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INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY,
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**Cross-national differences in
preferences for redistribution among
Africa's urban poor: evidence from a
survey experiment in Zambia and
South Africa**

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Abstract

This paper explores cross-national variation in preferences for redistribution in Africa. In the advanced capitalist countries of the global North, preferences for redistribution vary significantly between as well as within countries. These between-country differences are driven by citizens' perceptions of fairness and the real levels of inequality in that society. No comparative work into preferences for redistribution exists for Africa, where current policymaking debate is focused on whether financial support should be tied to some kind of work requirement or developmental project. This paper analyzes the attitudes and preferences of low-income informal settlement dwellers in two countries with varying levels of welfare provision – Zambia and South Africa – to understand whether policy preferences are, indeed, dependent upon institutional contexts. It finds that respondents in both contexts see unemployment as a failure of government policy, and, by extension, think it just that the poor and unemployed receive money from the government. Results from a conjoint experiment, however, reveal some striking differences in how respondents in each context evaluate the deservingness of different categories of poor people: Zambian respondents penalize poor unemployed people who are not job seeking, while, in South Africa, this attribute does not matter. These findings highlight how certain policy design elements (like conditionality) could be seen as inappropriate, and be met with resistance in some settings, while tolerated or even preferred in others. It adds to the body of welfare-attitudes research that underscores the need for cross-national scrutiny of findings from single country studies, to better understand how policies interact with political context.

1. Introduction

All poverty research, according to David Calnitsky, is about whether we wish to blame society or to blame the victim (Calnitsky, 2018). This maxim reveals itself often in scholarship on social policy preferences, where popular attitudes about welfare provision serve as both a diagnostic for what ails economic progress in society, and a barometer for how best to remedy inequality. Research from the global North has illuminated a great deal in the past two decades about how the blame-attribution question manifests itself in the social policy preferences of ordinary citizens (Tirole & Bénabou, 2005). There, scholars question whether variation within countries over support for redistributive social policies is driven more by individual level attributes such as class, income and political ideology (Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Bernasconi, 2006; Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) or by heuristics such as deservingness (Aarøe & Peterson, 2014; Hansen, 2019; Van Oorschot et al., 2017).

When scholars measure variation across societies, however, they find evidence of a feedback process between the economic regime citizens live in and their individual preferences (Corneo 2001; Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Neundorf & Soroka, 2018). That is, they find that “attitudes toward the welfare state are not only individual-level phenomena, but also collective phenomena, i.e., they are held not only by individuals, but also by collective groups like nations” (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003:415), which in turn, “influence popular attitudes regarding what kind of policies the state should pursue, and who should benefit” (*ibid.*). For example, Americans are less likely than Europeans to care that the government puts in effort to reduce income inequality (Hooghe et al., 2017), and Eastern Germans were more in favor of state intervention than West Germans due to exposure to Communism (Alesina & Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007).

The question of whether preferences are endogenous to nations is yet to be tested systematically with African cases. To date, the limited research on public preferences in Africa has focused on variations within countries, with a scholarly bent to understanding buy-in for cash transfer programs that have proliferated across the region in the past two decades to remedy the crisis of joblessness and income inequality across the region. Here, debate is focused on whether financial support for the poor and unemployed should be tied to some kind of work requirement or developmental project. Evidence from Zambia suggests popular support for some form of conditionality (Schüring, 2011). Evidence from South Africa suggests a general preference for job creation over the expansion of social grants (Sefalafala, 2018; Dawson & Fouksman, 2020). To date, however, no one has analyzed variation between countries within Africa.

This paper seeks to fill the gap in knowledge by testing whether attitudes towards redistribution are positively associated with the generosity of the redistributive

context experienced by the individual (Andreoli & Olivera, 2020). Central to its analysis is the possibility of country-specific effects that may result from the experience of living in and trying to secure a livelihood in contexts of high unemployment amidst varying opportunity structures afforded by a welfare state arrangement. Comparing countries with correspondingly different structures has the potential to enrich our analysis by showing how macro-level features of a given society affect the apportioning of blame for being poor and unemployed, and, as a consequence the penalties citizens think should be associated with that blame (Calnitsky, 2018).

The paper analyzes the attitudes and preferences for extending grants to the unemployed poor in two African countries, Zambia and South Africa, and asks if certain attributes make poor people deserving in one society and not in the other. If so, can similarities and differences in preferences be attributed to the policy regime? Another way of putting this is that it treats respondents as both the disconnected and connected (by their policy regime) individuals that they are. It uses the macro theoretical lens of situational accounts of poverty (Ross & Nisbett, 2011, cited in Calnitsky 2018), and the theorized (and empirically tested) notion that the non-searching-unemployed state is distinct from the searching-unemployed state in developing contexts with high unemployment rates (Kingdon & Knight, 2000) to explain these differences in attitudes towards the job seeking poor. That individuals in one country would evaluate one category of poor to be more deserving of public support than another has important implications for policy debate on whether the surplus-labor economies of sub-Saharan Africa should be moving towards policies (such as a basic income grant) that decommodify labor and income (Ferguson, 2010).

Though each country has its unique historic and socioeconomic inflection points, Zambia and South Africa are suited for comparison due to high rates of poverty and income inequality in both countries. They also have enough other similarities – high rates of informality; natural resource-led development; an ethnically heterogeneous population – to justify comparison, as well as enough differences – racialized inequality; financial capacity; and welfare apparatus robustness – to make contrasting them worthwhile. Given that the average poor South African already receives income support from the government, we should expect them to be more pro-welfare in their attitudes than Zambians. We would also expect – based on the tiers of social assistance available for children, the disabled, the elderly, and, most recently, the unemployed able-bodied – that South Africans would favor universalist policies, rather than those that differentiate between different categories of poor. Furthermore, and in line with findings in the global North literature using European cases, the high- and persistent-income inequality in South Africa should result in higher individual support for redistribution (Olivera, 2015).

Findings from an original survey administered to randomly selected low-income, informal settlement residents of Cape Town and Lusaka reveals a belief among both sets of respondents that unemployment is a failure of government policy, and that it is, by extension, just that the poor and unemployed receive money from the government. However, when asked to evaluate the deservingness of different hypothetical welfare recipients in a conjoint experiment, Zambian respondents greatly penalized the poor who are not job-seeking, while, in South Africa, this attribute does not matter. Drawing on Kingdon and Knight (2000) (and later Lloyd & Leibbrandt, 2013), I argue that this preference for conditionality is indicative of: 1) the opportunities for redistribution in the household, and 2) the constraints to job-seeking in the two contexts. With nothing to index the findings against, this crucial insight would have been missed had this experiment only been carried out within one country: we simply would have run micro-level regressions to see what characteristics of individual respondents predict this attitude and left out they key variables of the welfare state and local economic outcomes. By evaluating certain categories of poor as more deserving of social assistance than other categories, what respondents are essentially telling us, is that in that society, the person or persons in question, by virtue of their characteristics – in what they have done and in what they have failed to do – cannot be faulted for being poor and unemployed. This has implications for the design of policies that extend social assistance to the unemployed. Simply put, one can infer from these data that a policy that hinges on any form of job seeking behavior on the part of the unemployed poor is likely to be met with some resistance among South Africa’s urban poor, while in Zambia, a conditionality of this nature is likely to be tolerated, and even preferred.

Further analysis using standard survey questions reveals that South African respondents in the sample are significantly more likely to support grants for the poor and score higher on a ‘pro-welfare’ index, than Zambian respondents. The gap between the two groups shrinks significantly, however, when we control for subjective wellbeing and prior beliefs.

In addition to being generally more pro-welfare than the Zambians in the group, South Africans are also more likely to have contradictory views about welfare provision, as measured by an alternative, ‘ambivalence’ outcome variable. These findings imply that living in a highly generous regime with high levels of inequality and being pro-welfare are highly associated. Altogether, the findings add to the growing body of scholarship that makes the case for determining the cross-national robustness of welfare findings due to “pervasive, salient interactions between institutional contexts and social policies” (Biegert et al., 2022:37).

2. What explains cross-national differences in public preferences for welfare provision?

2.1 Western, industrialized nations

Scholars in the global North generally agree that different national configurations generate different public beliefs about the social problems and the citizen-state relations required to overcome those problems (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003; Dallinger, 2010; Arian & Bloom, 2015). But there is little to no consensus about the feedback mechanism for why this is so.

A dominant thread of inquiry in this regard has been one of testing the ‘regime hypothesis’, i.e., whether public support for redistribution varies systematically between different types of ‘welfare regime’ (Korpi, 1980; Esping-Andersen, 1990). The idea here is that, given that the different welfare regimes in the global North – Social Democratic vs. Conservative vs. Liberal – “comprise very different historical and institutional compromises between state, market, and family, one would expect levels of public support for redistribution to vary systematically across countries” (Jæger, 2006). Scholars have, by and large, found no consistent pattern in the relationship between regime type and attitudes towards redistribution in western industrialized nations (see Jæger, 2006 for a systematic review of the evidence).

Scholars like (Jæger, 2006). argue that this seeming lack of correlation between regime types and attitudes is due, primarily, to methodological shortcomings: many studies use outcome variables and indices from heterogeneous survey questions dealing with respondents’ attitudes. To remedy this, Jæger draws on data from standard European Social Surveys across 13 Western European countries, and uses a range of theoretically defining characteristics, e.g., “total public social spending” to test whether there are systematic differences in attitudes across the different regimes. Still, the results show only “mixed support” for variation by regime type, further corroborating the evidence that “no clear-cut relationship exists between welfare regimes and support for redistribution” (Jæger 2006).

A second analytic approach that tries to establish the relationship between welfare regimes and attitudes focuses on the complex relationship between actual inequality in a country and citizens’ redistributive preferences (Dallinger, 2010). In these types of works, scholars hypothesize that support for redistribution is directly correlated with real levels of income inequality (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). Yet, when data from the World Values Survey are analyzed, no compelling evidence of a higher demand for redistribution in highly unequal societies (such as South Africa) is revealed (Soskice, 2005, cited in Dallinger, 2010; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Pellicer et al., 2019).

When other macro-level indicators like the broad rate of unemployment, and overall dependency on government transfers are included in the analysis, the evidence is much more interesting. For example, Blekesaune & Quadagno (2003) hypothesized that the more people who are unemployed within a country, the more likely that the public will have positive attitudes toward social programs for the unemployed, even when controlling for unemployment at the individual level. Among twenty-four Western nations, the authors found that “in situations of high unemployment public support for welfare policies is generally higher, and those directed toward the unemployed in particular” (Blekesaune & Quadagno, 2003:424). Other scholars have argued that “generosity of the welfare system should be accounted for in the analysis of preferences for redistribution” (Andreoli & Olivera, 2020:13), and have shown, empirically, with European Social Survey data, that individual support for redistribution is related to the extent of redistribution individuals actually face in the economy, i.e., that the generosity of the welfare state shapes individual preferences for redistribution.

2.2 Sub-Saharan African countries

The evidence on social policy preference variation in Africa is scant. Few studies focus on similarities and differences in social policy preferences, and those that do include neither macrolevel variables in their analyses nor specify sufficiently the type of redistribution being measured. For example, in a study done in Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and Kenya, Langer et al. (2016) operationalize support for redistribution as the agreement with statements about the government supporting poor ethnic groups: “the government should give extra economic assistance to poorer ethnic groups” and “the government should budget more money to poorer ethnic groups”. They find strong support for redistribution in Ghana and Uganda (as high as 70% of respondents strongly agreeing with the statement), but much lower levels in Nigeria and Kenya (20% and 45% respectively). In explaining the differences in preferences, the authors confine their analysis to individual level variables such as socioeconomic status and ethnic identity. No country effects are controlled for.

Comparative work on broader public opinion in Africa relies heavily on Afrobarometer data.¹ The network mainly focuses on outcomes such as support for democracy and trust in public institutions (Gyima-Boadi et al., 2021; Fuchs-Schündeln & Schündeln, 2015), but also measures general attitudes towards government and poverty across the continent. In a question that probed funding preferences for expanded services, the latest merged round of surveys in 34 countries between 2019 and 2021 reveals that Africans are “sharply divided on whether they would be willing to pay higher taxes in exchange for more

¹ Afrobarometer is a pan-African survey research network that conducts face-to-face interviews in over 35 countries in Africa. Their data are nationally representative.

government services”, with 50% of respondents agreeing and 42% preferring lower taxes for fewer services (Isbell 2022a). In another question – one that probes redistributive preferences more directly – the data reveal that seven out of 10 Africans (69%) ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that it is fair to tax rich people at a higher rate than ordinary people in order to fund government programs to benefit the poor, while just 25% disagree (*ibid.*). Though the study reports high variability in responses, it does not analyze why support for progressive taxation is 30 percentage points below the African average in Angola but 20 percentage points higher than the average in Tunisia. This was the first time both these questions were asked; thus, we cannot tell how this attitude has changed over time.

Afrobarometer data-based studies that use more than one round of surveys try to understand the causes of between-country variation by controlling for such things as the impact of inequality and economic growth on attitudes (Isbell, 2022a); the number of consecutive years of liberal democracy and how that shapes citizens’ preferences (Mattes, 2020); and fixed time to see the impact of current events on attitudes (Depetris-Chauvin & Durante, 2017). In Mattes’ 2020 study on the incidence of lived poverty on the African continent, country level factors such as the impact of national wealth (Gross National Income per capita) and regime effects accounted for 36% of country differences (Mattes, 2020). To the extent that these factors affect the incidence of poverty, we can conjecture that they also affect attitudes towards redistribution.

This study is, to my knowledge, the first to use both experimental and standard survey items to directly measure preferences about redistribution, and attitudes to the expansion of welfare in two African countries.

3. Macroeconomic comparison of Zambia and South Africa

Attitudes to the provision of public support for unemployed people in urban areas are likely to be shaped by conditions in the labor market. The Zambian labor market differs from South Africa’s in two main ways. First, the number of jobless persons who are actively looking for work, i.e., the narrow (and typically reported) unemployment rate, is significantly lower in Zambia (as a whole) than it is in South Africa: 13% compared to 34% (Zambia, 2022; Statistics South Africa, 2021). In fact, for Zambia the broadly defined unemployment rate, i.e., the narrow unemployed plus those who wanted work but didn’t search for work, is, at 28%, still lower than South Africa’s narrow rate (34%), and 20 percentage points lower than South Africa’s broad rate, which was 46% in 2021. These numbers tell us two important things: 1) there is a fairly large number of persons in Zambia who are not actively looking for work, as indicated by the difference between the narrow and broad rates of unemployment, and 2) the scenario of

searching for work and not finding it is more common in South Africa than it is in Zambia. Given these markedly different labor market dynamics (summarized in Table 1 below), the opportunities to secure a livelihood beyond wage labor become important features that affect citizens’ views on welfare provision.

Table 1: Key institutional indicators by study site

Indicator (2021 figures)	Zambia	South Africa
Unemployment rate (narrow vs broad)	13 % vs 28%	34% vs 46%
Incidence of long-term unemployment (looking for a job for a year or more)	76%	78%
Inequality as measured by the GINI coefficient	0.57 ²	0.65
Ratio of social transfers to GDP	0.2% ³	4.6%
Welfare coverage rate	23% ⁴	47% ⁵

Unemployment data sources: Zambia, 2022; Statistics South Africa, 2021

4. The welfare landscapes of Zambia and South Africa

By every objective measure, South Africa has a more robust welfare apparatus than Zambia. Not only does it outspend Zambia on social programs (4.6% and 0.6% of GDP respectively), but it also outspends most other African countries, making it an outlier on the continent (ASPIRE data, n.d.; Seekings, 2002).

Prior to the rollout of the Social Relief of Distress grant during the COVID-19 crisis, South Africa’s welfare consisted mainly of publicly financed “means-tested cash transfers that support [ed] ‘deserving’ groups such as children, the elderly, and the disabled” (Moore & Seekings, 2019). The table below (Table 2) shows the monthly benefit generosity and coverage of social grants (see Gronbach et al. (2022) for a comprehensive review of contributory and non-contributory social protections pre-COVID).

² World Bank GINI index

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?most_recent_year_desc=true

³ World Bank ASPIRE dashboard 2015-2020

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/aspire/country/south%20africa>

⁴ Zambia Policy Monitoring and Research Center (2021) <https://pmrczambia.com/>

⁵ South African Social Security Administration Annual Report

https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/PBO/National_Development_Plan_Analysis/2021/june/03-06-2021/May_2021_Social_Grant_fact_sheet.pdf

Table 2: Grants benefit and coverage in South Africa

Social Grant	Monthly Benefit (2021)	Monthly Coverage (as of March 2021)
Child Support Grant	R460 / USD 30	13 million beneficiaries (children)
Older Person's Grant	R1,890 / USD 122	3.7 million beneficiaries
Disability Grant	R1,890 / USD 122	998,000 beneficiaries
Foster Care Grant	R1,050 / USD 68	309,000 beneficiaries
Care Dependency Grant	R1,890 / USD 122	150,000 beneficiaries
War Veterans Grant	R1,910 / USD 123	40 beneficiaries
Grant-in-Aid	R460 / USD 30	267,000 beneficiaries
Total		18.4 million beneficiaries

Source: reproduced from Gronbach et al. 2022 – data from SASSA statistical report, March 2021

Zambia, on the other hand, while having seen some marked expansion in social assistance in the past decade, lags farther behind South Africa in terms of scope, coverage, and spending, and opts for more targeted interventions for the agricultural sector through the Farmer Input Support Program (FISP) than for otherwise vulnerable households (Seekings, 2022). Table 3 below summarizes social protection provision in Zambia.

Table 3: Social protection benefit and coverage in Zambia

Program	Purpose	Coverage (2021)
Social Cash Transfer (SCT)	Income support to poor and incapacitated households	881,000 households
Food Security Pack (FSP)	Provides farming inputs to vulnerable but viable farmers	264,000 households
Girls Education and Women's Empowerment and Livelihoods (GEWEL)	Education and income support to girls from poor households	Keeping Girls in School: 28,000 adolescent girls in 29 districts Supporting Women's Livelihoods: 20,843 women

Program	Purpose	Coverage (2021)
Public Welfare Assistance Scheme (PWAS)	Cash support for needy communities (including households and individuals)	16,000 households + 6,000 individual beneficiaries
Comprehensive Agriculture Support Program (CASAP) / FISP	Subsidized farming inputs to (predominantly) small-scale farmers	1 million farmers
Empowerment Funds	Interest free loans to unemployed and self-employed women and youth; and small and medium enterprises (SMEs)	Unspecified ⁶
Presidential Empowerment Initiative Fund (PEIF)	Discretionary loans paid to informal economy workers	21,000 beneficiaries
Emergency Relief (COVID-19 Emergency Cash Transfer)	Six-month cash transfer for informal sector workers in districts most affected by COVID-19	Temporal support to 200,000 households in 25 urban and peri-urban districts
Home Grown School Meals (HGSM) Program	Daily school meals for pupils in community schools and public schools	1 million beneficiaries in 2,800 schools (28% of schools in Zambia) in 38 districts across all 10 provinces
Internship, Apprenticeship, Volunteer and Graduate (IAVG) program	One-year internships, apprenticeships or volunteer program in the public sector	2021: 9000 (target) 2023: 2000 (target)

Source: reproduced from Arthur et al., 2023

Beyond the numbers, the history and design of each country's welfare apparatus, as well as its ideological underpinnings, are key to understanding the differences in expenditure and coverage. While South Africa has a tax-funded grant based

⁶ Beneficiaries apply for empowerment funds and receive funding upon meeting requirements.

social programs borne out of domestic policy, Zambia’s social protection agenda has been predominantly donor-driven, both in funding and implementation (Siachiwena, 2016). Siachiwena argues that, along with bureaucratic inefficiencies and limited budgetary capacity, the impact of donor-promoted policies is that welfare reforms happen at a slow pace, which is further constrained by state ambivalence towards “unproductive handouts” (*ibid.*).

In addition to the lack of fiscal capacity, the value of transfer benefits paid to beneficiaries as cash in Zambia are lower than those in South Africa: SCT beneficiary households in Zambia receive an equivalent of USD 11.50 per month, while, in South Africa, an individual caregiver receives the equivalent of USD 28 per child per month, with the average recipient having close to two children. The South African old age pension paid close to USD 117 per month in 2022.

Some key studies on popular and elite perceptions of welfare in the region highlight unchallenged elite ideas on dependency and deservingness as a limiting factor to welfare expansion (Pruce & Hickey, 2017; Seekings, 2016). Qualitative interviews of elite politicians in Zambia indicate hostility from government bureaucrats towards “foreign grown” (Pruce & Hickey, 2017) programs and the dependency they create, expressing a privileging of workfare and entrepreneurship programs as a more relevant social protection orientation (Pruce & Hickey, 2017; Siachiwena, 2016). In South Africa, the ruling African National Congress’s prioritizing of development over welfare (Seekings, 2018a) was borne out of the need to tackle high unemployment rates in the post-apartheid era, by providing opportunities for employment rather than ‘handouts’ (Seekings, 2018a).

5. Broader attitudes towards government and poverty in Zambia and South Africa

To contextualize public opinion in the two countries, we begin with an analysis of broader attitudes towards government and poverty using the latest publicly available round of Afrobarometer data (2020-2021).

5.1 Attitudes towards government response to inequality in society

Results from these surveys reveal that four out of five South Africans think their government is doing a bad job at narrowing income gaps. Zambians feel the same, with 84% of respondents saying the government is handling this very badly and fairly badly (Afrobarometer, 2021). Figure 1 below reports the distribution of responses.




Figure 1: Government handling of economic issues, Afrobarometer 2021

Respondents were asked: “How well or badly would you say the government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: 1) Narrowing income gaps 2) Improving living standards for the poor”

In total, the Afrobarometer survey asked five questions about citizens’ perceptions of government’s handling of economic matters. Table 4 below reports the percentage of Zambians and South Africans who responded “fairly” and “very” badly to respective questions on how the government is handling economic issues compared to the African average.

Table 4: Percentage of respondents across both countries who think the government handling issues “fairly badly” and “very badly”

How government is handling	Africa Average (%) (Thirty-five countries)	South Africa (%)	Zambia (%)
Keeping prices stable	75	79	92
Creating jobs	76	85	83
Narrowing income gaps	76	81	85
Improving living standards of the poor	71	75	70
Managing the economy	62	67	75

5.2 Taxation-side preferences for redistribution

Afrobarometer also asks questions that probe taxation-side preferences for expansion of government programs. Overall, more Zambians and South Africans than not report agreeing with paying higher taxes if it means more government services (50% compared with those preferring less taxes for fewer services, 41%). The strength of support and opposition for that reform is where we see the difference in the two countries.




Figure 2: Preference for higher versus lower taxes

Respondents were asked: “Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: It is better to pay higher taxes if it means that there will be more services provided by the government. Statement 2: It is better to pay lower taxes, even if it means there will be fewer services provided by government/”

As seen in Figure 2 above, Zambians are more likely to agree strongly with one statement or the other than are South Africans. Additionally, there is a negligible difference between the proportions of Zambians who strongly prefer more taxes and those who strongly prefer less taxes. In South Africa, in contrast, there is an almost 10 percentage point difference between the two viewpoints. There are no significant differences by gender or rural/urban location, but poorer respondents appear somewhat more likely to favor the expansion of tax-financed public services.

Now consider the view on whether it should be the rich or ordinary citizens who should be paying for expansion of pro-poor programs.




Figure 3: Fair for rich to pay higher taxes

Respondents were asked: “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: It is fair to tax rich people at a higher rate than ordinary people in order to help pay for government programs to benefit the poor?”

Figure 3 shows that, in 2020-21, Zambians supported redistribution through progressive taxation more than South Africans, with an almost 10 percentage point difference between the countries for those who agree/strongly agree that it is fair for the rich to fund programs for the poor.

All in all, the key points from the Afrobarometer data are that both populations are very critical of their governments’ performance in tackling poverty and inequality, and there is substantial support for tax-financed public services.⁷

⁷ Surveys of Zambia were done in 2021 about 8 months before a general election, while the survey of South Africa was done ‘mid-term’ in 2022.

6. Respondents and Sampling

The data in this paper come from an original survey administered to a random sample of 190 residents of Site C, Khayelitsha (in Cape Town) and 200 residents of Kamanga (Lusaka). Cape Town fieldwork began in May of 2022, while Lusaka fieldwork began in July of 2022. Enumerators were instructed to interview every fourth household at both sites, working their way through both formal and informal housing structures in the bounds of the settlement. Data were collected using tablets furnished with the *SurveyCTO* collect application which allowed for the key feature of randomization of survey elements to be implemented while offline in the field. Data quality was ensured through automated high frequency quality checks and manual monitoring checks. The Geopoints of households were recorded via the survey platform to verify that the sampling procedure was followed. Interviewing was done by eight fieldworkers in Zambia and two in Cape Town. Interviews lasted, on average, 45 minutes, and data were submitted electronically from the field at the end of each day. Human Subjects ethics approval for the survey was obtained through the University of Cape Town.

The survey instrument consisted of a set of ‘standard’ survey questions and a conjoint or ‘survey’ experiment. The standard survey questions were worded as similarly as possible to questions included in an Afrobarometer 2018 survey done in South Africa, which probed attitudes to the social grants system. These questions were presented after the experimental questions, to prevent priming in the experiments. The choice experiment was fashioned according to the principles outlined by Hainmueller et al. (2014) in their study of causal inference in conjoint analysis. Conjoint analysis is “an experimental survey technique that asks respondents to choose from or rate hypothetical profiles that combine multiple attributes, enabling researchers to estimate the relative influence of each attribute value on the resulting choice or rating” (Hainmueller et al., 2014:2). Table 5 below reports key statistics for the entire sample.

The pooled sample is young, has slightly fewer males than females, and lives in a medium-sized household. About a fifth are married (23%), and very few are employed or self-employed (13%). They self-report having income difficulties, and fewer than half of respondents (42%) receive one or more transfers from the government.

When asked to imagine a six-step ladder on which the poorest people in the country were on the bottom (Step 1), and the richest people stood on the top (Step 6), most of the sample placed themselves on either Step 2 or 3 (34% and 32% respectively, in Table 6 below). Nobody placed themselves on the 6th step, and only 36 respondents (9% of the sample) saw themselves as doing better than the average in society (above Step 3). The mean score was 2.3 (with a standard deviation of 0.95).

Table 5: Pooled sample statistics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Zambian respondent	0.51	0.5	0	1
Attitudes				
Right for anyone who is poor and unemployed to receive a pension or grant	2.34	1.25	1	5
Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead to them not wanting to get a job	2.32	1.33	1	5
If unemployed people were paid a monthly grant, they would spend too much of it on alcohol	2.54	1.22	1	5
Citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or old age pensions	2.12	1.28	1	5
Demographics				
Age	34	12.8	18	85
Male	0.48	0.5	0	1
Household size	4.5	2.5	0	13
Number of children	2.0	2.2	0	10
Grade 12 educated and above	0.41	0.49	0	1
Employed	0.13	0.34	0	1
Married	0.23	0.42	0	1
Economic condition				
Household receives one or more grants from the government	0.42	0.49	0	1
Finding it very difficult to live on current income	3.3	0.84	1	4
Self-placement on 6-step ladder of wellbeing	2.3	0.95	1	5

Table 6: Where respondents place themselves on a 6-step ladder

Self-placement on 6-step ladder	Frequency	Percent
Step 1 (poorest)	97	24.87
Step 2	131	33.59
Step 3	126	32.31
Step 4	33	8.46
Step 5	3	0.77
Total	390	100.00

Self-placement on the ladder correlated well with self-assessments of the adequacy of their income ($r=0.45$). Respondents who reported living ‘well but not comfortably’ placed themselves on the ladder with a mean score of 3.0 (with a standard deviation of 0.8). Respondents who reported living ‘with some difficulty’ had a mean score of 2.3 ($SD=0.9$) and respondents who reported ‘finding it very difficult’ had a mean score of 1.9 ($SD=0.9$).

Respondents were also asked where, on the same ladder, they would place four imaginary families.⁸ The descriptions of the four families suggested that B was the best off, followed by C, then A, with D being the worst off. Respondents clearly ranked the households in this order, giving a mean score of 5.8 for B (with a standard deviation (SD) of 0.5), 4.5 for C ($SD=0.8$), 2.7 for A ($SD=1.0$) and 1.1 for D ($SD=0.4$). By implication, most of our respondents in both sites saw themselves slightly poorer than poor (family A) with a minority seeing themselves more like the poorest (family D).

The rationale behind this ladder vignette is well-documented in economic literature on subjective wellbeing, which posits that “people assess their welfare relative to some ‘comparison group’ such as neighbors or co-workers” (Frey & Stutzer 2002, cited by Beegle et al., 2009). The vignette allows us to circumvent a frame of reference bias i.e., the problem of respondents having different ideas about what it means to be ‘rich’ or ‘poor’, or what it means to be ‘satisfied’ or not with one’s life (Beegle et al., 2009), and thus allowing us to make cross-cultural comparisons.

7. Gap in characteristics of South African and Zambian respondents

So far, we have looked at the sample as a whole and gleaned, among other characteristics such as their relative youth and singleness, that the respondents are economically precarious, both objectively and subjectively. Given that our analytic interest is the difference between attitudes of South Africans and Zambians, we now take a look at how the two samples compare in characteristics to get a glimpse into how these differences might show up in our empirical findings.

Disaggregating the sample by country, we see that the two sets of respondents vary quite significantly in profile. In fact, they differ on every metric except the proportion that are educated at high school level and above.

⁸ See Appendix for full description of families, modeled after the Beegle et al. (2009) “Frame-of-reference bias in subjective welfare”.

Table 7: Differences in characteristics of Zambian and South African respondents

Variable	Zambia	South Africa	Difference	(p-value)
Age	36.05	31.59	4.46	***
Male	0.41	0.56	-0.14	***
Grade 12 and above	0.39	0.44	-0.05	----
Married	0.34	0.12	0.22	***
Household size	4.77	4.26	0.51	**
Number of children	2.63	1.39	1.24	***
Employed	0.17	0.09	0.08	**
Household receives one or more grants	0.12	0.73	-0.61	***
Finding it very difficult to live on current income	0.30	0.68	-0.37	***
Self-placement on 6-step ladder	2.44	2.09	0.35	***

Note *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$

As seen in Table 7 above, the employment rate in Kamanga, Zambia is almost twice the rate in Site C, South Africa. Not only are the South Africans less likely to be employed, but they are also more likely to report difficulty living on their current income (68% compared to 30% of Zambians), and also see themselves as poorer than the poor imaginary family (Family D). Most relevant to our analysis is the proportion of individuals that live in a household that receives at least one government transfer: a large 73% in South Africa compared to Zambia's 12%. Though neither of these averages are representative of the national rate of welfare coverage (which, as reported earlier in Table 1, stands at 47% in South African and 23% in Zambia), the familiarity with grants in one site over the other is, as will be tested, perhaps a key factor in attitudes to welfare provision.

With these data in mind, we now turn to the empirical analysis of 1) the experimental component of the survey, and 2) the attitudes to welfare.

8. Empirical strategy

To understand whether there are real differences in public preferences for welfare provision in Zambia and South Africa, and whether differences in public opinion reflect the policy regime individuals live in, I employ four empirical tests, each outlined in the sections below. I begin by analyzing the results of the conjoint experiment that probed perceptions of deservingness, followed by an analysis of the four standard survey questions that probed general attitudes towards welfare.

8.1 Analysis 1- Who do Zambians and South Africans think is deserving of public?

In this experiment, a hypothetical unemployed person was described to respondents, who were then asked to indicate what (if anything) the government should be doing for that person. Zambian respondents could choose between six alternative interventions through which the government could pay unemployed people, and South Africans could choose between five alternatives.

The question varied seven attributes of the hypothetical unemployed subject, six of which were similar and one of which differed for South Africa and Zambia. The seventh attribute in South Africa was race, while in Zambia, it was the political party for which the hypothetical subject voted during the most recent (2021) general elections⁹. Each respondent was presented with six randomly generated profiles, giving a total of 1,200 assessments of deservingness for Kamanga, Zambia and 1,140 for Site C, South Africa.

8.1.1 Results

Here, we are interested in 1) how often respondents chose to assist the hypothetical unemployed subject, and 2) the attributes of the unemployed person that mattered most to respondents when deeming them deserving.

Of the 2,340 profiles shown to respondents, 1,784 were evaluated as deserving, giving us an assistance rate of 76%. Next, we calculate the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE) of each attribute using the strategies of Hainmueller et al. (2014) for estimating the causal effects of treatment components under completely independent randomization in conjoint experiments. That is, the attribute(s) that, when included in the description of the unemployed person, made them more likely to be seen as deserving of assistance. The AMCE is estimated by fitting a simple regression of the observed choice outcomes on the $D_1 - 1$ dummy variables for the attribute of interest and looking at the estimated coefficient for the treatment level. The AMCEs are reported in Figure 4 below, for the pooled sample, and in Figure 5 for the two separate samples.

⁹ For ease of comparison, only the six common attributes are reported here.

8.1.1.1 Pooled sample




Figure 4: Effects of hypothetical welfare recipient attributes on preference for government assistance

This plot shows estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned unemployed person’s attributes on the probability of being deemed deserving of financial assistance from the government. Estimates are based on the regression estimators with clustered standard errors; bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The points without horizontal bars denote the attribute value that is the reference category for each attribute (Hainmueller et al., 2014).

The AMCE is the average change in the probability that a subject with this attribute will be deemed deserving of assistance, relative to the reference or baseline value for that attribute. For example, as seen in Figure 4 above, if the subject is described as being aged ‘in their 50s’ (as opposed to the baseline category of ‘early 20s’) then the probability that such a subject will be considered deserving of support will increase by 14% (with a standard error of 0.02).

Of the six randomized attributes, gender and education had no bearing on respondents’ choice: there was no statistically significant difference between how often respondents assisted men over women, or the university graduate over the high school educated.

Age, as already outlined above, was important, with older subjects (52years old) 14% more likely to be assisted than a 24-year-old, and a 38-year-old 5% more likely to be assisted than a 24-year-old (Standard Errors (SE)=0.02).

Also shown in the plot is that, when the subject is described as living in an affluent neighborhood, their chances of being deemed deserving drop by 9% compared to someone described as living in a township (similar to where our respondents live). Rural subjects were deemed slightly more deserving than those living in a township, but this was not statistically significant.

Having dependents of one form or another was also influential in evaluations of deservingness. Subjects described as single with dependent parents were 8% more likely to be deemed deserving than those who are single with no dependents (SE=0.02). This is more so, even, than those who are married with children, who were only 6% more likely to be seen as deserving than the those who are single with no dependents (SE=0.02).

By far the most influential attribute on perceptions of deservingness is the subject's work ethic. Looking for a permanent job while volunteering increases the probability that a subject would be seen as deserving by 18% (SE=0.02), meaning respondents place a high premium on job-seeking behavior on the part of the unemployed. But, as will be seen shortly, the pooled sample obscures some really important differences between Zambians and South Africans at both the overall rate of assistance and attribute level.

8.1.1.2 Un-pooled sample

Recall from the previous section that the average rate of assistance for the pooled sample is 76%. Disaggregating the sample by site, we find that Zambia's rate of assistance is 73% while South Africans chose to assist the hypothetical subjects 80% of the time. In both populations, most of the described subjects were considered deserving, but a minority of subjects was not. South African respondents were a little more favorably disposed to the described subjects than Zambians were.

Figure 5 shows that there are many similarities between the ACMEs for the two samples. But there are also some differences. First, in Zambia, older subjects and subjects with dependent children or parents were considered to be more deserving of assistance. Neither the subject's education or place of residence had a statistically significant relationship with perceived deservingness, i.e., our respondents did not perceive that someone who was highly education or lived in an affluent suburb was any less deserving than someone with less education or who lived in a township (like Kamanga) or a rural area. This accords with the work of Esther Schüring who found from her study conducted in 2009 that Zambians were only very weakly progressive in terms of favoring poor over non-poor claimants (Schüring, 2011). As with the pooled sample, the most influential attribute on perceptions of deservingness in Zambia was the subject's work ethic. Looking for a permanent job while volunteering increases the probability that a subject would be seen as deserving by 32% (SE=0.03).

South Africans in the sample tell a different story. While they, too, deem an older subject and those with any form of dependents as deserving (16%, SE=0.03, and 8%, SE=0.03 respectively), they heavily penalize the affluent by 17% (SE=0.03), and most notably, do not consider work ethic when evaluating deservingness, as this attribute is not statistically significant.




Figure 5: Effects of Hypothetical Welfare recipients' attributes on respondents perceiving them to be deserving of government assistance

8.1.2 Summary of Analysis 1

Taken together, these results suggest that Zambian respondents place a high premium on job-seeking behavior – much higher than any other attribute – when choosing to assist the unemployed. Thus, a policy to extend support to the unemployed will win support if it is targeted towards the elderly, people with dependents, and especially people who are actively looking for work. In South Africa, the extension of support need not be conditional on any behavior on the part of the unemployed. They simply need to be elderly, objectively poor, or saddled with responsibility for dependent parents.

These findings are consistent with those of other scholars who find that, while there is support for extending government assistance to the unemployed, in both Zambia and South Africa, this support is “far from universal” (Seekings, 2018b). Methodology-wise, using a conjoint analysis allows us, first and foremost, to reduce social desirability bias by providing respondents multiple reasons to justify their choice to assist or not assist, by citing the age or education level of respondents, for example (Wallander, 2009, cited in Hainmueller et al., 2014). It also allows us to test more than one causal hypothesis at a time (in this case six), to see which component is most influential in respondents’ choices. Lastly, and, as will be illustrated in the next section, it has the benefits of “enhanced realism relative to the direct elicitation of preferences on a single dimension” (Hainmueller et al., 2014), which sometimes produce conflicting responses.

8.2 Analysis 2: Standalone welfare attitudes

We now turn to the responses to the four standard survey questions that probed general attitudes towards welfare provision. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with four statements (below) that measure individual attitudes towards the provision of grants for the poor and unemployed.

1. “It is right and just that the poor and unemployed should receive a grant from the government.”
2. “Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead them to never want a job.”
3. “If unemployed people were to be given a monthly grant, they would spend most of it on alcohol.”
4. “Citizens become lazy when they rely on grants from the government.”

I analyze responses to these four questions in the following two ways: first, I try to predict the probability that different respondents agree with each individual statement using an ordered probit model. Next, I combine all four variables into one composite indicator that captures where respondents fall on what we shall call the ‘pro-welfare index’.

Tables 8 and 9 below report the distribution of responses by site. Each of the four questions measured responses on a 5-point scale from strongly agree (1), agree (2), neither (3), disagree (4), and strongly disagree (5). A score below 3, then, denotes agreement, while a score above 3 denotes disagreement. To illustrate, the average score for question 4, which asks whether citizens become lazy when they rely on grants, is 2.21, indicating that the majority of respondents in Zambia agree with the statement.

Table 8: Summary statistics

Attitude	Mean	SD	p25	Median	p75	range
Country: Zambia						
“It is right and just that the poor and unemployed should receive a grant from the government.”	2.54	1.54	1	2	4	4
“Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead them to never want a job.”	2.03	1.35	1	1	3	4
“If unemployed people were to be given a monthly grant, they would spend most of it on alcohol.”	2.29	1.42	1	2	3	4
“Citizens become lazy when they rely on grants from the government.”	2.21	1.33	1	2	3	4
Attributes unemployment to structural issues (<i>dummy</i>)	0.93	-	-	-	-	-
Prefers low unemployment and low wages over high wages and high unemployment (<i>dummy</i>)	0.92	-	-	-	-	-
Country: South Africa						
“It is right and just that the poor and unemployed should receive a grant from the government.”	2.14	0.82	2	2	2	4
“Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead them to never want a job.”	2.63	1.23	2	2	4	4
“If unemployed people were to be given a monthly grant, they would spend most of it on alcohol.”	2.80	0.89	2	3	3	4
“Citizens become lazy when they rely on grants from the government.”	2.02	1.22	1	2	3	4
Attributes unemployment to structural issues (<i>dummy</i>)	0.95	-	-	-	-	-
Prefers low unemployment and low wages over high wages and high unemployment (<i>dummy</i>)	0.92	-	-	-	-	-

Since we are concerned with general agreement with statements, I then reverse code and collapse responses from the 1-5 scale of strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree, to a 3-point scale where 1 = strongly disagree + disagree , 2 = neither and 3 = strongly agree + agree. Thus, the larger the number out of 3, the higher the respondent is on agreement with the statement. Table 9 below reports the gap in differences between the attitudes of respondents by site.

Table 9: Differences in attitudes between Zambian and South African respondents

Attitude	Zambia	South Africa	Difference	(p-value)
Attributes unemployment to structural issues	0.93	0.95	-0.02	---
Prefers low unemployment and low wages over high wages and high unemployment	0.92	0.92	-0.00	---
It is right that anyone who is poor and unemployed should receive a pension or grant (<i>1-3 scale</i>)	2.24	2.71	-0.47	***
Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead to them not wanting to get a job (<i>1-3 scale</i>)	2.54	2.19	0.35	***
If unemployed people were paid a monthly grant, they would spend too much of it on alcohol (<i>1-3 scale</i>)	2.40	2.14	0.26	***
Citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or old age pensions (<i>1-3 scale</i>)	2.44	2.52	-0.09	---

Note *** p<0.01

Earlier on (in Table 5), we saw that, as a cohort, respondents in both sites score high on believing the poor and unemployed should receive income support from the government, and on skepticism about the impact of grants, such as grants making citizens lazy. When disaggregated, we see now that there are statistically significant differences between the attitudes of respondents in the two sites. Table 8 above shows that South Africans and Zambians differ significantly on all but one attitudinal dimension: that of believing citizens become lazy when they rely on grants. On the other three attitudes: more South Africans than Zambians believe it is just for the poor to receive a government grant; fewer South Africans believe grants blunt the incentive to work; and fewer in South Africa believe grants will be misspent on alcohol, than in Zambia.

8.2.1 Covariates

Can we predict which kinds of respondents are most likely to agree with each statement? To do this we fit an ordered probit model with the following covariates (typically controlled for in the literature on attitudes):

1. *Country of respondent (Zambia 0, South Africa 1)*
2. *Demographics*
 - a. Age and age squared
 - b. Gender (*Female 0, Male 1*)
 - c. Married (*Not Married 0, Married 1*)
 - d. Household size
 - e. Number of children
3. *Human capital*
 - a. Highest level of education (*Grade 12 and above dummy*)
4. *Economic status*
 - a. Employment status (*Unemployed 0, Employed 1*)
 - b. Lives in a household that receives at least one grant (*dummy*)
 - c. Finding it very difficult to live on current income (*dummy*)
 - d. Self-placed below Step 3 on 6-step ladder (*dummy*)
 - e. Self-placed above Step 3 on 6-step ladder (*dummy*)
5. *Prior beliefs and preferences for the economy*
 - a. Structural vs. Individual attribution for high unemployment in country (*dummy*)
 - b. Preference for high wages and high unemployment vs. low wages and low unemployment (*dummy*)

8.2.2 Results

Table 10 below reports the marginal effects of different subgroups of respondents *agreeing* or *strongly agreeing* with the outcome statement from an ordered probit model. To illustrate, the estimated average marginal probability effect of a South African respondent = 0.219 implies that being a South African respondent (as opposed to Zambian) is associated with an estimated increase in agreeing with the statement that it is just for the poor and unemployed to receive a grant, by 22 percentage points (controlling for all of the other variables in the model). Similarly, men in the sample are 12% less likely to agree with the statement that grants will be misused, and 9% less likely to agree that they make people lazy.

Married people are significantly less likely (10%) to agree that the poor and unemployed should get a grant, and also significantly more likely to say grants will be misused (15%) (even controlling for nationality). Respondents with a high school diploma and above are significantly less skeptical about grants, being 9% less likely to believe they make people lazy.

Table 10: Marginal effects of Ordered Probit Regression of welfare attitudes

Variable	(dy/dx) It is just for poor and unemployed to receive a grant	(dy/dx) Grants blunt incentive to work	(dy/dx) Grant will be misused	(dy/dx) Grants make people lazy
South African	0.219*** (0.0590)	-0.100 (0.0643)	-0.0719 (0.0644)	0.103* (0.0626)
Age	-0.00156 (0.00254)	-0.00184 (0.00264)	0.000569 (0.00271)	-0.00299 (0.00260)
Male	0.0475 (0.0471)	-0.0626 (0.0488)	-0.118** (0.0475)	-0.0894* (0.0473)
Married	-0.0979* (0.0555)	0.0780 (0.0620)	0.150** (0.0602)	0.0415 (0.0599)
Household size	0.00665 (0.00970)	-0.00390 (0.0102)	-0.00224 (0.0101)	0.000592 (0.00986)
Number of children	-0.000165 (0.0162)	-0.00380 (0.0169)	0.00493 (0.0174)	-0.00759 (0.0165)
Grade 12 and above	-0.0663 (0.0484)	-0.0771 (0.0511)	-0.00650 (0.0503)	-0.0924* (0.0492)
Employed	-0.0514 (0.0623)	-0.0371 (0.0685)	-0.0259 (0.0680)	-0.00224 (0.0663)
One or more grants in household	-0.0328 (0.0605)	-0.0624 (0.0613)	-0.00988 (0.0611)	-0.0586 (0.0600)
Self-placed below Step 3 on ladder	-0.0299 (0.0503)	-0.0984* (0.0523)	0.0160 (0.0524)	0.0588 (0.0504)
Self-placed above Step 3 on ladder	-0.0353 (0.0795)	0.0872 (0.0958)	0.0681 (0.0867)	0.183* (0.0937)
Finding it very difficult to live on current income	0.00767 (0.0498)	-0.0420 (0.0521)	-0.0612 (0.00518)	-0.0620 (0.0508)
Prefers low wages and low unemployment	0.0917 (0.0812)	0.000 (0.0805)	-0.113 (0.00778)	0.00166 (0.0783)
Structural attribution for high unemployment	0.0879 (0.0854)	0.101 (0.0911)	-0.113 (0.0962)	-0.105 (0.0969)
Observations	390	390	390	390

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Another significant predictor of attitudes is where respondents place themselves on a hypothetical six-rung ladder of financial wellbeing relative to others in society. Respondents who place themselves below average on wellbeing are significantly less likely to believe that grants blunt the incentive to work (10%). Conversely, those that place themselves higher than average in society (Step 4 and above) are 18% more likely to say grants make citizens lazy. These findings echo that of other studies with African cases, that use perceptual measures of inequality to conclude that both perceived relative deprivation and relative advantage are associated with demand for democracy (Isbell, 2022b).

8.2.3 Summary of Analysis 2

We see from this analysis that there is a significant gap between South Africans and Zambians on two out of four attitudes: the justness of welfare provision for the poor, and the belief that grants make citizens lazy. There are no country effects for believing grants blunt the incentive to work or that grants will be misused. Here, the biggest predictor of attitudes is being male, married and placing oneself below average on the ladder of wellbeing. The biggest gap between the two countries is in agreeing with the normative statement that it is just for the poor to receive grants: South Africans are 21% more likely to agree with that than Zambians are. Most interestingly, while South Africans are in support of the idea of grants for the poor and unemployed, they are also significantly more likely to agree (10% more likely) that welfare makes citizens lazy. While these standalone attitudes tell us a great deal about respondents in both sites, it is clear from this previous example that it is entirely possible for individuals to agree with normative arguments about welfare provision and be skeptical about its downstream effects in society. Thus, it is important to see how these four individual attitudes come together to form a broad construct that captures whether one is generally pro- or anti-welfare.

8.3 Analysis 3: The pro-welfare index

We now combine the four individual items above into a ‘pro-welfare’ index that captures the attitudinal profile of respondents and tests whether one set of respondents sits higher on this spectrum than the other.

The pro-welfare index has the advantage of being a more robust measure of attitudes towards welfare than individual scale items are, and has the added value of being a continuous variable, which allows for more varied analysis. It is generated by 1) reverse coding item 1 so that a low score corresponds to a negative attitude, and 2) re-coding the original 5-item scale into a 4-scale item with a zero-starting point. To illustrate, a respondent gets a score of 0 on the index if they strongly disagree that the poor should receive grants and strongly agree that grants make citizens lazy, will be misused, and discourage work. Conversely, a respondent gets 16/16 on the pro-welfare index if they strongly agree that the poor

should receive grants, and strongly disagree on the other three statements that say grants make citizens lazy, will be misused, and discourage work.




Figure 6: Distribution of composite outcome variable ‘pro-welfare index’ for the pooled sample of respondents

As seen in Figure 6 above, the distribution of the pro-welfare index is positively skewed for the Zambian sample, and more normally distributed for the South African one. South Africans, on average, score slightly higher than Zambians on the pro-welfare index, with an average of 7.3 compared to 5.99.

Treating this index as a continuous variable, I run a hierarchical model with the same covariates as in Analysis 2. The first model (in Table 11 below) tests just the bivariate relationship between the country of the respondent and being pro-welfare. Next, I add demographics in the second model, then education in Model 3, comparative perceptions of financial wellbeing in Model 4, and, finally, prior beliefs and preferences for economic system. The r-squared change is most significant for the fifth model which accounts for 13% of the variation in the sample (see Table 12).

Table 11: Hierarchical multiple regression results for 'pro-welfare' attitudes index

Variables	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)
South African respondent	1.326*** (0.358)	1.010** (0.399)	1.023** (0.397)	0.772 (0.506)	0.769 (0.508)
Age		0.0237 (0.0205)	0.0298 (0.0206)	0.0238 (0.0210)	0.0228 (0.0212)
Male		0.989*** (0.373)	0.852** (0.378)	0.818** (0.385)	0.804** (0.386)
Married		-1.110** (0.465)	-1.195** (0.465)	-1.108** (0.471)	-1.089** (0.476)
Number of children		-0.0570 (0.132)	-0.0372 (0.132)	-0.0392 (0.135)	-0.0333 (0.135)
Household size		0.0774 (0.0757)	0.0802 (0.0755)	0.0734 (0.0798)	0.0702 (0.0802)
Grade 12 and above			0.777** (0.386)	0.797** (0.392)	0.725* (0.398)
Employed				-0.192 (0.538)	-0.208 (0.538)
Household receives one or more grants				0.126 (0.483)	0.140 (0.484)
Below Step 3 on ladder				0.0207 (0.412)	0.00209 (0.414)
Above Step 3 on ladder				-1.121* (0.667)	-1.136* (0.670)
Very difficult living on current income				0.256 (0.408)	0.246 (0.409)
Structural attribution for high unemployment					0.333 (0.739)
Prefers low unemployment and low wages					0.587 (0.639)
Observations	390	390	390	390	390
R-squared	0.034	0.074	0.083	0.094	0.096

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 12: Change in R-squared per model

Model	R2	F(df)	P	R2 change	F(df) change	p
1	0.034	13.698 (1,388)	0.000			
2	0.074	5.073 (6,383)	0.000	0.040	3.268 (5,383)	0.007
3	0.083	4.961 (7,382)	0.000	0.010	4.048 (1,382)	0.045
4	0.094	3.247 (12,377)	0.000	0.010	0.859 (5,377)	0.509
5	0.128	3.645 (15,374)	0.000	0.034	4.842 (3,374)	0.003

As seen in Table 11 there are country effects on being pro-welfare. South Africans are, on average, 1.32 points higher on the pro-welfare index than Zambians. The attitude shrinks slightly when we control for demographics and education and begins to wash away once we add perceived inequality and wellbeing. In the end, accounting for all chosen covariates fully explains the gap in pro-welfare attitudes between South Africans and Zambians in the sample.

8.3.1 Summary of Analysis 3

The results from Analysis 3 suggest that, while there is a country effect for being pro-welfare – South Africans are more likely to be pro-welfare than Zambians – for this group of respondents, being male and having a high school education are better predictors of being pro-welfare than any other observable factor about the sample. On the other hand, being married and seeing oneself as better off than the average person in society is associated with being significantly lower on the pro-welfare spectrum. Given that the Zambians in the sample are more likely to be married and place themselves higher on the ladder than South Africans, these results are consistent with the profile of respondents. Interestingly, and counter to one of the main hypotheses in this study, having a grant in the household does not predict whether one is more pro-welfare or not.

8.4 Analysis 4: How coherent are attitudes across the two sites?

We saw in the previous section that, based on the responses to the four individual measures, respondents can sit anywhere on the pro-welfare spectrum, from completely anti-welfare (0) to completely pro-welfare (16/16). Another way of looking at the individual measures beyond the index is to explore how coherent respondents' attitudes are about welfare. We can do this because the statements measured respondents' orientation towards redistribution, as well as their agreement with oft-floated criticisms of welfare in general. How consistent are attitudes at the individual level across our two sites?

For this analysis, we generate an attitude summary ranging from 1 to 3 where 1 indicates being consistently pro-welfare, 2 indicates having mixed or ambivalent views, and 3 indicates being consistently anti-welfare. This is not too dissimilar to the index, except, it now puts respondents into 3 discrete categories. To illustrate, one is consistently pro-welfare if they agree or strongly agree that it is right for the poor to receive grants and disagree or strongly disagree with the remaining three negative statements about grants. One is consistently hostile towards welfare if they disagree or strongly disagree that it is right and just for the poor to receive grants and agree or strongly agree with the three negative statements about grants. Everyone else with any other combination of views than this is placed in the ambivalent category.

This summary measure is useful and theoretically sound because public opinion scholarship has found that public attitudes are “fragmentary, inconsistent” (Zaller, 1992; Entman 1993 cited in Chong & Druckman, 2007), and often do not exist in a coherent form (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001),

Table 13: Differences in consistency of attitudes between Zambian and South African respondents

	Zambia	South Africa	Difference	(p-value)
Attitude Summary (1-3)	2.16	1.96	0.20	***
Consistently pro-welfare	0.10	0.07	0.03	-
Ambivalent	0.65	0.90	-0.25	***
Consistently anti-welfare	0.26	0.03	0.23	***

Note *** $p < 0.01$

Table 13 above shows the distribution of the summarized attitude variable across our sample. Across both sites, very few respondents are consistently pro-welfare – 10% in Zambians and 7% in South Africa. In South Africa, even fewer are consistently anti-welfare (3%). However, one out of four Zambians is consistently anti-welfare, and this average is statistically different from that of South Africa’s. The majority of people are, in fact, rather ambivalent in their attitudes, and this is true across both sites. Sixty-five percent of Zambians, and a huge 90% of South Africans, have mixed or incoherent attitudes towards welfare. Is one site more consistent in their attitude than the other? If so, in what direction? Below, I run a multiple linear regression with the three attitude summaries as a dummy and with the same set of controls from earlier analyses.

Table 14: Ordinary Least Squares regression results for attitude summary

Variables	(1) Consistently pro-welfare	(2) Ambivalent	(3) Consistently anti-welfare
South African	-0.0415 (0.0387)	0.235*** (0.0590)	-0.193*** (0.0509)
Age	-2.08e-05 (0.00130)	0.00164 (0.00248)	-0.00162 (0.00243)
Male	0.0623** (0.0298)	-0.0261 (0.0422)	-0.0363 (0.0343)
Married	-0.0415 (0.0295)	-0.0308 (0.0538)	0.0723 (0.0498)
Household size	-0.00404 (0.00654)	0.00885 (0.00977)	-0.00480 (0.00865)
Number of children	0.0113 (0.0102)	-0.0274* (0.0164)	0.0161 (0.0152)
Grade 12 and above	0.0866*** (0.0295)	-0.160*** (0.0457)	0.0737* (0.0387)
Employed	0.0102 (0.0456)	-0.0495 (0.0642)	0.0393 (0.0570)
One or more grants in household	-0.0147 (0.0369)	0.000613 (0.0566)	0.0141 (0.0484)
Self-placed below Step 3 on ladder	0.0103 (0.0293)	-0.0836* (0.0484)	0.0733* (0.0430)
Self-placed above Step 3 on ladder	-0.00592 (0.0444)	-0.0380 (0.0778)	0.0439 (0.0725)
Finding it very difficult to live on current income	0.0300 (0.0289)	0.00959 (0.0469)	-0.0396 (0.0424)
Prefers low unemployment and low wages	-0.0285 (0.0475)	0.125** (0.0629)	-0.0961** (0.0458)
Structural attribution for high unemployment	0.0381 (0.0466)	0.0486 (0.0852)	-0.0867 (0.0857)
Constant	0.0637 (0.0918)	0.341** (0.153)	0.595*** (0.140)
Observations	390	390	390
R-squared	0.052	0.138	0.136

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

8.4.1 Summary of Analysis 4

From the regression output in Table 14 above, we see that neither set of respondents is more likely to be consistently pro-welfare than the other. Among this group of respondents, it is men and those with a high school education and above who are most likely to be consistently pro-welfare.

For the two other attitudinal profiles, we see significant differences between respondents in the two countries. Specifically, South Africans, are 24% more likely to be ambivalent than Zambians, when every other variable is held constant. They are also 19% less likely to be consistently hostile towards welfare than their Zambian counterparts.

The individual attributes of respondents that predict an attitudinal profile are gender, marital status, number of children, educational attainment, where one sees themselves on the 6-step ladder, and, finally, prior beliefs about how the economy should be structured. First, across all three attitudinal profiles, education significantly predicts which category respondents fall into, with those who have completed secondary school and above less likely to be ambivalent in their attitudes towards grants; men are more likely to be consistently pro-welfare; the higher the number of children, the less likely one is to be ambivalent toward grants provision; seeing yourself below Step 3 on the ladder is associated with being less ambivalent and more hostile; and, lastly, respondents who prefer full employment and low wages are significantly less likely to be consistently anti-welfare, and more likely to be ambivalent.

In sum, there are supporters of welfare in both urban contexts, but fewer opponents and more ambivalents in South Africa than in Zambia.

9. Discussion

Throughout this paper, we saw, through a series of empirical tests, that there are some differences between how Zambians and South Africans perceive welfare and redistribution. The table below summarizes each empirical test and its finding.

Two key things emerge from these tests that provide evidence in support of the initial hypothesis that South Africans, by virtue of living in a generous welfare regime with high rates of involuntary unemployment are more likely to support welfare than Zambians. First, the tests show that South Africans are more universalist in their view of welfare than Zambians: not only do they overwhelmingly believe it is right and just for the poor to receive a grant from the government, they also are less likely – as seen in the conjoint experiment – to discriminate between different categories of poor, provided they are actually poor.

Table 15: Summary of empirical tests and findings

Test	Empirical strategy	Outcome of interest	Finding
1	Conjoint analysis of un-pooled sample	Perceptions of deservingness	Job-seeking behaviour matters to Zambians, and not to South Africans
2	Ordered probit model	4 standalone welfare attitudes	South Africans more likely to believe: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • it is right for the poor unemployed to receive a grant • grants make people lazy
3	Multiple regression model	A pro-welfare index of the 4 standalone attitudes	Covariates of prior beliefs and subjective evaluations of wellbeing wash out country effects. Having a grant in the household does not matter.
4	Bivariate relationships + Multiple regression model	Attitudinal profile of respondent <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consistently pro-welfare • Ambivalent • Consistently anti-welfare 	No one country is more consistently pro-welfare than the other. South African respondents are more ambivalent and less consistently hostile.

Which is also to say that South Africans in the group are more averse to conditionality of support than Zambians, as is evidenced by the fact that job-seeking behavior does not matter to them but is the biggest mitigating factor for their Zambians counterparts. This is perhaps an unsurprising finding given the structural realities of the South African labor market which makes searching and non-searching unemployment distinct from each other (Kingdon & Knight, 2000). The fact that the narrow and broad unemployment rates are both very high in South Africa means that individuals are aware that, try as one may, they are still unlikely to secure a waged livelihood. This provides a rather plausible explanation as to why South African respondents are less likely to penalize the unemployed subject who is not job-seeking. Given that many who seek never find, South Africans may not regard job-search as a pre-requisite for assistance.

Secondly, the tests show that the South Africans in this group are less likely to be anti-welfare, both in terms of general attitude structure and in attitude coherence (consistently hostile). Mostly, these South Africans are really just ambivalent about the provision of grants for the unemployed. This, again, is an unsurprising finding, given what other scholars have found about the predominance of a discourse about laziness (Dawson & Fouksman, 2020) and misuse (Surender et

al., 2010) among the poor and unemployed in South Africa. But while there may be debates about laziness and misuse, the reality is that the vast majority of the South African cohort in the study are dependent on grants: 70% of respondents in South Africa live in a household that receives one or more grants. It only follows, then, that respondents would not be outright hostile towards a redistributive policy they are direct beneficiaries of, even if they do have their apprehensions about it making citizens lazy.

Beyond the commonplaceness of grants in the social landscape, South Africans being ambivalent towards grants is also unsurprising for another, more theoretical reason. As public opinion scholars Meffert, Guge and Lodge argue, despite the intuitiveness of the assertion that people often simultaneously hold opposing ideas, considerations and reactions about a given policy, the concept of ambivalence has not received the attention it deserves in the study of political attitudes (Meffert et al., 2004). Treating political attitudes as the multidimensional phenomena they are by including ambivalence into our analysis allows us to better understand the stability (or lack thereof) of political support for reform. As other scholars of public opinion have found, public opinion on emergent policies takes time to reach stability, and remains susceptible to framing until arguments are clarified and reinforced (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Not only that, but, as Meffert et al. (2004) go on to show using American cases about voter attitudes towards presidential candidates, “ambivalent people are more likely to make balanced or accurate political judgments” (*ibid.*). We can infer from these data that South Africans are more likely to be amenable to arguments in favor of expansion, even if they are, at this present time, in two minds about the use of grants to combat inequality in society.

The findings from Zambia corroborate much of the existing evidence on public opinion about social protection, which is that, even among the poor and unemployed themselves, unconditional support for the poor is rather low. Schüring (2011), based on fieldwork done in Zambia in 2009, finds that Zambians have a preference for conditionality over that of universality in social protection reform.

The findings about South Africa corroborate some, but run counter to many, findings from recent scholarship on attitudes towards welfare in South Africa. They corroborate the nationally representative Afrobarometer survey findings (2021) that “a vast majority (79%) of South Africans believe it is better to have a low-paying job than to have no job at all”, and that grants are popular among South Africans in general (Moosa & Patel, 2020). But my findings complicate findings from pre-pandemic ethnographic studies that found little support for cash grants among precariously employed young men (Sefalafala, 2018; Dawson & Fouksman, 2020). The simple explanation for this is that the Social Relief of Distress Grant – the grant that provided support for able-bodied citizens for the

first time ever – has perhaps softened attitudes towards direct income support from the state for unemployed persons. Given how popular the grant became – the South African Social Security Administration (SASSA) reports that they received twelve million applications for the month of August 2022 alone – and given the evidence from welfare studies in the global North that a welfare state “conditions individuals’ ideas about government responsibility when the economy falters, i.e., it encourages a shift in what citizens expect from government” (Neundorf & Stuart 2018, it is now unsurprising to find that a sample of the long-term unemployed have a larger scope of legitimate claims on the state.

Commenting on the above-mentioned ethnographic findings, Hein Marais hypothesizes that the hostility towards grants found in the studies were perhaps “more circumstantial than they seem – as the groundswell of popular support for a UBI during the COVID-19 pandemic suggests ... rather than expressing steadfast principles” (Marais, 2022).

Beyond these specific cases, this study extends current scholarly understanding that attitudes towards redistribution are positively associated with regime generosity and mediated by real levels of inequality. It does this by providing evidence from two developing contexts with surplus labor economies, thus enriching the evidence-base for this claim. Additionally, it motivates, as other scholars have done, that the generosity of a welfare system should be accounted for in measurement of political support for policy measures intended to combat inequality (Andreoli & Olivera, 2020). Relatedly, it emphasizes the role of institutional feedback and support for the welfare state (Jordan, 2013) by showing the extent at which the generosity of the welfare state shapes individual preferences for redistribution due to exposure to benefits.

Lastly, given that no one policy will have the same impact across all contexts, it highlights how ordinary citizens perceive the design and role of new policies in light of all the “‘helping factors’ in the underlying institutional context” (Biegert et al., 2022). One can imagine that the presence of various tiers of welfare programs in the country makes it easier for South Africans to intuit how an additional grant would fit in the current social landscape, a counterfactual that respondents who are less familiar with grants, i.e., our Zambian respondents, may find harder to construct. This implies that support for welfare expansion may not be antecedent to expansion, but rather a political consequence of expansion.

10. Conclusion

This paper investigated the extent to which the generosity of the welfare state moderates individual preferences for redistribution. It did this by analyzing the preferences for welfare provision among low-income urban residents in South Africa and Zambia to understand if exposure to high levels of redistribution by virtue of living in a generous welfare regime with high rates of involuntary unemployment makes individuals more ‘pro-welfare’. It situated the analysis of factors that mediate pro-welfare attitudes in a broader analysis of attitudes to government and poverty in the two countries and found that respondents are generally dissatisfied with government handling of income inequality, and attribute high rates of unemployment to government policies. Consequently, they believe it just that the poor and unemployed should receive income assistance from the government, a finding consistent with that of studies from the global North that show that individuals tend to be in favor of redistribution if they believe that the main determinant of poverty is exogenous (Fong, 2001). It further provided evidence that there are, indeed, significant differences between the South Africans and the Zambians in the group, with South Africans being more averse to conditionality of support than Zambians, and more likely to support grants for the poor and unemployed. However, the gap between the two sets of respondents varies, based on the measure of attitudes used and individual attributes controlled for: South Africans are more pro-grants to address unemployment and poverty and are, on the whole, more pro-welfare than Zambians (as measured by an index of all attitudes, both positive and negative, towards grants), but this difference does not persist when individual traits of respondents are controlled for. Additionally, they are not more consistent in their pro-welfare attitudes than Zambians but are less likely to be consistently hostile to welfare.

More promisingly, when we focus on the ambivalence of attitudes, living in a generous welfare regime, such as that of South Africa, is a significant factor, even after all covariates are accounted for. Public opinion scholarship has shown that public opinion on emergent policies take time to reach stability, remaining susceptible to framing until arguments are clarified and reinforced (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Thus, there may be reason yet to be optimistic about an ambivalent public when it comes to welfare attitudes. The political implication of this hypothesis being that South Africans could possibly be more susceptible to positive framing of welfare expansion policies than Zambians would.

Further research should focus on how respondents in different settings respond to the different types of frames used to discuss welfare expansion. Future scholarship can also focus on comparing the views of rural and urban poor, as this may yield new insights about deservingness, given there are limited opportunities to secure a livelihood in most rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Appendix A - Survey Instrument and Results

Section 1: Kamanga, Lusaka, Zambia Results

Demographic information

		n	%	
1	Age: How old are you? (<i>recorded in years, coded later into these age categories</i>)	Below 20	18	9
		21-35	97	48.5
		36-49	52	26
		50 and above	33	16.5
		Total	200	100
2	Gender	Female	117	58.5
		Male	83	41.5
		Total	200	100
3	What is your first language?	Bemba	24	12
		Chewa/Nyanja	122	61
		Kaonde	3	1.5
		Lunda	1	0.5
		Luvale	3	1.5
		Lozi	8	4
		Tonga	10	5
		English	6	3
		Other	23	11.5
		Total	200	100
4	What ethnic group do you identify with	Bemba	35	17.5
		Chewa/Nyanja	58	29
		Kaonde	4	2
		Lunda	3	1.5
		Luvale	5	2.5
		Lozi	17	8.5
		Tonga	19	9.5
		Other	59	29.5
		Total	200	100
5	What is your marital status?	Single/Never Married	68	34
		Married	109	54.5
		Living with Partner	0	0
		Divorced or separated	13	6.5
		Widow/Widower	10	5
		Total	200	100
6a	Do you have any children?	Yes	152	76
		No	48	24
		Total	200	100
6b	If so, how many do you have	1	31	20
		2	33	22
		3-5	59	39
		6-10	29	19
		Total	152	100
7	How many people live with you in your household?	0	7	3.5
		1	9	4.5
		2	25	12.5
		3-5	92	46
		6-10	61	30.5
		Total	200	100

			n	%		
8	How many of these people who live with you in your household have an income from a full or part time job?	0	29	15		
		1	88	46		
		2	48	25		
		3	19	10		
		4	5	3		
		5	2	1		
		6	2	1		
	Total		193	100		
9a/b	Which of the following grants or programs were received in your household in the past 3 months? If yes, which grants were received and by whom?		myself	Someone else	total	
			n	n	n	%
		Farmer Input Support Programme	1	5	6	3
		Food Security Pack	0	1	1	0.5
		Empowerment Funds	0	1	1	0.5
		Social Cash Transfers	4	7	11	5.5
		Tertiary Education Bursary	1	2	3	1.5
		Constituency Development Fund	0	0	0	0
Other government grant	2	0	2	1		
	Total	8	16	24	12	
10	Did you or the receiving member(s) of your household receive this benefit in full and on time?	Yes		14	7	
		In full but not on-time		6	3	
		On-time but not in full		3	1.5	
		Neither on-time nor in full		1	0.5	
		Not applicable		176	88	
	Total		200	100		
11	What is your highest level of education?	Some primary school		42	21	
		Primary School Leaving Certificate		24	12	
		Grade 9 Certificate (Some secondary school)		57	28.5	
		Grade 12/Matric Certificate/BGCSE		59	29.5	
		Diploma/Certificate		14	7	
		Bachelor's Degree		4	2	
		Post graduate Degree		0	0	
	Total		200	100		

Employment

		n	%	
12	How long ago was it since you last had a full time or part-time job?	I currently have a job	34	17
		I am currently self employed	60	30
		Less than 3 months	8	4
		3- less than 6 months	4	2
		6- less than 9 months	3	1.5
		9 months to less than a year	2	1
		1 year to less than 2 years	17	8.5
		2 years to less than 3 years	9	4.5
		3 years to less than 4 years	5	2.5
		4 years to less than 5 years	0	0
		5 or more years	20	10
		I have never had a full or part time job	38	19
		Total	200	100
13	How long have you held this job for?	Not applicable	166	83
		Less than 3 months	2	1
		3- less than 6 months	3	1.5
		6- less than 9 months	3	1.5
		9 months to less than a year	2	1
		1 year to less than 2 years	6	3
		2 years to less than 3 years	2	1
		3 years to less than 4 years	3	1.5
		4 years to less than 5 years	4	2
		5 or more years	9	4.5
Total	200	100		
14	What kind of self-employment are you engaged in?	Making and selling goods	23	38.3
		Business owner or Partner	14	23.3
		Freelance Work	10	16.7
		Subcontractor or contract work	3	5
		Farming	1	1.7
		Piece jobs	3	5
		Other	6	10
Total	60	100		
15	In the last calendar month, what was your total take-home across all employment and self-employment / revenue from selling agricultural products? <i>If refuse:</i> If you are comfortable with this, please tell me which of the following bands your self-employment income fell in. Remember that this is your total take-home pay across all your self-employment activities in the last month. <i>Data from both parts combined into income bands.</i>	Don't know	8	4
		No income	45	22.5
		ZMW 1 – 1,000	43	21.5
		ZMW 1,001 – 2,000	44	22
		ZMW 2,001 – 3,000	26	13
		ZMW 3,001 – 4,000	10	5
		ZMW 4,001 – 5,000	9	4.5
		ZMW 5,001 – 7,000	8	4
		ZMW 7,001 - 10,000	5	2.5
		ZMW 10,001 - 15,000	2	1
		More than ZMW 15,000	0	0
Total	200	100		

Perceptions of poverty and inequality

16	How easy or difficult is it to live on your current monthly income?		n	%
		Living comfortably on current income	6	3
		Living well but not comfortably on current income	55	27.5
		Living with some difficulty on current income	78	39
		Finding it very difficult to live on current income	61	30.5
Total		200	100	

Q17a-17e:

Imagine a 6-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people in Zambia, and on the highest step, the sixth, stand the rich. On which step are ...

Step	You today		Family A		Family B		Family C		Family D	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1 poorest	37	18.5	24	12	0	0	0	0	181	90.5
2	65	32.5	106	53	0	0	3	1.5	18	9
3	74	37	56	28	0	0	22	11	1	0.5
4	20	10	12	6	5	2.5	55	27.5	0	0
5	3	1.5	2	1	29	14.5	102	51	0	0
6 richest	1	0.5	0	0	166	83	18	9	0	0
Total	200	100	200	100	200	100	200	100	200	100

Note: Families A through D were presented in randomized order.

Family A can afford to eat meat only once or twice a week. During the rainy season, the family can afford a 5kg bag of mealie meal. They do not own a home, but the apartment they are renting is not bad. Their clothing is sufficiently warm, but they own only simple garments. They cannot afford tertiary education for all their children, so some of their children won't go.

Family B can afford to eat whichever foods they would like, including eating out often at restaurants more than once a week. They can afford mealie meal all year round. They can afford for all of their children to complete their education, and then to continue at a local university. And if the children want, they can afford to pay for them to get a master's degree abroad. The family owns investment properties they rent out, and few good cars. The family also has a large commercial farm on the outskirts of the city.

Family C can afford to eat meat every day. During the rainy season, they can afford 25 kg mealie meal. Their everyday clothing is simple, but they also have some fancy items for special occasions. They can afford for their children to go to a local tertiary institution after secondary school. They own a 4-bedroom house in their home village where they maintain a small household vegetable plot, and a good quality car.

Family D cannot afford to eat meat with meals, sometimes on Christmas only. During the rainy season, the family can only afford a *Pamela* (mealie meal repackaged in small units for a day's consumption). Their children attend school in old uniforms and torn shoes. There is not enough warm clothing for the family during winter. The family lives in a shack in a township and does not own any farmland.

		n	%
18. In your opinion, what is the most important reason for the high unemployment rate in Zambia?	Our government's economic policies	99	49.5
	Low salaries	11	5.5
	Lack of educational qualifications	38	19
	Some Zambians just work harder than others at finding work	15	7.5
	Our tax system	0	0
	Trade between Zambia and other countries	3	1.5
	Lack of skills training programs	34	17
	Total	200	100
19. Imagine two economic systems. Which of these two systems will be better for you? System 1: Some people have high salaries, but lots of people are unemployed. System 2: Nearly everyone has a job, but with low salaries	Everyone has a job, but wages are low	183	91.5
	High wages and high unemployment	17	18.5
	Total	200	100

Welfare attitudes

Now I'm going to ask you a few questions about your opinions about government policies that affect people's work and income. For each of the following questions, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the statement.		Strongly agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Total (%)
20b	It is right that anyone who is poor and unemployed should receive a pension or grant from the government.	38	22	4	20.5	15.5	100
20c	Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead to them not wanting to ever get a job.	52	22	5.5	12	8.5	100
20d	If unemployed people were paid a monthly grant, they would spend too much of it on beer and alcoholic drinks.	42.5	21.5	12	12.5	11.5	100
20f	Citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or subsidies.	42.5	25.5	7.5	18	6.5	100

Section 2: Site C, Cape Town, South Africa Results

Demographic information

		n	%	
1	Age: How old are you? (<i>recorded in years, coded later into these age categories</i>)	20 and below	18	9.47
		21-35	112	58.95
		36-49	44	23.16
		50 and above	16	8.42
		Total	190	100
2	Gender	Female	84	44.21
		Male	106	55.79
		Total	190	100
3	What is your first language?	Sotho	1	0.53
		Xhosa	188	98.95
		Zulu	1	0.53
		Afrikaans	0	0
		English	0	0
		Tsonga	0	0
		Venda	0	0
		Swati	0	0
		Ndebele	0	0
		Tswana	0	0
		Pedi	0	0
		Total	190	100
4	What ethnic group do you identify with	Coloured	0	0
		Black African	190	100
		White	0	0
		Asian/Indian	0	0
		Other	0	0
		Total	190	100
5	What is your marital status?	Single/Never Married	147	77.37
		Married	22	11.58
		Living with Partner	17	8.95
		Divorced or separated	1	0.53
		Widow/Widower	3	1.58
		Total	190	100
6a	Do you have any children?	Yes	119	62.63
		No	71	37.37
		Total	190	100
6b	If so, how many do you have	1	46	6
		2	29	7
		3-5	40	33.61
		6-10	4	3.36
		Total	119	100
7	How many people live with you in your household?	0	0	0
		1	13	6.84
		2	31	16.31
		3-5	94	49.47
		6-10	52	27.89
		11-13	0	0
		Total	190	100

				n	%	
8	How many of these people who live with you in your household have an income from a full or part time job?	0		57	30	
		1		83	43.68	
		2		41	21.58	
		3		6	3.16	
		4		3	1.58	
		5		0	0	
		6		0	0	
		Total		190	100	
9a/b	Which of the following grants or programs were received in your household in the past 3 months? If yes, which grants were received and by whom?		myself	Someone else	total	
			n	n	n	%
		Child Support Grant	38	45	83	45.85
		Disability Grant	5	18	23	12.70
		Social Relief of Distress Grant	33	18	51	28.17
		Old age pension	2	19	21	11.60
		UIF payment	3	0	3	1.65
	Total	81	100	181	100	
10	Did you or the receiving member(s) of your household receive this benefit in full and on time?	Yes		142	78.45	
		In full but not on-time		6	3.31	
		On-time but not in full		20	11.04	
		Neither on-time nor in full		13	7.18	
		Total		181	100	
11	What is your highest level of education?	Some primary school		14	7.37	
		Primary School Leaving Certificate		2	1.05	
		Grade 9 Certificate (Some secondary school)		91	47.89	
		Grade 12/Matric Certificate/BGCSE		74	38.95	
		Diploma/Certificate		4	2.11	
		Bachelor's Degree		5	2.63	
		Post graduate Degree		0	0	
	Total			190	100	

Employment

		n	%	
12	How long ago was it since you last had a full time or part-time job?	I currently have a job	18	9.47
		I am currently self employed	0	0
		Less than 3 months	12	6.32
		3- less than 6 months	6	3.16
		6- less than 9 months	5	2.63
		9 months to less than a year	3	1.58
		1 year to less than 2 years	16	8.42
		2 years to less than 3 years	6	3.16
		3 years to less than 4 years	11	5.79
		4 years to less than 5 years	0	0
		5 or more years	21	11.05
		I have never had a full or part time job	92	48.42
Total		190	100	
13	How long have you held this job for?	Not applicable	172	90.52
		Less than 3 months	0	0
		3- less than 6 months	6	3.15
		6- less than 9 months	1	0.53
		9 months to less than a year	0	0
		1 year to less than 2 years	6	3.15
		2 years to less than 3 years	0	0
		3 years to less than 4 years	0	0
		4 years to less than 5 years	1	0.53
		5 or more years	4	2.10
Total		190	100	
15	In the last calendar month, what was your total take-home across all employment and self-employment / revenue from selling agricultural products? <i>If refuse:</i> If you are comfortable with this, please tell me which of the following bands your self-employment income fell in. Remember that this is your total take-home pay across all your self-employment activities in the last month. <i>Data from both parts combined into income bands.</i>	Refused/Don't know	1	0.53
		No income	156	82.11
		ZAR 1 – 1,000	2	1.05
		ZAR1,001 – 2,000	3	1.58
		ZAR 2,001 – 3,000	4	2.11
		ZAR 3,001 – 4,000	8	4.21
		ZAR 4,001 – 5,000	8	4.21
		ZAR 5,001 – 7,000	7	3.69
		ZAR 7,001 - 10,000	1	0.53
		ZAR 10,001 - 15,000	0	0
		More than ZAR 15,000	0	0
		Total		190

Perceptions of poverty and inequality

16	How easy or difficult is it to live on your current monthly income?		n	%
		Living comfortably on current income	2	1.05
		Living well but not comfortably on current income	23	12.11
		Living with some difficulty on current income	36	18.95
		Finding it very difficult to live on current income	129	67.89
Total		190	100	

Q17a-17e:

Imagine a 6-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people in Zambia, and on the highest step, the sixth, stand the rich. On which step are ...

Step	You today		Family A		Family B		Family C		Family D	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1 poorest	60	31.58	10	5.26	0	0	0	0	182	95.79
2	66	34.74	51	26.84	2	1.05	4	2.11	6	3.16
3	51	26.84	66	34.74	0	0	16	8.42	0	0
4	13	6.84	49	25.79	3	1.58	54	28.42	1	0.53
5	0	0	11	5.79	15	7.89	109	57.37	1	0.53
6 richest	0	0	3	1.58	170	89.47	7	3.68	0	0
Total	190	100	190	100	190	100	190	100	190	100

Note: Families A through D were presented in randomized order.

"Family A can afford to eat meat only once or twice a week. During winter months, they can heat a few rooms, but not the entire apartment. They do not own a home, but the apartment they are renting is not bad. Their clothing is sufficiently warm, but they own only simple garments. They cannot afford tertiary education for all their children, so some of their children won't go"

"Family B can afford to eat whichever foods they would like, including eating out often at restaurants more than once a week. During the winter months, they have no problems with heating and are able to keep their entire house warm. They can afford for all of their children to complete their education, and then to continue at a local university. And if the children want, they can afford to pay for them to get a master's degree abroad. The family owns investment properties they rent out, and few good cars. The family also has a large commercial farm on the outskirts of the city"

"Family C can afford to eat meat every day. They have sufficient clothing to keep warm in the winter. Their everyday clothing is simple, but they also have some fancy items for special occasions. They can afford for their children to go to a local tertiary institution after secondary school. They own a 4-bedroom house in their home village where they maintain a small household vegetable plot, and a good quality car. "

"Family D cannot afford to eat meat with meals, sometimes on Christmas only. During the winter months, they are unable to heat their one-room home. Their children attend school in old uniforms and torn shoes. There is not enough warm clothing for the family during winter. The family lives in a shack in a township and does not own any farmland."

		n	%
18. In your opinion, what is the most important reason for the high unemployment rate in South Africa?	Low salaries	21	11.05
	Our education system	39	20.53
	Our government's economic policies	91	47.89
	Our tax system	5	2.63
	Some South Africans just work harder than others	10	5.26
	Trade between South Africa and other countries	24	12.63
	Total	190	100
19. Imagine two economic systems. Which of these two systems will be better for you? System 1: Some people have high salaries, but lots of people are unemployed. System 2: Nearly everyone has a job, but with low salaries	Everyone has a job, but wages are low	173	91.05
	High wages and high unemployment	17	8.95
	Total	190	100

Welfare attitudes

Now I'm going to ask you a few questions about your opinions about government policies that affect people's work and income. For each of the following questions, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement with the statement.		Strongly agree (%)	Agree (%)	Neither (%)	Disagree (%)	Strongly disagree (%)	Total (%)
20b	It is right that anyone who is poor and unemployed should receive a pension or grant from the government.	15.79	65.79	7.89	10	0.53	100
20c	Providing unemployed people with a monthly grant will lead to them not wanting to ever get a job.	21.58	31.58	12.63	30.53	3.68	100
20d	If unemployed people were paid a monthly grant, they would spend too much of it on beer and alcoholic drinks.	7.89	25.79	46.84	17.37	2.11	100
20f	Citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or subsidies.	48.42	23.16	8.95	16.84	2.63	100

Appendix B: Questions that were included in other surveys

Wording in original survey	Wording in our survey
For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you agree or disagree. Anyone who is poor should receive a pension or grant from the government.	For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you agree or disagree. It is right that anyone who is poor and unemployed should receive a pension or grant from the government."
Citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or old-age pensions.	Citizens become lazy when they rely on government grants or subsidies".
Imagine two economic systems. In the first some people have high wages but lots of people are unemployed. In the second, nearly everyone has a job but with low wages. Which system will be better for you? Choose Statement 1 or Statement 2. Do you agree or agree very strongly?	Imagine two economic systems. Which of these two systems will be better for you? System 1: Some people have high salaries, but lots of people are unemployed. System 2: Nearly everyone has a job, but with low salaries

Source: Afrobarometer Round 7 in South Africa (2019)

Appendix C – Conjoint Analysis specification

Hypothetical Welfare Recipient's Attributes and Attribute Levels

Attribute	Attribute Level
Gender	Male, Female
Age	24 years, 38 years, 52 years
Education	Grade 9, Grade 12, University Graduate
Residence	Township on the outskirts of a city, affluent suburb of Lusaka, Small fishing/farming village
Work Ethic	Has held some odd jobs here and there but is not actively looking, actively looking for a permanent job while volunteering at their local secondary school
Dependents	Single with no dependents, Single with dependent parents, Married with children

The reference categories for the various contrasts are Gender: Female, Age: 24 years, Education: Grade 12, Residence: Township on the outskirts of a city, Work Ethic: Has held some odd jobs here and there but is not actively looking, Dependents: Single with no dependents

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