9	33	13
	De Klerk/NP	2	72	35	30	14
	DP	0	2	32	3	2
	Other	1	2	6	7	2
	Not vote (age eligible)	6	2	2	13	23
	Not vote (too young)	22	7	12	10	39
	Refuse / don't know	1	10	5	3	6
	total	100	100	100	100	100

Overall, of the ANC's 2004 voters, more than one fifth had been too young to vote in 1994 and an additional proportion, approximately, were old enough to have voted in 1994 but had not been living in Cape Town then. Only one-twentieth had converted from other parties. In short, the ANC's rising share of the vote owed more to demographic change than it did to conversions.

Table 9 shows that the DA support base included many former NP voters, whilst the ID supporters were drawn in more or less equal proportions from former ANC and NP voters. Defections *from* the ANC were far more important to the DA and ID than defections from all other parties *to* the ANC. Insofar as individual voters have shifted from one party to another, most of the shifts were between opposition parties, and there were more shifts away from the ANC to opposition parties than from the opposition parties to the ANC. Although the numbers are small, it seems that the ANC's gains were accomplished despite a net loss through voter defection.

The rise in votes for the ANC cannot be explained simply in terms of demographic change in the electorate. As we saw above, the ANC's rising *share* of the vote did not reflect a rising *number* of votes. The ANC gained ground in terms of shares of the vote because it did not lose votes to the same extent as the opposition parties, most especially the NP. This brings us back to the issue of turnout.

Turnout can be analysed using both ward- and voter-level data. The most readily available ward level data comes from the 2000 local government elections, when the DA performed relatively strongly and the ANC relatively weakly. Regressing turnout by ward against neighbourhood income shows that the latter had a significant and positive effect in 2000.[5] The relationship becomes insignificant, however, when variables are included for the racial composition of the ward. For each additional 1 percent of the ward population that is African, turnout in 2000 declined by one quarter of a percentage point. For each additional 1 percent of the ward population that is coloured, turnout declined by one third of a percentage point. In 2000, turnout is sensitive to racial composition above all, with the addition of other 'class' variables making little difference to the regression. Care must be taken when using individual-level data from, for example, CAS, because of suspicions that some reported ANC voters might not have actually voted in 2004. Taking the responses at face value suggests that party identifiers are much more likely to vote, being coloured reduces the probability of voting, whilst there is no significant relationship between being African and voting (but this last finding should be viewed with suspicion).

[5] These regressions exclude one ward where turnout was very much higher than 100 percent.

Conclusion

Post-apartheid politics in Cape Town (and the Western Cape) has never been boring. It has been the primary site of decline of the NP and rise of the DA. It has seen considerable ‘floor-crossing’ by municipal councilors, provincial legislators and members of the national parliament. The city and province have seen a bewildering succession of mayors and premiers. And both the DA and ANC have been wracked by deep division. Neither political parties nor the party system seem very stable.

There have been some important shifts in voter allegiance. Most importantly, the NP has retained fewer of its 1994 voters than it lost to the DA, and the ID has attracted former NP and ANC voters. But, overall, there has been little movement from the ANC to the opposition parties or visa-versa. The failure of the ANC to attract substantial numbers of former NP (or DP/DA) voters, despite having coloured provincial leaders, suggests that there has been little deracialisation of the electorate in this city.

The ANC’s gains since 1994 have not been due to a successful recruitment from the ranks of opposition party voters. Rather, they have been due to demographic changes and differential turnout (with the 2000 local government elections representing an exception to the general trend of low turnout among non-ANC voters). In 1994, Reynolds suggested that racial demographics were crucial to the provincial result, and ‘the prospects for the ANC in the Cape may well improve as the century draws to a close, with the continuing influx of black South Africans into the townships and squatter camps of Cape Town’ (1994: 204). Reynolds was right. Massive immigration into Cape Town of ANC-supporters from ANC-supporting areas, mostly in the Eastern Cape, together with the preponderance of ANC supporters among younger age cohorts reaching voting age, has massively swelled the ANC’s vote.

Demographics dictate that elections in Cape Town (and the Western Cape) continue to turn on the ‘coloured vote’, but this is slowly changing. During most of the apartheid period, only 10 percent of Cape Town’s population was African. At current rates of demographic change, Cape Town will have a majority African electorate by about 2012. This does not mean that Cape Town is guaranteed to deliver an ANC majority before or by 2012. Turnout remains crucial, although there are no signs that African voters are becoming apathetic or disinterested any faster than others. More importantly, opposition parties might break the mould of the first ten years of post-apartheid politics and recruit significant numbers of former ANC voters. But if current voting patterns persist, demographic change will deliver Cape Town and the Western Cape to the ANC without any need for floor-crossing or bizarre political coalitions.

References

Calland, Richard. 1994. ‘The Winds of Change? The ANC’s Campaign for the Western Cape: An Assessment of the Principal Strategic Issues and Some Projections for the Future’. Unpublished M.A. (coursework) dissertation, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town.

Ehrenreich, Tony. 2004. ‘Elections in the Western Cape: Which Way Will It Go?’ *South African Labour Bulletin* 28,1 (February): 17-19.

Eldridge, Matt. 1996. ‘Now Wasn’t The Time: The ANC’s 1994 Election Campaign in South Africa’s Western Cape Province’. Unpublished M.A. dissertation, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town.

----- and Jeremy Seekings. 1996. ‘Mandela’s Lost Province: The African National Congress and the Western Cape Electorate in the 1994 South African Elections’. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 22,4 (December): 517-40.

Habib, Adam and Sanusha Naidu. 1999. ‘Election ’99: Was there a “coloured” and “indian” vote?’ *Politikon* 26,2 (November): 189-200.

Horowitz, Donald. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Jacobs, Sean. 2001. ‘Making Sense of the “Coloured” Vote in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Comparing the 1994 and 1999 Provincial Results in the Western Cape’. *Journal of African Elections* 1,1 (May): 23-35.

Johnson, R.W., and Lawrence Schlemmer (eds). 1996. *Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lodge, Tom. 1999. *Consolidating Democracy: South Africa’s Second Popular Election* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press).

-----. 2002. *Politics in South Africa: From Mandela to Mbeki.* Cape Town: David Philip and London: James Currey.

Mattes, Robert. 1995. *The Election Book: Judgement and Choice in South Africa’s 1994 Election*. Cape Town: Institute for a Democratic South Africa.

-----, Hermann Giliomee and Wilmot James. 1996. ‘The Election in the Western Cape’. In R.W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer (eds). 1996. *Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 108-67.

-----, Helen Taylor and Cherrel Africa. 1999. ‘Judgement and Choice in the 1999 South African Election’. *Politikon* 26,2: 235-47.

Nijzink, Lia and Sean Jacobs. 2001. Provincial elections and government formation in the Western Cape: the politics of polarisation'. *Politikon* 27,1: 37-49.

Piombo, Jessica, and Lia Nijzink (eds). 2005. *Electoral Politics in South Africa: Assessing the First Democratic Decade* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

Ozinsky, Max. 2000. 'The Good, the Bad …' *South African Labour Bulletin* 24,1 (Feb): 79-83.

-----. 2001. 'Our elections campaign in the Cape Town metro'. *Umrabulo* 10 (May): 17-21.

Reynolds, Andrew (ed.). 1994. *Election '94 South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip).

----- (ed.). 1999. *Election '99 South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip).

Seekings, Jeremy. 1995. 'What Swing? Local Elections in the Western Cape'. *Indicator SA*. 13,1 (Summer): 29-32.

-----. 1996a. 'From independence to identification', in Wilmot James, Daria Caliguire and Kerry Cullinan (eds), *Now That We are Free: Coloured Communities in a Democratic South Africa* (Cape Town: IDASA): 28-38.

-----. 1996b. 'Anticlimax: Cape Town's Local Elections', *Indicator SA* 13,3 (Winter): 41-45.

-----. 1997a. 'South Africa's First Democratic Local Elections: The Case of the Western Cape, 1995-96'. *Society in Transition*, 28,1-4: 122-36.

-----. 1997b. 'From the Ballot Box to the Bookshelf: Studies of the 1994 South African General Election'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 115,2 (July): 287-309.

-----, with Tracy Jooste, Mirah Langer and Brendan Maughan-Brown (2005), 'Inequality and Diversity in Cape Town: An Introduction and User's Guide to the 2005 Cape Area Study', CSSR *Working Paper* no.124 (Cape Town: Centre for Social Science Research, University of Cape Town).

Southall, Roger (ed.). 2001. *Opposition and Democracy in South Africa.* London: Frank Cass.

The Centre for Social Science Research
Working Paper Series

RECENT TITLES

Ardington, C. Lam, D. Leibbrandt, M. Welch, M. 2005. *The Sensitivity of Estimates of Post-Apartheid Changes in South African Poverty and Inequality to key Data Imputations*. Cape Town. CSSR Working Paper No. 106.

Dieden, D. 2005. *Ahoy the Good Hope? Some Bearings and Signals in Seldom-Navigated Waters - on Inequality in South Africa's Coloured and African Population*. Cape Town. CSSR Working Paper No. 107.

Wreford, J. 2005. *'We can help!' - A Literature Review of Current Practice involving Traditional African Healers in Biomedical HIV/AIDS Interventions in South Africa*. Cape Town. CSSR Working Paper No. 108.

Breier, M. and Visser, M. 2005. *The free rider problem in community-based rural water supply: a game theoretic analysis*. CSSR Working Paper No. 109.

Rohleder, P. Gibson, K. 2005. *"We are not fresh": HIV-positive women talk of their experience of living with their spoiled identity.* Cape Town. CSSR Working Paper No. 110.

The Centre for Social Science Research

The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:

The **AIDS and Society Research Unit** (ASRU) supports innovative research into the social dimensions of AIDS in South Africa. Special emphasis is placed on exploring the interface between qualitative and quantitative research. By forging creative links between academic research and outreach activities, we hope to improve our understanding of the relationship between AIDS and society and to make a difference to those living with AIDS. Focus areas include: AIDS-stigma, sexual relationships in the age of AIDS, the social and economic factors influencing disclosure (of HIV-status to others), the interface between traditional medicine and biomedicine, and the impact of providing antiretroviral treatment on individuals and households.

The **Data First Resource Unit** ('Data First') provides training and resources for research. Its main functions are: 1) to provide access to digital data resources and specialised published material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web site to disseminate data and research output.

The **Democracy in Africa Research Unit** (DARU) supports students and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following three areas: 1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal.

The **Social Surveys Unit** (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the methodology, ethics and results of South African social science research. Our core activities include the overlapping Cape Area Study and Cape Area Panel Study. The Cape Area Study comprises a series of surveys of social, economic and political aspects of life in Cape Town. The Cape Area Panel Study is an ongoing study of 4800 young adults in Cape Town as they move from school into the worlds of work, unemployment, adulthood and parenthood.

The **Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit** (SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002. In line with its historical contribution, SALDRU's researchers continue to conduct research detailing changing patterns of well-being in South Africa and assessing the impact of government policy on the poor. Current research work falls into the following research themes: post-apartheid poverty; employment and migration dynamics; family support structures in an era of rapid social change; the financial strategies of the poor; public works and public infrastructure programmes; common property resources and the poor.