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The Social Consequences of Class Formation among Black South Africans in the 2000s: Evidence from the South African Reconciliation Barometer

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Abstract

This chapter examines changing social attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa, asking whether the African middle classes have distinctive social attitudes, relative to poorer or lower class African people, whether this has changed over the 2000s, and thus how the rapid growth of the African middle classes is affecting social and political life. The chapter uses survey data (from the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation's South African Reconciliation Barometer) to show that the African middle classes assess much more positively than the poor the economic changes that have taken place in post-apartheid South Africa, and that this differential has grown over time. The middle classes are aware of their privilege, but may underestimate the challenges facing the poor. They are also more positive about improved inter-racial relations since 1994, perhaps because they enjoy very much more inter-racial interaction than do the poor. In terms of public policy, the middle classes support affirmative action more strongly, but are also more likely to say that the government does too much for people and probably see less need for active policies around employment creation. Simple multivariate models indicate uneven class and race effects on selected social attitudes. Overall, the growth of the African middle classes seems to be good for race relations but may reduce the likelihood of pro-poor policies to challenge inequalities of class.

Introduction

Probably the most striking social change in post-apartheid South Africa has been the explosive growth of the 'African' elite and 'middle classes'. Apartheid had battered the African (and 'coloured' and 'Indian') middle classes in the 1950s and 1960s, but from the 1970s there was accelerating upward mobility by African people into semi-professional and white collar occupations (Crankshaw, 1997). This process accelerated in the 1990s and 2000s, and carried forward into professional and managerial occupations, as well as the ranks of the economic, political and social elites (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005; 2015). For many African

people, the 'new' South Africa was a land of opportunity and rising prosperity. The extreme case was Patrice Motsepe: born in 1962, without inherited wealth, but with net worth of almost $3 billion in the 2000s. Motsepe was the only black dollar billionaire, but a growing minority – about 8,000 in 2012 – of South Africa's dollar millionaires were black.[1] In 1994, only about one in four people in the richest income quintile (i.e. the richest one-fifth of the population) were African.[2] By 2008, this proportion had doubled, to 50 percent.[3] Significant numbers of people shared in this upward mobility. Whilst the precise rate of growth depends on the definition of the 'middle class' (Burger *et al.*, 2015a), most definitions and studies pointed to strong growth. 'Four million and rising', proclaimed the Unilever Institute for Strategic Marketing at the University of Cape Town in 2012.[4] Visagie (2015) found even stronger growth, with the number of African people in the middle and upper 'classes' growing from 2.2 million in 1993 to 5.4 million in 2008.

Opportunities did not open for all, however (World Bank, 2012). Poverty persisted in the 'new' South Africa as people, especially in supposedly rural areas, experienced the combination of chronic unemployment and landlessness. The result was a marked growth in inequalities within the African population (Leibbrandt *et al.*, 2012: 25-26). Growing differentiation or even stratification within the African population was a major cause of the changing relationship between race and class in South Africa. Whilst most white South Africans remained privileged and the poor were overwhelmingly African, it was no longer the case that African people were excluded from privilege (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005; 2015).

This chapter explores whether and how the process of 'middle class' formation within the African population has affected social attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa, focussing on the ways that African, 'middle class' South Africans perceive racial, class and gender inequalities. The chapter is a contribution to the literature on the African middle class in South Africa. This literature, like the African middle class itself, has both deep historical roots and recent rapid growth. In the 1950s, the largely Weberian literature on the African middle classes tended to emphasise the social and cultural distinctiveness of the African middle classes (Wilson and Mafeje, 1963; Kuper, 1965; Brandel-Syrier, 1971; Seekings, 2009). In the 1980s and 1990s, many studies tended to downplay differences between the re-emerging African middle class and other classes.

[1] Business Day Live, 15th November 2012; http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2013/11/15/black-dollar-millionaire-numbers-rocket.
[2] The precise figure differed between censuses and surveys (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2005: 306).
[3] NIDS, wave 1, author's calculations.
[4] http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/research/4-million-rising/#wpcf7-f195-o1.

Modisha (2007), for example, studied the 'contradictory class location' of African managers (the 'corporate middle class'): Whilst middle class in terms of occupation and residential location, many retained enduring links to – and identities with – the working-class communities from which they came. In their study of Soweto (Johannesburg), Alexander *et al*. (2013) emphasise the commonalities between different sections of the population of Soweto, in part because even people who could afford more – and identified themselves as being 'in the middle' – were vulnerable to impoverishment and were tied to poorer neighbours and kin; their privileges were precarious. These understandings of the African middle class contrast with the portrayal in other academic studies, most of which rely on ethnographic research (e.g. Nkuna, 2006; Chipkin, 2012; Seekings, 2014b; Newman and De Lannoy, 2014; Chevalier, 2015; Krige, 2015), as well as in novels (notably, Kopano Matlwa's 2007 novel *Coconut*) which emphasise the consumerist and individualistic distinctions claimed and asserted by the new middle classes.

This chapter uses quantitative data from the South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB) surveys between 2003 and 2013 to plot the changing social and economic profile of South Africa's majority African population, and to explore the relationship between this and changing perceptions of race and class inequalities. The SARB data suggest that the growing African middle classes have somewhat distinctive social attitudes on both race and class inequalities, and in some respects they have become more distinctive over time. The African middle classes tend to be more positive about changes in 'race relations', which is encouraging, and about economic changes, which risks complacency and indifference to the poor. The chapter compares the attitudes of different classes within the African population, but does not explore the possible indirect effects of the growth of the African 'middle class' on the attitudes and beliefs of white, Indian and coloured South Africans. In the final section, however, I examine race and class effects by modelling selected attitudes across the entire South African population. I find evidence of uneven race and class effects on social attitudes. This paper does not explore political attitudes, which have been analysed by Mattes (2014).

This chapter focuses on the South African case, but South Africa is not unique. Other racially oppressive societies – the USA, Brazil – have also experienced dramatic growth in the black middle class, subverting the historical relationships between race and class in these societies. Research in Brazil has found that upward mobility among black Brazilians is associated with 'whitening', as the newly rich see themselves and are seen by others as more 'white' and less 'black' than before (Schwartzman, 2007). In the USA, a series of studies of African-American middle classes points to the complexity of their identities, interests and behaviours (see Pattillo-McCoy, 2000, on Chicago, and Lacy,

2007, on Washington D.C.). In addition, the study of the middle classes has recently exploded across much of the global South, as the middle classes themselves have grown in size and importance (see, for examples, Heiman *et al.*, 2011; Fernandes, 2006, Baviskar and Ray, 2011, on India; Liechty, 2002, on Nepal; Darbon, 2011, on Africa). Further research will compare the South African case with the evidence from other societies.

Conceptualising and measuring the 'middle class(es)'

There is, of course, no consensus over how to conceptualise or measure the 'middle classes' in South Africa (or anywhere else). Burger *et al*. (2015) identify three approaches to this, focusing respectively on income (primarily in the work of economists), occupations (in the work of sociologists) and self-identification. The first two of these approaches are themselves heterogeneous, with economists divided in terms of whether the 'middle classes' should refer to income strata in the middle of the income distribution, or richer, non-poor income strata (see also Visagie, 2015), whilst sociologists have long been divided between Marxian and Weberian approaches (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2005; Alexander *et al*., 2013).

Economists tend to focus on income. For them, 'class' means 'income category'. Visagie reports that the combination of the elite and middle strata comprised 20 percent of the population in 1993 and 24 percent in 2008. The rising number of African people in the 'middle class' massively offset the decline in the number of white people in this 'class' (Visagie and Posel, 2013; Visagie, 2015). With a slightly more inclusive definition, Burger and McAravey (2014) calculate that the proportion rose from 28 percent in 1993 to 48 percent in 2012. The proportion of the African population in these categories rose from 8 to 15 percent (in Visagie's analysis) and from 12 to 40 percent (in Burger and McAravey's). However, these studies suffer from the problem of growing under-reporting of income (see Yu, 2013; Seekings, 2014a), so probably underestimate the growth of the 'middle class'.

Sociologists tend to focus more on the occupational structure than on the income structure. Initial studies used census data to conclude that deindustrialisation had led to a more polarised 'post-Fordist' class structure in South African cities, with growth in both high-income and low-wage jobs but shrinking middle-income employment, primarily because employment in services was more differentiated than industrial employment. Crankshaw (2012) argued that these findings were based on flawed data. In South African cities, both he and others

found, middle-income manufacturing jobs were replaced by middle-income white-collar service sector jobs. Within each of manufacturing and services, lower-skill and -wage jobs continued to be replaced by higher-skill and –income ones. The result was not so much occupational polarization as a process of 'professionalisation' (Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw, 2008; Selzer and Heller, 2010; Crankshaw, 2012; Crankshaw and Borel-Saladin, 2014).

Household survey data – encompassing all households, not just employed individuals – present broadly consistent findings. Figure 1 shows the distribution of households between three broad strata, each comprising several classes, in 2008 (using data from the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Study, NIDS). There have been only small changes in the class structure since the end of apartheid (analysed in Seekings and Nattrass, 2005). This is unsurprising, given that the economy remained capitalist with enduringly high unemployment. The structural changes, whilst small, are nonetheless revealing. The 'upper classes' grew and accounted for a larger share of total income. The lower middle and working classes shrank marginally in proportion to the (growing) total population, due primarily to the shrinking core working class, but grew in absolute terms. The 'lower' classes overall shrank marginally but maintained their income share (primarily due to redistribution and decommodification through government grants and pensions). This is not a simple story to interpret: The rich prospered, as they did in the new 'gilded age' that characterised most capitalist societies in the early 2000s. But they did not do so primarily at the expense of the poor. Poverty declined at the same time as the rich prospered. It is in the middle that the story gets more complex. What might be called the lower middle classes – comprising skilled and white-collar workers – expanded. The 'core working class', comprising less skilled workers in industrial employment and agricultural or domestic employment, shrank dramatically. The 'marginal working class', comprising less skilled workers in agricultural or domestic employment, forming part of the 'lower classes' in Figure 1, also shrank. This reflected the decline of less skilled industrial employment, due in large part to the changing skill composition of the workforce, as mechanisation resulted in a shift from less to more skilled, and from blue- to white-collar, employment opportunities (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2015, for further discussion).



3 ‘upper’ classes, defined by occupation (managerial or professional), wealth or (substantial) business activity:
12% of households, 45% of income

4 classes in a middle position: the semi-professional class, intermediate class, core working class and petty traders:
48% of households, 45% of income

3 ‘lower’ classes: the marginal working class, underclass (defined in terms of systematic disadvantage in the labour market) and a residual ‘other’ category:
41% of households, 10% of income

Note: Calculated using NIDS data
Source: Seekings and Nattrass, 2005.

Figure 1: The Class Structure of South Africa, 2008

In earlier work I generally avoided using the term ‘middle class’ because of uncertainty over precisely what this might usefully mean in the South African context. The conventional ‘lower middle class’ would comprise most of what I labelled the ‘semi-professional’ and ‘intermediate’ classes. They have grown since the end of apartheid, although only a little faster than the population as a whole. In 1993 these two classes included 24 percent of South African households. By 2008 this proportion had risen to 27 percent. Over the same period these households’ incomes rose (but not as fast as the incomes of even richer households, with the result that their share of total national income actually fell).[5] The overall class structure has not changed dramatically. What has changed is the racial composition of these classes, with significant upward mobility by black South Africans into these ‘lower middle classes’ (see Seekings and Nattrass, 2015: Chapter 5).

A third approach to classification might rely on the self-classification of South Africans. Burger *et al*. (2015a: 35) report the longitudinal data on self-reported social class in South Africa collected in surveys conducted as part of the World Values Survey (WVS) (see Table 1). It is hard to discern any clear trend between 1995 and 2013. Indeed, the sharp rises between 2001 and 2006 in self-identification as ‘lower class’ or between 2006 and 2013 in self-identification as ‘working class’ (and concomitant decline between 2006 and 2013 in self-identification as middle or upper class) fly in the face of the trends identified using income or occupational data.

[5] This is probably true even if allowance is made for significant under-reporting of incomes.

Table 1: Self-reported social class, 1995-2013

	1995 (%)	**2001 (%)**	**2006 (%)**	**2013 (%)**
Lower class	42.5	26.4	43.9	44.9
Working class	24.1	30.8	18.9	24.9
Lower middle class	16.6	21.0	19.5	17.3
Upper middle class	15.4	18.5	15.2	11.5
Upper class	1.4	3.2	2.4	1.4
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: World Values Survey, reported in Burger *et al*., 2015a: 35.

The data for 2006 are, however, consistent with 2008 data from the first wave of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) on self-placement in the income distribution. NIDS asked its respondents to locate themselves in the income distribution by imagining a six-step ladder on which the poorest people stood on the lowest step and the richest on the top step. Very few respondents (less than 10 percent) said they were on the top two steps, just as very few people identify themselves as 'upper class'. One in three said they were on one or other of the bottom two steps, just as more or less the same proportion identify themselves as 'lower class'. Almost 60 percent said that they were on one of the two middle steps – which is about the same proportion who identify themselves as 'working class', 'lower middle class' or 'upper middle class' (Burger *et al*., 2015a). Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any comparable data from the 1990s that would allow analysis of change over time.

Other scholars have argued that 'middle class' means very different things to different people. In Alexander *et al*.'s thorough study of Soweto, being 'in the middle' generally meant being able to afford some non-essential goods. A 'middle class' identity in Soweto was consistent with a 'working class' identity in the workplace (Alexander *et al*., 2013). Khunou (2015) also points to the disparate meanings of being 'middle class'. It seems likely that middle class has a different meaning in Cape Town (see Seekings, 2007a) than in Soweto. Without considerably better understanding of identity formation, self-identification appears to be a particularly problematic measure of what it is to be middle class in contemporary South Africa.

Burger *et al*. (2015a) and most other recent contributions[6] to the South African debate on class tend to ignore a fourth approach, even though it was of crucial importance for renewing interest in the black middle class in post-apartheid South Africa. In the 2000s marketing researchers discovered that there was a large new 'class' of (mostly black) consumers who enjoyed a 'living standard' beyond the basic necessities. The concept of the 'black diamond' was coined by researchers at the Unilever Institute at the University of Cape Town, to refer to the very top end of this new class. The Unilever Institute's 2010 documentary *Forerunners* provided a powerful account of the changes experienced by this new elite, and how the elite responded.[7] The advertising and marketing industry[8] generally avoided income-based measures, and developed instead 'Living Standard Measures' (or LSMs) based on asset ownership, use of financial services and selected other variables, without consideration of income. The underlying conceptualisation seems to be that consumer behaviour is not driven simply (or primarily) by current income, and that measures of asset ownership and use of financial services take into account preferences and tastes as well as income. High-LSM households might therefore be asset-rich but cash-poor. The precise measurement of LSMs has changed several times, particularly in 2000/01. Until then, the population was divided into eight LSMs. Thereafter, and using a revised set of variables, the top two LSMs were divided into four, giving a set of ten LSMs in total (see Boehme *et al.*, 2007).

Most social scientists ignore the LSMs, without explaining why.[9] Yet the LSMs might be viewed as operationalising, imperfectly, a Bourdieusian approach to social classification that integrates social distinctions into the analysis of economic privilege. For Bourdieu, the economic inequalities of class are reproduced in part through the exercise of everyday classification – i.e. through labelling and self-identification – that rely heavily on social and cultural cues.[10] The study of class in South Africa would benefit from a fuller engagement with Bourdieu, as I have argued previously (Seekings, 2007b; 2008). This is

[6] Chevalier (2015) is a notable recent exception. Schlemmer (2005) combined LSMs with income and occupational data to define the 'core middle class' in the first part of his analysis.
[7] http://www.uctunileverinstitute.co.za/research/forerunners/.
[8] Specifically, the South African Audience Research Foundation (SAARF), called the South African Advertising Research Foundation until 2010.
[9] Ironically, Van der Berg *et al.* (2008) used LSMs in their analysis of poverty trends but disregarded them in their more recent account of different approaches to class (Burger *et al*., 2015a).
[10] A Bourdieusian approach was operationalised in the recent 'Great British Class Project' through asking questions about social capital (acquaintance with people in selected occupations of varying status) and cultural capital (measuring leisure, musical, eating and holiday preferences) as well as economic capital (measured in terms of savings and property-ownership as well as household income) (Savage *et al*., 2013). For critiques see, for example, Mills (2014).

especially true of the African middle class – as is evident in novels such as *Coconut*, which I read as Bourdieusian texts, detailing the cultural bases of the new elite's claimed distinction and privilege. The marketing and advertising industry presumably employ LSMs because they accord with patterns of consumer preference and behaviour. Whilst there is little or no existing research into whether LSMs also correlate with other social and political behaviours, or do so better than other measures of class, the use of LSMs should not be dismissed out of hand.

LSM data emphasise the pace of social and economic change since 1994. The proportion of the South African population classified in the top three LSMs in the earlier 8-LSM scheme rose from about 33 percent in 1994 to 44 percent in 2006. The proportion in the equivalent top five LSMs in the later 10-LSM scheme rose from 44 percent in 2007 to 62 percent in 2014. However the 'middle' is defined, it seems to have grown: The proportion in LSMs 6 through 8 (using the 10-LSM scheme) rose from 27 percent in 1993 to 45 percent in 2014 (see Table 2).

Table 2: South African population by LSM

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">LSMs</th><th colspan="3">Old LSMs</th><th colspan="2">New LSMs</th></tr>
<tr><th>1994 (%)</th><th>2000 (%)</th><th>2006 (%)</th><th>2007 (%)</th><th>2014 (%)</th></tr>
<tr><td>1-4</td><td>55</td><td>44</td><td>37</td><td>42</td><td>22</td></tr>
<tr><td>5</td><td>14</td><td>18</td><td>19</td><td>14</td><td>16</td></tr>
<tr><td>6</td><td>14</td><td>17</td><td>21</td><td>16</td><td>23</td></tr>
<tr><td>7</td><td rowspan="2">13</td><td rowspan="2">14</td><td rowspan="2">17</td><td>9</td><td>13</td></tr>
<tr><td>8</td><td>6</td><td>9</td></tr>
<tr><td>9</td><td rowspan="2">6</td><td rowspan="2">7</td><td rowspan="2">6</td><td>7</td><td>10</td></tr>
<tr><td>10</td><td>6</td><td>7</td></tr>
<tr><td>Total</td><td>100</td><td>100</td><td>100</td><td>100</td><td>100</td></tr>
</table>

Source: www.saarf.co.za.

Income, occupational and LSM data tell a broadly consistent story, although the details differ. The shifts from less to more skilled blue-collar work and from blue- to white-collar work combined with rising earnings for more skilled working people, to generate rising real earnings for many (even most) people in formal employment. These, perhaps together with the expansion of formal housing and improved municipal infrastructure and services, led to expanded asset ownership and access to services (as measured in the LSMs) and, perhaps, changing consumption patterns. The LSMs suggest that prosperity was shared

more widely than was revealed by income data, presumably because ownership of household assets and use of financial and other services (included in the LSM classifications) expanded faster than incomes. The identity data are discrepant, but it is not clear how one should interpret changes at the national level in self-reported class identity.

Measuring the middle classes using data from the South African Reconciliation Barometer

Between 2003 and 2013, thirteen surveys were conducted for the Institute of Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), for its South African Reconciliation Barometer (SARB). The surveys formed parts of omnibus surveys conducted by the market researchers IPSOS Markinor. Some questions were included in every round, but others were specific to one or a few rounds. IPSOS Markinor also provided data on LSMs,[11] and rather poor data on incomes and occupations. However, there are no data collected on self-identification. The samples were large, varying between 3,289 and 3,590, with a total of more than 45,000 respondents across all thirteen rounds. Metropolitan areas, and hence LSMs 6-10, were over-sampled. Non-metropolitan areas, and hence LSMs 1-5, were under-sampled. The analysis below uses reweighted data.[12]

The SARB data demonstrate the steady growth of the share of the African population in the top and middle LSM categories (see Figure 2). The proportion of African households in LSMs 1-5 dropped from 85 percent to 49 percent. The proportion in LSMs 6-8 rose from 15 percent to 46 percent. The proportion in the elite LSMs 9 and 10 rose from less than 1 percent to more than 5 percent. For our purposes, LSMs 6-8 might be viewed as corresponding to the 'lower middle classes' (including many households whose breadwinners might also consider themselves to be working class, at least in the workplace), whilst LSMs 9 and 10 correspond to the 'upper middle classes'. The elite are unlikely to be represented in a sample of this size and survey of this kind. Both the African

[11] LSM data were missing for round 9 (2009). Most of the variables used to construct LSMs were available however. Using the formula at the time, I scored households on the LSM variables. One important negative variable (radios) was missing, which might explain why the LSM scores seemed inflated. I adjusted the LSM scores by arbitrarily allocating the lowest 70 percent of households to the lower class category, the next 26 percent of households to the 'lower middle class' and the top 4 percent of households to the 'upper middle class'. Further details are available on request.

[12] IPSOS Markinor have not explained how the weights were derived, but we assume that they adjust for both sampling design and non-response.

lower and upper middle classes grew dramatically between 2003 and 2013 (the latter off a very small base).[13]



Figure 2: Black Population by LSM

However, a caveat needs to be added here. The SARB data – even weighted – do not match the data published by the SAARF itself on the national distribution of households by LSM. In 2007, according to the SAARF, 56 percent of all households (i.e. of all racial or population groups) were in LSMs 1-5. The weighted SARB data for the same year put 72 percent of all households in these LSMs. The SAARF put 31 percent of households in LSMs 6-8, compared to 18 percent of SARB households (using weights). The SAARF put 13 percent of all households in LSMs 9 and 10, whereas the weighted SARB data put only 11 percent of all households into these LSMs. In other words, the SAARF data show many fewer lower-LSM households and more middle- and high-LSM households. It is impossible to make sense of these discrepancies without more information on both samples and weights from the SAARF and IPSOS Markinor, who conducted the fieldwork for the SARB; this information is not available. This need not matter for our purposes, however. This chapter is concerned not with measuring precisely the growth of the black middle classes, but rather with examining whether these classes have distinct social attitudes. This chapter focuses on the relative attitudes, not the relative size, of these classes.

The SARB data include some data on incomes and occupations, but these are not amenable to precise construction of class categories. Income was recorded in bands which were fixed in nominal terms, making it difficult to construct a longitudinal measure of real income (i.e. taking inflation into account). In addition, there are missing data. There are also good reasons for believing that,

[13] Given the small number of households in the upper middle class in the early years, these data should be treated with due caution.

in all surveys, many South African individuals and households under-report their earnings or incomes, and that this under-reporting worsened over time (Yu, 2013; Seekings, 2014a). The SARB occupational data also pose challenges. The data are coded at the one-digit ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) level, with no data on industry or sector. The category 'self-employed' does not distinguish between the survivalist hawker and the shopkeeper with his or her own employees. Moreover, the occupational data are for individuals, and are available only for the respondent, and not for other household members. This means that it would be very difficult if not impossible to identify a household class position. If the respondent records his or her employment status as unemployed or not in the labour force, then we have no information on whether the breadwinner is a highly-paid professional or a farmworker, or if there is no breadwinner.

Tables A1 and A2 (in the Appendix) show that there are inexact correlations between household LSM, household income and individual occupations, using data from round 11 of the SARB (2011). Almost all of the households with reported incomes below R3,000 per month (in 2011 prices) were in LSMs 1 through 5. A small minority of low-income households were in LSMs 6-8. These were likely to have included households which had experienced a loss of earnings, because the breadwinner had retired, died, left or become unemployed. At the top end of the income hierarchy, households with the highest incomes were almost all in LSMs 6 through 8 or LSMs 9 and 10. But some high-income households – i.e. households in approximately the 8th and 9th income deciles – were in LSMs 1 through 5. These were cash-rich but asset-poor households, perhaps because household income had grown relatively recently, and asset accumulation might have been stalled also by the number of dependents to be supported. Table A2 shows that the relationship between LSMs and occupation or work status is also imprecise. Most professional or managerial employees are in the LSMs 6 or higher, but some are in the lower LSMs. Most unskilled workers are in the lower LSMs, but some are in LSMs 6 or higher. It is impossible to say with any certainty whether LSMs are a good proxy for a more orthodox sociological conception of class. The SARB data unfortunately do not include any measures of self-identified class.

Given the imprecise relationship between LSMs and the income and occupational measures of 'class', it is important to assess the robustness of findings on the relationship between any one measure of 'class' and attitudes, beliefs or behaviours. The Appendix examines whether the findings using LSMs (reported in the main text) are robust to alternative specifications of 'class', using the limited occupation and income data available in the SARB.

Assessments of social and economic change

African middle class South Africans are much more likely to say that their financial situation and their living conditions had improved, and less likely to say that they had worsened, over the preceding year.[14] They were also much more likely to say in 2011-13 that their personal economic circumstances had improved since 1994 (see Table 3). Two-thirds of the respondents in LSMs 9-10 (or upper middle class) said that their circumstances had improved, with only 10 percent saying that they had worsened. In LSMs 1-5, in contrast, only one-third of respondents said that their circumstances had improved, and almost as many said they had worsened. Respondents in LSMs 6-8 (or lower middle class) tended to be positive, but less clearly than the high-LSM respondents.

Table 3: Personal economic circumstances compared to 1994, by LSM, 2011-13

	LSM 1-5 (%)	**LSM 6-8 (%)**	**LSM 9-10 (%)**	**Total (%)**
Improved a great deal	5	10	22	7
Improved somewhat	28	39	44	33
About the same	38	32	23	35
Worsened somewhat	18	14	7	16
Worsened a great deal	9	4	3	7
Don't know	3	2	1	2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: SARB, variable *econcirc94*, weighted data, rounds 11, 12 and 13 only; African people only.

Most higher-LSM respondents were also aware of their relative privilege. In 2011 and 2013, the SARB asked respondents to compare their living conditions with those of most other South Africans (see Table 4). Two out of three respondents in LSMs 9-10 said that their living conditions were better or a lot better than most other South Africans'. Only one-quarter of the LSM 1-5 respondents said this.

[14] See variables *finsityear* and *livconyear*.

Table 4: Relative living conditions by LSM, 2011 and 2013

How do your living conditions compare with those of most other South Africans?	**LSM 1-5 (%)**	**LSM 6-8 (%)**	**LSM 9-10 (%)**	**Total (%)**
Better or a great deal better	24	42	66	32
About the same	43	40	24	41
Worse or a great deal worse	31	16	9	25
Don't know	2	2	<1	2
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: SARB, variable *livconSA*, weighted data, rounds 11 and 13 only; African people only.

High LSM respondents were also more positive about changes in post-apartheid South Africa. Beginning with the 2007 round, respondents were asked to compare the South Africa of today with the country it was in 1994, when it became a democracy', with respect to a series of issues. Asked about employment opportunities, about one half of the high-LSM respondents said that they had improved somewhat or a great deal (see Figure 3). Almost as many high-LSM respondents said that employment opportunities had worsened (not shown), but the overall assessment was more positive than negative. Among low-LSM respondents, however, few said that employment opportunities had improved (see Figure 3), whilst twice as many said that they had worsened, so that the overall assessment was massively negative. Respondents in LSMs 6-8 were in between the two other groups in terms of their assessments.

This same pattern is mirrored with respect to whether the 'gap between rich and poor' had improved or worsened since 1994 (see Figure 4). The high-LSM group show a clear trend (2010 notwithstanding) of rising agreement that the gap had improved. Fewer respondents in the low-LSM group thought that the gap had improved and twice as many said that it had worsened (not shown). Again, LSMs 6-8 were in between.



Figure 3: Assessment that employment opportunities have improved, by LSM and year



Figure 4: Assessment that the gap between rich and poor has improved, by LSM and year

The question about 'employment opportunities' might have been understood as referring to the opportunities facing the respondent, so agreement that they had improved might reflect the reality that, for educated and skilled black people, opportunities did improve massively after 1994. The same logic cannot apply to the gap between rich and poor. Given that all data point to enduring or even worsening income inequalities over time, the relatively positive assessment of

the higher-LSM respondents presumably reflects either their concern with the *racial* income gap or the gap between them and rich, white people, or their ignorance of the realities of inequality stretching out below and behind them.

Higher-LSM respondents were also much more optimistic about the future. Asked in 2011 about their family's lives in a year's time, 70 percent of LSM 9-10 respondents answered 'better off than today', 23 percent said 'about the same' and only 7 percent answered 'worse off than today'. In LSMs 6-8, the 59 percent were optimistic, 33 percent were neutral and 8 percent were pessimistic. In LSMs 1-5, however, only 40 percent were optimistic, 46 percent were neutral and 13 percent were negative.[15]

In one round, in 2006, respondents were asked about the perceived causes of prosperity. They were asked to assess how strong was the influence of each of a series of factors on the 'individual prosperity of ordinary South Africans'. The list of factors comprised: level of education, hard work, religious belief, family, work experience, race, health, political connections, luck, social class of parents, location (urban or rural), gender and the legacy of apartheid. Almost all African respondents assessed that education (88 percent) and hard work (79 percent) had a strong or very strong influence (see Table 5). These were followed by work experience and health. The precise ranking differed, however, between the high LSM respondents and the rest. More of the high LSM respondents rated hard work as having a strong or very strong influence relative to education.

[15] Variable *imyear*.

Table 5: Perceived major factors influencing success, by LSM, 2006

Ranking	LSMs 1-5 (% saying strong or very strong influence)	LSMs 6-8 (% saying strong or very strong influence)	LSMs 9-10 (% saying strong or very strong influence)	Total (% saying strong or very strong influence)
1	Education (88%)	Education (86%)	Hard work (91%)	Education (88%)
2	Hard work (78%)	Hard work (80%)	Education (83%)	Hard work (79%)
3	Work experience (75%)	Work experience (73%)	Health (81%)	Work experience (75%)
4	Health (66%)	Health (67%)	Work experience (77%)	Health (67%)
5	Family (64%)	Race (63%)	Gender (67%)	Family (64%)

Source: SARB, weighted data, round 6 only; African people only; other factors that were ranked lower included political connections, luck, religious beliefs, parents' social class, location (urban/rural) and the legacy of apartheid.

A series of studies of the African middle class – as well as novels and media reports – focus on consumerism and individualism (Nkuna, 2006; Kaus, 2013; Burger *et al*., 2015b). The SARB data point to other aspects of the middle class worldview: Positive assessments of economic change (and optimism about the prospects of further change), a sense of privilege, and a more pronounced tendency to attribute success to hard work. These findings are consistent with other recent work on discourses and ideologies of privilege among African men and women. In Cape Town, I found that the African lower middle class distinguish themselves sharply from lower classes through a discourse that contrasts their own 'independence' with the latter's 'dependence' on state (for housing or social grants) or kin (Seekings, 2014b). Telzak, drawing on interviews in Cape Town and the rural Eastern Cape, found that 'successful', upwardly-mobile young African men and women emphasise their hard work, which they contrast with the sloth or inertia of many other people (Telzak, 2012; 2013; 2015). Chipkin (2012) and Krige (2015) show how the new middle classes from Soweto on the West Rand manage the claims made on them by poorer kin whilst asserting their own individuality and private ambitions. The privileges of class have to be legitimated. Class formation within the African population in the 2000s has been accompanied by the emergence of new ideologies and discourses of class (or at least the re-emergence or strengthening of these insofar as they have historical roots).

Attitudes around 'race relations'

The quality of 'race relations' was, unsurprisingly, a major concern for the SARB. From 2007, the SARB asked respondents whether they thought that race relations had improved or worsened since 1994. The responses of African men and women differed by LSM. Higher LSM respondents were consistently more likely to agree that race relations had improved, and were less likely to disagree (see Figure 5). In most years, about two out of three high-LSM respondents agreed, whereas less than half of the low-LSM respondents did so; the 'lower middle class' category (LSM 6-8) were generally in between. The same pattern was evident in a question asked in 2011: "Would you say that the relationship between the different races in our country is improving, staying the same or getting worse?"[16] Among LSM 1-5 respondents, 48 percent said 'improving', 42 percent said 'staying the same' and 10 percent said 'getting worse'. In LSM 6-8, the proportions were 55, 38 and 7 percent. In LSM 9-10, they were 64, 26 and 10 percent. As Figure 5 shows, however, there does not appear to be any clear trend over this six-year period.



Figure 5: Assessment that race relations have improved, by LSM and year

This pattern was evident also in responses to the statements 'South Africans have made progress in reconciliation since the end of apartheid'[17] and 'My friends and family have experienced reconciliation since the end of apartheid'.[18] The responses (for pooled surveys) were: 57 percent (LSM 1-5), 65 percent

[16] Variable *imrace.*
[17] Variable *recondex1* (2011-13).
[18] Variable *recondex_new* (2012-13).

(LSM 6-8) and 72 percent (LSM 9-10) for the first question, and 49 percent, 54 percent and 57 percent for the second question. The differences were more modest for the second question, perhaps because it might be understood as asking whether the respondent was *completely* reconciled; many respondents answered that they were uncertain or did not know.

Different assessments of race relations correlate closely with racial integration. In 2012, high LSM respondents reported that they were very much more likely to talk to white, Indian or coloured people on a daily basis (see Figure 6).[19] More than one half of the people in LSM 9-10 said they did so 'often' or 'always', compared with just under one-third in LSM 6-8 and only 15 percent in LSM 1-5.



Figure 6: On a typical day, how often do you talk to white, Indian or coloured people?

These differences were mirrored in data on how often respondents socialised at home with white, Indian or coloured people.[20] Lower-LSM respondents were also slightly more likely to say that they struggle to understand the customs and ways of white, coloured and Indian people, but the differences are modest.[21] There were, however, almost no differences in the reported trustworthiness of white, coloured and Indian people.[22] Respondents were also asked about their attitudes to inter-racial marriage. In 2012, high-LSM African respondents were more likely to say that they disapproved of their relatives marrying coloured

[19] Variable *grouptalk_b*.
[20] Variable *socialise_b*.
[21] Variable *understand_b*.
[22] Variable *untrust_b*.

people, but were slightly more likely to say that they approved of neighbours marrying white or Indian people.[23] The importance of racial identity opposed to other identities did not vary significantly by LSM (nor did they change much over time).[24]

In 2011, respondents were asked a set of questions concerning the importance of race in a range of situations: getting a job (in the public and private sectors), accessing educational opportunities (in school and college), and getting government contracts. High-LSM respondents were marginally more conscious of the importance of race, but the differences were small.[25]

Overall, the African middle classes, and especially the 'upper middle class' (operationalised here as LSM 9-10) are more positive about improvements in race relations, perhaps because they experience much more racial integration, but perhaps also because they have enjoyed the benefits of the formal deracialisation of opportunities after the end of apartheid. The African middle classes appear to be much more positive about both class and racial inclusion than the African poor.

Assessments of public policy

The African middle classes appear to have somewhat distinctive social attitudes in relation to the poor majority of the African population. Does this matter? Mattes (2014) finds that class formation does not seem to have resulted in significantly more democratic attitudes or behaviours. In this section, I consider whether the attitudinal changes accompanying class formation have implications for the kinds of public policy that are demanded.

The fact that higher-LSM African men and women assess changes in race relations more positively than lower-LSM African men and women does not mean that they are less supportive of racialised policies. There is no significant difference by LSM in whether African people agreed or disagreed with the statement that 'It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country'[26], but higher-LSM men and women are more likely to agree that 'It is possible to create one united South African

[23] Variables *relmarry_b*, *relmarry_c*, *relmarry_i*, *relmarry_w*.
[24] Variable *identity1*.
[25] Variables *raceaffjob, raceaffprivate, raceaffschool, raceaffcollege, raceaffcontract* (2011 only).
[26] Variable *unitdesire* (2003-13).

nation'.[27] Indeed, the African middle classes are somewhat more positive than the poor about past policies of affirmative action and they are more supportive also of continued affirmative action (see Table 6).[28]

Table 6: Assessments of public policy around race, by LSM

Strongly agree or agree	**Variable, years**	**LSM 1-5 (%)**	**LSM 6-8 (%)**	**LSM 9-10 (%)**
It is desirable to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country	*unitdesire*, 2003-13	72%	71%	74%
It is possible to create one united South African nation out of all the different groups who live in this country	*unitposs*, 2007-13	59%	62%	69%
The government should continue to use racial categories to measure the impact of its programmes for previously disadvantaged communities	*racecats*, 2005-13	47%	50%	52%
It should be a national priority to make the workforce representative of all races	*reprace*, 2007-13	64%	67%	73%
Employment Equity policies have been successful in creating a workforce that represent the South African population	*r12_b16_6*, 2012 only	45%	49%	61%

Source: SARB, weighted data; African people only, selected years.

The SARB questions about policies concerning class inequalities focused more on assessments of past or current government performance than on policy choices in future. Higher-LSM African men and women are more positive (or less negative) about past government performance, but are also more likely to view people as over-dependent on the government (see Table 7). This is consistent with the worldview that the state should promote equitable opportunities, allowing energetic or competent individuals to progress, and the assessment that this is what ANC governments had done since 1994.

Higher-LSM people were also more likely to agree that 'reconciliation is impossible as long as people who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue to be poor'. This might seem to imply a commitment to reduced inequalities, but

[27] Variable *unitposs* (2007-13).

[28] There is less enthusiasm among all classes of African people for Black Economic Empowerment policies (see variables *beepolicies* and *beepolicies_new*, asked in 2005 and 2012). It is not clear whether this reflects beliefs about the idea of BEE or past practice.

it seems likely that what higher-LSM individuals understand by this question is 'reconciliation is impossible as long as race holds back their upward mobility', i.e. it is understood more as a question about race than a question about overall inequality.

Table 7: Assessments of public policy around economic inequalities, by LSM

Strongly agree or agree; Well or very well	**Variable, years**	**LSM 1-5 (%)**	**LSM 6-8 (%)**	**LSM 9-10 (%)**
Government is doing well in getting young people into jobs:	*r12_b9_4*, 2012-13	35%	44%	52%
How well do you think the government is doing in reducing unemployment by creating jobs?	*imunemploy*, 2011 only	27%	38%	39%
Reconciliation is impossible as long as people who were disadvantaged under apartheid continue to be poor:	*reconimp*, 2011-13	48%	52%	60%
South Africans depend too much on government to change our lives:	*r12_b16_8*, 2012-13	57%	62%	64%

Source: SARB, weighted data; African people only, selected years.

The African middle classes are clearly not ignorant or in denial of the economic difficulties facing many poor and especially young people in terms of unemployment. A substantial proportion is critical of government performance. But the African middle classes are more positive about progress than the poor. To some extent, either their own successes or their ideology of effort lead some African middle class men and women to views that risk complacency about the need for energetic pro-poor public policies. The SARB data unfortunately cannot tell us how people view the relative importance of race- and class-targeted policies.

Modelling race and class effects on selected social attitudes

The SARB data provide evidence of clear class effects on a range of social attitudes among African people and evidence that, in some cases at least, these effects have grown over time. If we extend the analysis to include non-African respondents in the SARB surveys, we can compare the effects of race and class

on selected attitudes. Table 8 reports the results of a series of multivariate probit regression models that distinguish between race and class effects in different ways. All of the models include controls for age, gender and year (i.e. round of the SARB), and use pooled data from 2007 to 2013. In the first pair of models the dependent variable is whether the respondent agrees that race relations have improved in South Africa since 1994.[29] The first model (A1) regresses this on a set of dummy variables for different combinations of race and class: African people in LSMs 9-10, African people in LSMs 6-8, African people in LSMs 1-5, and non-African people in each of these three LSM categories. Compared to African people in LSMs 1-5, African men and women in the upper middle class (LSM 9-10) were 15 percentage points more likely and people in the lower middle class were 7 percentage points more likely to agree that inter-racial relationships had improved. Non-African people were less likely to say that inter-racial relationships had improved. Model A2 uses separate variables for race and class, showing how being in a higher LSM correlates with more positive assessments even controlling for race, whilst being in any non-African racial category correlated with more negative assessments even controlling for class.[30] Further regression models (not shown in Table 9) indicate that the models are not improved by the inclusion of interaction effects between race and class categories.

Models B1 and B2 repeat this exercise for a second dependent variable, i.e. whether the respondent agrees that employment opportunities have improved since 1994.[31] The results are almost identical to the ones for race relations. Being in a higher class has a positive effect, and being non-African has a negative one. These models suggest that there are clear and discrete race and class effects, and these have a similar magnitude.[32]

[29] Variable *racerel*, transformed into a dummy variable.
[30] Coloured and white people were more negative than Indian people, but the differences were small.
[31] Variable *empopp*, transformed into a dummy variable.
[32] Whilst the relationships are highly significant (mostly at the 0.01 level), the models as a whole explain only a very small part of the variance in social attitudes. One reason for this is methodological, in that the variables in the models are all dummy variables. A second reason is substantive: Many people in all classes think that race relations have got better, but are more ambivalent about employment opportunities.

Table 8: Class and race effects on perceived progress since 1994

	Agree that race relations improved since 1994		**Agree that employment opportunities improved since 1994**	
	Model A1	**Model A2**	**Model B1**	**Model B2**
African LSM 9-10	0.16***		0.19***	
African LSM 6-8	0.09***		0.09***	
African LSM 1-5	Omitted		Omitted	
Non-African LSM 9-10	-0.04**		-0.03**	
Non-African LSM 6-8	-0.06***		-0.06***	
Non-African LSM 1-5	-0.05		-0.07**	
LSM 9-10		0.10***		0.13***
LSM 6-8		0.08***		0.08***
LSM 1-5		Omitted		Omitted
Not African		-0.12***		-0.13***
African		Omitted		Omitted
n	23871	23871	24186	24186
r squared	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02

Note: All models control for age, gender and year; all variables are dummy variables; data are weighted; models are probit regressions, reporting marginal effects; data are pooled but do not include data from 2009; significance reported at * 0.1 ** 0.05 *** 0.01.

Table 9 reports one model for each of five further social attitudes: whether respondents agree that 'the government is doing well in getting people into jobs', whether their living conditions are better than 'those of most other South Africans', whether they agree that 'it should be a national priority to make the workforce representative of all races', whether they say that people are too dependent on government, and whether they think that hard work is the most important factor in individual prosperity.[33]

[33] Variables *r12_b9_4*, *livconSA*, *reprace*, *r12_b16_8* and *prospwork*, all transformed into dummy variables.

Table 9: Race and class effects on additional social attitudes

	Model C: Government creating jobs	**Model D: Relative privilege**	**Model E: Affirmative action**	**Model F: People are too dependent**	**Model G: Importance of hard work**
LSM 9-10	0.17***	0.41***	0.09***	0.09***	0.12***
LSM 6-8	0.09***	0.18***	0.03***	0.05***	0.05*
LSM 1-5	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Not African	-0.10***	-0.11***	0.04***	-0.12***	0.02***
African	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
n	6978	6969	23378	7152	3483
r squared	0.02	0.03	0.02	<0.01	<0.01

Note: All models control for age, gender and year (where appropriate); all variables are dummy variables; data are weighted; models are probit regressions, reporting marginal effects; data are pooled but do not include data from 2009; significance reported at *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01.

Race and class effects vary. Model C is almost identical to Model B in Table 8. The results of model D are not immediately intuitive. There is a clear class effect on whether someone says their living conditions are better than other people, but being non-African has a negative effect. This is not because white, Indian and coloured people do not recognise that their living conditions are better, but rather that this is an effect of their class, not their race. Controlling for class, being non-African has a negative effect. The same pattern is evident in Model F (perceived overdependence on government) and, more weakly, in Model G (the perceived importance of hard work). There are clear class effects on support for continued affirmative action. In this case, the race effect (i.e. the effect of being non-African) is also positive, i.e. everyone is supportive relative to low-LSM African people.

The regression models suggest that race and class have clear effects on a variety of social attitudes. The fact that interaction effects are not significant suggests that the effects are discrete. As Mattes (2014) finds with respect to political attitudes and behaviours, this does not mean that there is evidence of convergence between the African and white middle classes. The analysis in this chapter goes beyond Mattes' analysis to explain why, at least with respect to social attitudes: there is a persistent race effect which often works in the opposite direction to the class effect. It is not that class does not matter, but that the effects of class formation remain muted by the enduring effects of race.

Conclusion

This chapter has used data from SARB surveys conducted between 2003 and 2013 to examine whether the growing African middle class has distinctive attitudes around issues of race and class in comparison with African people in lower classes, and then to examine how race and class affect attitudes among the entire South African population. The analysis is constrained by the availability of data in the SARB dataset. The income and occupational data are not conducive to thorough class analysis, attitudes were measured on some issues but not others, and there are no data for self-identification in class terms. Given these constraints, I used LSM categorisation as a measure of class, distinguishing between the upper middle classes (LSMs 9 and 10) and the lower middle classes (LSMs 6 through 8). I found that the attitudes on a wide range of issues of the African middle classes showed statistically significant differences to those of the African lower classes. These differences should not be exaggerated, they nonetheless point to the importance of class formation in reshaping popular attitudes on issues of race and class. The African middle classes were more positive about changes since 1994, were more optimistic about future changes, and are more likely to view poverty and prosperity in terms of a conservative ideology or discourse that emphasises (in)dependence and hard work. On some issues, the differences grew over the decade covered by the dataset.

The extent of heterogeneity should not be overstated. Most African men and women agree that hard work is important for individual success. It is just that agreement is even higher among the middle classes than among people in the lower LSMs. Most African men and women do not think that the government has done a good job with job creation. But this view is much more widespread among lower LSM people than among the middle classes. Most African men and women believe that race relations have improved. But this view is even more widespread among the middle classes than among people in the lower LSMs. The measured differences on these selected social attitudes tend to be ones of degree, not of complete contrast.

Elsewhere I have argued that the new middle classes claim distinctions that are exclusive of the poor, through a discourse that contrasts their industrious independence against the dependency of the poor (Seekings, 2014b; see also Chipkin, 2012; Telzak, 2012; Krige, 2015). The SARB surveys did not include the questions needed to measure adequately this kind of exclusive distinction. Nor do the surveys allow for the measurement of differences in consumption or individualism, which have been emphasised in ethnographic accounts of the African middle classes. The survey data provide a poor platform for developing a Bourdieusian analysis of South Africa.

Nonetheless, showing that both race and class have clear and discrete effects on a range of attitudes among the total population is important for understanding cleavages in contemporary South African society, whilst the precise direction of the effects has both reassuring and troubling implications. The growth of the black middle classes is associated with the deepening perception that race relations have improved. This is surely a positive trend. At the same time, however, the growth of the black middle classes is associated with a growing perception that employment opportunities have improved since 1994, and that the gap between rich and poor has improved. Given that other data suggest that employment opportunities have not improved in practice for large numbers of South Africans, and that the gap between rich and poor has in fact widened since 1994, these perceptions of improvement might reflect a worrying complacency on the part of the black middle classes. If that complacency feeds into a deepened disinterest in improving opportunities for the poor, then the deracialisation of the middle classes might impede or undermine the kinds of policy changes that would address continuing poverty and inequality in South Africa. In short, the growth of the black middle classes might be bad for the poor. This is a worrying prospect.

Appendix: Are these findings robust to the specification of 'class'?

Does it matter whether 'class' is measured using LSMs rather than occupation or income? As discussed in the main text, it is difficult to construct good occupation-based class categories or consistent income-based categories over time using the SARB data. Tables A1 and A2 show the relationships between the LSM-based class categories and data on incomes (from 2011) and occupations (from 2008-12).

Table A1: Household income by LSM, 2011

Household income, in R/month (with approximate income deciles)	**LSM 1-5 (%)**	**LSM 6-8 (%)**	**LSM 9-10 (%)**	**Total (%)**
<1200 pm (poorest 3 deciles)	86	14	0	100
1201-2999 (next 3 deciles)	83	17	0	100
3000-3999 (7th decile)	68	32	0	100
4000-5999 (8th decile)	58	41	1	100
6000-9999 (9th decile)	39	59	2	100
10000 + (10th decile)	7	78	15	100

Source: SARB , African people only, weighted data.

Table A2: Occupation by LSM, 2011

Occupation or work status (with share of sample)	**LSM 1-5 (%)**	**LSM 6-8 (%)**	**LSM 9-10 (%)**	**Total (%)**
Professional or managerial/executive (3%)	12	74	15	100
Clerical/sales or skilled/tradesman (10%)	40	56	4	100
Semi-skilled (6%)	48	51	1	100
Unskilled (11%)	74	25	0	100
Unemployed (28%)	77	23	1	100
Housewife/retired/student (38%)	70	28	2	100

Source: SARB, weighted data, African people only.

Table A3 shows the results of regression models using 'class' categories derived from the available income data (for 2011 only) and occupation data (for 2008-12), for comparison with the LSM-based categories used in the models reported in Table 8. With respect to income, I label as 'upper middle class' households with incomes above R10,000 per month (i.e. approximately household income decile 10) and as 'lower middle class' those households with incomes between R3000 and 10,000 per month (approximately deciles 7 through 9). Occupational data cover only respondents who are themselves working, with little detail on their occupations; they do not cover people with 'mediated' class positions, i.e. mediated through their membership of households. I label as 'upper middle class' respondents in professional, managerial or executive occupations and as 'lower middle class' respondents in clerical, sales, skilled or trade occupations. I exclude from this analysis all respondents who said they were either unemployed, housewives, students, retired, or self-employed (because the category might include shopkeepers and hawkers, i.e. people in very different class positions).

Table A3: Class and race effects on perceived progress since 1994, using alternative measures of class

	Agree that race relations improved since 1994		**Agree that employment opportunities improved since 1994**	
	Model A3 Income (2011)	**Model A4 Occupation (2008-12)**	**Model B3 Income (2011)**	**Model B4 Occupation (2008-12)**
'Upper middle class'	0.09***	0.09***	0.06	0.07***
'Lower middle class'	0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.04**
Not 'middle class'	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
Not African	-0.09**	-0.09***	-0.09***	-0.13***
African	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted	Omitted
n	2250	6217	2287	6290
r squared	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03

Note: All models control for age, gender and year (where appropriate); all variables are dummy variables; data are weighted; models are probit regressions, reporting marginal effects; significance reported at *0.1, **0.05, ***0.01.

These four models (compared with those in Table 8) show that the effects of being 'upper middle class' or non-African are remarkably consistent, regardless of whether class is measured in terms of LSMs, household income or individual occupation. The only caveat to this is that the relationship between being upper middle class and perceived improvement in employment opportunities is not statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The effect of being 'lower middle class'

is not, however, robust, when ‘class’ is defined in terms of household income or occupation.

When perceived changes in employment opportunities are regressed on LSM controlling also for occupation or income, LSM remains significant. The picture is a little more complicated when perceived changes in race relations are regressed on LSM, controlling for occupation or income, then being in the ‘upper middle class’ LSM categories (i.e. LSM 9-10) is less significant than being in the ‘upper middle class’ defined in terms of occupation or income. This is consistent with the inter-racial contact data discussed above: Perceptions of improvements in race relations seem to correlate with inter-racial contact, and such contact is more likely to be associated with having a professional, managerial or executive occupation than with having the assets that place you in the higher LSMs. How to understand the similarities and differences between different measures (or aspects) of class is something that must await further research.

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