students who do want to pursue philosophy as a career will be better prepared having been mentored by a club advisor.

Finally, the social interaction with students outside the classroom makes advising a philosophy club rewarding. If one has a heavy teaching load, or one's classes only allow for formal lecturing, a philosophy club is a great opportunity to know students more personally. Indeed, it is very satisfying for an instructor to hear students apply or debate philosophical ideas from the classroom in their "off hours" at a philosophy club event. Teaching can be exhausting, but philosophy club events are for me curiously energizing because they are fueled by student enthusiasm.

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Teaching Ethics for Everyday

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Teaching practical ethics

The teaching of practical ethics courses provides special opportunities and poses special challenges. Among the former is the opportunity to teach material that readily engages student interest. Whereas students sometimes have to be convinced of the importance of other philosophical questions, some of which strike ordinary people as silly, students typically do not have to be convinced of the importance of questions in practical ethics. Practical ethics is thus a valuable vehicle for attracting students to philosophy courses and then for teaching philosophical skills. Among the special challenges, however, is the fact that students usually enter a practical ethics course with strongly held opinions about the topics that will be discussed. The challenge instructors thus face is to help students to overcome the students' (often uninformed) prejudgments on these topics. Instructors must assist students to think critically about these prejudgments, but such critical assessment is often extremely uncomfortable for students.

The scholarly area of practical ethics has burgeoned in recent decades. One feature of this has been the proliferation of sub-areas of practical ethics, including bioethics, legal ethics, business ethics, educational ethics, environmental ethics, and others. When I was asked to teach our department's undergraduate practical ethics course about eight years ago, I began to give some thought to what topics I might teach. For various reasons I ruled out most of the conventional areas of practical ethics. (I already taught bioethics in our medical school and did not want to teach the same material in a second course. I wanted to avoid questions in legal ethics because many of our students go on to law school where these topics might be taught. I know next to nothing about business and thus thought it unwise to teach business ethics.)

Ethics for everyday

I thought that the ethical questions of everyday life—what we might call "quotidian ethics"—would make an exciting theme for a practical ethics course. These questions are to be distinguished from moral problems faced by those deciding issues of public policy[1] or faced by individual people only in their professional roles or in unusual circumstances.

The questions of quotidian ethics, of all the questions in practical ethics, have the greatest relevance for the largest number of people. We all (or almost all) face these sorts of problems and we face many of them daily. Although the social and professional issues are often much grander, they are also less immediate in most people's lives. A second reason why the problems of quotidian ethics are more relevant to the largest number of people is that unlike decisions about the big social policy issues, decisions about quotidian ethical questions can be implemented immediately by an individual. If one decides that capital punishment is right or wrong, one cannot immediately implement that decision (unless one is one's country's dictator). Indeed, the chances are that one will have nearly no influence in bringing about a change in social policy. By contrast, a decision about some matter of quotidian ethics can be implemented forthwith.

Having decided to teach a course on the quotidian ethics theme and discovering that there was no suitable text,[2] I decided to develop one. Over the following few years, while I worked on compiling the anthology, I experimented with different topics and papers in my course. Since publication of the collection,[3] I have used it as the course text.

Teaching ethics for everyday

Theory:

Some instructors like to introduce a practical ethics course with some attention to normative ethical theory. My own preference is to teach theory in one course and practical problems in another. This gives more time to both theory and practice. Although not all my students who take the practical ethics course have taken the theory course, resolution of the theoretical issues is not usually necessary for reaching conclusions about practical moral problems. However, I do give a very brief overview of the major theories in order to help students who encounter reference to theories in some of the readings.

Sitting on the fence or taking a stand?:

Many instructors prefer not to divulge their own views to students. They argue that it is better for instructors to be impartial in the classroom, particularly when discussing highly emotive issues. Although that approach has its merits, I prefer

not to hide my own views. Although the approach I prefer has its costs, which I shall discuss shortly, it also has a number of advantages. First, those instructors who do not take a stand often unwittingly foster the impression that whatever view one takes of an ethical issue is simply a matter of opinion because there are arguments both pro and con for each position. In arguing for one view, I show that I think that the balance of evidence and arguments supports one view. This enables students to see and participate in the activity of philosophy, which is not simply a listing or even examination of competing views but a structured argument toward some conclusion. Second, when I think that the prevailing orthodoxy on some question is mistaken, it helps me to challenge that view much more effectively. Third, students learn a valuable lesson in those cases where I *am* undecided. I can show that one should suspend belief in those cases in which it is unclear what view is best. Because I take a stand on other issues, my indecision in some cases is not a symptom of "fence-sitting" but rather the consequence of the arguments and evidence not being decisive (in my view). Given how many people hold firm opinions on topics about which they are not fully informed and about which they have not thought enough, it is good for students to learn that suspending belief is sometimes not only *an* option but the *best* option. Finally, I am able, at the end of the semester, to show students that the views I have defended during the course cannot be boxed neatly into one category—such as liberal, conservative, revolutionary, or reactionary. I note how people's views on one topic are too often predictable once one knows their views on another topic and that this is often because people are not thinking sufficiently critically about each of the issues. It may well be the case that one should be liberal about some matters and conservative about others.

There are a number of potential costs of my defending specific views. First, students might confuse my arguing for some conclusion as an indication that I am not open to the alternative view. Second, students may feel reluctant to defend alternative views in their essays and exams. There are a number of steps I take in order to ameliorate these problems even though they cannot be avoided entirely. I indicate that I *have* changed my mind on some issues, and I sometimes explain what led me to change my mind. I tell the students that I would change my mind yet again if I were persuaded that my current views were wrong. I show which arguments against my position are strongest and why. Sometimes each view has both strengths and weaknesses and the question is which set of strengths and weaknesses one thinks is best (or least bad). I show that it is sometimes the case that reasonable people could disagree in this judgment. Finally, I emphasize that I have failed papers that support views I hold because they defend those views poorly and awarded first-class passes to essays defending opposite views because they defend those views as well as they do.

Topics:

There are many possible quotidian ethical issues—and obviously many more than can be taught in a semester-long course. My preference is to focus in greater depth on fewer topics, but one could decide instead to cover more ground more superficially.

I usually begin with the ethics of humor. This is partly because the articles that I use discuss pertinent issues concerning harm, and harm has relevance for all other practical moral problems. More importantly, I start with humor because it is both a fun topic and one about which people are very sensitive. Humor has been one of the major victims of political correctness, and people have lost their jobs or been ostracized on account of telling allegedly unethical jokes. Before I begin this topic, I ask students to write down a joke or two that they find morally troubling and to hand these in (anonymously, unless they prefer otherwise). Usually the examples are about race, women, or Jews, but they sometimes also include jokes about dead babies or tragedies such as the Holocaust or famine. I often draw on these examples to illustrate points in our subsequent discussions. I argue against the prevailing view that all jokes turning on stereotypes must *always* be morally wrong, even though such jokes often are. And I argue that it is not always wrong to tell jokes about dead babies, the Holocaust, famine, Diana Spencer's death, and the space shuttle accidents. Once we have finished this topic, I screen "The Yada Yada" episode of *Seinfeld* in which Jerry's Catholic dentist converts to Judaism and Jerry is offended at how quickly he takes to telling Jewish jokes. The dentist similarly takes exception to Jerry's jokes about dentists and Jerry is accused of being an anti-dentite.

Next, I turn to sex and examine either promiscuity or adultery, and then homosexuality. Student views on promiscuity are quite sharply divided. Some think that it is immoral, while others think that there is nothing wrong with it. I advance an argument about sexual ethics that is deeply unsettling to both groups.[4]

Most students are opposed to adultery, but disagreement can be generated by considering adultery in "open marriages." Parties to such marriages make no undertaking of sexual exclusivity and indeed expressly allow one another the option of extra-marital sexual relations. Students tend to be more divided on the ethics of adultery in such contexts (and on the ethics of entering into such marriages).

Most students in my classes think that there is nothing wrong with homosexuality, although there is a non-negligible minority that does not share this view. Some instructors are reluctant to teach this topic because they think that we ought not to turn some peoples' sexual preference into a topic for moral debate. That is not a view I share. Although I think that there is nothing morally wrong with homosexual activity, I think that those who disagree need to be persuaded and not ignored or dismissed. It is antithetical to the philosophical approach to close off questions. In any event, discussion of homosexuality is helpful for its application to other questions of sexual ethics. Discussion of homosexuality invariably raises questions about "abnormality," "unnaturalness," and "God's will," which also arise in the context of other sexual practices.

After examining the ethics of various sexual matters, I turn to moral problems that pertain to the rearing of children. Sometimes I include the question of children's rights and children's liberation. I present the strongest arguments in favor of the liberationist position—that children are entitled to equal rights and that paternalistic interventions in the lives of children are unwarranted. Most students do not accept this position. Since I too reject it, I found that the students are not made as uncomfortable by the liberationist arguments as I would like. Although I present these arguments as compellingly as I can, students are too easily rescued from their unease by the arguments I then raise against the liberationist position. Instructors committed to the liberationist view might have more success here.

One topic on children that I have found challenging is the physical punishment of children. My students are quite sharply divided on this issue. The intermediate view I defend on this topic—that corporal punishment is usually wrong but cannot be ruled out categorically—is a challenge to the views that most of the students bring to the class. Toward the end of our discussion of this topic, I present them with a rich case in which it is very difficult to decide whether corporal punishment would be wrong.

The next question we examine is whether it is morally permissible to eat animals (and use their bodies and flesh for other purposes). Most students think that there is nothing wrong with eating meat and are deeply disturbed by the best arguments to the contrary—arguments from which I do not rescue them. Of all the topics we discuss, this one generates the most interest. I suspect that this is because not only is the prevailing orthodoxy challenged but the implication of doing so is that most people are engaged in behavior that is not merely mildly wrong but very seriously wrong. I am careful to show that some arguments for vegetarianism or veganism are very poor, and I show that there are some quite sophisticated (although, in my view, nonetheless fatally flawed) arguments for the view that eating meat is acceptable. I spend more time on this topic than I do on most others, primarily because I have found that students need ample time to work though all the arguments, often more than once. Once we have finished this section, I show some videos about the rearing and slaughter of animals. I am sensitive to the obvious concerns about doing so. I take the following steps to ameliorate these concerns. First, I warn students in advance that the material may upset sensitive viewers and offer students the option of not attending class that day without penalty. Second, I advise students of the ways in which people can be manipulated by visual images and urge them to guard against these. However, I do note that the images can also inform in a way in which mere descriptions cannot. For instance, students can witness the behavioral responses of animals being slaughtered. I indicate that some may be reflexes but that others suggest distress and pain. Third, the videos that I show are not ones that depict unusually cruel treatment of animals but rather show quite ordinary scenes—disturbing enough though these are. Finally, I allow ample time for discussion after the screening of these videos, during which students can raise any concerns they might have.

The next topic to which I usually turn is the question of the extent to which we are obliged to help those of the world's poor who are starving to death. This topic has all the gravity of the previous one. I present Peter Singer's challenge and then show how the various most plausible responses to it suggest that, at most, our duties are only a little less extensive than he suggests. However, I do raise a few tentative responses of my own that, if sound, would suggest that the extent of our duties is much more like most people's views than like Peter Singer's. I indicate the tentative nature of these responses and that I am not entirely convinced of them. While many students grab at these arguments, others rush to Peter Singer's defense. This divide lends itself to some helpful debate. Many students draw connections between the questions of eating meat and helping the world's poor. This opens the way to discussing the similarities and differences between our responsibilities for the suffering of animals and the suffering of poor humans.

On one or two occasions I have concluded the course with an examination of the question of sexist language. However, I have found that doing so is an anticlimax. I do not know whether this is because the question seems so trivial after discussing such momentous topics as eating meat and giving aid to the world's poor, or whether today's students have so accepted the feminist critique of language that the sexist-language question is a non-issue for them. One way to test which of these hypotheses is correct, assuming that they do not both play a role, would be to teach about sexist language immediately after humor. Depending on whether the topic then engaged student interest, one could determine whether it was the topic or the timing that was the problem.

Another topic I often incorporate toward the end of the course is smoking. Although also much less momentous than either eating meat or giving aid, it engages student interest much more than does the problem of sexist language. This may be because smoking in the presence of others is thought to cause so much more harm than the generic use of the male pronoun and of "man" (and its compounds). I argue, however, that a case can be made against smoking in the presence of others (without their permission) even if the harms of second-hand smoke are ignored.

Student responses:

Most students respond very favorably to the course content and the approach to it. At the beginning of the semester, I ask students to answer some questions about their views on the topics that will be discussed during the course. At the end of the semester, I often ask them to answer the same questions in order to determine to what extent, if any, they have changed their minds. It is always interesting how many students do change their minds. Many of them are struck by how their received views on various topics have been turned on their heads. Practices that they thought were morally troubling they come to think are not so bad, while other actions that they assumed were morally permissible they come to think are deeply worrying. Whether or not students change their minds, they seem pleased to have examined moral problems that impact on their daily lives.

Examining ethics for everyday

Students write two essays during the course, but the final exam accounts for 60 percent of the final grade. The course content lends itself to exciting exam questions. I divide the final examination into two parts. The first consists of questions requiring short answers. These are designed to test students' understanding both of particular concepts and of the central ideas of the readings. The second part of the exam consists of essay questions. Here are some examples:

1. On 11 March 2004, the *Cape Argus* contained the following report:

   "Radio DJ Gareth Cliff has been suspended for two days by 5fm after complaints about an interview purporting to be with Jesus Christ. The interview, aired on Tuesday, was pre-recorded with Cliff interviewing himself speaking with a fake Israeli accent. He asked 'Jesus' what viewers would get out of seeing the movie *The Passion of the Christ*. 'Jesus' replied that moviegoers didn't need to buy popcorn as he could multiply one box into many more. The comment upset a number of listeners. Cliff apologised yesterday. He said he had not intentionally aimed to disparage any religion, merely to parody the Mel Gibson film. Nick Grubb, the programme manager at 5fm, said: 'We believe that the segment was inflammatory, and could have been interpreted negatively by a large portion of our listeners. While Gareth is often irreverent and controversial, he merely overstepped the mark this time'. Cliff will be back on air on Monday."

   Was this bit of radio humor morally wrong? Justify your answer.

2. On a tour around Britain this year, to celebrate Queen Elizabeth's fifty years on the throne, Prince Philip, the Queen's husband, said the following to a blind woman who was wheelchair-bound and who had a guide dog: "Do you know they have eating dogs for the anorexic now?" (*Toronto Metro*, 2 May 2002)

   Do you think that it was morally acceptable for Prince Philip to offer this humorous comment to this woman? Why?

3. Imagine that Bill Clinton has consulted you, as a moral philosopher, inquiring whether adultery is always immoral. Write back to him with your well-argued response. (From the 1999 exam)
4. Would it be morally acceptable to spank your children in the following circumstances?:

   Your twelve-year-old son and eleven-year-old daughter conspire with one another to lie to you in order to avoid punishment for some other wrongdoing. You suspect, but are not sure, that they are lying. You ask them directly what the truth is, indicating the seriousness with which you view lying about this matter, but they continue adhering to their original story. You investigate the matter further and establish (without their knowledge) that they have indeed lied. You ask them once again what the truth is and they continue with their lie. You then disclose that you have established the truth via an independent source and they confess to having lied.
5. Must a utilitarian be a vegetarian? Justify your answer.
6. Can one consistently judge bestiality (having sex with animals) to be immoral if one does not judge the killing of animals for food to be wrong?
7. Is Peter Singer's example of the child drowning in the pond an appropriate analogy for those of the world's poor who are dying of malnutrition? In answering this question, consider various objections that could be levelled against the analogy and demonstrate either (i) that these objections undermine his conclusion about the extent of our duties to the poor, or (ii) how these objections could be met.
8. What duties, if any, do we have to provide aid to those people who suffer from absolute poverty?
9. In her book, *The Trouble with Blame: Victims, Perpetrators and Responsibility*, Sharon Lamb offers the following "Note on Terminology":

   "Throughout this book I have used the male pronoun for perpetrators and the female pronoun for victims, counter to the practice of some of my colleagues who strive to remain gender neutral. The overwhelming preponderance of perpetrators of abuse are male, whereas the majority of victims are female. I have therefore decided that it is less ambiguous and more accurate to use the gendered pronoun throughout. This should in no way diminish the very real experiences of the large number of male victims of sexual abuse."

   Is the author's convention of using gendered pronouns (for the reasons she cites) sexist? If not, is it also morally acceptable to use the male pronoun when talking of mathematicians or engineers if the majority of them are male, and to use the female pronoun when talking of nurses and teachers if the majority of them are female? And would it be morally acceptable to use one or other gender pronoun even where the group to which one is referring is not dominated by the relevant sex?
10. Is smoking in the presence of nonsmokers morally equivalent to urinating in a public swimming pool (as long as other swimmers know that one is relieving oneself in the pool)?

As should be evident, in devising exam questions I sometimes draw on topical issues, as I did in questions 1 to 3 above. Some questions (such as 1, 2, 4, and 9 above) require students to apply what they have learned to a case. Some questions about a topic (such as 3 and 8) are of a very general kind, while others (such as 5 and 7) are more focused. Occasionally, I include a question that requires students to draw on ideas not raised in class or readings in addressing some topic we have covered. Question 10 above is an example. I had not discussed urination in public swimming pools and then asked students to think about the similarities and differences between this and smoking in the presence of nonsmokers. Very occasionally I include an even more challenging question (such as question 6), which requires students not only to think across two topics (sexual ethics and eating meat, in this case) but to do so without our having discussed these in class. When I include such a question, I also include a warning that this is a more difficult question. I indicate that those answering it well will be rewarded but suggest that those unsure of themselves not attempt it.

Conclusion

I have found that quotidian ethics makes a very rewarding theme for a course in practical ethics. For instructors it is a pleasant change from the usual fare.[5] For students, the topics are not only very engaging but also highly pertinent to their daily lives. Insofar as "relevance" is a desirable attribute of course material, quotidian ethics must surely score highly.[6]

Endnotes

1. There is a difference, for example, between the question of whether gambling ought to be legally permitted and the question of whether, given legal permission, it is morally acceptable for somebody to engage in gambling.
2. I later discovered Christina and Fred Sommers's popular *Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), but this collection has a distinctly different focus. As its title suggests, it is concerned more with questions of character than with moral dilemmas about what one should do. There is nonetheless some (but very little) overlap between that collection and the one I developed. There are a few other books on everyday ethics. Joshua Halberstam's *Everyday Ethics: Inspired Solutions to Real-Life Dilemmas* (New York: Viking, 1993) is intended for general readership and is less suited to a class text. The focus of this book is also more on character, virtues, and relationships than on the kind of dilemmas about what to do that predominate in the text I developed. *Moralities of Everyday Life* by John Sabini and Maury Silver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) also focuses on issues of character, and its approach is more psychological than philosophical.
3. David Benatar (ed.). *Ethics for Everyday* (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002). The book comprises seven parts, with each part containing a number of chapters. Part 1 is about communication and contains chapters on humor, sexist speech, gossip, and lying. Part 2 contains a chapter on premarital sex, promiscuity, and masturbation, and chapters on adultery and homosexuality. In Part 3, there are chapters on rearing children and on familial and filial duties. Part 4 is devoted to eating meat, wearing leather, and keeping pets. Part 5, on money matters, covers copyright violation, giving aid, gambling, and tipping. In Part 6, there are papers on smoking, recreational drug use, gastronomic pleasures, and a chapter on the environment, cars, and consumption. The final part examines forgiveness, modesty, politeness, gratitude, jealousy, and envy.
4. For more on this, see David Benatar, "Two Views of Sexual Ethics: Promiscuity, Paedophilia and Rape," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 16:3 (2002): 191-201.
5. Some instructors may be deterred from teaching quotidian ethics because they lack the time or energy to prepare a full course of entirely new material. They should note that because of the overlap between quotidian ethics and the

more usual content of applied ethics courses, the amount of new preparation can be reduced.

6. I would be grateful to hear about the experiences of instructors teaching quotidian ethics and about the work of philosophers writing on quotidian ethics problems. (I can be reached at: dbenatar@humanities.uct.ac.za)

Book Reviews

Ten Essential Texts in the Philosophy of Religion, Classics and Contemporary Issues

Steven M. Cahn (Oxford: Oxford University, 2005), 512 pp.

Reviewed by Jerome Gellman
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This volume joins a number of previous textbooks Cahn has produced for philosophy of religion. It is a really good collection of forty-three readings, all the way from Plato to Plantinga. The readings are not snippets or "selections from" but are full essays or entire chapters, or in some cases a complete work. So this is a text for a serious, probably year-long, course that aims to discuss issues in philosophy of religion in depth. There might not be a comparable textbook out there.

If you are curious why a book of forty-three readings is entitled "Ten Essential Readings," the answer is that the ten readings are supposed to be the centerpieces around which come supplementary readings, "a variety of essays…that provide background for the texts, discuss the texts directly, or develop themes on subjects related to the texts" (from the Introduction). So we have ten units, based on ten texts.

Here are the ten texts: (1) Plato's *Euthyphro*, (2) a selection from Boethius's *The Consolation of Philosophy*, (3) Anselm's *Proslogion*, Gaunilon's reply *On Behalf of a Fool*, and Anselm's reply to him (all as "one text" of the ten!), (4) Aquinas's section I,1,2 of the *Summa Theologiae*, including the five proofs, (5) Hume's *Of Miracles*, (6) Hume's entire *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*, (7) selections from Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, (8) James's *The Will to Believe*, (9) two whole chapters from James's *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, and (10) the old-time favorite, the Flew, Hare, and Mitchell debate, *Theology and Falsification*.

The set-up of central texts surrounded by others, however, is bound to confuse students. The reason is that in some of the units the supplemental readings tend to relate to what is quite tangential to the central reading or only vaguely connected to it. Here are some examples:

In the unit on Anselm's *Proslogion*, because Anselm *mentions* omnipotence, we have two articles, by Frankfurt and Mavrodes, on the paradoxes of omnipotence, unrelated to Anselm. And because Anselm *mentions* forgiveness, we have an article on that topic, by Anne Minas, once again not related to Anselm.

The section leading off with James's "The Will to Believe" appropriately follows with Clifford's "The Ethics of Belief," which was the occasion for James's essay, and but one article on James's essay. But the rest is only tangentially related to James's specific pragmatist stance, instead dealing with the entire question of whether belief requires evidence. This rest has Pascal's wager, a critique of it by Simon Blackburn, and an exchange between Alvin Plantinga and Michael Martin on the former's idea of basic propositions, which require no evidence. It would have made much better sense to structure this unit with Clifford's essay—demanding evidence for all beliefs—as the central text, followed by Pascal, James, Plantinga, etc., as responding to Clifford's demand. That way James's pragmatist reply to Clifford would have lined up with non-pragmatist attempts to recognize the warrant of non-evidentially based beliefs, all contra Clifford.

So students are likely to be confused: anticipating supplemental readings dealing with major themes of the lead-reading, they might find that the supplemental readings do no such thing. And what is presented as a unit based on the central reading can turn out to be instead a unit based on a *topic* of which the central reading is no more than a part.

In addition to collecting the readings, Cahn gives introductions to each unit. Here, much attention is given to the lead article and not enough to supplemental ones, especially when they are technical. The description of the supplementary articles tends toward the perfunctory.

My recommendation: Forget about the structure of "Ten Essential Texts," which doesn't work too well. Instead, just use it as an excellent "reader in philosophy of religion" that happily brings together in one volume lengthy selections of some of the best in the field throughout history.

Possible Worlds

John Divers (New York: Routledge, 2002), 380 pp., $125 hardback, $34.95 paper.

Reviewed by John Nolt
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The groundbreaking work of Saul Kripke, David Lewis, David Kaplan, Alvin Plantinga, Roderick Chisholm, and others made modal metaphysics a hot new area in the analytic philosophy of the 1960s and early 1970s. Since then, though much of the vast conceptual territory that these thinkers opened up remains *terra incognita*, some has been explored in great detail. In *Possible Worlds* John Divers surveys the results of these subsequent explorations.

The book's coverage of theories of possible worlds is, as Divers concedes at the outset, less than complete. These are either realist, which hold that many possible worlds exist, or antirealist, which deny this. Divers treats only the realist theories in depth—though among them he includes actualist theories, which regard possible worlds as one or another kind of actually existing abstract entities. Among all the realist views, Divers favors (and devotes most of his attention to) what he calls "genuine realism," a position typified by Lewis's work. Divers does not, however, dismiss antirealism; indeed, he had originally planned to cover it, but, he says, "I became convinced that the literature on possible worlds as it stood did not offer an appropriate basis on which to proceed. So the work on antirealism was postponed, and the present book emerged as an attempt to clear the ground for that work" (p. xi).

The book as we have it is divided into four parts. Part I is an introduction to possible worlds and their philosophical uses, Part II a discussion of genuine realism, and Part III a treatment of actualist realism. Part IV provides a brief summary and conclusion.

Regarding Part I, "I hope," writes Divers, "that the introductory material will serve both the philosophy undergraduate who